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EXAMINING THE POLICY DIFFUSION OF ORGANIC FOOD AND AGRICULTURE 
LEGISLATION IN THE U.S. – THE ROLE OF THE STATES IN DEVELOPING ORGANIC 
STANDARDS 
 
From 1976-2010, 38 states created and passed legislation regarding the regulation of organic food 
and agriculture. Most legislation was passed during the time period of 1985-1990, a period that ended 
with Congress passing the Organic Food Production Act [OFPA] in 1990. OFPA was passed to eliminate 
the patchwork of state and private third-party organic standards regulating the market and to maintain 
access to international markets by assuring U.S. standards were harmonized with key markets. 
Subsequently, it may have been expected that state adoption of organic policies would cease after federal 
action in 1990. However, many states continued to adopt and modify existing policies after the passage of 
OFPA. This research examines the diffusion of organic food and agriculture legislation and dynamics of 
legislative refinement in the United States both prior to and after federal adoption of organic legislation.  
With both theoretical and applied implications to be derived, this research uses the policy 
diffusion literature to examine the diffusion of organic legislation. A mixed-methods approach is utilized 
to answer the central research question of why do some states adopt organic food and agriculture 
legislation while others do not? The quantitative portion of this research uses time-series logistical 
regressions to test an enhanced unified model of policy diffusion. Time controls were used to evaluate the 
nationwide dynamics across several time periods. In addition, regional models were constructed for four 
statistically significant regions to further examine regional variations in diffusion factors. The qualitative 
portion of this research consists of a comparative case study between a leader and laggard state adopters. 
California and Georgia were the state cases selected for analysis. 
The results of this analysis suggest that wealth, political culture, partisan control of state 
government, state vegetable production, third-party certification organizations, horizontal pressures, 
national-scale pressures, and salience are key explanatory factors for state adoption of organic food and 
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agriculture legislature from 1976-2010. Per capita wealth, issue salience, and regional effects are the most 
robust explanatory power over the 35-year time period and for each adoption-type. Pre-1990 state 
adoptions were also strongly influenced by the presence of third-party certifiers and the policy type 
design. Post-1990 state adoptions were additionally influenced by federal adoption and implementation, 
partisan control of state government, and state vegetable production.  
Action at the federal level, including federal adoption and implementation, did not dramatically 
deter state adoption or cause the repeal of state organic food and agriculture statutes. Across all time 
periods, certain regions remain distinctive in terms of diffusion dynamics including the Far West, North 
Central, Southeast, and Mid-Atlantic regions. Two case studies, California and Georgia, shed some light 
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 Since the 1960s, political science scholars have studied the diffusion of innovative government 
policies and programs. The foci of scholarly investigation range from speed of adoption, conditions likely 
to lead to innovation, and the application of policy diffusion models to explain contemporary problems in 
politics. While the development of the literature has been substantial in the past 50 years, this dissertation 
seeks to advance the policy diffusion literature by examining the diffusion of organic food and agriculture 
legislation in U.S. states from 1976-2010. During the 35-year time period, 38 states adopted organic food 
and agriculture legislation (see Appendix A). Why did some states adopt organic food and agriculture 
legislation while others did not? Answering this question not only improves our understanding on the 
substantive issue area, but it also further develops our understanding of policy diffusion, as well. There 
are both theoretical and practical implications to be derived from this research. 
 Theoretically, I am advancing the policy diffusion literature by developing and testing an 
enhanced unified policy diffusion model. The unified policy diffusion model draws from Berry and 
Berry’s (2007) unified model of diffusion and Boushey’s (2010) contagion model of diffusion. There are 
inherent strengths and weaknesses in each model. The weaknesses of the existing models limit scholars’ 
ability to address long- and short-term time periods of policy diffusion simultaneously. Furthermore, each 
model lacks the ability to contend with endogenous policy conditions including policy type and pre-
existing policy in the same substantive issue area. Using a mixed-methods research design, this 
dissertation provides a more fully developed understanding of the policy diffusion process by addresses 
both the breadth and depth of how and why policy diffusion occurs.  
 From an applied or practical application standpoint, the issue area of organic food and agriculture 
legislation not only aids in advancing the policy diffusion literature, given the long history of the 
innovative policy in the U.S., but it also improves our understanding of organic policy development. 
While there are numerous scholarly, government and practitioner pieces on organic policy, there is no 
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comprehensive study examining the development of organic policy in the United States accounting for 
state-federal interaction. Furthermore, there are substantial discrepancies in the literature on which states 
passed organic regulation, what year regulation passed, and what exactly the content of the regulation 
entailed for implementation. The lack of a cohesive and comprehensive historical evaluation creates 
challenges in assessing current implementation challenges in the National Organic Program, assessing 
why there is variation in regional production of organic agriculture, and how to keep organic competitive 
with local, natural, fair trade, and GMO-labeled foods.  The remainder of this chapter provides a broad 
overview on organic food and agriculture policy development in the United States.   
History of Organic Food and Agriculture Policy in the United States 
The United States represents the single largest organic market globally.
1
 In 2011, U.S. organic 
sales reached 31.5 billion representing approximately 3-percent of U.S. food sales (Economic Research 
Service [ERS] 2012a; FiBL and IFOAM 2013). The demand for organic products in the U.S. began in the 
1960s and has grown steadily since.
2
 While organic consumers are often wealthier, well-educated and 
Caucasian (Dettman and Dimitri 2007), demand for organic products is driven by a wide range of salient 
consumer issue groups including environmentalists, food phobics (i.e. food safety), healthy eaters, 
welfare enthusiast, and hedonists (Bonti-Ankomah and Yiridoe 2006; Davies, Titterington, and Cochrane 
1995; Hughner et al. 2007). Many of these modern organic consumer groups coincide with social 
movements that initially influenced the emergence of the organic market and demand for organic food 
and agriculture regulation. 
The present U.S. market for organic food is regulated by the United States Department of 
Agriculture [USDA] National Organic Program, housed in the Agricultural Marketing Service, which sets 
the standards for the production and labeling of organic goods. The current third-party implementation 
scheme, co-regulatory policy, is based on prior state policies on organic food and agriculture. Starting in 
                                                          
1
 European and North American consumers represent about 90-percent of all global demand (FiBL and 
IFOAM 2013). 
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the 1970s in the United States, local and state governments were the first to enact organic regulatory 
policies.  Earlier regulations were relatively straightforward to implement as legislation provided a 
detailed definition and the appropriate use of the term organic on food and agriculture products. By the 
passage of the National Organic Food Production Act [NOFPA] in 1990, regulation had shifted to a more 
collaborative scheme among both public and private entities. Post-1990 organic policy legislation at the 
federal and state levels would delegate power to the bureaucracy to develop an appropriate regulatory 
scheme. This resulted in the third-party certification scheme in place today. 
To further detail the influences and development of organic policy in the U.S., a historical 
overview will be provided starting with the organic movement and early state regulation activity from 
1976 to 1989. To conclude, an overview of the current organic market and regulatory system will be 
provided. 
The Organic Movement and Early Regulation in the States (1976-1989) 
The Organic Movement 
The organic farming movement in the U.S. has an extensive history dating back to the beginning 
of the 20
th
 century. Considered to be one type of sustainable or alternative agriculture,
3
 organic 
agriculture can be broadly defined as a “holistic production management system which promotes and 
enhances agroecosystem health, including biodiversity, biological cycles and soil biological activity” 
(FAO/WHO Codex Alimentarius Commission 1999/2001). According to Guthman (2004, 4), four 
broadly conceived social movements, which have substantial overlap, influenced the emergence of the 
organic market in the U.S.  
The first social movement is linked to soil conservation and alternative production technologies. 
Depressed agricultural prices in the 1930s and poor soil management practices that contributed to the 
                                                          
3
 According to Lejano, Ingram, and Ingram (2013) there are several alternative farming networks that 
have operated since the 1940s including eco-agriculture, biodynamic, and organic farming. Each network 
subscribes to a particular set of organic techniques and is influential in a number of movements for 
organics. For additional information about the rise of specific organic farming practices see Lockeretz’s 
(2007) “What Explains the Rise of Organic Farming?” However, despite the identified differences in 




Dust Bowl led to concern about the direction and consequences of conventional agricultural practices 
(Guthman 2004, 4-5). Key figures within this movement, such as Edward Faulkner, Jerome Rodale, Louis 
Bromfield and Aldo Leopold, were largely concerned with improving agricultural practices to address the 
negative consequences, including poor soil quality, that could result from conventional agriculture 
methods. The primary concern of this movement was that conventional farming was ineffective and could 
result in additional environmental disasters like the Dust Bowl. 
The second social movement is tied to efforts to promote pure food (Guthman 2004, 5-6). The 
range of scholars and journalists within this movement are primarily concerned with the contamination 
and adulteration of foods. Yet, this movement has expanded to include concern over working conditions 
in food production and manufacturing. For example, Upton Sinclair (1906) and Eric Schlosser (2001) 
both connect working conditions and a sub-optimal food supply to creating a number of human health 
problems. The arguments presented within the food safety movement indicate a need to critically evaluate 
the entire food system from farm-to-table. 
The 1960s counterculture, a third social movement, influenced organic agriculture through the 
establishment of communes, food cooperatives, and utopian experiments inspired by back-to-the-land 
movements (Guthman 2004, 6-7). References to organic agriculture as a fringe, “hippie” practice are the 
result of the counterculture movement’s involvement in producing organic foods. However, the 
counterculture movement is also responsible for attempts to distinguish the differences between organic 
and natural foods, a concern that is now reemerging.  
Finally, the environmental movement is considered by Guthman (2004, 7-9) to have a less direct 
influence on organic farming. Beginning with Rachel Carson’s (1962) Silent Spring, the environmental 
movement’s focus on sustainable development has led to indirect influences on organic practices such a 
questioning dietary choices, consideration appropriate technology and bioregionalism, and questioning 
how energy is linked to agricultural production. Yet, environmental concerns directly pertaining to 
organic farming, and food remained largely indirect in the 1970s and 1980s. 
5 
 
 While it could be argued that these social movements could be expanded or consolidated, it is 
evident in each movement that there is a concern for how food is produced, processed, and distributed, as 
well as its interface with natural resources and human health. Yet it is important to remember that organic 
farming largely remained at the fringes of the agricultural community and was unpopular in political 
circles for most of the twentieth century (Blobaum 2010; Ingram and Ingram 2005; Lipson 1998; 
Youngberg, Schaller, and Merrigan 1993). Conventional agriculture is often seen as the solution to 
addressing food insecurity and hunger. In contrast, organic production methods have been viewed in the 
past as antiquated and out-of-touch with modern demands of feeding a large population. Indeed, in his 
dissertation on the diffusion of innovative agricultural practices, Rogers’ considered organic farmers as 
laggards in agricultural innovation (1957; 2003, 193-194). Yet in hindsight, he admits that early organic 
farmers were perhaps pioneers in the market. 
 It was only the late 1980s that the organic market growth “took off” (Rawson 1998). Consumer 
concerns over chemical residues on foods and an increase in the number of organic farms led to explosive 
growth in sales starting in 1989. According to an industry survey, retail organic foods sales in 1990 
reached $1 billion in the U.S. (Organic Trade Association [OTA] 2011a). Sales would continue to 
increase by approximately 20% each year after the passage of the Organic Food Production Act in 1990. 
Prior to the 1990s, a patchwork of state and third-party standards regulated a market where federal policy 
was absent. 
Federal Policy  
In the 1970s, organic agriculture was not promoted as a viable industry at the federal level. An 
iron triangle
4
 existed between commodity agriculture interests, Congressional agricultural committees, 
and the USDA (see Figure 1.1).
5
 The iron triangle maintained support for conventional agricultural 
practices and resulted in limited federal support for alternative production methods including organic 
                                                          
4
 The iron triangle concept refers to the stable relationship between congressional committees, an 
executive branch administrative agency, and interest groups to maintain a particular policy or program. 
The iron triangle is believed to result in a monopoly of power in a particular policy area. 
5
 Winders and Scott (2009, 80) note that eventually as farmers’ power in policy-making declines the 
power of urban, consumers rises. 
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farming (Ingram and Ingram 2005). Earl Butz, the Secretary of Agriculture from 1971-1976,
6
 served as a 
gatekeeper for the USDA by preventing any action on organic production during his tenure. In an 
infamous response to proponents of organic agriculture, Butz (1971) remarked, “Before we go back to 










Commodity                                                Congressional 
Agriculture                                                   Agriculture 
    Interests                                                    Committees 
 
 
Figure 1.1: 1970s Conventional Agriculture Iron Triangle 
 
 
Even after the end of Butz’s term, it would be a few years before the USDA or Congress 
demonstrated support for organic agricultural practices.
7
 Amidst pressures from the oil crises and 
environmental concerns, Congress commissioned the USDA to do a study on uses of organic waste to 
improve soil productivity in 1977 (Rawson 1998). In 1980, under the leadership of Agricultural Secretary 
Bob Bergland, the USDA published its own commissioned report, Report and Recommendations on 
Organic Farming, and created the Office of Organic Resources Coordinator to oversee organic research 
and education programs (Rawson 1998; Rich 2008; USDA Study Team 1980). However, the organic 
                                                          
6
 Butz is credited as being one of the best-known and controversial Secretaries of agriculture. His remark 
on organic agriculture is only one of many controversial statements made during his five-year term (see 
Goldstein 2008). His service as secretary of agriculture came to an end during the 1976 presidential 
election after he made a series of insensitive racial remarks regarding blacks’ “sexual, dress and bathroom 
preferences” (Associated Press 1976). 
7
 One exception to federal support is the Federal Trade Commission. In 1979, the Federal Trade 
commission had a proposed rule for regulations regarding food advertising including defining organic and 
natural food (Federal Trade Commission 1979; USDA Study Team 1980, 6) 
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resource coordinator position and office would be abolished by Reagan in 1981, effectively ending 
organic agriculture programs and research in the USDA until the 1990s. 
State and Third-Party Regulations 
Despite being kept at the fringes at the national level, organic farmers had success in promoting 
organic agriculture at the state level. In 1976, New York was the first state to pass organic legislation by 
creating a set of organic labeling laws.
 
California, Connecticut, and Maine would follow New York’s lead 
in developing organic labeling rules in 1979.
8
 By 1990, twenty-six states had passed organic legislation 
ranging from labeling, certification programs, or agreements with third-party certifiers.  
Coinciding with state action in the 1970s and 1980s, several organic farmers’ associations were 




 and California 
Certified Organic Farmers (CCOF)
11
 were three prominent organic farming organizations that sought to 
improve organic methods and influence policy at the state and federal level. In addition, each organization 
offered organic certification of products. 
The earliest certification program was operated and paid for by Rodale Press’ Organic Gardening 
and Farming Magazine in the early 1970s (CCOF 1988). The West Coast editor of the magazine, Floyd 
Allen, oversaw the examination of 34 California farms for organic certification. CCOF’s organic 
certification program would emerge a few years later in 1973 at the direction of Floyd Allen. It would be 
several years later before Oregon Tilth’s first certification program was organized in 1982 by the 
Willamette Valley chapter (Oregon Tilth N.A.). The requirements for these certification programs were 
often more simplistic than the requirements set forth by states. Yet, these early efforts by farmers to self-
                                                          
8
 Oregon passed administrative rules in 1973. Similarly, Massachusetts passed administrative rules in 
1978.  
9
 The Rodale Institute is the oldest organic farmer institution. Founded in 1947 as the Soil and Health 
Foundation by Jerome Rodale, the institute provided authoritative information on organic management 
practices to farmers (Rodale Institute ND). The institute expanded in the 1970s with the acquisition of a 
333-acre farm in Pennsylvania and dedication to researching sustainable organic methods. 
10
 Oregon Tilth began as Regional Tilty in 1974 with chapters in Oregon, Washington, Idaho, and 
Northern California (Oregon Tilth N.A.). The Willamette Valley chapter became Oregon Tilth in 1986. 
11
 CCOF emerged from the California Organic Farmers Association (COFA), which formed in 1972 
(CCOF 1988). COFA was primarily focused on marketing instead of certification. 
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regulate had profound implications for the federal regulatory structure that would emerge in the 1990s by 
pushing for collaboration among farmers and policymakers in developing unified national standards. 
The Organic Food Production Act & Current Developments (1990-Present) 
 The Organic Foods Production Act [OFPA] was passed by Congress as Title XXI of the 1990 
Farm Bill.
12
 State agency associations and several industry groups petitioned Congress in the late 1980s to 
eliminate problems in the market. These groups were collectively seeking to eliminate the differences in 
standards and to address newly emerging concerns in the market (1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4656, 493-44; 
Johnson 2008).
13
 OFPA aimed to eliminate consumer confusion and improve interstate commerce, 
problems created by differing standards, by establishing national standards for governing the organic 
market (7 U.S.C. 6501).  
The bill authorized the creation of the National Organic Program [NOP] and the National Organic 
Standards Board [NOSB] to be implemented by the USDA Agricultural Marketing Service. The NOP is 
responsible for setting the standards for organic production, handling and processing. In addition, the 
NOP oversees organic certification to ensure compliance with set standards. Private certifiers and state 
certification programs would have to be accredited under the new national standards to certify organic 
producers, processors and handlers. As another key element of the legislation, the NOSB is an advisory 
committee for setting the standards by which the NOP operates. There are 15 members of the board that 
advise the Secretary of Agriculture.
14
 The first board was appointed in 1992
15
 and submitted 
                                                          
12
 Three congressional bills were introduced in 1989 to federally regulate the organic market (Lathrop 
1991).  
13
 Newly emerging concerns included a burgeoning international organic market, multi-ingredient organic 
products, and addressing organic production methods for meat, poultry and seafood.  
14
 Members of the board are appointed by the Secretary of Agriculture and serve 5-year terms. The board 
is comprised of the following members: four farmers/growers; three environmentalists/resource 
conservationists; three consumer/public interest advocates; two handlers/processors; one retailer; one 
scientist; and one USDA accredited certifying agent (NOP 2012). 
15
 The years between passage of legislation and appointment of the board have been referenced as “the 
lost years” (Gershuny 2002 as referenced by Ingram and Ingram 2005).Lack of funds contributed to the 
delay of implementation (Gershumy 2002; Rawson 1998) 
9 
 
recommendations from June 1994 to September 1996 to the NOP staff (Rawson 1998). On December 16, 
1997, the proposed rule
16
 appeared in the Federal Register (62 FR 65850).  
By the end of the extended public comment period in April 1998, the USDA received over 
275,000 comments on the proposed rule. According to Rawson (1998), the Organic Trade Association 
identified nine specific problem areas with the proposed rules, inferring that a majority of the comments 
related to these concerns (see Table 1.1). There are two explanations for the controversy surrounding the 
1997 proposed rule including a changing USDA constituency base and international trade dilemmas 
(related to harmonization of standards) between the U.S. and Europe. Since the 1950s, the USDA’s key 
constituents were farmers that “eagerly adopted the stream of new technologies that flowed from the 
research labs of the land grant colleges of agriculture and from private agribusiness firms” (Rawson 
1998). However, by the 1990s, the USDA became responsible for food safety regulation along with the 
Food and Drug Administration and the Environmental Protection Agency. A new domestic constituency 
emerged that approached conventional agricultural practices with greater caution.  
This cautious approach to conventional methods was also present in the international community. 
By the 1990s, the U.S. was actively working to ensure U.S. agricultural products would be accepted into 
international markets. The European Union was denying the import of genetically engineered soybeans 
and corn from the U.S. on the basis of environmental and health concerns. The 1997 proposed rules were 
reflective of these precarious policy scenarios. The USDA was deliberative in distinguishing GMOs and 
synthetic pesticides as being different but equally safe to organic practices.  
  On May 8, 1998, the USDA announced it would revise the proposed standards and specified it 
would not permit irradiation, GMOs, or use of sewage sludge in organic production.
17 
 Two years later, 
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 The National Archives and Records Administration (see https://www.federalregister.gov/) defines 
proposed rules as the following: “This category contains proposed regulations. These documents 
announce and explain agencies’ plans to solve problems and accomplish goals, and give interested 
persons an opportunity to submit comments to prove the final regulation. It also includes advance notices 
of proposed rulemaking, petitions for rulemakings, and various proposed determinations and 
interpretations.” 
17
 A majority of the comments received by the USDA addressed concerns permitting the “Big Three” (i.e. 




the USDA published a revised proposed rule on March 13, 2000 (65 FR 13512) and published a final 
rule
18
 on December 21, 2000 (65 FR 80548) in the Federal Register. On October 12, 2002, twelve years 
after the passage of OFPA and nearly ten years after the expected implementation date,
19
 the NOP was 
officially and fully implemented. Under the final rule, organic production is defined as “a production 
system that is managed in accordance with the Act and regulations in this part to respond to site-specific 
conditions by integrating cultural, biological, and mechanical practices that foster cycling of resources, 
promote ecological balance, and conserve biodiversity” (7 C.F.R. pt. 205.2). This definition reflected the 
philosophical, ecological, and biological concerns raised by the USDA’s new organic constituents and the 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
raised because the USDA did not explicitly condemn the use of these practices, which have negative 
environmental and health effects (Manoochehri, 1998). 
18
 The National Archives and Records Administration (see https://www.federalregister.gov/) defines final 
rules as the following: “This category contains regulations that apply to the general public and have final 
legal effect. It also includes interim final rules, direct final rules, and various determinations, interpretive 
rules, and policy statements. The documents cite to the Code of Federal Regulations, which contains the 
codified text of final rules, and is published annually in 50 titles.” 
19
 The original implementation date was expected to be October 1, 1993. 
Table 1.1: Identified Problem Areas with 1997 NOP Proposed Rule 
1 
The proposed rule would eliminate key concepts (ex: ecosystem health, biodiversity) from the 
definition of organic agriculture. 
2 
The proposed rule undermines the authority of the NOSB. The USDA’s recommendations on 
organic practices and materials substituted the recommendations of the NOSB. 
3 The proposed rule allows genetically engineered crops and organisms in organic agriculture. 
4 The proposed rule permits irradiation of organically produced foods. 
5 The proposed rule allows potentially toxic municipal sewage sludge to be used a fertilizer. 
6 The proposed rule is too lax in organic livestock production standards. 
7 
The proposed rules create unnecessary loopholes for the use of synthetic materials to be used in 
organic production. 
8 
The proposed rule undermines the integrity of the organic label by giving the USDA the sole 
authority to decertify organic operations, which could lead to long delays. 
9 
The proposed rule does not consider land history as part of its certification requirements. Some 
soils may be used in organic production that are unacceptably contaminated. 





 Since the final rule, the NOP has published nearly 900 notifications, rules, and 
proposed rules to continuously improve and maintain the integrity of the organic program.  
Operating in the International Market: The Structure of the National Organic Program 
The current global organic market is regulated by a combination of voluntary and compulsory 
international, state, and local policies and agreements. At the international level, voluntary guidelines and 
standards are established by the International Federation of Organic Agriculture Movements [IFOAM]
21
 
and the Codex Alimentarius Commission.
22
  Both sets of guidelines are considered international voluntary 
standards meant to guide states, producers and consumers to identifying acceptable organic management 
principles.
23
 Compulsory measures are currently in place in 
eighty-six countries including the U.S. (FibL and IFOAM 
2013). The NOP, a third-party or co-regulation scheme, is 
considered to be the premier labeling and accreditation 
system globally and has arrangements with several nations 
to facilitate trade (National Organic Program [NOP] 
2013a). In 2012, the U.S. and European Union, 
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 After official implementation in 2002, a civil lawsuit was filed by Arthur Harvey with 9 counts 
challenging the NOP as not in compliance with OFPA. In January 2005, The U.S. Court of Appeals for 
the First Circuit rules in favor of Harvey on three issues, which required the USDA NOP to revise 
existing rules in 2006. For more detailed information see 
http://www.ams.usda.gov/AMSv1.0/getfile?dDocName=STELDEV3013543 
21
 IFOAM formed in 1972 in Versailles, France. In 1980, IFOAM passed the International Basic 
Standards for Organic Production and Processing, which the FAO considers as “the private sector’s 
equivalent to the Codex Alimentarius guidelines” (FAO ND). 
22
 The Codex Alimentarius Commission was created in 1963 as a joint effort between the U.N. Food and 
Agriculture Organization [FAO] and the World Health Organization [WHO] to harmonize international 
food standards, guidelines, and codes of practice.  In 1999, the commission first adopted the Guidelines 
for Production, Processing, Labeling and Marketing of Organically Produced Foods. 
23
 In 2003, a joint venture was undertaken by the FAO, IFOAM, and the United Nations Conference on 
Trade and Development to reconcile the differences between two sets of guidelines in light of many 
standards, regulations, and certification requirements that created trade barriers.  The joint venture 
resulted in the development of the Common Objectives and Requirements of Organic Standards 
(COROS) in 2010, which seeks to provide equivalence assessments of organic standards and regulations. 









representing the second largest global market, reached an agreement to mutually recognize standards and 
systems (FibL and IFOAM 2013).  
 Under the current NOP framework, producers, handlers and processors that desire to use the word 
“organic” or the USDA organic seal (see Figure 1.2) must be certified by USDA-accredited third-party 
agents. Agricultural products, alcohol, textiles, and cosmetics and personal care products can be labeled 
with organic claims as long as the item meets all requirements as outlined by the USDA and related 
governing agencies.
24
 As of February, 2013, there were 2,503 certified operations and 85 certifying agents 
domestically and abroad (NOP 2013b, 2013c).
25
 To become a certifying agent, private and government 
entities must apply to the USDA Grading and Verification Division for a desk audit. After the desk audit, 
the NOP Accreditation Committee makes a recommendation to approve or deny accreditation. 
Accreditation must be renewed every five years. Non-compliance or failure to enforce standards during 
the five year accreditation period may result in suspension or revocation of an agent’s accreditation status. 
Similarly, non-compliance by a certified organic operation may result in suspension or revocation of 
certification status. 
A Redefined Role for the States  
When the NOP was officially implemented in 2002, the role of the states in organic policy 
changed dramatically. Some states, like California, were actively engaged in NOP rule-making and 
sought to influence the direction and structure of the national program. California and Alaska even passed 
legislation in 1998 urging the USDA to reconsider aspects of the proposed rule. Yet, despite a state’s 
decision to influence the development of the NOP, only a few policy options would be available after 
2002. According to Miles McEvoy, current Deputy Administrator of the NOP, there are three options for 
states to support the national program (Personal Communications, Telephone, 1/29/2013). First, states 
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 The USDA is in the process of developing standards for organic aquaculture, honey, mushrooms, and 
pet food.  
25
 Some farms and businesses are “exempt” operations. Those whose gross agricultural income from 
organic sales does not exceed $5,000 per year do not need to be certified to “sell, label or represent their 




may apply to operate their own organic program. OFPA required for minimum standards to be set and 
allowed for the option of states and certifiers to have additional and more stringent requirements or 
standards. However, additional requirements must comply and not conflict with the minimum standards. 
California is the only state approved to operate a state organic program. Thus, certifiers and operations 
within California must meet the state’s requirements and standards to be labeled as organic.  
A second role for the states is to become certifying agents. Like private entities, states may seek 
to certify organic operations. State departments of agriculture are often the government entity that 
operates as a certifying agent. Sixteen states are currently accredited certifying agents (see Table 1.2) and 
vary in the certification scopes (AMS 2013a). 
Table 1.2: State Certifying Agents as of April 4, 2013 
State Agency Certification Scopes 
Colorado Department of Agriculture  Crop, Livestock, Wild Crop, Handling 
Iowa Department of Agriculture and Land Stewardship  Crop, Livestock, Wild crop, Handling 
Idaho State Department of Agriculture  Crop, Livestock, Handling 
Kentucky Department of Agriculture  Crop, Livestock, Wild crop, Handling 
Maryland Department of Agriculture  Crop, Livestock, Wild crop, Handling 
Montana Department of Agriculture  Crop, Livestock, Wild crop, Handling 
Nevada Department of Agriculture  Crop, Handling 
New Hampshire Department of Agriculture, Markets 
& Food 
Crop, Livestock, Wild crop, Handling 
New Jersey Department of Agriculture  Crop, Livestock, Wild crop, Handling 
New Mexico Department of Agriculture  Crop, Livestock, Wild crop, Handling 
Oklahoma Department of Agriculture, Food and 
Forestry  
Crop, Livestock, Handling 
Oregon Department of Agriculture  Crop,  Handling 
Rhode Island Department of Environmental 
Management 
Crop, Handling 
Texas Department of Agriculture  Crop, Livestock, Handling 
Utah Department of Agriculture  Crop, Livestock, Wild crop, Handling 




The third role for states in supporting the national program is participation in one of two 
certification cost-share programs. The 2002 and 2008 Farm Bills authorized funds for the National 
Organic Certification [NOC] Cost-Share Program. The Agricultural Management Assistance [AMA] 
Cost-Share Program received mandatory funding from section 2801 of the Farm Bill’s Conservation title 
as created by Section 1524 of the Federal Crop Insurance Act (Johnson 2008). While funding for the 
NOC ended in FY 2012, both programs offered financial assistance to operators seeking organic 
certification to off-set costs. The NOC offered assistance to producers and handlers in all 50 states where 
agreed upon, whereas the AMA offers assistance to producers in sixteen states.
26
  
Contemporary Concerns: Regional Variation in Production & Label Competition  
The organic market has changed dramatically since the first organic policy passed in 1976 by 
New York. Aside from compliance and enforcement concerns, there are two broader challenges in the 
market relevant for future examinations of organic policy in the U.S. at both the federal and state levels. 
First, the organic market is facing increasing pressures from emerging labeling scheme in the marketplace 
such as local, fair trade, GMO-free, and natural (Brush and Link 2012; Costanigro et al. 2014; ERS 2009; 
Onozaka and Thilmany-McFadden 2011;  Renner 2012). Historically, natural and organic labels have 
competed in the market with early organic advocates attempting to distinguish between the two (Knorr 
1982, 1984; Price 1985). However, the fair trade, GMO-free, and local-labeled goods are more recent 
developments. Some would argue these label strategies are in response to the belief that the organic label 
has lost some the connotation of representing small-farm and locally produced goods or equitable 
sustainability practices globally (Adams and Salois 2010; Guthman 2004; Popoff 2010; Rigby and Bown 
2003; Raynolds 2000; Yue and Tong 2009; Zepeda and Deal 2009). Indeed, consumers may have 
different motivations for buying organic goods, as opposed to local, non-GMO, or fair trade goods 
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 States covered in the AMA program include Connecticut, Delaware, Hawaii, Maine, Maryland, 
Massachusetts, Nevada, New Hampshire,  New Jersey ,New York, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Utah, 




(Guthman 2004; Loureiro and Hine 2001; Onozaka, Nurse, and Thilmany-McFadden 2011; Raynolds 
2000).  
A second and related concern is what Miles McEvoy terms “geographic-specific challenges” 
(2012). U.S. organic acreage has doubled since the late 1990s (ERS 2009). However, certified organic 
operations remain concentrated in certain states and regions. For example, while there are numerous 
certified operations in California and Washington, the southeast region has less than 50 certified 
operations in each state. Hooker and Shanahan (2012) confirm spatial concentration of the organic supply 
chain has increased over-time. The concentration of production may impact the market for locally-labeled 
foods and small-scale farmers. 
Collectively, these two emerging concerns represent policy programs that cannot be adequately 
addressed without examining the initial development and evolution of U.S. organic policy. Accounting 
for regional variations requires consideration of how states and constituents in these areas were, and are, 
stakeholders in the policy process. 
Organization of Dissertation 
 This dissertation is organized into seven additional chapters. Chapter II provides of an overview 
of the policy diffusion literature, the theoretical grounding of this research, and details how this research 
is contributing to the theoretical development of policy diffusion. Particular attention is allotted to 
combined models (e.g. the event history analysis and contagion models) of policy diffusion.  
 Chapters III and V outline the research methods used to examine the diffusion of organic food 
and agriculture policy in the U.S. Chapter III details the research question, justification for a mixed-
methods approach, the policy diffusion model used in this analysis, hypotheses, and the quantitative 
methods. Chapter V details the qualitative method portion of the study by justifying the selection of two 
case studies.  
 The statistical examination of organic policy diffusion is included in Chapter IV. This chapter 
begins with a descriptive overview of national and regional pictures of legislative adoption. Next, the 
chapter covers pre-federal state adoption, post-federal state adoption, and a comprehensive 35-year 
16 
 
modeling of diffusion. Regional models are then evaluated. Finally, the chapter concludes with the overall 
findings from the statistical modeling. 
 Chapters VI and VII present the findings of two case studies. Chapter VI examines the case of 
California. California was a leading adopter of organic legislation and is currently an exemplary case for 
organic food and agriculture policy. Chapter VII examines the case of Georgia. Georgia is a laggard 
adopter of organic legislation. In addition, Georgia is located within the Southeastern region, a region 
with low certified-organic production overall and unique diffusion dynamics based on Chapter V’s 
analysis (McEvoy 2012).  
 Finally, the dissertation concludes with Chapter VIII. Chapter VIII bridges the findings from the 
quantitative and qualitative research findings. The results suggest the policy diffusion model developed 
and tested in this dissertation provides a more comprehensive understanding of how and why policy 
diffusion occurs. The mixed-methods research design aided in providing a deeper understanding to why 
































The diffusion of innovation
27
 has been the focus of academic inquiries in a variety of disciplines 
including anthropology, sociology, education, communication, marketing and business, geography, 
economics, public administration, political science, and psychology. Likewise, the innovation diffusion 
research also covers a variety of substantive issue areas such as media studies, technological innovations, 
agricultural technology, form of government, tax policy, and educational trends.
28
 Since Walker (1969)
29
 
and Gray’s (1973a) seminal work in diffusion of innovation,
30
 political science scholars have continued to 
examine how and why certain innovations are adopted among governmental entities over a given time 
period. To date, there are numerous academic inquiries in political science, public policy, and public 
administration journals on the diffusion of innovative policies and practices under the umbrella of policy 
diffusion literature.  
This chapter covers the development and current state of the of the policy diffusion literature. 
First, this chapter will cover the formative debate in the political science policy diffusion literature. 
Second, this chapter will cover the pertinent models of policy diffusion. Specifically, several models will 
be detailed including external determinants, internal determinants, unified models, and policy attributes 
and change research. Three of these categories are identified and discussed in-depth by Berry and Berry 
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 One of the most common definitions used for innovation is “an idea, practice, or object that is 
perceived as new by an individual or other unit of adoption” (Rogers 2003, 12). Innovation should not be 
confused with invention, which suggests refers to “the process by which a new idea is discovered or 
created” (Rogers 2003, 43). 
28
 Rogers’ Diffusion of Innovations provides a comprehensive overview of the diffusion literature. 
However, it should be noted that Rogers classifies political science and public administration as minor 
disciplines in the diffusion literature. Therefore, Rogers lacks a comprehensive discussion of the diffusion 
literature in all minor disciplines even in the most recent edition of the book in 2003. 
29
 Walker’s (1969) article was not the first diffusion of innovation article written by a political scientist. In 
the first issue of The American Political Science Review in 1969, Mohr’s work on innovation in public 
agencies was published. Mohr’s (1969) worked would largely be ignored until Berry and Berry (1990) 
used Mohr’s work as a foundational piece for their unified model of diffusion. 
30
 Diffusion refers to the spread of innovation (e.g. legislative adoption of a policy or program) from one 





(2007). This overview will include more recent investigations in these areas but will consider 
investigations on policy attributes and modifications separately. Finally, this chapter will conclude with 
future directions for research. 
Policy Diffusion –  
The Diffusion of Innovation Literature in Political Science 
Within the discipline of political science, innovation is most often defined using Walker’s 
definition. Walker (1969, 881) defines innovation as “a program or policy which is new to the state 
adopting it, no matter how old the program may be or how many other states may have adopted it.” 
Historically, the policy diffusion research is diverse and incohesive (see Eyestone 1977; Savage 1985). 
Research varies in focus, method, and conclusions over time. The earliest debate within the literature was 
between Jack L. Walker and Virginia Gray. The two scholars differed on the trajectory of diffusion 
research. 
The Walker-Gray Debate: Early Roots of Policy Diffusion Literature 
 The Walker-Gray policy diffusion debate appeared in the pages of The American Political 
Science Review in 1973. The debate centered on the trajectory of research on policy diffusion. Walker 
(1969, 1973) argued that the diffusion research should focus on innovativeness as a state characteristic as 
well as the origin of innovation. He was specifically interested in the speed of legislative action in 
innovation (i.e. why some states adopt innovations sooner than other states) along spatial dimensions. 
Walker was not particularly concerned with innovation in public organizations or the courts. 
Gray (1973a, 1973b), however, argued for theories of diffusion that would examine both how and 
what factors influenced the spread of adopting innovations.
31
 She did not find innovativeness as a 
consistent state characteristic in her own study. Whereas Walker (1969) found regional pace-setters such 
as New York, California, Massachusetts, and Michigan across several policy domains, Gray claimed that 
innovativeness in states was time and issue-specific at best. Therefore, the focus of policy diffusion 
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 Gray (1973b) likened the disagreement between Walker (1969, 1973) and herself to that of a 
disagreement “over a half-glass of water, where it is half full or half empty.” She shows no reason why 
policy diffusion theory development couldn’t include examination of general innovativeness. 
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research should be on conditions that lead to the adoption of an innovation and not innovativeness as a 
state characteristic. 
After the Walker-Gray Debate 
Several theoretical models of policy diffusion have been developed since the Walker-Gray 
debate. The diffusion literature has predominantly moved away from studying innovativeness as a state 
characteristic (exceptions Boehmke and Skinner 2012; Boushey 2010; Canon and Baum 1981;Savage 
1978, 1983, 1985) and has focused instead on how innovation spreads from one adopting unit to the next.  
  While the diffusion research remains diverse, the literature has become more cohesive since 
1990 due to the development of the event history analysis model, the initial unified model, developed by 
Berry and Berry (1990, 1992, 1994, 2007).
32
 Models of policy diffusion in the 1970s and 1980s either 
focused solely on regional pressures for adoption or on how state characteristics influenced adoption. The 
unified model presented by Berry and Berry marked a key turning point in the literature. As a result of the 
Berry and Berry model, scholars would examine how both internal state characteristics and external 
pressures led to the diffusion of innovative policies.  
Since the EHA model emerged, scholars have continued to improve upon the unified model. 
Improvements include the inclusion of policy entrepreneur activity, interest group activities, and a 
broader spectrum of pertinent adopter internal characteristics. Furthermore, scholars have also sought to 
examine how policy attributes influence diffusion patterns. In the section that follows, each model of 
diffusion will be discussed in depth. 
Policy Diffusion Models 
External Determinant Models 
External determinant models, or what Berry and Berry (2007) refer to as diffusion models, 
examine how non-adopters are influenced by adopters of an innovation through a number of 
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 A majority of political science diffusion research focuses on U.S. states, including both horizontal and 
vertical studies. Studies on courts, organizational innovation, local-level adoption, and global diffusion 
patterns are more limited. For examples of these foci see Dye and Davidson (1981), Glick (1981), Tolbert 
and Zucker (1983), and Weyland (2004). The literature review will predominantly focus on U.S. state 





 Competition, learning, and pressure from other adopting states may lead to 
emulation among adopting entities.  To date, five different external determinant models have been 
identified in the political science literature by Berry and Berry (see Table 2.1 for outline). A debate 
common to all these models is how policies are communicated through the identified communication 
channels and the consequences of communication styles. In other words, scholars are still investigating 
whether emulation among states or adopting units is the result of learning or mere mimicking due to 
external pressure. Of particular concern is the depth of adoption (see Clark 1985; Glick and Hays 1991) 
and the consequences associated with coercion and mimicking (i.e. non-learning) adoptions (Sharman 
2010; Shipan and Volden 2008; Soule 1999; Weissert and Scheller 2008; Weyland 2007).  
The two oldest identified external determinant models, the regional diffusion and national 
interaction model, originate from the Walker-Gray debate. The regional diffusion model, initially 
proposed by Walker (1969), suggests states or other adopting entities are influenced by those that are 
geographically closest to them. Therefore, the probability of adoption increases as other nearby states 
adopt an innovation. Walker developed a tree model of diffusion (see Figure 2.1) that has two basic steps 
for tracing the spread of innovation. First, at the base of the tree model there is a set of pioneer states, or  
the most innovative states, that compete and emulate each other at a national level. For each region in the 
country, there is at least one pioneer state. According to Walker (1969, 893), “States like New York, 
Table 2.1: External Determinant Models 
Model Description 
Regional Diffusion 
Examines how states within a region influence each other. Evaluations can 
be neighbor-based or follow a fixed-region approach. 
National Interaction 
Model 
Examines how states interact through national communication networks.  
Leader-Laggard Examines how pioneer states are emulated by other states. 
Isomorphism 
Examines how states (or other adopting units) look toward states with similar 
characteristics for adoption cues.  
Vertical Accounts for federalism in the diffusion process.  
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Massachusetts, California and Michigan should be seen as regional pace setters.” Second, there is a set of 
followers for each region, some considered quick adopters and other considered laggards that usually only 
adopt a given innovation after the regional pioneer state has had success with the adopted innovation. 
This emulation occurs because, after observation of the early-adopting state, the perceived risk associated 
with departing from the status quo policy or program is diminished. These follower states typically have 
lower innovativeness scores than their regional pioneer state. One assumption of the model is that 
follower states will not look outside their own region for innovation cues. This assumption has been 
challenged and is a key focal point for improving upon regional models of diffusion. 
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Since the tree model, scholars have used two approaches for assessing regional influence. Some 
scholars use a fixed-region approach, which suggests those states or entities within the same geographical 
area (e.g. the South, New England) are influenced by similar channels of communication (for example see 
Mooney and Lee 1995). Other scholars use a neighbor-based approach, which examines only how 
bordering states or entities influence each other (for example see Berry and Berry 1990).
34
 The neighbor-
based approach is used in most models. Yet, a number of scholars suggest a decline in regional diffusion 
because of rapid technology advances that make communication and travel quicker than they were a 
century ago (Boekmke and Skinner 2012; Shipan and Volden 2012; Weyland 2007). However, some 
evidence suggests that neighbor influence may be stronger or weaker depending on the stage the state is 
in the policy process (Cohen-Vogel and Ingle 2007). Therefore, regional diffusion models may present 
limitations in explaining diffusion patterns among states or governmental entities, but cannot be 
altogether disregarded. 
The national interaction model overcomes some of the limitations of the regional model by 
suggesting states interact in national communication networks where there is free and equal opportunity 
to interact with all other states. According to Gray (1973a) and as stated by Berry and Berry (2007), “the 
probability a state will adopt is proportional to the number of interactions its officials have had with those 
that have already adopted.” Gray’s observations for three issue areas (education, welfare and civil rights) 
lead her to conclude adopters influence non-adopters on a national level, thereby resulting in an s-shaped 
curve
35
 in cumulative adoptions when plotted (see Figure 2.2). Scholars that have used the national-
interaction model generally find that national platforms for state policy maker interaction may lead to 
diffusion but a nonrandom pattern of diffusion (Balla 2001; Glick and Hays 1991; Menzel and Feller 
1977). 
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 Alaska and Hawaii are often excluded from neighbor-based approaches.  
35
 The s-shaped curve demonstrates how the cumulative total number of adopters increases over time as 
the interaction between adopters and non-adopters occur. It is considered as the normal distribution of the 
cumulative number of adopters when plotted. It has been observed in all disciplines that study diffusion. 
Gabriel Tarde (1903), a forefather of sociology and social psychology, was the first to observer the s-


















Figure 2.2: S-Shaped Curve of Cumulative Innovation Adoption 
 
 
Beyond the regional diffusion and national interaction model, three other external determinant 
models have been identified – leader-laggard models, isomorphism models, and vertical models. Closely 
related to the regional diffusion model are the leader-laggard models. Leader-laggard models posit that 
there are pioneer states that other states seek to emulate. Walker’s (1969) tree model of diffusion contains 
elements of both regional diffusion and leader-laggard models by assuming regional pioneers. However, 
leader-laggard models are not always spatially confined and can encompass the communication channels 
present in vertical diffusion, national-interaction, and isomorphism models (Berry and Berry 2007). 
Studies that use the isomorphism model examine how states or countries with similar 
characteristics may emulate each other. Similarity characteristics can include population size, ideology, or 
economic conditions. Regionalism can play a factor in isomorphism models as states or countries in the 
same regions could share similar social, political, or economic values (Brooks 2005; Nicholson-Crotty 
2004; Weyland 2004).  
 The vertical influence models account for federalism in the diffusion process by moving beyond 
mere horizontal diffusion among equitable adopting units. In the U.S. context, diffusion researchers have 
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sought to explain how localities (including cities and counties), states, and the federal government may all 
influence each other. Initially, it was argued state influence on federal adoption was limited (Rose 1973). 
However, both bottom-up and top-down influences have been observed in the U.S. in the past several 
decades (Allen, Pettus, and Haider-Markel 2004; Boeckelman 1992; Daley and Garand 2005; Gray, Gray, 
and Williams 1981; Karch 2006; Shipan and Volden 2006; Welch and Thompson 1980). From a bottom-
up perspective, Shipan and Volden (2006) identified two particular effects local entities could have on 
state adoption of antismoking policies. A snowball effect occurs when more local adoption leads to 
momentum for state adoption. A pressure valve effect occurs when local adoption minimizes pressure for 
state adoption. Interest groups and state legislature capacity determine which effect is observed.  
Internal Determinants Models 
Internal determinant models focus on the adopter characteristics, including innovativeness and 
affluence, as the primary explanation for diffusion. Research examining internal determinants of diffusion 
has reached many of the same conclusions summarized nearly two decades ago by Savage (1985). 
Wealth, capacity, and size impact the adoption decision (Bailey and Rom 2004; Berry and Berry 1990, 
2012).
36
 In addition, election proximity, problem severity, policy entrepreneurs, and interest 
groups/advocacy coalitions have been identified as influencing internal conditions necessary for fostering 
adoption (for example see Haider-Markel 2001; Jacobsson and Lauber 2006; Karch 2007; Mintrom 1997). 
All of these variables have been identified in the broader policy process literature as critical to the passage 
or modification of policies. For example, Kingdon (2003) indicates the significance of policy 
entrepreneurs (also see Baumgartner and Jones 2009) and perceived problem severity in policies reaching 
high agenda status or passage. However, there is mixed evidence for how other characteristics, such as 
general innovativeness
37
 or political culture, influence adoption or adoption proneness (see Savage 1985). 
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 Fairbanks’ (1979) morality study, Regens’ (1980) energy policy study, and Rosebaum’s (1976) land 
use study are noted exceptions for finding a positive relationship between affluence and adoption 
likelihood. 
37
 It is significant to note that only one article has been published since 1985 on innovativeness as a state 
characteristic. Boehmke and Skinner (2012) re-examine Walker’s (1969) original scores and discover 
drastic changes in both aggregate and individual levels of innovativeness in the states. 
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Most research today,confers with the appropriate substantive issue area to identify internal independent 
variables to include for analysis.  
The time-span and focus of the research conducted for this study spans across 35-years and must 
account for changes in state political conditions, in addition to socio-economic factors such as agricultural 
factors and wealth, since the mid-1970s. Politically, the American landscape has undergone extensive 
transformations including increasing party polarization and reinventing government. The political 
changes overtime affects the state and federal governments’ approach to adopting and implementing 
regulatory policy. The election of Reagan ushered in a new government philosophy marked by 
privatization, less regulation, new federalism, and supply-sided economics. Policies and management 
emphasized efficiency and made government work more like the private sector. Barzelay (2001) outlines 
one distinguishable development of the new public management trend was the increase in governance, 
public-private contracts, voluntary organizations, and sale of publicly owned capital. Co-regulation is 
included as part of governance and this transformative period in government. The term refers to “a blend 
of voluntary initiatives and binding legislative acts” (Jordan, Wurzel, and Zito 2003). Scholars studying 
environmental and European policy have relatively extensive investigations into co-regulatory schemes. 
Indeed, European food policy scholars have already identified the potential use and implications of co-
regulatory agreements on food safety (Martinez et al. 2007), and environmental scholarship identifies co-
regulation as one of four broad categories of innovative arrangements (Steelman 2010).Therefore, the 
examination of how state political conditions affect adoption decisions from 1976-2010 must also contend 
with political changes that resulted in hostility toward bigger government and government regulations. As 
will be discussed below, policy type and policy change must also contend with changes in political 
attitudes over time. However, the literature does not discuss the nature of policy change over policy 







Unified models of policy diffusion unite external and internal determinants of diffusion under a 
singular analytical lens. Berry and Berry’s (1990) unified model, also referred to as the EHA model, has 
been the predominant unified model applied in the recent diffusion literature. Berry and Berry claimed a 





 determinant models. In isolation, each model could not fully explain diffusion 
and can only offer one potential explanation. However, if the two models were unified, scholars would be 
better equipped to predict adoption influences.
41
  
Berry and Berry’s unified model approach is methodologically grounded in event history analysis 
(EHA) but is theoretically grounded in Mohr’s (1969) work on organizational innovation. EHA is used in 
biological and other social science research to account for risks and probability of certain event 
occurrences. Accordingly, EHA is incorporated into the unified model because of its ability to increase 
the methodological rigor and “substantive relevance of research findings” of policy diffusion research 
(Berry and Berry 1990). In particular, EHA can reduce spurious relationships by controlling for regional 
effects, allow for pooled cross-sectional data analysis, and adequately predict adoption probability. Prior 
diffusion studies did not control external/internal influences and used traditional cross-sectional 
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 Berry and Berry (1990) outlined three methodology approaches to regional diffusion explanations 
including factor analysis (see Walker 1969; Canon and Baum 1981), assessing the relationship between 
adopters and non-adopters (see Lutz 1986), and surveying state officials on the influences of adoption 
(see Freeman 1985; Grupp and Richard 1975, Light 1978; Menzel and Feller 1977.) At the time, Berry 
and Berry did not include vertical diffusion studies, those studies focusing on local-state-federal influence 
(for example see Boeckelman 1992; Daley and Garand 2005; Karch 2006; Shipan and Volden 2006), as 
part of regional diffusion but would later include vertical diffusion studies as part of a broader “diffusion 
models” category (2007).  
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 At the time, Berry and Berry did not include vertical diffusion studies, those studies focusing on local-
state-federal influence (for example see Boeckelman 1992; Daley and Garand; Karch 2006; Shipan and 
Volden 2006), as part of regional diffusion but would later include vertical diffusion studies as part of a 
broader “diffusion models” category (2007). 
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 At the time of publication in 1990, internal determinant models used cross-sectional analysis with the 
dependent variable either being year adopted or whether a state adopted a policy by a certain date. 
41
 Berry and Berry (1990) indicated there were a number of studies that evaluated both internal 
determinants and regional diffusion models. However, scholars never combined the two models and kept 





 One potential explanation for avoiding pooled cross-sectional data is the limited variance in 
the dependent variable (e.g. adoption/non-adoption) on a yearly basis. However, Berry and Berry do not 
find low adoption rates, as adoptions are considered unusual and infrequent events, problematic for their 
analysis on state lottery adoption. 
Mohr’s work on organizational innovation was also incorporated into unified diffusion model 
because of its ability to drastically improve the diffusion research. Mohr (1969) developed and confirmed 
a three-dimensional hypothesis that predicted “innovation is directly related to the motivation to innovate, 
inversely related to the strength of obstacles to innovation, and directly related to the availability of 
resources for overcoming such obstacles.” Berry and Berry argued that Mohr’s work could integrate 
elements of regional and internal determinant models of diffusion. The motivation, obstacles, and 
resources presented to politicians account for internal determinants. Policy adoptions in other states 
provide information, an external resource, and reduce uncertainty, one perceived obstacle. To test the 
unified model, Berry and Berry examined state lottery adoptions by developing eleven hypotheses divided 
into three categories – motivation, obstacles, and resources. What they found confirmed the utility of a 
unified diffusion model and Mohr’s evaluation of innovation in state organizations. Specifically, they 
found support of regional influence, fiscal health and election proximity as internal determinants for state 
lottery adoption. The unified model helped to bridge the significance of both internal and external 
conditions simultaneously. 
 The unified model developed by Berry and Berry (1990) not only closed a theoretical gap but a 
methodology gap, as well. The EHA unified model could account for year-to-year variations in external 
and internal variables that influence adoption decisions. Only minor adjustments of independent variables, 
such as region (for example see Haider-Markel 2004; Mooney and Lee 1995), or addition of vertical 
variables (for example see Allen, Pettus, and Haider-Markel 2004) have been made to address limitations 
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 Prior to Berry and Berry’s (1990) unified model, no year-to-year variation of independent variable data 







of the model. No major adjustments of the basis of the EHA model have been made. The EHA model is 
the most utilized diffusion model since 1990.  
Despite the theoretical rigor of the EHA model, a second unified model, the contagion model, has 
emerged in the political science literature in the past few years. According to Boushey (2010, 3), “the 
rapid and sudden adoption of innovations across states is not well explained by extant studies of policy 
diffusion.” Speed of adoption has increased overtime, and, more often than not, diffusion occurs in very 
short time frames that cannot be explained by mere incremental assessments like the EHA model. The 
commonly found s-shaped cumulative adoption curve does not exist in rapid- adoption scenarios and is 
replaced by an r-shaped cumulative adoption curve (see Figure 2.3). This leads to considerable challenges 
in determining which factors, whether internal or external, truly influenced sweeping policy adoptions 
(i.e. policy outbreaks). Borrowing from epidemiology, Boushey likens policies to diseases (and their 
spread) and develops a triad that explains factors that influence policy diffusion (see Figure 2.4).  
 The policy innovation diffusion triad rests on the components of state characteristics, innovation 
characteristics, and interest group and professional organizations. At the center of the triad is the political 
environment, including national mood and issue salience, which dictates conditions for adoption.  
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policy itself. It is argued that not all policies share characteristics that lead to ease of diffusion. 
Governance policies
43
, for example, should be more prone to policy outbreaks than incremental policy 
decisions. State characteristics, equating to host characteristics on the epidemiology triad, generally refer 
to the impact of internal characteristics of adopting entities. Most of the factors identified by internal 
determinants models and the EHA model are included by Boushey. Interest groups and professional 
organizations, also referred to as policy vectors, are the agents that transmit ideas through the 
communication channels among the states. External determinants are incorporated into the model so far 
as policy entrepreneurs may seize upon outside knowledge, national organizations may coordinate on a 
national level, or focusing events shock the system.  
To date, there has been very limited political science research using the contagion model 
(Pacheco 2012). However, some scholars believe the model provides a new direction for policy diffusion 
research both inside and outside of the political science discipline (Jones and Baumgartner 2012). 
Policy Attributes and Change Research 
Policy attributes and policy change are two diffusion conditions that are not completely 
accounted for in external determinants, internal determinants, or unified models (exceptions include Allen 
and Clark 1981; Boushey 2010). These two variables are challenging to scholars who seek to evaluate 
their impact in the diffusion process. The attributes of a policy may dictate the speed and appeal of 
innovation adoption. Policy change creates difficulties for scholars determining when a policy may 
transform to such an extent it becomes a new policy. In addition, there are also concerns for how policy 
learning versus economic competition influence change in policy. Until more recently, these conditions 
were largely ignored in most diffusion research. The significance in incorporating these conditions into 
diffusion research allows scholars to comprehensively examine how and why certain policies spread 
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 Boushey relies on Tolbert’s (2002) definition of governance policies, which are identified as policies 
that “modify the behavior of the public sector and government officials.” Governance policies are noted 
as being different than other regulatory policies for three reasons: 1) citizens regulate the behavior of 
government; 2) governance policies have high levels of salience and encourage mass political support; 3) 




faster from one adopting unit to the next or are modified by adopting units. However, the literature 
generally fails to account for how changing political conditions (e.g. attitude towards regulation) has 
shifted overtime. 
Policy Attributes  
Lowi (1972) argued “policies determine politics” when developing a policy taxonomy that 
assesses how the behavior of political actors is determined from the policy itself. He departed from the 
traditional assumption that politics determined what policies were conceived. Within the diffusion 
literature, Lowi’s policy typologies have never been tested in a diffusion model.
44
 Instead, most 
researchers have focused on policy areas (e.g. morality or economic policies) and policy attributes (e.g. 
salience, complexity, compatibility). For example, Mooney and Lee (1995, 1999, and 2000) found that 
morality policies and economic policies each have similar diffusion patterns. Nicholson-Crotty (2009) 
and Boushey (2010) find the salience of the issue increases the rate of diffusion.  
In the most comprehensive evaluation of policy attributes in the political science literature, Makse 
and Volden (2011) use the five innovation attributes identified by Rogers (2003) to test 27 criminal 
justice laws adopted by states over a 30-year period. All five attributes were confirmed in influencing 
adoption and diffusion patterns. “Specifically, policies with high relative advantages, high compatibility, 
low complexity, high observability, and high triability
45
 all spread across the states at a greater rate” 
(Makse and Volden 2011). Future research, of course, is needed to confirm how the attributes of the 
policy itself influence diffusion. 
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 Clark (1985) hypothesized that redistributive policies may be more popular in certain political cultures. 
Mooney and Lee (1995, 1999, 2000) argued morality policies differed from the economic policies that 
Lowi’s policy typology configured. Their work is considered an extended study on Lowi’s policy 
typology. Many scholars, like Mooney and Lee, often reference Lowi’s policy typology but none have yet 
to directly use the identified variables in a diffusion study.  
45
 Triability is defined by Rogers (2003, 243) as “the degree to which an innovation may be experimented 




Policy Change  
Warner (1974) was one of the earliest scholars in political science journal to question when 
modifications of an innovation technically constitute a new innovation. He specifically asks, “which of 
these changes constitute ‘modifications’ and which are actually themselves new innovations?” 
Furthermore, “how does the existence (and the number) of items or programs competing with the 
innovation affect its diffusion?” The fine distinction between modifications to an existing innovative 
policy or program versus a new innovation could be arbitrary. An existing innovative policy can be 
improved upon in terms of scope and depth of the program or policy without changing the fundamental 
purpose of the policy itself. Improvements in an innovative policy can signify learning behavior among 
states instead of drastic departure from the original intent of the policy. 
 Variation in innovation adoptions could be related to speed and depth of adoption (Clark 1985; 
Glick and Hays 1991). In three policy areas, Clark (1985) found early and late adopters were found to 
prefer broader program adoptions than the middle-range adopters. Middle-range adopters preferred a 
narrower scope on program adoption. No reason was identified for why the relationship between 
early/late adoption and scope of program adoption was found. Glick and Hays (1991), however, found 
that early adopters of living will laws were likely to amend policies to be similar in scope to later 
adopters. It is believed that the political struggle over the language and imagery constructed in a policy 
may result in later amendments to correct how a policy is being implemented. Implementation is 
considered just as significant in policy innovation as the adoption itself. The suggestion that some states 
may have “deep” adoptions is to suggest learning in the diffusion process leading to small modifications 
to improve implementation of policies. “Superficial” adoptions, on the other hand, suggest largely 
symbolic efforts rather than any real attempt to learn from others. This suggests that diffusion may be 
more of mimicking rather than learning and adopting innovative policies according to the state’s own 
needs and capabilities. 
 Other studies on policy modification have discovered a number of additional insights into the 
causes for modification. For example, more successfully modified policies spread quicker than less 
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successful policies (Volden 2006). In other studies, economic competition increases the likelihood of 
adoption and modification in certain policy areas (Berry and Baybeck 2005; Boehmke and Witmer 2004). 
Finally, the opportunity for managers to modify adopted policies resulted in the reinvention in public 
organizations (Zbaracki 1998). Yet despite the numerous studies in policy modification or reinvention, 
the diffusion literature has yet to find any universal patterns or causes for reinventing an innovation. As 
Karch (2007, 151) points out, “the most problematic characteristic of the reinvention concept is that it 
describes a mechanical process in which the order of adoption over-rides political factors.” In other 
words, political conditions can still determine the breath or depth of a policy at any given time.    
Filling the Gaps – Theoretical and Applied Contributions of this Research 
There are both applied and theoretical contributions to be derived from this research. From a 
theoretical perspective, this project is advancing the policy diffusion literature. Despite the extensive and 
rich variety of the policy diffusion literature, there still remain a number of directions future research 
should elaborate upon. There are four ways this research advances our knowledge and understanding of 
how and what factors contribute to policy diffusion. From an applied standpoint, this project seeks to 
provide a comprehensive history of organic food and agriculture legislation in the U.S. Furthermore, 
based on the development of a comprehensive history and the results of this analysis, this research may 
help to address contemporary concerns in the organic industry including increasing competitive in the 
market and geographic-specific challenges as discussed in Chapter I. 
Theoretical Contributions 
Shipan and Volden (2012) outline a number of challenges to improving the policy diffusion 
literature including fine-tuning our understanding of diffusion mechanisms; policy attributes; capacity to 
learn; the role of competition and coercion in the diffusion process; exploring other stages of the policy 
process such as implementation; and moving beyond a dichotomous dependent variable. Shipan and 
Volden’s list is not exhaustive. Innovativeness as a state characteristic (see Boehmke and Skinner 2012), 
testing Boushey’s contagion model, and incorporating more rigorous mixed-methods are also research 
areas with a number of unanswered questions.  
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 This dissertation seeks to fill a number of gaps in the diffusion literature by answering the 
overarching question of why do some states adopt organic food and agriculture legislation while others do 
not? There are four key goals of this research to advance the policy diffusion literature. 
 First, the primary contribution of this research is the development and testing of an enhanced 
policy diffusion model. Chapter III details the enhanced unified policy diffusion model. The enhanced 
model draws from both the strengths, weaknesses, and gaps present in the two unified policy diffusion 
models identified within the literature, the EHA model and the contagion model.  The enhanced unified 
model will be able to address the conditions identified by previous research that are more robust 
explanations for why policy diffusion occurs. However, the enhanced model also considers a number of 
conditions that have not been considered within policy diffusion research, but are significant within the 
broader public policy process literature. Specifically, this model accounts for the factors of policy 
typology, as designated by Lowi (1972), and existing policy are endogenous variables and are 
simultaneously influenced and are influenced by adoption. As will be further discussed in Chapter III, the 
role of policy typology and existing policy tap into assumption of the policy process that deal with risk or 
perception of risk, the policy design influencing probability of adoption, and incremental notions of 
policy making. 
 A second theoretical contribution of this research is assessing how policy typology is established 
and how policy typology may shift overtime. Many policy diffusion scholars have focused on Lowi’s 
(1972) assumption“policy dictates politics.” However, It is particularly troublesome that scholars in the 
diffusion literature have never explicitly used Lowi’s policy typology or the refocusing of Lowi’s 
typology (Spitzer 1987) to examine how policies may dictate politics. Furthermore, there is scarce 
attention to how the interaction of policy and politics may lead to change in the type of policy observed 
overtime.  Scholars that have examined the role of policy attributes have either focused on broad 
conceptions of policy type (e.g. economic policy or social policy) or have used Rogers’ (2003) five 
innovation attributes. This research seeks to give explicit consideration for how policy can dictate politics 
while assessing the modification of existing policy. In the case of organic legislation, this may explain 
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how organic policy ended in less-coercive, co-regulatory form of policy design. Specific consideration for 
the policy design will be analyzed through the two case studies evaluated in Chapter VI and VII. For the 
early adopter, California, the case presents an opportunity to examine the effect of policy design over the 
span of 33 years. Georgia, conversely, presents an opportunity to examine a late adopter and determine if 
policy design was significant after several years of policy development by other states.  
A third advancement goal is the longitudinal examination of the effects of federalism. 
Specifically, this research examines how federal adoption and implementation in a policy area can alter 
state policy trajectories. While intergovernmental relations and federalism have been discussed in the 
broader diffusion literature, there has not been an evaluation examining a policy area both prior and after 
federal adoption of an innovation. Furthermore, the literature does not examine how delayed federal 
implementation may impact state adoption decisions. Examining organic policy represents an opportunity 
to examine how states behave in the diffusion policy prior to and after federal adoption, after federal 
implementation, and during an extended period between federal adoption and implementation where state 
laws still regulated the market. Based on the results, this research contributes to a better understanding of 
federal-state policy interaction in the diffusion process. The effects of federalism are analyzed through 
both quantitative and qualitative methods. 
A final theoretical goal of this analysis is to improve the methods used in policy diffusion 
research. This analysis will use mixed methods to give both breadth and depth to our understanding of 
policy diffusion. Most research to date has failed to combine quantitative analysis with in-depth case 
studies, limiting the ability of scholars to contend with variables not easily quantified.  
Applied Contributions 
For practitioners or those studying organic policy, this research serves as a foundation for 
improving our understanding of organic policy development as well as addressing a couple of 
contemporary concerns in the organic market. While there are numerous scholarly, government and 
practitioner pieces on organic policy, there is no comprehensive study examining the development of 
organic policy in the U.S. accounting for state-federal interaction. Moreover, there are substantial 
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discrepancies in the literature on which states passed organic regulation, how that regulation became law, 
what year regulation was passed, and what the content of the regulation entailed for implementation. 
While establishing a comprehensive history may be a contribution of itself, the history of organic food 
and agriculture legislation among U.S. states from a policy diffusion perspective may help address a 
number of contemporary concerns in the organic market.  
As identified in Chapter I, two current concerns in the organic market include increasing 
competition in the marketplace with other food labeling schemes and geographic-specific challenges. The 
historical development in policy in U.S. states may help to address these concerns. In particular, the 
results of this research can help to address how organics’ biggest market competition stems from locally-
grown food as opposed to natural, GMO-identified, or other food labeling schemes. The local versus 
organic competitions may be based not only on different consumer driven demands but by negative 
perceptions of organic. This may be particularly true in light of geographic-specific challenges. In 
essence, the lower figures for certified organic operations in Southeast may be attributed to consumer 










 This chapter will give an overview of the research methods used in this study and will detail the 
quantitative methodology. However, discussion of the comparative case study methods, the qualitative 
portion of the research, willed be detailed in Chapter V. This chapter will begin by covering the research 
questions of this study. Second, the justification for using a mixed methods research approach will be 
covered. Next, this chapter will cover the policy diffusion model utilized for this study and identify each 
hypothesis tested. Finally, the chapter will conclude with a description of the quantitative methods used. 
Specifically, the chapter concludes with an explanation for the time-series analysis conducted to 
determine what factors contributed to the diffusion of organic food and agriculture legislation in U.S. 
states.  
Research Questions 
 This study seeks to answer one broad question and a series of more specific questions aimed to 
give more depth to the analysis. The following research questions are asked:  
 Why do some states adopt organic food and agriculture legislation while others do not? 
o What conditions (i.e. political, economic, and industry-related variables) influence the 
initial adoption of organic policies? 
o What conditions influence the modification of organic policies? 
o What conditions influence the type of regulatory organic policy adopted? 
To explore these research questions, state- and time-specific data was collected, used to create some new 
variables, and assessed for each of the fifty American states for the calendar years 1976-2010. Additional 
years will be considered through qualitative inquiry where appropriate.  
Justification for Mixed Methods 
 This research uses a mixed methods approach to strengthen the analysis and to overcome some of 
the limitations that stem from using only quantitative or qualitative methods. A mixed method research 
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design can refer to use of a combination of either philosophical assumptions or data collection and 
analysis techniques (Creswell and Clark 2007, 5). For this analysis, the mixed methods design emphasizes 
the dynamic of data triangulation (i.e. the methods of inquiry) by using a combination of quantitative and 
qualitative approaches to collecting and analyzing data.  
It is widely recognized that mixed methods research designs have significant benefits (Creswell, 
2009; George and Bennett 2005; Gerring 2007; King, Keohane, and Verba, 1994; Patton 2001; Riccucci 
2010; Tashakkori and Teddlie 2003; Yang, Zhang, and Holzer 2008). Specifically, a mixed methods 
approach can overcome the shortcomings that arise by solely relying on quantitative or qualitative 
methods and increase the validity and credibility of research findings). Quantitative techniques are ideal 
for deriving broader generalizations but generally lack the ability for specificity or in-depth analysis of 
underlying causal mechanisms. Qualitative methods, however, can provide specific details and in-depth 
analysis of a few cases but lacks the ability to derive broad generalizations from research findings 
(George and Bennett 2005; Riccucci 2010).  
The ability of researchers to achieve both breadth and depth within the analysis is crucial for 
improving the quality of research findings. This type of analysis is intended to serve both theoretical and 
applied purposes because a mixed methods approach can help to deliver the best results for both scholars 
and practitioners. Several scholars claim that mixed methods research in applied fields, such as public 
administration, is crucial for deriving significance of research results (Gerring 2007; Patton 2001; 
Riccucci 2010). As Riccucci (2010, 109) states, “Triangulation, or mixed methods, becomes particularly 
important in applied fields in that it provides flexibility in efforts to find solutions to practical, real-world 
problems.” Using a mixed methods approach for this research aids in improving public policy and public 
administration theory but also informs practitioners and those interested in organic and alternative 
agricultural policy. 
In addition to improving the validity of the research findings, using mixed methods can also 
overcome limitations encountered with collecting data. There are a number of limitations of this research 
design. First and foremost, the element of time presents a number of challenges in collecting and 
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analyzing data in this study. The availability of data ranging from 1976-2010 is limited; especially for a 
quantitative investigation. Subsequently, a small number of the variables used in the analysis contain 
missing information for certain years. Furthermore, statistical documentation was not collected for 
particular variables for most years included within this analysis. For example, the inclusion of measures 
for state environmental performance or state health quality may have proved statistically significant in the 
adoption of organic legislation given the characteristics of consumers and farming methods. However, no 
continuous state environmental or health index exists, which could explain how other policy areas or 
concerns coincide with organic adoption. Likewise, detailed information pertaining to organic cropland, 
existence of certifiers, and state agency rulings are also lacking. To statistically construct any of these 
measures under the time limitations of this project is insurmountable if not impossible. 
A number of additional variables were excluded for quantitative evaluation due to access and 
subjectivity concerns. Specifically, policy entrepreneurs, organic agricultural networks, and the influence 
of other related policies are difficult to quantify. While legislative and academic archives have 
documented the organic movement and subsequent legislation, it is difficult to measure the presence of 
industry networks and policy entrepreneurs. In particular, many of the events of interest occurred almost 
forty years ago. This presents extensive opportunity for subjectivity and bias to enter a statistical analysis 
of policy diffusion.  On a similar note, the ability to access older legislative archives to assess proposed, 
or other related, legislation is challenging. For example, other policies related to organic regulation 
adoption could reasonably include policies geared toward natural, local, free-trade, and GMO labeling. 
Yet, a wide array of environmental and health policies could also be linked to organic policies including 
farm bills, food safety regulations, and restrictions on pesticide use. While narrowing the scope of related 
issues would be manageable if even imperfect, collecting data for each proposed or passed policy would 
be time-intensive and likely impossible for earlier years of this analysis. 
A second limitation regards the scope of the analysis. A comprehensive evaluation of organic 
policy diffusion could incorporate bureaucratic rule-making, U.S. localities, and other countries as 
influences on state and federal adoption. The creation of standards by Yolo County, California, EU 
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countries, IFOAM, and Codex Alimentarius represent the creation of standards on a sub-national, 
national, supranational, and international scale from the 1970s to today. However, incorporation of these 
additional governmental levels in this investigation would eliminate or dilute the theoretical 
improvements to the diffusion model in assessing state-federal interaction in policy diffusion.  
An Enhanced Unified Policy Diffusion Model 
 As discussed in chapter II of this dissertation, there are two unified models of policy diffusion in 
the political science literature. Berry and Berry’s event history analysis [EHA] policy diffusion model
46
 is 
the oldest and most tested unified model. Based on Mohr’s (1969) work on organizational innovation, 
Berry and Berry (1990; 1992) developed the EHA policy diffusion model to assess motivation, obstacles 
and resources for innovation adoption. Using pooled cross-sectional data, the EHA model suggests policy 
adoption is the function of motivation to innovate, obstacles to innovate, resources available to innovate, 
other policies, and external events. Berry and Berry’s (2007)  EHA policy diffusion model equation is as 
follows: 
ADOPTi,t = ƒ(MOTIVATIONi,t , RESOURCES/OBSTACLESi,t ,  
OTHERPOLICIESi,t ,EXTERNALi,t ) 
 
Berry and Berry’s model borrows from event history analysis techniques used in biostatistics. 
Like medical research, examination of policy diffusion account for longitudinal examination of the 
probability of an event occurring over a period of time for entities within a designated population. In 
medical research, individuals are at risk for the given event occurring at some point in time. For policy 
diffusion studies, government entities, including states, are at risk for adopting an innovative policy or 
program. The probability of adoption occurring is called the hazard rate. According to Berry and Berry 
(1990, 399), in policy diffusion hazard rate is defined as “the probability of a state adopting a policy 
during a particular period, given that it has not already adopted it in a previous period.”  In the model 
above, each variable represents a set of conditions likely to affect the probability of adoption.  Table 3.1 
identifies each model variable, what it measures, and examples of factors used to determine its effect. 
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 Berry and Berry’s model may be referred to as the EHA model. However, EHA is a truly a 
methodological technique. Most policy diffusion scholars use EHA models in their research.  
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Table 3.1: EHA Model Variables 
Model Variable Measuring Included Factors/Conditions  
ADOPTi,t 
The adoption of a policy as broadly 
defined 
Adoption of a policy in a given year or 
timeframe 
MOTIVATIONi,t 
The factors that motivate public or 
elected official to act on a particular 
problem 
Problem severity, public opinion, electoral 
competition, focusing events 
RESOURCES/ 
OBSTACLESi,t 
The factors that prevent or create 
barriers to adoption 
State legislature professionalism, skill of 
policy entrepreneur, strength of advocacy 
coalition, economic development level 
OTHERPOLICIESi,t 
The presence of other adopted 
policies that could influence 
adoption outcome 
A set of dummy variables for related issue-
specific policies 
EXTERNALi,t 
The behavior of other governmental 
entities (e.g. state, local, federal)that 
would influence adoption decision 
Adoption or other governmental decisions  
 
The EHA diffusion equation identified above is the culmination of the original 1990 EHA model 
and the subsequent modifications made to address its limitations related to vertical diffusion, policy 
modification, understanding policy learning v. mimicking, and quality of policy (Berry and Berry 2007; 
Karch 2006; Karch and Cravens 2011; Shipan and Volden 2006, 2008). The factors composing each 
model variable have been identified by referencing the policy process literature and relevant substantive 
policy literature. To date, there is no agreement on which measurements should be used to test the model 
for all issue areas. 
Boushey’s contagion model represents a second unified model of policy diffusion. The contagion 
model works to address some of the limitations not addressed by the EHA model. However, the contagion 
model has not been rigorously tested by scholars. While Boushey does not provide an equation like Berry 
and Berry, a testable equation for the contagion model would look like the following: 
 ADOPTi,t = ƒ(INNOVATIONCHARACi,t , INTEREST/PROFESSIONALGROUPSi,t , 
STATECHARACi,t, ISSUESALIENCE/NATMOODi,t) 
 
 Like the Berry and Berry’s EHA model, ADOPTi,t remains the probability of adoption, and the 
model variables represents a set of conditions likely to influence adoption. Table 3.2 outlines each 
contagion model variable, what it is measuring, and factors used to determine its effect. The biggest  
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Table 3.2: Contagion Model Variables 
Model Variable Measuring Included Factors/Conditions  
ADOPTi,t 
The adoption of a policy as 
broadly defined 
Adoption of legislation in a given year 
or timeframe 
INNOVATIONCHARACi,t Issue complexity Program costs, emotional appeal  
INTEREST/ 
PROFESSIONALGROUPSi,t 
The presence and magnitude 
effect of interest groups 
Interest group advocates, presence of 
interest groups 
STATECHARACi,t State characteristics 
Economic conditions, political 
conditions, social conditions 
ISSUESALIENCE/ 
NATMOODi,t 
Attention and perception of the 
issue 
Citizen opinion, media attention, 
frequency of media attention 
 
departure from Berry and Berry’s model is the inclusion of innovation characteristics, which incorporates 
the element of policy type. Boushey examines the passage of three types of policies, each with varying 
degrees of complexity or conflict. An additional departure from Berry and Berry’s model is the exclusion 
of external pressures created by other state governments, federal policy, or regional pressures. The 
contagion model does not explicitly address regional or isomorphic patterns of diffusion. 
This analysis combines elements of the Berry and Berry’s policy diffusion model and Boushey’s 
contagion model to examine the diffusion of organic food and agriculture legislation. Combining the two 
models is significant because it accounts for the influence of policy typology and modification into the 
diffusion process while maintaining representation of internal and external conditions that influence 
adoption. Three equations were developed for this analysis. Each equation demonstrates that external 
conditions, internal conditions, and salience each uniquely affect adoption, enacted statutes, and policy 
type. During the policy process, policy typology is determined prior to the adoption decision. 
Furthermore, drawing from Simon’s (1947) bounded rationality, the existence of previously adopted 
legislation may influence future modifications of the policy by constraining alternative choices, but also 
through reducing risk associated with adopting innovative policy. The proposed equations to be used in 
this analysis include the following: 
ADOPTi,t =  ƒ(INTERNALi,t , EXTERNALi,t, SALIENCEi,t, EXSPOLICYi,t , POLICYTYPEi,t) 
POLICYTYPE i,t =  ƒ(INTERNALi,t , EXTERNALi,t, SALIENCEi,t, EXSPOLICYi,t ,) 




 The primary dependent variable in this analysis is adoption of organic policy (ADOPTi,t), which is 
broadly conceived as legislation passed in regards to regulating the organic food and agriculture market. 
As will be discussed later, my coding for ADOPTi,t departs from the hazard rate approach of the original 
EHA model and most other policy diffusion studies. Specifically, variables were calculated for all 
adoption, initial adoption, and amending adoptions. For all adoption models, once a state adopts organic 
policy it does not lead to exclusion of that state being at risk for further adoptions. States can continue to 
remain at risk to adopt organic policy even after initial adoption or subsequent modifications because 
states may continue to adopt legislation for every additional year included with the model thereby never 
diminish the risk of adoption or hazard rate.  
Table 3.3: Enhanced Unified Model Variables 
Model Variable Measuring Included Factors/Conditions 
ADOPTi,t 
The adoption of a policy as broadly 
defined 
For this analysis, adoption includes adoption 
of legislation pertaining to regulating the 
organic food and agriculture market. 
POLICYTYPE i,t Type of policy adopted 
Type of policy (e.g. regulatory, 
redistributive) with consideration of 
complexity and implementation measures   
EXSPOLICYi,t 
Measures years in which statutes 
are enacted for the policy 
Enacted state statutes in a given year and 
could include administrative rules if 
necessary 
INTERNALi,t   
State characteristics or internal 
conditions of state 
Socio-economic conditions, political factors, 
local government activity 
EXTERNALi,t 
Influences of other governmental 
entities outside of the state 
Federal, regional, and other state pressures 
SALIENCEi,t 
Attention and perception of the 
issue 
Citizen opinion, media attention, frequency 
of media attention 
 
Policy type (POLICYTYPE i,t) and the existence of policy (EXSPOLICYi,t) are two endogenous 
variables. Each simultaneously influences adoption decisions but is also determined by the adoption 
outcome. In Boushey’s contagion model of diffusion, he discusses the policy type as a function of the 
innovation characteristics itself including whether it is governance, regulatory, or morality policy. This 
analysis is not based on Boushey’s innovation qualities, but rather the policy typology presented by Lowi 
(1972) and redefined by Spitzer (1987). Furthermore, this study includes the potential for existing policy 
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limiting the options and behavior for change overtime. As it relates to epidemiology, a host that has been 
infected by the disease once before may either develop immunity, as in the case of chicken pox, or change 
behavior to avoid further outbreaks (e.g. washing hands during cold season). For states, this could 
translate into behavioral patterns that explain why some states may be more likely to adopt amending 
legislation than others. While innovation is not necessarily a terrible “disease,” some states may be more 
open to transmitting the policy and even modifying its content, which can either increase the spread of 
innovation or decrease it. The change of the innovation overtime is akin to adaptation of viruses and 
disease to changing conditions in the environment and potential hosts. Chapter V, which details the 
specifics the qualitative methods used this analysis, provides further detail on how each variable is 
conceptualized. In sum, the inclusion of these variables aids in overcoming the shortcoming of the EHA 
model in appropriately addressing policy type as an influential factor of adoption. Both variables allow 
for ease in determining how modification over time results in different forms of organic regulation. In 
addition, each variable aids in assessing how federal adoption impacted state organic policy action.  
 In light of previous versions of the EHA model and the contagion model, internal conditions, 
external conditions, and salience were constructed as separate model variables. The external conditions 
(EXTERNALi,t) is based on the EHA external determinants variable. The internal determinant variable 
(INTERNALi,t) draws upon state characteristics, presence of interest groups, resources, and motivation to 
adopt as components of internal determinants.  Finally, the assessment of issue salience (SALIENCEi,t) 
was constructed as neither an internal nor external variable because of difficulties in determining how 
information may spatially spread or be used. Assessing issue salience contends with the local and national 
attention to a particular issue without the potential problem of limiting the effects to one particular state or 
region. 
 A notable exclusion from the model formula used for this research is a variable considering other 
related policies (OTHERPOLICIESi,t) that was used in Berry and Berry’s EHA model formula. Several 
reasons led to the exclusion of this variable in this initial investigation. First and foremost, organic food 
and agriculture sits at the crossroads of many related policies in public health, the environment, and 
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agricultural considerations including economic considerations, as well. Disentangling which related 
policies may relate or influence the adoption of organic legislation may detract from the primary focus of 
this research. Specifically, this research clarifies and provides a comprehensive history and evaluation of 
organic policy in U.S. states. Before investigating related issue areas, there is more immediate need to 
fully explore the diffusion pattern and causes of organic food and agriculture legislation. However, future 
research should address how other related policies or issue areas, such as policies that address local foods, 
water and land conservation, may influence adoption, amendments, and termination of innovative policies 
in the states. In addition, this research is also improving the policy diffusion literature by improving the 
model, expanding the methods utilized, fully examining policy typology change, and assessing federal 
impact on state policy trajectories.   
Hypotheses 
 Eighteen hypotheses were developed based upon the policy diffusion literature, the policy process 
literature, and the history of the organic food and agriculture industry. The hypotheses are categorized 
under one of the several model variables identified above. Table 3.4 lists each hypothesis and 
coordinating model variable. As will be discussed later, some hypotheses will be tested using mixed 
methods while others may rely solely on a qualitative evaluation. For those tested through mixed 
methods, variables included to test each hypothesis in the time-series analysis will be discussed in the 
quantitative methods subsection of this chapter. 
INTERNALi,t Hypotheses 
 Nine hypotheses were developed to test how state internal characteristics may influence adoption 
of organic legislation. The hypotheses examine how a state’s socio-economic, political, and general 
innovativeness contributes to the adoption probability.  
 The first hypothesis is based upon Walker’s (1969) conclusion that certain states like New York, 
California, Massachusetts, and Michigan are more innovative states that set regional pace of adoption. 
This hypothesis is significant because it is testing if innovativeness is a state characteristic. In the early 
Walker-Gray debate, Gray (1973a, 1973b) claimed that innovativeness was issue and time specific at 
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best. This analysis is predicting that innovativeness is a state characteristic, and it is more likely to lead to 
specific early adopters like New York, California, Massachusetts, and Michigan. 
The next four hypotheses are used to examine political factors (see Table 3.4). While there is no agreed 
upon set of political hypotheses to test in policy diffusion studies, the collective evidence from the 
literature and the history of the organic food sector and agriculture point to a four key political 
hypotheses. In general, it is expected that states are more likely to adopt legislation if the state legislature 
is more professionalized,
47
 state government is controlled by Democrats,
48
 and the state government is not 
divided.
49
 Each hypothesis demonstrates the capacity and underlying motivations to adopt innovative 
policies, such as organic food and agriculture legislation, both of which require consideration of the 
collective good but may go against contemporary beliefs. 
The last four internal condition hypotheses pertain to economic and industry-related conditions 
within a state. As previous research found, wealthier states were more likely to adopt innovative policies. 
Similarly, it is found that wealthier individuals are more likely to purchase organic foods. Therefore, it is 
predicted that wealthier states are more likely to adopt organic food legislation than poorer states as 
predicted in H6. 
The remaining internal determinant variables and hypotheses (H7, H8, and H9) each pertain to 
the agriculture industry within a state. All three hypotheses are based on broader agriculture and organic 
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 This assumption has been tested by policy diffusion scholars with mixed-evidence. Shipan and Volden 
(2006) were the first to argue that state legislature professionalism may lead adoption of innovative 
policies. 
48
 For organic policy, which is grounded in a number of environmental health movements, it is expected 
that more liberal states will adopt legislation. Democrats have been identified as being more sympathetic 
to environmental causes and policy than Republicans (see Kamieniecki 1997; Kraft 2012; McCright and 
Dunlap 2011; Shipan and Lowry 2001). Despite environmental concerns being weak in national elections, 
environmentalists often vote for Democratic candidates (Duffy 2003). Overtime, the two parties diverge 
in environmental policy positions with particular divergence during poor economic times where there is 
high unemployment (Shipan and Lowry 2001). 
49
 While there is no conclusive evidence to demonstrate the effect of divided government on policy 
outcomes, this analysis does take into consideration the potential effects of divided government on 
adoption decisions. For more detailed examination of divided government consequence see Mayhew’s 
(1991) Divided We Govern. 
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Table 3.4: Hypotheses 
Model Variable Hypothesis 
INTERNALi,t 
H1: California, New York, Massachusetts, and Michigan are more likely to be early 
adopters of organic legislation. 
H2: More professionalized state legislatures are more likely to adopt organic 
legislation than less professionalized state legislatures. 
H3: States with divided government are less likely to adopt organic legislation. 
H4: States with Democratic partisan control are more likely to pass organic legislation 
than Republican or divided partisan control. 
H5: States with a moralistic political culture are more likely to adopt organic 
legislation than states with traditionalist political culture. 
H6: States with higher per capita income are more likely to adopt organic legislation 
than states with lower per capita income. 
H7: States with a higher percentage of total GDP resulting from agriculture are more 
likely to adopt organic legislation. 
H8: States with a higher percentage of total agriculture sales resulting from fruit and 
vegetable sales are more likely to adopt organic legislation. 
H9: States with third-party certification programs are more likely to adopt organic 
legislation than states with no certification programs. 
 
EXTERNALi,t 
H10: States are more likely to adopt organic legislation if a state within the same 
region adopts organic regulation. 
H11: States are more likely to adopt organic legislation when there is a higher 
percentage of states in the region that have existing organic statutes. 
H12: States are more likely to adopt organic regulation if states with similar economic 
and political conditions adopt organic policy. 
H13: States are more likely to adopt legislation during the post-federal adoption period 
between 1990-1992 than the 1993-2002 time period. 
H14: States are more likely to adopt legislation to terminate state organic statutes after 
official implementation of the NOP in 2002. 
 
SALIENCEi,t 




H16: States are more likely to adopt organic legislation that provides strict regulatory 
rules or guidelines in the 1970s than later decades. 




H18: More innovative states are more likely to amend organic food and agriculture 




agriculture literature.H7 focuses on the size of the total agricultural industry relative to the state’s total 
GDP. It is predicted that states are more likely to adopt organic legislation when there is a higher 
percentage of total GDP resulting from the agricultural industry. While this may be counterintuitive based 
on the historical rift between conventional and alternative agricultural practices, there are a few reasons 
for the direction of this hypothesis. First, states with larger agriculture industries may have more 
resources or climate-related ability to invest or experiment with alternative production methods. Second, 
the shift in organic agriculture from a fringe to mainstream industry means the total agriculture GDP does 
represent economic activity of the organic industry as well particularly starting in the 1990s as organic 
sales increased.  
However, the effect of increased agricultural productivity may also increase the amount of money 
going into political lobbying and other activities on behalf of conventional agriculture. Evidence from 
studies on European Union Farmers suggests that the diffusion of organic farming practices from country 
to country is based on the dominant farm type such as arable or specialist animal farming (Gabriel et al. 
2009; Kaufmanna et al. 2011; Kerselaers et al. 2007; Michelsen et al. 2001). If a similar pattern holds true 
for diffusion among U.S. states, organic agriculture growth may only be minimally contributing to the 
over GDP or GNP. Therefore, agricultural policy decisions may still be made through the iron triangle 
(see Figure 1.1) between the USDA, commodity agricultural interests, and Congressional agricultural 
committees (Bellemare and Carnes 2013; Ingram and Ingram 2005). Some policies may emerge to 
support alternative agricultural production methods, because of rising power in urban consumer groups in 
agricultural policy (Winders and Scott 2009), 80, but major agricultural policy developments would be in 
support of conventional agriculture.   
H8 examines how production and sales of specialty crops, like fruits and vegetables, influences 
adoption decisions. This hypothesis is partially the result of limitations in more pertinent data being 
unavailable overtime but is meant to be a proxy for a state’s relative levels of specialty crop production. 
Alston and Pardey (2008) argue for more research to be directed toward specialty crop production 
because of the “social rate of return” to making fruit and vegetables more affordable and available to 
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include in healthy diets. While organic food sales still remain as only a small percentage of total food 
sales in the past decade,
50
 organic fruit and vegetables historically constitute the largest percentage of 
organic food sales in the U.S.  According to OTA (2011a), organic fruit and vegetable sales constitute 
39.7% of all organic sales in 2010. While there are many consumer reasons for purchasing organic foods, 
health is often a primary consideration (OTA 2011b). Therefore, it is expected that states with higher 
sales of fruit and vegetables are more likely to potentially benefit from the margins that can be gained 
with certification, and thus, may be more likely to adopt organic legislation. 
 Finally, H9 considers the role and existence of certification programs within a state on adoption 
decisions. Lee (2009) claims that third-party certifiers influenced adoption in an earlier period; his data 
ran from 1973-2000.
51
 Therefore, it would also be expected that the presence of an organic certifying 
program operating within a state would more likely lead to adoption of regulating policy than states with 
no certifying organizations.  
EXTERNALi,t Hypotheses 
 The diffusion literature identified both horizontal and vertical dimensions of external influence. 
Five hypotheses address the two dimensions. The first three external determinant hypotheses (H10, H11, 
and H12) examine the horizontal dimension of diffusion. H10 and H11 are based on the regional model of 
diffusion. While H10 considers the influence of more adopting states, H11 contends with the numbers 
states that have existing organic food statutes. Both predict a positive relationship but H11 gives 
consideration to how termination of the policy in one state or region may decrease the pressure on non-
adopting states. 
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 OTA (2011a) estimated 4% of all food sales were organic food sales in 2010. 
51
 Due to discrepancies in Lee’s data set and concerns over measurements of adoption and certification 
organizations, this research cautiously references his work. Lee considered administrative rules as an 
equivalent adoption to legislation and did not include several state adoptions, such as New York, as part 
of his research. This research considers legislative rulemaking a separate form of adoption as it involves a 
different set of decision-makers. In addition, Lee’s work does not provide details on the certification 
organizations he used in his analysis. Considering his exclusion of a state such as New York, there may 
be reason to believe he also may have missed critical data for certifying organizations. 
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 H12 is based on an isomorphism model of diffusion. It is expected that states that share similar 
economic and political conditions will be more likely to adopt organic policy. The inclusion of an 
isomorphism model of diffusion and a regional diffusion model is meant to overcome the limitations of 
geographic clustering (Shipan and Volden 2012; Volden, Ting, and Carpenter 2008). States in the same 
geographic area may share similar political, economic and demographic characteristics, which may 
undermine explanations for regional diffusion. Therefore, both an isomorphic and regional hypotheses are 
included in this analysis. 
 The last two external determinant hypotheses (H13 and H14) test vertical dimensions of diffusion 
over time. H13 tests the time period between initial federal adoption and the effective date of the final 
rule in 2002. The 1990-1992 time period is expected to have more state adoptions than the 1993-2002 
period. The early 1990s period had more uncertainty regarding implementation given a delay developing 
rules until 1993. Uncertainty of when official implementation would begin could theoretically deter state 
investment in developing or modifying existing policies. The decline in adoption after 1992 is expected 
because official rule development finally began. States adoptions from 1993-2002 would be operating 
under more certainty of federal law eventually being established.  
H14 examines the post-final rule era. It is expected that states are more likely to terminate 
legislation after the 2002 implementation of the final rule. Official implementation of the federal program 
denotes the need for states to assess and appropriately realign policy to comply with federal law.  
SALIENCEi,t, Hypothesis 
As noted by numerous public policy scholars (see Baumgartner and Jones 2009; Kingdon 2003; Sabatier 
and Weible 2007), high issue salience, also described as the national mood, is associated with elevated 
attention to a policy problem and the potential to lead to change in the policy system. For this analysis, 
salience is neither an external variable nor confined as an internal determinant. Both national events and 
local/state events can contribute to mass media attention to organic food and agricultural issues. H15 




POLICYTYPE i,t & EXSPOLICYi,t Hypotheses 
Based on the changing nature of policy development and reduced risk of modifying existing 
policies (see Simon 1947; Walker 1969), three hypotheses are proposed based on the underlying premises 
of POLICYTYPE i,t and  EXSPOLICYi,t..  Two hypotheses, H16 and H17, were developed regarding 
policy type. First, it is expected that organic legislation in the 1970s is more likely to provide strict rules 
and regulatory guidelines for the production and sale of organic foods. This expectation is grounded in 
changes in political attitudes towards regulations in the 1980s. The Reagan administration downsized the 
size of government and sought to deregulation to create a more efficient government. The Clinton 
administration continued to carry the emphasis on more efficient government in the 1990s. Therefore, the 
expectation is more strict regulatory policy would be more likely to occur in the 1970s prior to 
downsizing and deregulation. Second, it is expected that organic legislation in the 1980s is more likely to 
shift to a co-regulatory or less coercive policy type as a result of deregulation and emphasis on smaller 
government.. Specifically, using Sptizer’s (1987) refocusing of the Lowi policy typology (see Chapter V 
for detailed conceptualization), the movement from more coercive regulatory policy to less coercive 
policy would theoretically confirm to increased regulation without increasing the size of government. 
These two hypotheses are informed by the historical shift in regulatory policy where governments began 
to seek less-coercive and more cooperative arrangements with industry.  
The final hypothesis, H18, assesses how more innovative states are more likely to continually 
adjust existing organic policy. It is expected that current state leaders in organic food and agriculture 
policy are more likely to consistently amend policy, indicating a fine-tuning and reassessment of policy 
performance. 
Quantitative Methods 
 The quantitative methods used in this research includes analysis of state-annual annual data from 
1976-2010. A total of 37 variables
52
 were utilized to test 14 of the 18 hypotheses. H9, H16, H17, and H18 
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 The variables time and statenum (i.e. state identification numbers) are not included in the 37 variable 
count. These variables are included in univariate descriptive statistics and correlation assessment.  
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will be tested through the comparative case studies. While the comprehensive model includes 
POLICYTYPE i,t  and EXSPOLICYi,t, the model used for the quantitative portion of this research does not 
include either variable due to limitations in statistical measurements.  
Data Collection 
 Data for both independent and dependent variables was collected through archived materials. The 
independent variables are based on available data from government and academic sources. Government 
sources include the United State Department of Agriculture, the Bureau of Economic Analysis, and the 
Census Bureau.  
 For the dependent variables, archived materials were cross-referenced with law library staff, 
career civil servants, or organic agriculture interest groups. Initial information was collected through 
surveying the current organic policy literature and evaluating current and historical state statutes and 
administrative rules. After compiling a list of states that had either passed legislation or administrative 
rules, a list of states to further examine was generated, and dates of initial legislative adoption, amending 
legislative adoption, and effective dates for statutes were confirmed.  
Dependent Variables 
 Three binary dependent variables are used in this analysis to give a dynamic evaluation of 
adoption and appropriately answer the research questions of this project (see Table 3.5). The first 
dependent variable (adopt) measures all adoptions of organic legislation in a calendar year. The second 
dependent variable (iadopt) measures only the adoption of initial organic legislation in calendar year. 
Finally, the amending adoption variable (aadopt) measures only the adoption of amending organic 
legislation in a calendar year. For each measure of adoption, total annual adoption numbers are calculated 
under three separate variables (totadopt, totiadopt, and totaadopt). 
 Passed legislation was counted as an adoption if it outlined organic food and agriculture 
regulations, delegated policy-making power to administrative agencies, created task forces, or some 
combination of regulations, task forces, or delegated power. Non-substantive legislation, legislation 
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funding organic agriculture research to universities, or legislation that was proposed but never passed was 
not included as an adoption. 
For this analysis, administrative rules are considered a separate form of law than state statutes or 
code created by legislative action. Previous policy diffusion studies have used varying combinations of 
law in assessing adoption. Some scholars may consider administrative rules as interchangeable with 
legislative bills or resolutions. Yet, administrative law has a different set of decision-makers and a 
separate decision-making process than the legislative bills or resolutions. Therefore, states that only had 
organic administrative rules but no state statutory code were excluded from this analysis. Massachusetts, 
Ohio, Rhode Island, and Utah are states identified as having administrative rules developed not based on 
organic food and agriculture statutes. For states where administrative rules pre-dated legislative action, 
the initial adoption and amending adoption dates are reflected. Texas and Oregon were identified in 
having administrative rules pre-dating legislative action. 
Independent Variables 
 A total of 28 independent variables were included this analysis. Table 3.5 details each 
independent variable and how it is included within the broader diffusion model. 
INTERNALi,t Variables 
Thirteen independent variables are used to test internal condition hypotheses. State legislative 
professionalism (stlegprof) is calculated using Squire’s (2007) assessment of data from 1960, 1979, 1986, 
1996, 2004, and 2009. For missing years, legislative professionalism was calculated through interpolation 
and extrapolation as needed. Under this variable, states that have more professionalized state legislatures 
would have scores closer to 1 whereas less professional legislatures would be scored closer to 0. Squire’s 
measure uses member pay, staff members per legislator and total days in session to calculate the 
professionalism rate. U.S. Congress is used a baseline for an ideal professionalized legislature; States are 
compared to the U.S. congressional baseline. 
This analysis elects to use scaled version Elazar’s political cultures (sharkculmeas) to assess the 
influence of political beliefs on adoption. Unlike other political ideology measures, political culture 
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encompasses broader conceptualization for the scope of government and moves beyond the Republican-
Democrat dichotomous categorization. Sharkansky’s (1969) scaled version of political cultures eliminates 
some of the problems in relying on a dichotomous assessment of each state’s culture. In particular, the 
political cultures were not envisioned as a continuum but rather a circular reference. Dichotomous 
measures lack the ability to contend with dominant moralistic cultures that contain strong individualistic 
or traditionalist strains. The scaled version accounts for the presence of strong contradictory strains in 
culture with 1 equal to a perfect moralistic culture, 5 equal to a perfect individualistic culture, and 9 equal 
to a perfect traditionalist culture. According to Elazar (1972), moralistic cultures value government 
service as a public good whereas traditionalists political cultures (i.e. the South) favor a more limited role 
of government. Individualistic cultures are more utilitarian in nature and politics is seen as a business. A 
state’s political culture can be predominantly one culture but contain strong strains of another culture. 
While there are inherent limitations to using political culture (Lieske 1993; Nardulli 1990), scholars have 
found moralistic states to be more likely to adopt policy innovations (Boushey 2010; Karch and Cravens 
2011).  
Two final internal political variables are partisan control (parcont) and divided government 
(dividedgov). Each variable originates from Klaner’s (2013) state partisan balance data set. Partisan 
control is Klaner’s (2013) true government control variable (true_government_cont_a2), which “ignores 
the part of the governor when there are veto proof majorities in the state legislature.” Divided government 
is a binary variable where 1 indicated divided government and 0 equals unified control of the governor’s 
office and both chambers of the legislature.  
The last three internal conditions variables test the economic and industry hypotheses. Per capita 
income (pcwealth) is measured through both a raw number and logged version. The industry variables 
include assessments of market value sales percentages and logged variables of the market value sales. The 
log of fruit and vegetable sales (logfru & logveg) were created by logging the raw figure of market values  
The last three internal conditions variables test the economic and industry hypotheses. Per capita 
income (pcwealth) is measured through both a raw number and logged version. The industry variables 
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Table 3.5: Description of Variables 
Model Variable Variable Description Level of Measurement 
 adopt State adoption of organic legislation 
(whether initial or amending) 
0 = No Adoption 
1 = Adoption 
 iadopt State initial adoption of organic 
legislation 
0 = No Adoption 
1 = Initial Adoption 
ADOPTi,t 
aadopt State adoption of organic legislation 
that amends state statutes 
0 = No Adoption 
1 = Amending Adoption 
totstadopt Total number of state adoptions 
(initial or amending) in a year 
Interval (0-50) 
 
 totiadopt Total number of state initial adoptions 
in a year 
Interval (0-50) 
 
 totaadopt Total number of state amending 









stenact Total number of state statutes 
officially enacted in a year 
 
 
0 = No Enacted Statutes 
1 = Enacted Statutes 
 
stlegprof State legislative professionalism 
Interval (0-1) 
0 = Less Professional 
1 = More Professional 
 
sharkculmeas 
Sharkansky’s measurement of 
Elazar’s political cultures (Moralistic, 
Individualistic, Traditionalist) 
Interval (1-9) 
1 = Perfectly Moralistic 
5 = Perfectly 
Individualistic 




Party that truly controls state 
government (ignores governor’s party 
when veto-proof majority) 
-1 = Republican Control 
0 = Neither Party in 
Control 
1 = Democratic Control 
 
dividedgov 
Divided government – control of state 
government institutions (two 
chambers of legislature and 
governor’s office) 
0 = All 3 Institutions 
Controlled by Same Party 
1 = All 3 Institutions Not 
Controlled by Same Party 
 
pcweatlh 
Per capita income of residents in a 
state 
Interval 
 logpcw Log of pcwealth -- 
 
Peraggdp 
Percentage of state’s gdp that results 




Model Variable Variable Description Level of Measurement 
 logpagdp Log of peraggdp -- 
 fruper Percentage of state agricultural market 
value sales resulting from fruit, tree 
nuts, and berries 
Interval (0-100%) 
INTERNALi,t logfru Log of fruper -- 
vegper Percentage of state agricultural market 
value sales resulting from vegetables, 
melons, potatoes and sweet potatoes 
Interval (0-100%) 





Agricultural Marketing Service seven 
agricultural regions designation 
1 = Far West 
2 = Rocky Mountain 
3 = Southwest 
4 = North Central 
5 = Southeast 
6 = Mid-Atlantic 
7 = Northeast 
 ar71 Far West Dummy Variable 
(Alaska, California, Hawaii, Nevada, 
Oregon, Washington) 
0 = Not in Region 
1 = In Region 
 ar72 Rocky Mountain Dummy Variable 
(Arizona, Colorado, Idaho, New 
Mexico, Montana, Utah, Wyoming) 
0 = Not in Region 
1 = In Region 
EXTERNALi,t ar73 Southwest Dummy Variable 
(Arkansas, Louisiana, Oklahoma, 
Texas) 
0 = Not in Region 
1 = In Region 
 ar74 North Central Dummy Variable 
(Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, 
Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, 
Nebraska, North Dakota, Ohio, South 
Dakota, Wisconsin) 
0 = Not in Region 
1 = In Region 
 ar75 Southeast Dummy Variable 
(Alabama, Florida, Georgia, 
Kentucky, Mississippi, North 
Carolina, South Carolina, Tennessee) 
0 = Not in Region 
1 = In Region 
 ar76 Mid-Atlantic Dummy Variable 
(Delaware, Maryland, New Jersey, 





0 = Not in Region 
1 = In Region 
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Model Variable Variable Description Level of Measurement 
 ar77 Northeast Dummy Variable 
(Connecticut, Maine, Massachusetts, 
New Hampshire, New York, Rhode 
Island, Vermont) 
0 = Not in Region 
1 = In Region 
 regiadoptper Percentage of all states in a region 
that have adopted organic legislation 
up to and including a given year 
Interval (0-100%) 
 retgexistper Percentage of all states in a region 
that have enacted statutes in a year 
Interval (0-100%) 
EXTERNALi,t natiadoptper Percentage of all states that have 
adopted organic legislation up to and 
including a given year 
Interval (0-100%) 
 natexistper Percentage of all states that have 
enacted statutes in a year 
Interval (0-100%) 
 fedadopt Federal adoption of organic 
legislation (initial or amending) 
0 = No Adoption 
1 = Adoption 
 fedimpl Federal statutes officially enacted/in 
effect 
0 = No Enacted Statutes 





Issue salience - number articles 
published in The New York Times in a 
year 
Interval 
logsali Log of salience -- 
 
 
include assessments of market value sales percentages and logged variables of the market value sales. The 
log of fruit and vegetable sales (logfru & logveg) were created by logging the raw figure of market values  
sales for the categories of fruit, tree nuts, and berries and vegetables, melons, potatoes and sweet potatoes. 
The sales percentages are calculated by dividing the fruit and vegetable market value sales by total 
agriculture market sales. Since the Census of Agriculture was only available every four to five years, 
extrapolation and interpolation were used to fill in missing yearly values. 
EXTERNALi,t Variables  
Fourteen variables are used to assess external conditions of adoption. To evaluate regional 
horizontal patterns of diffusion, the AMS 7-region designation used by the Sustainable Agriculture 
Research and Education Program (see Figure 3.1 for visual representation) is used to control for and 
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examine the influence of regional adoption and existing policy patterns. Dummy variables (ar71-ar75) 
were created for each region. In addition, adoption percentages and percentages of enacted statutes were 
also calculated at the national (natiadoptper and natexistper) and regional levels (regiadoptper and 
regexistper). Enacted statutes percentages were derived from the enacted statutes variable (stenact), a 
binary endogenous variable that assesses absence or presence of enacted statutes in a year. To examine 
isomorphism, internal variables were assessed as needed and the national total of adoption and enacted 



















The vertical dimension of diffusion is examined through federal adoption (fedadopt) and federal 
implementation (fedimpl). Federal adoption of organic legislation is a dichotomous measure. Any year 
Congress passed organic legislation, whether initial or amending, is marked as a 1. Any year federal 
policy is officially implemented are marked as 1. 
. SALIENCEi,t Variable 
Salience is measured according to the number of articles that mention organic food and 
agriculture printed in the New York Times for each year from 1976-2010. Relevant articles were identified 
through three different keyword and title searches under two different New York Times newspaper archive 
databases. Articles were included in the final count if references to organic food, farming, or agriculture 
were mention at some point in the article. Article types range from clear discussions on organic food and 
farming to lifestyle pieces such as food editor columns or lists of organic Thanksgiving turkey brands. 
While a number of approaches have been used to construct an issue salience measure, the 
decision to use New York Times is based on availability of archived articles and validity of the method 
itself. Specifically, not all newspapers, such as the Los Angeles Times, have archived materials reaching 
the entire span on the study. Furthermore, a dispute with freelance writers (see New York Times v. Tasini) 
with most major newspapers on full-text online databases create substantial difficulties with obtaining 
older materials. The New York Times has resolved most of the freelance writer disputes but in 2002 had 
approximately 8% of all articles missing from online archive databases, a figure that is lower than most 
newspapers (Chen 2002). Therefore obtaining an accurate article count using multiple newspapers 
sources may not be and achievable or accurate measure. However, reliance on just the New York Times is 
not an invalid measure. Several scholars have identified the New York Times as a key and prominent 
source for identifying the national pulse and setting the agenda (Dearing and Rogers 1996; Epstein and 
Segal 2000; Kiousis 2004; Reese and Danielien 1989; Roberts Wanta, and Dzwo 2002; Rogers and 






Step 1: Univariate Descriptive Statistics  
Table 3.6 provides the descriptive statistics for each variable. The minimum number of 
observations is 1715 while the maximum number observed is 1750. The minimum observation number is 
created by the exclusion of Nebraska for partisan control and divided government variables. Chapter IV 
will provide a more detailed analysis of trends over time for each dependent variable. 
Step 2: Bivariate Analysis 
Appendix B contains the correlations between each variable. Strong correlations were found 
between key independent variables and time. Time had a strong positive correlation with regional and 
national adoption percentages, regional and national enacted statute percentages, wealth, and salience. 
Similarly, strong correlations were found between the same key independent variables.  
Appendix C contains time-series logistic regressions between each dependent variable and the 
independent variables. The results collectively confirm statistically significant relationships among the 
dependent variables for regional and national adoption percentages, regional and national enacted statute 
percentages, percentage of fruit sales, log of vegetable sales, salience measures, per capita wealth 
measures, federal adoption, and federal implementation. When comparing the bivariate results for each 
dependent variable, initial adoption only demonstrates a statistically significant relationship with federal 
implementation. 
Step 3: Constructing a Collapsed Data Model  
Based on the results of the bivariate analysis, an initial step in this analysis was to construct a 
collapsed data model to inform the construction of the state year models. This model collapses the state 
year data into national year variables. Variables that are not constant among all states were excluded from 
the national year model. One national year model was constructed for each dependent variable due to the 
high correlation between salience measures with the national adoption and enacted statutes percentages 




Table 3.6: Descriptive Univariate Statistics 
Variable Observations Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
year 1750 1993 10.10 1976 2010 
statenum 1750 25.5 14.43 1 50 
adopt 1750 .08 .27 0 1 
iadopt 1750 .02 .14 0 1 
aadopt 1750 .06 .24 0 1 
stenact 1750 .42 .49 0 1 
amsregion7 1750 4.1 1.90 1 7 
ar71 1750 .12 .32 0 1 
ar72 1750 .14 .35 0 1 
ar73 1750 .08 .27 0 1 
ar74 1750 .24 .43 0 1 
ar75 1750 .16 .37 0 1 
ar76 1750 .12 .32 0 1 
ar77 1750 .14 .35 0 1 
fedadopt 1750 .23 .42 0 1 
fedimpl 1750 .26 .44 0  
regiadoptper 1750 .44 .31 0 .85 
regexistper 1750 .42 .29 0 .85 
natexistper 1750 .42 .25 .02 .70 
natiadoptper 1750 .44 .27 .02 .76 
salience 1750 31.37 36.45 0 151 
logsali 1750 2.57 1.53 0 5.02 
pcwealth 1750 21882.09 10621.14 4746 56959 
logpcw 1750 9.86 .54 8.46 10.95 
stlegprof 1750 .20 .12 .03 .66 
sharkculmeas 1750 5.06 2.56 1 9 
parcont 1715 .15 .65 -1 1 
dividedgov 1715 .55 .50 0 1 
peraggdp 1750 .06 1.43 .00 60 
logpagdp 1750 -2.39 .18 -4.46 -.15 
fruper 1750 .05 .08 3.77 .35 
logfru 1750 9.50 2.54 .69 16.30 
vegper 1750 .05 .10 .00 1.59 
logveg 1750 10.28 2.01 4.19 16.13 
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regression. The results of each model demonstrate that salience and federal actions explain nearly half of 
the variation across all adoption and amending adoptions can be explained by four independent variables. 
Despite the results, two concerns emerge from these models. First, federal adoption and federal 
implementation have different effects on amending versus initial adoption. Second, the fit of the initial 
adoption model demonstrates that the need to investigate other variables in the state year models. 
Step 4: Constructing State Year Models 
The final step in the analysis was to construct a number of state year models based on 
consideration a time and regional variations. Three basic models were constructed to be used across time 
periods and regional examinations (see Table 3.10). Model 1 includes the regional and national adoption 
percentages. Model 2 includes the enacted statutes percentages. Model 3 excludes both adoption and 


















Table 3.7: Total Annual of All Adoptions 
Source SS df MS 
     Model 194.0535 4 48.5133 
 
# of obs 35 
  Residual 176.2322 30 5.8744 
 
R-squared 0.5241 
  Total 370.2857 34 10.8907 
 
Adj R-squared 0.4606 
  
         totstadopt Coef. Std. Err. t P>|t| [95% Conf. Interval] 
  fedadopt 2.2588 1.068 2.11 0.043 0.0774 4.4401 
  fedimpl 1.2792 1.6729 0.76 0.45 -2.1373 4.6958 
  salience -0.0757 0.026 -2.91 0.007 -0.1288 -0.0226 
  logsali 2.0786 0.4868 4.27 0 1.0844 3.072 
  _cons 0.3203 0.8882 0.36 0.721 -1.4937 2.1345 
  
         Table 3.8: Total Annual of Initial Adoptions 
Source SS df MS 
     Model 14.2822 4 3.5705 
 
# of obs 35 
  Residual 92.4605 30 3.082 
 
R-squared 0.1338 
  Total 106.7428 34 3.1394 
 
Adj R-squared 1.7556 
  
         totstadopt Coef. Std. Err. t P>|t| [95% Conf. Interval] 
  fedadopt 0.7549 0.7736 0.98 0.337 -0.825 2.3349 
  fedimpl -1.6668 1.2117 -1.38 0.179 -4.141 0.8078 
  salience -0.0029 0.0188 -0.16 0.876 -0.0414 0.0355 
  logsali 0.2724 0.3526 0.77 0.446 -0.4477 0.9926 
  _cons 0.7332 0.6434 1.14 0.263 -0.5807 2.0473 
  
         Table 3.9: Total Annual of Amending Adoptions 
Source SS df MS 
     Model 165.5714 4 41.3928 
 
# of obs 35 
  Residual 132.3142 30 4.4104 
 
R-squared 0.5558 
  Total 297.8857 34 8.7613 
 
Adj R-squared 0.4966 
  
         totstadopt Coef. Std. Err. t P>|t| [95% Conf. Interval] 
  fedadopt 1.5039 0.9254 1.62 0.115 -0.3861 3.394 
  fedimpl 2.9461 1.449 2.03 0.051 -0.0142 5.9066 
  salience -0.0727 0.0225 -3.23 0.003 -0.1188 -0.0267 
  logsali 1.8062 0.4218 4.28 0 0.9447 2.6677 
  _cons -0.4129 0.7696 -0.054 0.596 -1.9848 1.159 


























































































 This chapter presents the statistical examination of the diffusion of organic food and agriculture 
legislation. The quantitative analysis presented in this chapter begins by describing the variation over time 
in organic policy adoption among the states. Next, this chapter evaluates the results from the cross-
sectional time-series logistic regression models of diffusion. Three eras, covering five different time 
periods, are analyzed including pre-federal adoption, post-federal adoption, and a comprehensive 35-year 
time period model. In addition, four regions (Far West, North Central, Southeast, and Mid-Atlantic) are 
modeled based upon the results of the comprehensive 35-year time period model.  
A National Picture 
From 1976-2010, a total of 38 U.S. states passed legislation regarding organic food and 
agriculture (see Appendix A for state adoptions). The earliest initial adoption of organic legislation was in 
1976 and the most recent initial adoption in the analysis timeframe occurred in 2009. Adoption of 
amending legislation varies from state to state. Some states did not adopt any amending legislation while 
other states frequently amended existing statutes. According to this data, California reported the most 
amending adoptions of any state. In total, California made 17 amending adoptions over the course of 29 
years; Most amending adoptions occurred during the 1990s.   
The S-Curve and R-Curve: Assessing the Speed of Diffusion  
As discussed in Chapter II, policy diffusion scholars have observed both a gradual adoption (i.e. 
the s-curve) and rapid adoption patterns (i.e. the r-curve). The r-curve is expected to occur during a short 
time period, which would result in a sharp increase in the cumulative total of adoptions in a one- to three-
year time period. A key difference between Berry and Berry’s policy diffusion model and Boushey’s 
policy diffusion model rests on the speed of diffusion. For U.S. state organic food and agriculture 
legislation, speed of adoption over time is slower but there is a window of time in which diffusion is rapid 
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and fast.  Figure 4.1 illustrates the cumulative percentage of total adopters from 1976-2010. The curve 
can be evaluated as both an s-curve and an r-curve for the 35-year time period evaluated.   
The s-curve for organic adoption is clearly present when examining all 35 years in the study. 
Prior to 1985, there are several years when no state adopted organic legislation. Similarly, there is 
minimal growth at the end of the s-curve after 2000. The r-curve is clearly present from 1988-1990 with 
approximately a 30% growth in the total number of adopters. In isolation, this 3-year time period may 
suggest a contagion diffusion pattern due to the rapid rate of adoption, which would confirm Boushey’s 
(2010) contagion model of diffusion. However, a comprehensive 35 year analysis suggests an extended 
period of diffusion, represented through the s-curve, which is consistent with most of the diffusion of 
innovation literature.  
What is the significance of finding both an s-curve and an r-curve? It signifies the development of 
a diffusion model that can explain both long- and short-term diffusion patterns is necessary. Furthermore, 
it signifies the need to consider more than just a broader comprehensive analysis. Any policy diffusion  
 

































analysis should consider different time frames based on the speed of adoption. In this particular case, the 
speed of diffusion creates the need to examine adoptions before and after 1990 in solidarity. In addition, 
by focusing on the period of 1985-1990, when most initial state adoption occurred, aids in identifying the 
difference between the slower periods of diffusion versus the period of rapid adoption. The statistical 
models developed below are based the speed of adoption, which also happens to coincide with the goal of 
determining the effect of federal adoption in 1990. 
Cumulative Totals of Initial and All Adoptions 
 In addition to examining the speed of diffusion through an s-curve or r-curve assessment, 
adoption patterns and shifts in adoption type can be examined through the cumulative totals of initial and 
all adoptions. Figure 4.2 plots the cumulative totals of initial and amending adoption. As also confirmed 
by Figure 4.1, most initial adoption occurred from 1988-1990 with slow growth both before and after. 
This pattern further confirms the s-curve and r-curve patterns in the cumulative percentage of state  
 
 




































adopters. However, Figure 4.1 cannot demonstrate how initial adoption growth compares to growth in 
amending adoptions as illustrated in Figure 4.2. Most early adoptions were initial legislation whereas 
post-1990 adoption growth is primarily attributed to amending legislation. The gap between the 
cumulative initial adoption line and the cumulative total adoption line demonstrates the total cumulative 
number of amending adoptions. The number of amending adoptions suggests state legislatures continued 
to reassess state organic policy. Of particular significance is the sharp increase in amending adoptions in 
the years leading up to 2002, the year when the NOP was officially implemented. This amending adoption 
pattern is more than likely in response to federal implementation suggesting vertical influence on 
adoption decisions in the states. The significance of these findings demonstrates the need for the analysis 
to differentiate between initial and amending adoptions within the same analysis.  
An Annual Picture of Adoptions and Enacted Statutes 
 In addition to the cumulative total of adoption and state adopters, calculating annual totals of 
adoption and enacted statutes provide a more detailed picture of overtime variation in adoption decisions. 
Figure 4.3 illustrates the annual variation in all adoptions, initial adoptions, and enacted state statutes for 
each year from 1976 to 2010. Annual total of amending adoptions can be observed as the space between 
the initial adoption and all adoption lines. 
This graph is significant to deriving more descriptive depth for two reasons. First, Figure 4.3 
highlights three primary periods of initial adoption and one peak of amending adoption. The three periods 
of initial adoption were in 1979, 1985-1990, and 2000.
53
 These three periods denote leading adoptions (c. 
1979), lagging adopters (c. 2000), and middle-of-the pack of adopters (c. 1984-1990). It is the second 
period (1985-1990) of initial adoption that contains the most initial adoptions. Also of interest in this 
second time period are the two spikes in adoption in 1985 and from 1989-1990. A lull of initial adoption 
activity existed in 1986 and 1987. There does not appear to be a clear explanation for the lull from 1986-
1987 or the sudden inactivity in 1991 based on the descriptive statistics alone.  However, the presence of 
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 A moderate peak exists from 1992-1994. However, this time period does not have a year in which the 
annual total of initial adoption is more than two states.  
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a large group of adopters between 1985 and1990 suggests that organic food and agriculture began having 
traction as a significant state policy issue in the U.S. 
Comparatively, the first and third primary periods of adoption also convey some important 
information about state level organic policy diffusion. The third initial adoption period is followed by a 
spike in amending legislation adoption in 2003, one year after official enactment of the NOP final rule.
54
 
This peak in amending adoptions is likely the result of federal implementation. Conversely, the first 
period of initial adoption has minimal amending adoption in the years following. However, it is clear 
some states delayed the enactment of statutes by a year.
55
 This point leads to secondary significance of the 
plotted data in Figure 4.3. 
In addition to the confirmation of annual totals of adoptions, it can also be confirmed that most  
 




Figure 4.3: Total State Adoption and Statutes by Year 
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 Amending adoption annual totals can be calculated as the space between initial and total adoption.  
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number of amending adoptions from 2001 through2004, there is only a slight decline in the number of 
states with enacted statutes. This is contrary to what was expected to occur as indicated in H14, which 
predicted states would be more likely to terminate state statutes after federal implementation. Instead, 
most states modified legislation to allow for federal supremacy in the policy domain. This suggests that 
official implementation at the federal level did not deter most states from maintaining existing statutes on 
organic food and agriculture.  
Regional Pictures 
The picture of adoption at the regional level provides a spatial perspective to the spread of 
organic legislation diffusion in the U.S. Figure 4.4 and Table 4.1 provide snapshots of adoption and 
enacted state statute percentages for each region for six key years during the 35-year time period.  
Two regions emerge as leaders. New York, Connecticut, and Maine were the first to adopt in the 
Northeast. California led the Far West region. This pattern in early adoption partially confirms the first  
Table 4.1: Regional Adoption and Enacted State Statute Percentages 
Region Percentages 1979 1985 1990 2000 2010 
Far West 
Adoption % 17% 33% 67% 83% 83% 
Statute % 0% 33% 67% 83% 67% 
Rocky 
Mountain 
Adoption % 0% 14% 57% 71% 86% 
Statute % 0% 0% 57% 71% 86% 
Southwest 
Adoption % 0% 0% 75% 75% 75% 
Statute % 0% 0% 75% 75% 75% 
North 
Central 
Adoption % 0% 0% 50% 75% 83% 
Statute % 0% 0% 50% 67% 75% 
Southeast 
Adoption % 0% 0% 25% 63% 63% 
Statute % 0% 0% 25% 63% 50% 
Mid-
Atlantic 
Adoption % 0% 0% 33% 50% 67% 
Statute % 0% 0% 33% 50% 50% 
Northeast 
Adoption % 43% 57% 71% 71% 71% 






   1979         1985 
 
 
   1990         2000 
 
         
2010 











hypothesis of this study that claims states like California, Massachusetts, Michigan, and New York are 
more likely to be early adopters. New York and California set the paces in their region with initial 
adoptions in 1976 and 1979. Michigan did not adopt legislation until 2000, and Massachusetts has never 
passed legislation. However, if the scope of the law is expanded to include administrative rules, 
Massachusetts would be considered an early adopter of organic food and agriculture policy. In 1978, the 
Massachusetts’ Department of Public Health enacted organic food regulations. Therefore, evidence exists 
to support both Walker and Gray’s conclusions about innovativeness as a state characteristic. Specifically, 
Walker was correct in his assumption that innovativeness can be a state characteristic with particular 
states acting as trendsetters. New York, Massachusetts, and California all had adopted policies regulating 
organic food and agriculture prior to 1980. Yet evidence also supports Gray’s assumption that 
innovativeness may be issue and time specific. Walker identified Michigan as being an early adopter and 
regional trend-setter. By the time Michigan adopted in 2000, seven other states in the North Central 
region had already adopted legislation. The case of Michigan signifies that innovativeness as a state 
characteristic may fluctuate based on the issue itself. 
 Laggard regions include the Southeast and Mid-Atlantic. Neither region experienced an initial 
state adoption until 1990. Middle-of-the-pack regions include the Rocky Mountain, Southwest, and North 
Central regions. The North Central region, which contains 13 states, experienced the most growth in the 
1980s.  
  By 2010, regional decline in enacted state statutes declined for all regions except Rocky 
Mountain and the Southwest.
56
 The Northeast had the most dramatic decline with 28% of the states in the 
region repealing state organic statutes. Most state statute repeals occurred in 2003 and 2004. While not 
conclusive, it could be argued that federal implementation led to some repeals but not a drastic, across-
the-nation decline. Instead, the effect of federal implementation may have different regional impacts as 
                                                          
56
 Discrepancies in percentage of adopters and percentage of enacted statutes in 1979 and 1985 are caused 
by delayed enactment of legislation. For example, California passed legislation in 1979 but was not 
enacted until 1980. 
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the Northeast and Far West regions have the greatest decline in enacted state statutes after 2000 (see 
Figure 4.1). 
Another explanation for the decline in enacted state statutes may relate to the life-cycle of 
innovative policies. The Northeast and Far West regions were the earliest regional adopters. The decline 
in enacted regional percentages of enacted state statutes since 2000 may be the result of replacing the 
organic food policy with a new innovative policy. For example, this dataset ends at 2010, but several 
states adopted amending legislation in 2009 and 2010 that subsequently terminated organic statutes. In 
Kentucky, organic statutes were replaced with the Kentucky Proud program, a local food program, and 
administrative rules remained. While there is not a similar and clear example in the Northeast or Far West 
regions, there is the potential that local food and community-based agriculture movements push for the 
policy replacement of organic state statutes. As more recent data becomes available, the decline of 
enacted statutes may continue as state legislators focus attention on new issues, such as local food, and 
remove older innovative policies.
57
 
Modeling Results of Organic Policy Diffusion in the U.S. 
To identify causes and drivers of organic policy diffusion in the U.S., three adoption-type models 
are developed (as discussed in Chapter III), and adoption activity is tested for five different time periods 
representing three different eras of analysis. This section will cover the results of the 45 statistical models 
completed in this study. The model results are divided into four subsections – pre-federal adoption, post-
federal adoption, comprehensive 35-year model, and statistically significant regional models. To begin, 
the results from the pre-federal adoption era are analyzed including adoption activity from 1976-1989 and 
initial adoptions from 1985-1990. Evaluation of post-federal adoption activity in the states will follow 
with models examining adoptions from 1990-2010 and 1990-2004. Finally, a comprehensive evaluation 
of adoptions from 1976-2010 will conclude the section focused on modeling at the national level. The 
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 In the construction of the salience measure, it was found that articles on local foods and community-
based agriculture began to replace attention once allotted organic food. Starting in 2007, a number of 
articles questions if organic had lost its meaning and suggested local and community-based agriculture as 
having being clearer and more meaningful. 
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data is assessed for each time frame to illuminate the dynamic relationships between dependent and 
independent variables given the patterns of adoption highlighted above. It allows for particular 
consideration of pre- versus post-federal state adoption activity being motivated by a different set of 
factors in consideration speed of adoption over time. The section concludes with the presentation of 
regional model results. Four regions that were statistically significant in the comprehensive models are 
examined. Analysis of how the results from those segmented analyses confirm or reject the expectations 
framed in the earlier hypotheses of the study will follow. 
Pre-Federal State Adoption Activity (1976-1989) 
 State adoption activity prior to the passage of NOFPA in 1990 covers a 14 year time period from 
1976-1989. Two time frames are used to analyze the causes for state adoption prior to federal adoption of 
organic legislation. The first time frame examines the results from all adoptions from 1976-1989. The 
second time frame focuses on initial adoptions from 1985-1990, when the majority of states adopted 
organic legislation for the first time. 
  Table 4.2 outlines each model tested for all adoptions, initial adoptions, and amending adoptions 
in the pre-federal adoption era (1976-1989). The results indicate a number of factors including; salience, 
per capita wealth, political culture, agricultural GDP, regional adoption and enacted state statutes, as well 
as the Far West region, are statistically significant variables for state adoption decisions prior to 1990. 
However, initial versus amending adoptions are impacted by different variables. For initial adoptions, 
issue salience, political culture, and regional adoption and enacted state statutes
58
 are significant. The 
direction of the relationships suggests that states experiencing increasing issue salience, classification as 
moralistic/individualistic political culture, and facing regional pressures are more likely to adopt organic 
legislation. For amending adoptions, the Far West region, decreases in agricultural GDP, and per capita 
wealth are explanations for why adopting states would be more likely to adjust existing policy. 
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 It is expected that the regional percentage of adoption and regional percentage of enacted state statutes 
would have similar results in the pre-federal adoption era. The divergence between the percentages mirror 
each other until 2000 when there is a decline in the number of states with enacted state statutes.  
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Table 4.2: Adoption Models 1976-1989      
 All Adoptions Initial Adoptions Amending Adoptions 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Federal Adoption (omit) (omit) (omit) (omit) (omit) (omit) (omit) (omit) (omit) 
Federal 
Implementation 



























































































































































































































































 All Adoptions Initial Adoptions Amending Adoptions 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Log of Vegetable 



















National Adoption % -2.93 
(9.44) 
  -.626 
(11.80) 







  10.00** 
(3.40) 
  8.941 
(6.15) 
  






  -13.08 
(10.43) 
  4.62 
(15.82) 
 




  9.16** 
(3.08) 
  8.24 
(5.53) 
 














































































Southeast Region 20.91 
(238461) 
















Mid-Atlantic Region -207.29 
(122479) 



































Standard errors in parenthesis; † p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01 
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 Table 4.3 exhibits the results from the 1985-1990 initial adoption models. Political culture, state 
legislative professionalism, national and regional percentages of adoption and enacted state statutes, and 
two regions, the Southeast and Mid-Atlantic, are statistically significant. The results suggest that 
moralistic-leaning political cultures and regions with higher percentages of state adoption and enacted 
statutes are more likely to adopt organic legislation. Furthermore, the results suggest that national 
pressures may have influenced state adoption decisions during this period.   
Table 4.3: Initial State Adoptions 1985-1990 
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 





































































































Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
National Adoption Percentage -24.24* 
(12.36) 
  
Regional Adoption Percentage 13.28** 
(3.35) 
  
National Enacted Statute Percentage  -18.59* 
(8.40) 
 
Regional Enacted Statute Percentage  10.88** 
(2.90) 
 










































Standard errors in parenthesis; † p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01,  
 
Post-Federal State Adoption Activity (1990-2010) Results 
 Two different time frames are analyzed to examine adoption decisions after federal adoption of 
organic food and agriculture legislation in 1990. The first set of models examine adoptions from 1990-
2010. The second set of models examine adoptions decisions from 1990-2004. In the second set of 
models, the key focus is to examine how states reacted to lag development of federal rules from 1990-
2002 and hone in on the effect of official federal implementation in 2002. During this 12-year gap in 
federal policy, states and third-party certification programs were responsible for regulating the market. 
The years of 2003 and 2004 are included to account for delayed state responses.
59
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 Not all states meet annually. Some states meet biannually. Adding 2003 and 2004 also accounts for the 
biannual meeting and potential delayed responses from state legislatures. 
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 Table 4.4 demonstrates the model results for state activity from 1990-2010, the post-federal 
adoption era. Federal activity (i.e. adoption and implementation), per capita wealth measures, the 
vegetable sale measures, regional and national adoption and enacted statute percentages, and four regional 
designations are statistically significant among all of the adoption models. Initial adoptions during the 
post-federal adoption era are positively influenced by federal adoption, per capita wealth, and regional 
adoption and enacted statute percentages. The federal implementation and per capita wealth measures 
have a negative relationship with adoption. The Far West, North Central, Southeast, and Mid-Atlantic 
regions are also statistically significant. Amending adoptions during the post-federal adoption era are 
positively influenced by national and state enacted statutes, increase in the log of vegetable sales, and 
federal implementation. Negative relationships are found for decreases in the percentage of vegetable 
sales and the North Central Region. 
 Table 4.5 outlines the results for 1990-2004 adoption models. For all adoptions from 1990-2004, 
federal adoption, salience measures, political culture, partisan control, both vegetable sale measures, and 
adoption/enacted statute percentages were significant. The Far West and North Central Regions were also 
significant. However, many of these variables were not significant in the initial and amending adoption 
models.  Federal implementation, salience measures, regional adoption and enacted statute percentages, 
and three regional designations are found to be statistically significant for initial adoptions. Positive 
relationships are found for salience, the three regions, and regional adoption and enacted statutes 
percentages. Negative relationships are found with federal implementation and the logged salience 
variable.  
For amending adoptions, federal implementation, salience, vegetable sales measures, and the 
North Central region were statistically significant. The directional relationships for federal 
implementation and salience differ from those reported in the initial adoptions model. 
Comprehensive Model (1976-2010) Results 
 The comprehensive models results (see Table 4.6) provide a complete picture of significant 
variables from 1976-2010. The Far West, North Central, Southeast, Mid-Atlantic regions remain 
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Table 4.4: Adoption Models 1990-2010    
 All Adoptions Initial Adoptions Amending Adoptions 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 













































































































































































































































































 All Adoptions Initial Adoptions Amending Adoptions 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 




















Log of Vegetable 




















National Adoption % 7.70 
(5.47) 
  -7.61 
(13.74) 







  17.29** 
(5.78) 
  2.85 
(2.06) 
  




  -10.68 
(12.27) 
  10.92* 
(4.76) 
 




  14.89** 
(5.03) 
  4.40** 
(1.72) 
 









































































































































Table 4.5: Adoption Models 1990-2004       
 All Adoptions Initial Adoptions Amending Adoptions 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 











































































































































































































































































 All Adoptions Initial Adoptions Amending Adoptions 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 




















Log of Vegetable 
































  21.37** 
(7.14) 
  1.20 
(2.35) 
  




  .301 
(14.34) 
  5.16 
(6.28) 
 




  12.01* 
(5.41) 
  2.47 
(2.13) 
 










































































































































Table 4.6: Adoption Models 1976-2010 
 All Adoptions Initial Adoptions Amending Adoptions 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 












































































































































































































































































 All Adoptions Initial Adoptions Amending Adoptions 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 




















Log of Vegetable 



















National Adoption % -5.21* 
(2.29) 











  10.35** 
(2.13) 
  5.97** 
(1.59) 
  




  -13.80** 
(3.36) 
  2.90 
(2.79) 
 




  8.31** 
(1.95) 
  6.29** 
(1.46) 
 





































































































































Standard errors in parenthesis; † p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01  
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significant among the models. Similarly, statistical significance remains for federal action, salience 
measures, per capita wealth, political culture, partisan control, agriculture industry measures, and national 
and regional adoption and enacted statute percentages. All of the statistically significant variables in the 
comprehensive models appear in pre-federal and post-federal adopt models demonstrating the robustness 
of each variable. 
 Initial adoptions are positively influenced by federal adoption, federal implementation, salience, 
democratic partisan control, and regional pressures. Negative relationships exist for national adoption and 
enacted statute percentages. In addition, the Southeast and Mid-Atlantic region are distinctive regions for 
initial adoption. Amending adoptions are positively influenced by federal implementation, wealth,
60
 
increases in vegetable sales, and increases in regional adoption and enacted statutes. Negative 
relationships exist for political culture (e,g. traditionalist cultures less likely to adopt), issue salience, and 
annual vegetable sales. The Far West and North Central regions are distinctive regions for amending 
adoptions.   
Modeling Significant Regions 
 Based on the results of the comprehensive models, four regions are further examined statistically. 
The Far West, North Central, Southeast, and Mid-Atlantic regions were statistically significant variables 
in the comprehensive models examining adoptions from 1976-2010. Table 4.7 outlines the results for 
each region. Only two models are developed for each region for the time frame of 1976-2010. The 
analysis for only three regions results in statistically significant findings. There are no significant 
variables found for the Mid-Atlantic region. The results demonstrate that each region is influenced by 
regional pressures, including both the percentage of regional adoptions and enacted statutes. 
 Yet beyond regional pressures, the Far West has little in common with other statistically 
significant regions. Adoptions in the Far West appear to be influenced by only two other explanatory 
factors – log of fruit sales and regional adoption. The only difference between the North Central and 
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 No directional relationship is indicated for per capita wealth. However, the logged per capital wealth 
measure demonstrates a positive relationship.  
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Southeast Regions exist in agricultural GDP and increases in the national percentage of adoption. For the 
North Central, the increase in adoptions and enacted statutes nationally appear to be a deterrent for 
adoption. For the Southeast, increases in agricultural GDP increase the likelihood for adoption. The 
similarities between the North Central and Southeast regions are based on legislature professionalism and 
political culture. The political culture factor is particularly interesting considering the significant 
polarized politics of the Southeast region. Southeastern states ranged from 7.4-9 on the Sharkansky’s 
political culture scale. This means that even the slightest shift towards an individualistic or moralistic 
culture in a Southeastern state increases the probability of amending adoptions. 
Discussion of Results - Explaining Adoption 
 The results of the policy diffusion models demonstrate both the consistency of a few explanatory 
variables over time and the time-dependent and adoption-type variance of some explanatory factors. 
Collectively, there are far fewer variables that influence pre-federal adoption behavior than post-federal 
adoption behavior. Furthermore, amending adoptions have fewer explanatory variables than initial 
adoptions. Table 4.8 summarizes the results and presents a comparison of significant variables by time 
era. Table 4.9 summarizes the results and presents a comparison of significant variables by region. In the 
following section, the discussion briefly revisits the expectations of this study and then turns to analyzing 
the results of the models. Table 4.10 identifies how results from each era confirm or rejects the 
hypotheses of the study. 
Revisiting the Expectations of Study 
 This study set forth eighteen hypotheses indicating how internal determinants, external 
determinants, issue salience, existing policy, and policy typology influence state adoption decisions (see 
Table 4.10). Fourteen of the eighteen hypotheses can be statistically examined directly given variables 
included in the models. The role of policy typology, existing policy, and third-party certifiers cannot be 
quantitatively examined due to unavailability of relevant data. Nonetheless, it is expected that a host of 
political, economic, and social conditions can explain adoption behavior accounting for both vertical and 
horizontal diffusion pressures, some of which are explored with models and others through case studies. 
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Table 4.7: Regional Adoption Models 1976-2010    
 Far West North Central Southeast Mid-Atlantic 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 
















































































































































































































































 Far West North Central Southeast Mid-Atlantic 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 


















Log of Vegetable 




























































Standard errors in parenthesis; † p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01  












Table 4.8: Comparison of Results 
Adoption Type 
Pre-Federal Adoption  
(1976-1990) 




All Adoptions Issue Salience (+) 
Per Capita Wealth (+/-) 
Political Culture (-) 
Regional Adoption % (+) 
Regional Statute % (+) 
Far West 
 
Federal Adoption† (+) 
Federal Implementation† (+) 
Issue Salience (+) 
Per Capita Wealth (+/-) 
Political Culture†† (-) 
Partisan Control†† (+) 
Vegetable Sales† (+) 
Regional Adoption %† (+) 
Regional Statutes %†† (+) 
National Adoption %† (-) 
National Statute % (+) 




Federal Adoption (+) 
Issue Salience (+/-) 
Per Capita Wealth (-) 
Political Culture (-) 
Partisan Control (+) 
Vegetable Sales (+/-) 
Regional Adoption % (+) 
Regional Statutes % (+) 
National Adoption % (-) 
Far West Region 




Issue Salience (+) 
Political Culture* (-) 
State Legislature Professionalism**(-) 
Regional Adoption %*(+) 
Regional Statute %* (+) 
National Adoption %** (+) 




Federal Adoption (+) 
Federal Implementation†† (-) 
Issue Salience†† (+/-) 
Per Capita Wealth† (+) 
Regional Adoption %† (+) 
Regional Statute %† (+) 
Far West region 
North Central Region† 
Southeast Region† 
Mid-Atlantic Region† 
Federal Adoption (+) 
Federal Implementation (-) 
Issue Salience (+) 
Partisan Control (+) 
Regional Adoption  % (+) 
Regional Statutes % (+) 
National Adoption % (-) 
National Statutes % (-) 
Far West Region 









Pre-Federal Adoption  
(1976-1990) 






Per Capita Wealth (+/-) 
Agriculture GDP (-) 
Far West Region 
Federal Implementation† (+) 
Issue Salience†† (-) 
Vegetable Sales† (+/-) 
Regional Statute % (+) 
National Statute % (+) 
North Central Region† 
 
Federal Implementation (+) 
Issue Salience (+/-) 
Per Capita Wealth (+) 
Vegetable Sales (+/-) 
Regional Adoption % (+) 
Regional Statutes % (+) 
Far West Region 
North Central Region 
 
Direction Relationship in Parentheses. For (+/-) direction relationship conflicts between models or raw versus logged variable versions. 
* Also significant in 1985-1990initial adoption models. 
** Statistically significant only in the 1985-1990 initial adoption models. 
†Also significant in 1990-2004 adoption models. 












Table 4.9: Comparison of Results for Significant Regions 
Adoption Type Far West Region North Central Region Southeast Region 
All Adoptions Federal  
  Implementation (+) 
Fruit Sales (+/-) 
Regional Adoption % (+) 
Regional Statutes % (+) 
State Legislature Professionalism (-) 
Political Culture (-) 
Regional Adoption % (+) 
Regional Statutes % (+) 
National Adoption % (-) 
National Statutes % (-) 
State Legislature Professionalism (-) 
Political Culture (-) 
Agriculture GDP (+/-) 































H1: California, New York, Massachusetts, and Michigan 
are more likely to be early adopters of organic legislation. 
Mixed Evidence -- Mixed Evidence 
H2: More professionalized state legislatures are more 
likely to adopt organic legislation than less 
professionalized state legislatures. 
Reject Reject Reject 
H3: States with divided government are less likely to 
adopt organic legislation. 
Reject Reject Reject 
H4: States with Democratic partisan control are more 
likely to pass organic legislation than Republican or 
divided partisan control. 
Supported Reject Supported 
H5: States with a moralistic political culture are more 
likely to adopt organic legislation than states with 
traditionalist political culture. 
Supported Reject Supported 
H6: States with higher per capita income are more likely 
to adopt organic legislation than states with lower per 
capita income. 
Supported Supported Supported 
H7: States with a higher percentage of total GDP 
resulting from agriculture are more likely to adopt 
organic legislation. 
Reject Reject Reject 
H8: States with a higher percentage of total agriculture 
sales resulting from fruit and vegetable sales are more 
likely to adopt organic legislation. 
Reject Mixed Evidence Mixed Evidence 
H9: States with third-party certification programs are 
more likely to adopt organic legislation than states with 






















H10: States are more likely to adopt organic regulation if 
a state within the same region adopts organic regulation. 
Supported Supported Supported 
H11: States are more likely to adopt organic regulation 
when there is a higher percentage of states in the region 
that have existing organic statutes. 
Supported Supported Supported 
H12: States are more likely to adopt organic regulation if 
states with similar economic and political conditions 
adopt organic policy. 
Mixed Evidence Mixed Evidence Mixed Evidence 
H13: States are more likely to adopt legislation during the 
post-federal adoption period between 1990-1992 than the 
1993-2002 time period. 
 Mixed Evidence Mixed Evidence 
H14: States are more likely to adopt legislation to 
terminate state organic statutes after official 
implementation of the NOP in 2002. 
 Reject Reject 
SALIENCEi,t 
H15: States are more likely to adopt legislation in years 
where organic issue salience is high. 
Supported Supported Supported 
POLICY-
TYPEi,t 
H16: States are more likely to adopt organic legislation 
that provides strict regulatory rules or guidelines in the 







H17: States are more likely to adopt organic legislation 









H18: More innovative states are more likely to amend 









For internal characteristics, it is expected that adoption of organic food and agriculture legislation 
is more likely to occur in states that have a more professionalized state legislature, more progressive state 
politics (i.e. both Democratically controlled government and moralistic culture), undivided government, 
and high dependence on agricultural production, particularly in specialty crops where organic certification 
is more common (i.e. agricultural GDP, vegetable sales, fruit sales). For external conditions, it is expected 
that states are more likely to adopt when more states within the same region are adopters and have 
enacted state statutes or when states that share similar economic and political conditions are adopters and 
have enacted state statutes. In addition, two external hypotheses address the influence of federal adoption 
and implementation. Specifically, uncertainty of federal implementation will lead to more adoptions from 
1990-1992 than the1993-2002 period. After federal implementation in 2002, it is expected that most states 
would terminate their organic food and agriculture statutes. Salience remains neither an internal nor 
external variable. It is an independent consideration and is expected to have a positive relationship with 
adoption. 
Explaining Pre-Federal Adoption 
The pre-federal adoption models are able to explain behavior of both early adopters (c. 1976-
1979) and middle-of-the-pack adopters (c.1985-1990).  Consistent across both groups are the influence of 
issue salience, political culture, per capita wealth, agricultural GDP, and horizontal pressures at both the 
regional and national level (see Table 4.8). Collectively, six hypotheses can be supported based on the 
results of the pre-federal adoption models (see Table 4.10). The remaining hypotheses are either rejected, 
cannot be guided by ambiguous or insignificant results, or cannot be directly statistically examined. For 
two rejected hypotheses, H2 and H7, the rejection is based on the statistically significant relationship 
being opposite of prior beliefs driven by past literature or concepts. Furthermore, descriptive statistics of 
early adopters and comparison across states leads to only partial confirmation of the H1 and H12. 
 Three internal determinant hypotheses (H4-H6), two external determinant hypotheses (H10 and 
H11), and the issue salience hypothesis (H15) are supported. For initial adopters, increased issue salience, 
moralistic-leaning cultures, and an increased percentage of state adopters within a region are conditions 
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that are more likely to result in an adoption. Comparatively, amending adoptions during this time period 
had far fewer significant explanatory variables but confirmed the relationship predicted in H6. States with 
more wealth are more likely to amend existing policy. Three regions were significant during this time 
period. However, the statistical significance of the Southeast and Mid-Atlantic regions should not suggest 
these regions were leaders. Neither region had an initial adoption until 1990 (see Appendix A). The 
Northeast followed by the Far West region were regional leaders in initial adoption. Indeed, H1 is 
partially supported on the grounds that New York and California were two of the first states to adopt 
legislation. Similarly, the twelfth hypothesis can be partially supported when comparing of early 
adopters’ economic and political conditions (see Appendix E). For example, New York and California 
share similar political cultures, legislative professionalism scores, per capita wealth scores, and 
agriculture GDP totals. However, further investigation qualitatively would confirm if states take cues 
within the region or from states that are similar on economic and political grounds. 
 Two hypotheses that warrant further examination are H2 and H7. It was predicted that adoption is 
more likely to occur in states that have more professionalized state legislatures and states with a larger 
percentage of GDP resulting from the agriculture industry. However, the results of pre-federal adoption 
suggest the opposite. Three potential causes may explain the negative relationship between adoption, but 
more specifically amending adoption, and aggregate agricultural GDP. First, only a few states passed 
amending legislation during the pre-federal adoption era. Four states had passed initial legislation up to 
1984. With a minimal number of states able to pass amending legislation, the ability to see the variance in 
the dependent variable is limited. A second explanation rests in any perceived competition between 
conventional and alternative agriculture. Conventional agricultural interests were dominant until the late 
1980s. State policymakers may have been more likely to respond to the concerns of conventional 
agriculture than alternative agriculture especially after the election of Ronald Reagan. A third possible 
explanation is the farming crisis of the 1980s. Poor weather and shifting economic conditions led to the 
collapse of the family farm and created turmoil in the agriculture industry from 1981-1986 (Barnett 
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2000). This may explain why a decrease in the agriculture GDP is negatively associated with amending 
adoptions. Positive growth and recovery in the agricultural sector would not occur until the late 1980s. 
 As for the relationship between initial adoption and state legislative professionalism, the cause for 
the relationship more than likely conditioned by time. The relationship was only statistically significant 
for initial adopters from 1985-1990. At first glance, it seems that the more professionalized legislatures 
did not possess a distinctive advantage for adoption. However, the state legislature professionalism scores 
for each state were exceptionally low from 1985-1990 for most states. Perhaps, like the farm crisis 
explanation, the negative relationship between adoption and legislature professionalism is a result of time 
bounded political events that decreased the professionalism of most state legislatures in the time period 
examined here. 
Explaining Post-Federal Adoption 
 After federal adoption in 1990, states’ adoption decisions are influenced by a wider range of 
factors.  Initial adoptions during the post-federal adoption era have a positive relationship with federal 
adoption, per capita wealth, and regional adoption and enacted state statute percentages. The federal 
implementation and per capita wealth measures have a negative relationship with initial adoption. For 
amending adoptions, state adopters are positively influenced by national and state enacted statutes, 
increase of vegetable sales, and federal implementation. Negative relationships with adoption are found 
with the percentage of vegetable sales. The Far West, North Central, Southeast, and Mid-Atlantic regions 
are also statistically significant across the models. In total, four hypotheses are supported including H6, 
H10, H11, and H15. However, the evidence to support H15 is only for adoptions made from 1990-2004. 
Similarly, three hypotheses present mixed evidence or inconclusive evidence leading to neither support 
nor rejection.   
 The supported hypotheses confirm regional pressures, increasing issue salience, and increased 
wealth are more likely to lead to adoption. Yet, issue salience is a condition that only appears significant 
for adoptions made from 1990-2004. This suggests that adoptions made after 2004 are not influenced by 
organic issue salience. Instead, the nineteen initial and amending adoptions made from 2005-2010 are not 
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impacted by the increase or decline of issue salience after federal law was implemented. Similarly, 
adoptions after 2004 are not impacted by federal implementation.  
In examining adoptions from 1990-2004, federal implementation had a negative impact on initial 
adoption whereas federal adoption had a positive influence on initial adoption. However, both 
relationships may be more of a coincidence than providing true explanatory power. The positive 
relationship with federal adoption may be the result of the spike in initial state adoptions in 1990 
coinciding with federal adoption that same year. Similarly, 70% of states had already passed initial 
legislation leaving only a small fraction of states as non-adopters by 2002. Inaction among these fifteen 
states may not have been the result of federal implementation, but rather general disinterest in adopting 
organic food and agriculture legislation. 
What is clear about state adoption from 1990-2004 is that federal adoption and implementation 
did not deter states from maintaining state organic policies. Despite the spike in amending adoptions in 
2003, most states maintained state statutes regulating organic food and agriculture (see Table 4.3). 
Therefore, H14 can be rejected. Less clear is how lagged federal response in implementing the 1990 
federal organic law contributed to state adoption behavior. From 1990-1992, there were twenty total 
adoptions; eight were initial adoptions (see Table 4.11). From 1993-2002, there were a total of 59 
adoptions, but there were only eight initial adoptions. Undoubtedly, the latter period contained more 
amending adoptions, but each period contained the same number of initial adoptions. This suggests that 
states may have been operating under more uncertainty in the earlier period or even riding the tail end of 
the second peak period of adoption that ended in 1990. Adoptions made after 1992 could be the result of 
anticipating federal implementation. Nevertheless, H13 cannot be supported or rejected. 
Table 4.11: Adoptions From 1990-2004 
Years Amending Adoptions Initial Adoptions Total Adoption 
Per Annual 
Adoption Rate 
1990-1992 12 8 20 6.66 




 Two other hypotheses are also not supported or rejected. Post-federal state adoptions are 
positively influenced by an increase in vegetable sales. However, fruit sales did not register as a 
statistically significant variable across any of the national-level models. One potential explanation is that 
the vegetable crops can be grown annually whereas much of fruit production is in perennial crops 
(requiring a long lag in time for changes in production certification) and fruit is grown in a more limited 
set of regions.
61
 Therefore, the statistical significance of vegetable sales only partially confirms the 
expectations of H8.  
Likewise, H12 cannot be supported or rejected for the post-federal adoption time period based on 
the evidence presented. Similar to the pre-federal adoption era, the problem with definitely determining a 
national-interaction model is that there is not enough detail from the results alone for which states took 
cues from other states. The regional diffusion model, tested in the thirteenth and fourteenth hypotheses, 
can be supported as it is clear regional cues played a positive factor. The national-interaction model needs 
more evidentiary depth to inform discussion, which may be achievable through qualitative methods, to 
determine how and where states adoption cues are taken. 
Explaining Adoption from 1976-2010 
 The results of the comprehensive adoption models confirm the outcomes of the pre-federal 
adoption and post-federal adoption era models. Many of the same variables from the time-constrained 
models remain statistically significant across the 35-year time span. Consistent over time and across 
adoption types is the significance of wealth, political culture, and regional pressures.  Initial adoptions 
maintain a negative relationship with federal implementation and positive relationships with federal 
adoption, issue salience, regional adoption activity, and partisan control.  Meanwhile, amending adoptions 
continue to be influenced by federal implementation, issue salience, per capita wealth, regional adoption 
activity, and vegetable sales. The Far West, North Central, Southeast, and Mid-Atlantic regions also 
continue to be statistically significant.  
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 Six hypotheses are supported under the comprehensive models’ evidence while four hypotheses 
remain neither supported nor rejected as there was mixed evidence. Comparatively, the comprehensive 
adoption models merely provide additional insight as to what variables matter across time. Specifically, 
H6, H10, H11, and H15 demonstrate the consistency of regional pressures, issue salience, and wealth as 
influential on adoption decisions. On the contrary, H4and H5 four and five demonstrate the partisan 
politics and political culture are more likely to influence state adopters prior to 1990. Post-1990 adoptions 
show some evidence of supporting H8. Growth in the vegetable crop sales is linked to a higher 
probability of amending adoptions. 
Comparing Regional Adoption Decisions 
The Far West, North Central, Southeast and Mid-Atlantic regions were statistically significant 
regions in the pre-federal adoption, post-federal adoption, and comprehensive model adoption models. In 
the comprehensive adoption models, the Far West and North Central regions were statistically significant 
across all adoption types. The exclusion of the Southeast region from amending adoptions may be 
attributed to lower amending adoption rates (see Appendix A), but there is no clear explanation for why 
the Mid-Atlantic is not statistically significant for amending adoption. The results of the regional adoption 
models may shed some light on why these four regions can be considered exceptional. However, for the 
Mid-Atlantic region, no variable included within the model provides insight. Speculatively, the 
significance of the region may be related to delayed initial adoption in the region until 1990. 
Beyond regional pressures, California exhibits little in common with the North Central or 
Southeast region. The significant national role that fruit production in California plays, which is detailed 
in Chapter VII, may indicate why the Far West is positively influenced by increasing fruit sales. 
Furthermore, the timing of amending adoptions in the Far West occurs for every state except Hawaii, a 
non-adopter, and Oregon on or after 2003. California has five amending adoptions from 2002-2010.  
The similarities between the North Central and Southeast regions may be attributed to timing of 
adoptions or even shared socio-economic and political characteristics. The results of the regional 
univariate and correlation outputs (see Appendix F) demonstrate similarities in wealth and agricultural 
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GDP. Yet, another potential rationalization for similarity could be that each region saw state initial 
adoption begin in the 1985-1990 time period. The Far West and Northeast regions adopted in the 1970s. 
This secondary explanation could indicate why the Far West model has minimal similarities with the 
other regions.  
Final Remarks on the Hypotheses 
  In revisiting the hypotheses, five hypotheses are clearly rejected based on the comprehensive 
model outcomes (see Table 4.10 Comprehensive Models). H2, H3, H7, H13, and H14 are not supported 
by the evidence. On the other hand, H4, H5, H10, H11, and H15 are supported. The remaining hypotheses 
either could not be statistically determined or presented mixed evidentiary support. 
INTERNALi,t Hypotheses 
Two internal characteristic hypotheses are clearly supported. Political culture and partisan control 
each demonstrated the expected directional relationship and were significant. Democratically controlled 
state governments were more likely to adopt initial organic legislation than divided or Republican 
controlled state governments. Similarly, states that are ranked closer to moralistic political cultures were 
more likely to adopt amending organic legislation than individualistic or traditionalist states.  
 Three internal characteristic hypotheses present mixed or inconclusive evidence that made 
rejection only partially correct. H1 could be rejected based on the scope of this research on just legislation 
as innovativeness could be argued as time and issue specific. However, if an expanded scope and 
interpretation of the law are used (e.g. inclusion of administrative rules), then the hypotheses could be 
supported. California, New York, and Massachusetts clearly set early regional cues and regional adoption 
paces.  
 H8 also presents mixed evidence because of the different significance of vegetable versus fruit 
sales. Vegetable sales presented statistically significant evidence at the national level. Fruit sales only 
appeared significant in the Far West region. On the basis of fruit sales alone, the hypothesis should be 
rejected. On the basis of vegetable sales measures, the hypothesis should be supported. The vegetable 
may have more substantive explanation as most states can produce vegetables and production decisions 
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are made on an annual (not long-term) basis. Moreover, since not all climates within the U.S. support fruit 
production, the regional dynamics for that sector may be muted.  
 Finally, H6 does not provide enough evidence to support. Per capita wealth measures were 
significant, but there is limited evidence for the direction of the relationship. Both slightly negative and 
positive relationships are established. Therefore, it is difficult to assess how wealth impacts adoption 
decisions. Nonetheless, it can be argued that wealth matters but how it matters is elusive.  
EXTERNALi,t.Hypotheses 
Of the five external determinant hypotheses, one hypothesis is rejected, three are supported, and 
one is undetermined. H14 is rejected based on descriptive statistical evidence. Only three states 
terminated statutes from 2002-2004 with the year 2004 accounting for lagged reaction time (see Figure 
4.3). This is not a substantial percentage of state enacted statutes considering the number of amending 
adoptions from 2002-2004 which suggest most states modified statutes. Therefore, it is clear that federal 
implementation did not negatively impact states’ decisions to maintain organic food and agriculture state 
statutes.  
 H12 cannot be supported or rejected. The statistically significant internal characteristics 
demonstrate that wealth, political culture, and partisan control matters. The problem with definitely 
determining a national-interaction model is that there is not enough detail from the statistical results alone 
for which states took cues from other states. The regional diffusion model, tested in both H13 and H14, 
can be supported as it is clear regional cues played a positive factor. The national-interaction model needs 
more evidentiary depth, achievable through qualitative methods, to determine how and where states 
adoption cues are taken.  
 Lastly, H14 is supported based on the per annual adoption rates for each time period. There were 
20 total adoptions from 1990-1992. Eight of those were initial adoptions. The per annual adoption rate is 
6.66 adoptions. From 1993-2002, there were a total of 59 adoptions, but there were only eight initial 
adoptions. The per annual adoption rate for the latter period is 5.9. Undoubtedly, the latter period 
contained more amending adoptions, but each period contained the same number of initial adoptions. This 
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suggests that states may have been operating under more uncertainty in the earlier period or even riding 
the tail end of the second peak period of adoption that ended in 1990.  
SALIENCEi,t. Hypothesis 
Both salience variables confirm the significance of media attention on organic food and 
agriculture. As logged version of salience indicates, states are more likely to adopt as issue salience 
increasing. While there is a slightly negation relationship with the raw measurement of salience, meaning 
the variable measured the total number of articles published annually, there is still confidence in rejecting 
the null hypothesis and supporting H15. In all comprehensive models, the logged version of issue salience 
is significant. 
 Conclusion of Results 
  The evidence presented in this chapter suggests that adoption of organic food and agriculture 
legislation is influenced by a variety of factors dependent on time period, region, and type of adoption 
(i.e. initial or amending). Consistent across time is the influence of per capita wealth, issue salience and 
regional pressures on state adoption decisions. Political culture also demonstrated some consistency 
overtime, as well. However, the 1990-2010 post-federal adoptions models did not find political culture as 
significant thereby eliminating it as statistically significant over time. As for per capita wealth, the 
majority of states have seen a steady increase in wealth overtime, thereby explaining low directional 
coefficients. Yet, despite the effect of wealth, states appear to be influenced more consistently by regional 
pressures and salience. Specifically, states appear to take cues from states within their own region and are 
responsive to increased salience of the policy issue at hand. While it may be possible that an isomorphism 
or a national-interaction pattern of adoption may also be occurring, further evidence is needed. National 
adoption percentages were statistically significant across the time-controlled models. However, the 
comprehensive models did not show significance of the national adoption and enacted state statutes 
percentages.   
 The significance of per capita wealth, issue salience, regional pressures, and political culture 
supports larger arguments within the policy diffusion literature as to what factors are more robust causes 
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for the diffusion of innovative policies and programs among U.S. States. The quantitative results 
presented in this chapter confirm the significance of these factors for the diffusion of organic food and 
agriculture legislation, as well as, demonstrating how these conditions are more likely to predict diffusion 
of other innovations among U.S. states. However, scholars should be cautioned with how issue salience 
and regional pressures are evaluated in other issue areas. Specifically, this analysis used a narrowed and 
rigid measurement for assessing issue salience. Likewise, regions are designated according to industry 
standards and contemporary concerns set forth and identified by the USDA. Future policy diffusion 
evaluations should contend with how to incorporate each of these variables into an analysis but should be 
aware of differences between issue areas. 
 Aside from the robust explanations of per capita wealth, regional pressures, and political culture, 
adoptions are also influenced based on time and adoption-type specific considerations. Prior to 1990, state 
initial adoptions were more likely to occur in years when state legislative professionalism is low, 
Democrats control the state legislature, and the state political culture is more moralistic in nature. 
Amending adoptions prior to 1990 were more likely to occur in states where per capita wealth is higher 
and agricultural GDP is lower. These relationships appear to be a by-product of the decade in which 
conventional agriculture suffered an economic decline and political conditions were generally hostile to 
regulation and big government. State adopters from 1976-2010 each saw a decline in agriculture GDP and 
state legislative professionalism. However, political conditions remained stable with most states 
possessing moralistic-leaning cultures and having either Democratically-controlled or divided control 
state governments. 
For initial state adoptions made from 1990-2010, vertical diffusion pressures emerged as the 
predominant explanation for adoption. Amending state adoptions post-1990 were more likely to occur in 
the years after federal implementation and when vegetable sales were increasing. Political culture and 
partisan control also demonstrated some significance but is limited to explaining all adoptions only. 
While the significance of federal adoption and implementation might be by chance, the results suggest 
that the effect of vertical pressure is highly significant in both the act of adopting legislation and the act of 
105 
 
implementing the policy. Despite federal supremacy, states continued to adopt initial food and organic 
legislation after 1990 and, even 2002, after official implementation. Likewise, amending state adoptions 
spiked in 2003 but did not result in most states terminating statutory language regarding organic food and 
agriculture. States’ adoption responses signify how innovative policies may diffuse and be modified in 
U.S. federalism system. 
Given the time- and adoption-type specific significant of certain variables, the results demonstrate 
the importance of focusing on conditions that are significant across all years of the diffusion process, but 
also the importance of narrowing the focus of the analysis to key time periods of adoption. In this 
particular issue area, pre- versus post-federal adoption results demonstrate how political and economic 
changes occur both within states and at the national level, and the effect on state adoption of organic food 
and agriculture legislation. Yet, given the drastic variation in economic and political conditions from the 
1970s to the 2000s, assessing the meaning behind the statistical findings is crucial to understanding how 
variations in diffusion in early versus later initial and amending adoptions are important to the diffusion 
process. If the quantitative results are any indication for what could occur in other policy diffusion 
scenarios, consideration of economic cycles and conditions, political attitudes towards the size and role of 
government, and when federal adoption and implementation occurs is just as important for understanding 
policy diffusion as per capita wealth, issue salience, and regional pressures to diffusion.  
Future Directions for the Statistical Modeling Organic Diffusion 
 There are a number of additional variables and steps that should be included in future research. 
First, it would be very beneficial to examine how state administrative rules influenced adoption of 
legislation. The data set would have begun in 1973 had administrative rules been included as a variable in 
this analysis. Oregon was the first state, but not the only state, to pass administrative rules prior to 
legislative action. Similarly, explanatory power is also lost if not accounting for how administrative rules 
may have decreased pressure to adopt initial legislation or amend state statutes. Future statistical policy 
diffusion models should contend with how different forms of law impact decision making.  
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 The second area of improvement is the consideration of the life-cycle of an innovation. Nearly 
twenty-two years after New York adopted legislation, some states decided to terminate organic statutes. 
While administrative law may still exist, it is questionable as to why this would occur. This question 
could be answered as additional data becomes available for more recent years. A number of the amending 
adoptions in 2009 and 2010 led the termination or replacement of organic statutes after 2010 in Louisiana, 
Missouri, New Jersey, and Pennsylvania. In Kentucky, delegation of rule-making power remained but the 
legislature commanded the replacement of the Kentucky Organic Program with the Kentucky Proud 
program, a local food initiative. Additional cases provide the opportunity to tease out regional patterns of 










This chapter will give an overview of the qualitative research methodology used in this study. 
This chapter will first briefly revisit the hypotheses with particular attention to the hypotheses that 
required a qualitative investigation. Then this chapter will explain and justify the use of the comparative 
case study method, outline the case selection criteria, and identify the cases selected for further 
examination. Finally, this chapter will conclude with the data collection process and sources.   
The Comparative Case Study Method 
In addition to the quantitative analysis, the comparative case study method will be utilized for this 
research to help answer the research question of ‘why do some states adopt organic food and agriculture 
legislation while others do not?’ Because quantitative methods are limited by the data available, the 
frequency of data and the overly standardized coding that is usually required to categorize observations 
(states in this case), case studies can be used to complement those types of analyses. 
A case study approach was selected because of its ability to answer ‘why’ questions. As Yin 
(2009) states, case studies are one qualitative method that can answer more explanatory questions such as 
‘why’, which deal with operational and causal links rather than incident frequencies. While a single case 
study approach could be used, the approach cannot meet the systematic and rigorous procedures needed 
for this study. Specifically, there is a clear ebb and flow of initial and amending legislative adoption in 
states and regions overtime. A single case study would not holistically illuminate the variation over time 
among states or regions. Therefore, the comparative case study method is ideal to complete a complex 
time-series analysis of a singular phenomenon along spatial dimensions (see Yin 2009, 146-148). 
The comparative case study method in the social sciences has a long-standing history and a 
number of strengths in enhancing research quality. As George and Bennett (2005, 19-22) indicate, case 
studies allow researchers to reach “high levels of conceptual validity”, identify causal mechanisms, and 
develop new hypotheses for future research directions. Along similar grounds, Yin (2009, 19-20) outlines 
108 
 
case studies as having, “a distinctive place in evaluation research,” through illustration, description, 
explanation of causal mechanisms, and enlightenment of multiple explanatory variables. For this study, 
the comparative case method is used for more than just description but to determine causality and identify 
additional directions for future research. 
Many scholars have highlighted the comparative case method for its ability to determine causality 
(George and Bennett 2005; Gerring 2007; King, Keohane and Verba 1994; Mahoney, 2010; Yin 2009). 
There are a few techniques in case study research that can determine causality including historical 
evaluation and process-tracing. This research uses the process-tracing technique. Process-tracing is an 
excellent tool for theory development and testing because it can identify intervening causal processes 
(George and Bennett 2005, 206-207). The number of variables and the nature of some of the hypotheses 
in this study creates the need to evaluate intervening causal mechanisms. For example, H18 is based on 
the presumption that amending adoption is more likely because of existing legislation, and amending 
existing policy could result from a different set of causal mechanisms than initial adopting legislation. 
This could explain why many initial adoption models had no statistically significant variables compared 
to amending adoption models. Furthermore, as another example, the process-tracing technique could also 
help explain the differences between initial and amending adoption and evolution of policy-type over 
time. H16, H17, and H18 require a descriptive evaluation of policy type. For this analysis, Spitzer’s 
enhancement of Lowi’s policy typology, discussed previously, will be used to evaluate the policy type 
and shift in policy type in each case study. 
In addition to the aforementioned benefits of process-tracing, the method can also aid in 
identifying causal mechanisms not identified or included in the statistical models. For instance, process-
tracing could identify the presence and strength of influence of other issue areas or issue networks on 
adoption. Identification of these other issue areas can greatly enhance future research endeavors on 






 Two cases are selected for analysis based on maximized variance of the independent variables 
with control for region and the time-based variation of the dependent variable. Selection of cases based on 
these criteria complements the quantitative analysis by addressing variation over time as well as 
addressing statistically significant regions. California and Georgia are state cases that represent a leader 
and a laggard in adoption the dimensions of time and space (i.e. regional and agriculture variation). There 
were a number of steps used in identifying and selecting each case. 
 First, only adopting states were considered. The cases were then further narrowed by selecting 
states that have existing enacted statutes. In other words, states that terminated enacted statutes were 
removed from consideration to increase comparability among cases. By using this filter, examining the 
termination and life-cycle of innovative policies is reserved for future research objective.  
Second, states were grouped were grouped into leading, lagging, and middle-pack initial adoption 
cases. As identified in Figure 5.1, there are three key periods of initial adoption from 1976-2010. Leading 
cases are states that adopted between 1978 and 1980. Middle-pack cases, which include two peaks, 
includes adoptions from 1986 to 1990. Laggards are states that adopted in 2000. Leading and lagging 
adopters are of particular interest given the amount of time between passages for each group. 
Furthermore, a leader-laggard comparison can also enhance the pre- versus post-federal adoption of 
organic policy 
Third, based on the time-period groupings, the states were further defined by region and then 
evaluated along the dimensions of current policies and variation in the independent variables that were 
found to be significant in the statistical models. The West was one leading adoption region, thereby 
leading to the selection of California. The Southeast was a laggard region with no state adopting 
legislation until 1990. Subsequently, Georgia, which was one the last states in the region to adopt 








Figure 5.1: Total State Adoption and Statutes by Year 
 
 
California: A Leader 
California is an ideal leader case for several reasons. First, California is largely considered a 
leading innovator in organic food and agriculture policy. It is the only state to operate its own state 
organic program since the creation of the NOP. This factor is of particular interest in light of Walker’s 
identification of California as a leading regional hub of innovation. Second, California has the most 
certified organic operations and has the most total acreage dedicated to organic production in addition to 
having organic certifiers operating within the states in the 1970s (ERS 2012b). The prevalence of these 
factors may help in answering questions about organic production and organic certifiers as influences on 
diffusion. 
A third reason for selecting California is because it is the state with the most amending adoptions. 




























1999, the period from initial federal adoption and the public of the NOP final rule. In addition, 
modifications were made in 2002 and 2003, the year of and the year after official enactment of the NOP 
final rule. These sequential adoptions may highlight the uncertainty and impact of federal action in this 
policy area. 
Finally, California is a leading adopter and part of the Far West region. The Far West region is 
the second region in the U.S. to have state adoption of organic legislation. Furthermore, the Far West has 
maintained enacted state statutes above 50% since 2000. New York, located in the Northeast region, was 
the first adopter. However, examining the New York case is problematic for two reasons. First, the New 
York Agriculture Commissioner convened a meeting only once in 1978 to, “fulfill their statutory 
requirement,” but never passed any rules (NY Organic Community Member, Personal Communications, 
E-mail, 6/3/2013). Second, state lawmakers never amended or addressed the issue after initial adoption in 
1976, and, in 2010, the resulting statute chapter was eliminated as being outdated. Despite the elimination 
of New York as a case study, the sequence of adoption between the Northeast and Far West regions may 
indicate national competition between leading hubs of innovation in states like New York and California.  
Georgia: A Laggard 
 Georgia was selected based on regional considerations. The Southeast region has the lowest 
percentage of state organic adoptions, and there was not an initial state adoption in the region until 1990. 
Also, from a theoretical standpoint, the Southeast is a unique region from a political ideology standpoint 
(see Elazar 1972) and is a lagging certified organic region (McEvoy 2012). A case from this region may 
confirm this regional political distinction in innovation and shed some light on the reasons behind low 
certified organic production levels in that state’s ag sector. 
Georgia emerged as the selected laggard case because it was one of the last adopting Southeastern 
states in 2000 and shares borders with three non-adopting states, Alabama, South Carolina, and 
Tennessee. Florida and North Carolina are the only states that adopted organic legislation in 1990 and 
1993, respectively. Mississippi also adopted organic legislation in 2000. However, cross-regional 
influence may be present since the Southwest region shares a border and has a 75% adoption rate.  
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Data Collection and Sources 
 A combination of data sources are used to examine each case including archived and 
contemporary document review, review of archived multi-media sources, and interviews with individuals 
and organizations. Archived material was collected through online sources and field research trips to each 
state. Triangulation of data sources strengthens the ability to determine causal mechanisms and create a 
detailed process-tracking narrative (Yin 2009, 114-119). Initial data collection began with a review of oral 
histories and archived materials, both documents and multi-media collections, from government agencies, 
state legislatures, interest groups, and media sources. Then interviews were conducted with elected 
officials, government officials, interest group leaders, and other pertinent qualified experts on the 
development of organic food and agriculture policy in each state.  
 A “snowball” sampling method is used for identifying potential interview contacts (Lofland, 
Snow, Anderson and Lofland 2006, 43). Initial interview respondents are identified through the document 
and multi-media review. At the end of the interview, it is asked if they know of any additional contacts 
that may be willing to discuss their experience. This collection of additional contacts will only be asked to 
the first and second set of interview participants as diminishing returns are expected. Appendix G lists the 
organizations in each state that the interview participants were recruited. For California, 80 individuals 
were identified for interviews. For Georgia, 34 individuals were identified for interviews. Due to several 
logistical challenges, a total of ten individuals were interviewed for both cases.
62
   
 Each interview was conducted using a semi-structured or flexible interview format (Lofland, 
Snow, Anderson and Logland 2006, 105). A set of guiding questions was created to give direction for 
each interview (see Appendix H). However, depending on the information revealed during the interview, 
flexibility in asking unscripted questions is ideal and could reveal key data for determining causal 
mechanisms or revealing unknown variables of influence. For each type of interview participant (e.g. 
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 Due to the amount of time that has passed between initial adoptions and today, many interview 
participants are unable to recall information, have retired, or have passed away. Oral histories existed for 
California’s organic movement and are included where appropriate. For Georgia, no oral history or 
archived material exists detailing the organic movement or any organic bill.  
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elected official, government official, etc.), a different question guide is developed. Questions are 
customized to the extent that specific dates or organizations vary from case to case. For example, initial 
and amending adoption dates vary for each case and implementing state organizations also vary by formal 
title (e.g. Georgia Department of Agriculture.) 
 Questions guides begin with questions which reveal the individual’s expertise and then move 
towards broad questions intended to identify the broader economic, political, and social dynamic of the 
policymaking environment. The questions become more tailored at the end of the interview session to 
tease out nuanced differences or peculiarities of the policy environment.  
Briefly Revisiting the Qualitatively Tested Hypotheses 
 As outlined in Chapter III, this dissertation includes 18 hypotheses. While most of the hypotheses 
could be tested quantitatively, four hypotheses are best tested with qualitative methods. Specifically, H9, 
H16, H17, and H18 all had variables that could not be constructed quantitatively for examination (see 
Table 5.1). Validity concerns and resource constraints, such as lack of historical documentation over time, 
creates challenges in quantitatively measuring organic certifiers, policy type, and identifying innovation 
leaders in organic food and agriculture policy. However, these variables can be examined qualitatively 
and provide some evidence to support or reject the four hypotheses not addressed with quantitative 
modeling. This permits a full examination of the policy diffusion model outlined in Chapter IV through 
the complete inclusion of all INTERNALi,t,, POLICYTYPEi,t, and EXSPOLICYi,t considerations. 
In addition to testing H9, H16, H17, and H18, the comparative case study also strengthens this 
research in two ways. First, qualitative investigation permits further confirmation of the generalized 
findings from the time-series analysis. As discussed below, the cases selected for this research highlight 
the differences between a leader, a laggard, and a middle-of-the-pack adopter. The generalized 
quantitative results may not adequately or accurately explain the individual influences of adoption for 
each case. Some significant variables may not be significant in the leader case but are for the laggard 
case. Also, some variables not included in the models may appear as significant. In turn, a second benefit 
of the comparative case study method is to identify additional conditions that influence adoption or 
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Table 5.1: Non-Statistically Tested Hypotheses 
Model Variable Hypothesis 
INTERNALi,t 
H9: States with third-party certification programs are more likely to adopt organic 
legislation than states with no certification programs. 
POLICYTYPEi,t  
H16: States are more likely to adopt organic legislation that provides strict regulatory 
rules or guidelines in the 1970s than later decades. 
H17: States are more likely to adopt organic legislation that is co-regulatory in the 
1980s. 
EXSPOLICYi,t 
H18: More innovative states are more likely to amend organic food and agriculture 
statutes more often. 
 
change of policy overtime. For example, the comparative case study approach allows for exploratory 
investigation into other issue areas that influence adoption. Based on the results of the three cases, 
additional questions or hypotheses could be generated for future research. 
Measuring Third-Party Certification 
 The influence of third-party certification, tested in H9, will be assessed by examining the 
presence of third-party certifiers in the state associated with development and passage of organic food and 
agricultural legislation. Specific consideration will be given to third-party certifiers that sponsored 
legislation, wrote legislation, or were providing active feedback during legislative debate.  
Measuring Policy Typology and Change 
 H16, H17, and H18 all require qualitative measuring of policy type and change over time. Within 
the diffusion literature, scholars have focused on the influence of policy typology on political decisions by 
citing Lowi. Lowi (1972) claims that policies determine politics, meaning that the design of policy may 
influence how political actors support or oppose the policy. Lowi’s policy taxonomy contains four 
different policy types (see Figure 5.2). Each policy type is associated with a particular likelihood of 
coercion (either as remote or immediate) and applicability of coercion (influencing either individual or 
environment of conduct).  Lowi is primarily concerned with identifying how policy conditions influence 
political patterns discovered. In 1987, Spitzer clarified Lowi’s original policy typology scheme to address 

































Figure 5.2: Lowi and Spitzer’s Policy Taxonomies 
 






















































figure in half to represent policies with mixed characteristics (see Figure 5.2). For example, regulatory 
policies can vary from pure regulation, which includes, “specific prohibitions back by firm sanctions,” to 
less coercive regulations, which may rely on fines, license withdrawal, or positive incentives to modify 
behavior. This analysis will focus on the varying types of organic regulatory policy and will use Spitzer’s 
re-focused policy taxonomy as a guide for distinguishing between more pure regulatory organic policies 
and less- coercive regulatory policies. However, this analysis will include co-regulatory schemes (e.g. 
third-party certification) as an extension of less coercive regulation with it bordering between more versus 
less coercive regulation. 
Measuring Existing Policy 
 As indicated in the policy diffusion model, existing policy is expected to have an influence on 
adoption. The assessment of existing policy on adoption decisions is qualitative assessed through the 
number of adoptions. More frequent adjustments of existing policy may be the result of more innovative 
states but may also provide cues for the changing of policy typology shifting over time. 
Case Study Procedure 
 The next two chapters detail the events in the two cases selected for analysis. Chapter 6 examines 
the events surrounding California from 1978-2010. Chapter 7 examines Georgia’s adoption of organic 
food and agriculture legislation from 2000-2010. For both cases, historical background about the state’s 
agriculture industry, including the emergence of the organic food and agriculture sector, is provided to 
establish the context of the industry’s power and status within each state. The analysis of significant 
variables concludes each chapter with the consideration of all quantitatively assessed hypotheses, as well 
















 The story of organic agriculture in California spans over four decades. While not the first state to 
adopt organic food and agriculture legislation, California is considered a leading model state for organic 
policy development. California played an instrumental role in moving organic policy forward on a 
national and international scale, and it is the only state to be approved to operate its own state organic 
program post-NOP implementation in 2002.
63
 Furthermore, since the initial adoption in 1979, California 
has amended its statutory code 17 times adjusting both the Health & Safety Code and the Food & 
Agricultural Code.
64
 The number of amending adoption far exceeds other leading states in amending 
adoptions including Idaho, Minnesota, Texas, and Washington.
65
  
 The California case is an exceptional case to study, but also provides the opportunity to examine 
an early adopter of organic policy that remains a significant player in the policy domain today. There are 
many factors that influenced adoption decisions including the presence of a third-party certifier, political 
considerations, salience, regional influences, federal influences, and a growing and expanding market. 
The significance of each of these variables waxes and wanes over time. The variables that matter most 
during the initial adoption in 1979 are not likely the same set of factors that influenced reform in 1990, 
2002 or amending adoptions in 2010.  
 This chapter is divided into six main sections. First, a brief introductory overview of California is 
provided followed by an overview of agricultural production and California agriculture industry is 
provided. Details of California’s transition to specialty crops are included. Third, an overview of the 
emergence and growth of the organic industry is discussed. Next, an overview of California’s organic 
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 State Organic Programs are partial pre-emption arrangements where states are given the opportunity “to 
oversee its production and handling operations per the USDA organic regulations,” but can, “also add 
more restrictive requirements,” if necessary (NOP 2011). 
64
 This count is between 1976 and2010. It does not include any amendments that may have been adopted 
after 2010. 
65
 Number of amending adoptions from 1976-2010 for each state is as follows: Idaho (8), Minnesota (9), 
Texas (9), and Washington (7). 
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legislative adoptions is provided. A total of eighteen bills were adopted from 1979-2010. The history of 
California organic policy is divided into three eras including the Organic Foods Act of 1979, the 
California Organic Foods Act of 1990, and the California Organic Products Act of 2003. Finally, this 
chapter then concludes with an evaluation of significant factors of adoption and an overview of the case 
study’s contribution to the knowledge of organic policy and policy diffusion. 
About California 
 California, also known as the Golden State, is the third largest geographical state in the U.S. with 
approximately 155,780 square miles of land area (U.S. Census Bureau 2010a). Located in the western 
U.S., California has 840 miles of Pacific coastline and shares borders with Mexico and three other U.S. 
states including Oregon, Nevada and Arizona. The California capital is Sacramento located in north 
central region of the state in Sacramento County, approximately 87 miles northeast of San Francisco (see 
Figure 6.1 for a map of California). According to the 2010 Census, the state’s population grew to 37.3 
million people from 33.8 million. The areas surrounding Los Angeles, Sacramento, San Diego San 
Francisco, and San Jose have higher population concentration. Furthermore, many of the counties in these 





 California has the largest U.S. state economy as measured by GDP and if one of the top ten 
largest global economies in 2011 (Center for Continuing Study of the California Economy 2013; 
Legislative Analyst’s Office [LAO] 2013). According to California State University (2010), the state is 
dependent on seven core industries for driving the economy including; agriculture, information 
technology and electronics, media and cultural industries, business and professional services, tourism, life 
sciences, and transportation services/manufacturing. Collectively, these industries employ roughly 5 
million Californians and the most to the state’s overall economic productivity (see Table 6.1). 
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 It is important to note that no county in California has an average median household income lower than 






Figure 6.1: California Map with Counties and Some Cities 
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2010. 
 




Future projections indicate the most growth in employment for educational services, health care, and 
professional and business services (Employment Development Department [EDD] 2012).  The recovery 
since the Great Recession, however, is uneven statewide as coastal areas, such as San Francisco, have 
rebounded quicker than inland areas like Sacramento (Avalos 2013).   
Political Environment 
 The political environment in California is complex, but in more recent years, there is more 
favoritism towards Democratic candidates rather than Republicans (Cook Political Report 2014). In more 
recent national elections, Democrats have fared well. However, the state hasn’t always favored 
Democratic candidates and regional differences remain along a Republican-Democrat divide. Figure 6.2 
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areas of California have majority support for Democratic candidates whereas interior regions voted 
predominantly Republican. On average, Democratic-leaning areas are wealthier and have higher 
population densities (see Appendix I).  
California shares similarities with other states regarding partisan control of state government (see 
Appendix J). Most states within the West region have been controlled by either Democrats or under split 
control. California shares a similar pattern with Nevada and Oregon of Democrat versus split government 
control over time. For much of the past three decades, California and Nevada have been under split 
government control, where neither part controls state government. California is also similar to Nevada 
with regards to political culture. California’s political culture is identified as moralistic with a strong 
individualistic strain (Elazar 1994, 284), which correlates to a 3.55 ranking on Sharkansky’s numeric 
scale (1969). California’s political culture, therefore, has a concern for the public good but also supports 
the rights of the individual. In general, the broad designation of California’s political culture demonstrates 
trust in government to address public concerns while there is an undertone of mistrust in government, as 
well. Comparatively, Nevada is the only other state in the region with a similar political culture with a 
3.66 political culture ranking on Sharkansky’s scale. Oregon and Washington have political cultures 
ranking more purely moralistic whereas Alaska has an individualistic culture and Hawaii has a political 
culture closer to being traditionalist.   
 California differs from other states in the West with regards to the level of state legislature 
professionalism. California’s state legislature professionalism ranges from .626 as a peak in 2003 to a low 
of .526 in 1979. While California’s professionalism score follows a similar increase and decrease pattern 
over time, Alaska, Hawaii, Nevada, Oregon, and Washington all have state legislature professionalism 
scores lower than California by at least .200. Nevada, with which California shares other similar political 
environmental conditions, maintains the lowest regional level of state legislature professionalism with a 
peak of .163 in 2010 and a low of .130 in 1979. California’s higher level of state legislature 
professionalism indicates the state legislature spends more days in session, has more resources, has a 
larger staff, and is considered full-time. In sum, the political conditions in California are similar to other 
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states in the region. Yet, Californian political conditions are distinctive with the state being more 
professionalized than other states.  
A Brief Overview of Agricultural Production in California 
 Over the past century, California has consistently ranked as one of the top or the top agricultural 
producer(s) in the United States (Ball, Wang, and Nehring 2013). While agriculture barely contributes to 
the state’s current overall GDP,
67
 California’s agricultural industry plays a significant role in the U.S. and 
global agricultural markets.  The Golden State not only has the largest agricultural production and sales 
figures in the U.S., but it also has the most diversified set of crop production including nuts, fruits, 
vegetables, horticulture, dairy, poultry, and cattle products (Olmstead, and Rhode 2003). California is the 
leading producer for several products, contributing to 99% or more of U.S. production totals, of almonds, 
artichokes, dates, figs, raisins, kiwis, olives, pistachios, prunes, and walnuts among other commodity and 
specialty crops (Sumner, Bervejillo and Kuminoff 2003, 61).  On the global market, top export 
destinations for California agricultural commodities in 2011 include; Canada, China, the European Union, 
India, Japan, and the United Arab Emirates (Agricultural Issues Center ND). Total value of the 
California’s 2011 exports is $16.8 billion with almond exports being the foremost export valued at $2.8 
billion (Agricultural Issues Center ND). California’s share of total 2011 U.S. agricultural exports was 
12.4%, only a slight decrease from 2010.   
The agriculture industry is a vital part of California to the extent it can be argued that 
“California’s politics, economy, culture, society, environment and technology are inextricably tied to 
agriculture” (University of California-Berkeley Library [UCB-Library] ND). The history of California 
agriculture is relatively short, complex, and inextricably linked to the regional climate and natural 
resources, in addition to migration patterns and use 
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 The percentage of California’s total GDP resulting from agricultural industry from 1976 to 2010 ranges 
from a high of 3.1% in 1979 to a low of .1.3% in 2001 and 2006. In 2010, the percentage of California’s 




of newer agricultural technology. In general, California can claim it has a Mediterranean climate with a 
two-season cycle of rainy winters and dry summers allowing for year-round production (UCB-Library 
ND). For example, Figure 6.3 demonstrates how leafy greens can be produced year-round in the state due 
to the unique 2-season growing cycle. However, California is also the second largest geographical state in 
the continental U.S., so it experiences extreme variations in natural resources and climatic patterns across 
its vast geography. For example, the state includes Death Valley, the Redwood Forest, and the Sierra 
Nevada mountain range, all of which represent extreme variations in temperatures, rainfall, and elevation 





Source: CLGMA 2012  
 
Figure 6.3: Year-Round Production of Leafy Greens in California 
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 Death Valley sits 282 feet below sea level, averages less than 2 inches of rainfall annually, and can 
reach temperatures of 120˚F during the summer (NPS 2013a). The Redwood National and State Parks 
average annual rainfalls of 60-80 inches and average high temperatures around 67˚F in the summer, 
typical for northern coastal climates (NPS 2013b). Yosemite, situated towards the north of the Sierra-
Nevada mountain range, reaches up to 13,000 feet in elevation, receives 37 inches of average annual 
precipitation, and reports average high temperatures in the summer of 89 (NPS 2013c, 2013d). 
125 
 
There are several ways to demonstrate the regional variance of agricultural production in 
California. State agencies and universities have created several approaches to identifying agricultural 
regions within the state. State agricultural region maps have ranged from including 4 to 8 different 
regional designation based on production areas largely based on different resources, land uses, and 
climatic patterns in each county (EDD 2010; Johnston 2003). Figure 6.4 demonstrates one example of 
regional agriculture production. The Central Coast, Sacramento Valley and San Joaquin Valley are key 
agricultural production centers largely responsible for most of the state’s agricultural production 
(Johnston 2003, 34-37). Yet none of the regions would be as productive today had it not been for regional 
settlement patterns and the use of agricultural technology. 
It was only after the 1760s that California could be considered a “mecca for agriculture” (UCB-
Library ND).  Prior to early settlers in the region, the California region lacked native crop species. Settlers 
in the region, predominantly Spanish missionaries, were the first to introduce non-native crops including 
wheat, grapes, nuts, and cotton. For much of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, California 
agriculture was predominantly large-scale wheat farms (Olmstead and Rhode 2003, 2-3). After decades of 
poor agricultural management practices (e.g. lack of crop rotation and/or deep plowing), wheat farming 
became a fruitless endeavor with yields and crop quality sharply declining. According to Olmsted and 
Rhode (2003, 3-5), the farm economy shifted from large-scale operations to small-scale specialty crop 
production. The rapid growth of irrigated land
69
 at the beginning of the twentieth century coincided with 
the sharp increase in specialty crop production.
70
 Figure 6.5 demonstrates the decline of wheat cropland 
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 Irrigation is an agricultural practice that “makes agriculture possible in areas previously unsuitable for 
intensive crop production,” by transporting water to cropland (Environmental Protection Agency 2012). 
Irrigation in California started as early as 1797 but irrigated lands remained at less than 1% until the 
1890s (UCB-Library ND; Olmstead and Rhode 2003, 3) 
70
 The California Department of Food and Agriculture identifies specialty crops to include fruits, 
vegetables, tree nuts, dried fruits, horticulture, and nursery crops (California Department of Food and 




Source: Johnston 2003 
Figure 6.4: California’s Eight Agricultural Production Regions 
 
Region 1: North Coast 
Region 2: North Mountain 
Region 3: Northeast Mountain 
Region 4: Central Coast 
Region 5: Sacramento Valley 
Region 6: San Joaquin Valley 
Region 7: Sierra Nevada 
Region 8: Southern California 
      a) South Coast 
      b) South Desert 
 
* The Sacramento and San Joaquin Valley may be 





Source: Olmstead and Rhode 2003, 5 
Figure 6.5: Distribution of California Cropland Harvested 
 
and conversion to specialty crops. Many of the specialty crops were produced by emerging 
cooperatives.
71
 For example, the Sunkist was a label developed by the California Fruit Growers Exchange 
established in 1905 (Olmstead and Rhode, 23).  
Since the end of World War II, specialty crops are not the only area for rapid agricultural 
production growth. The cotton and livestock industries also grew substantially (Olmstead and Rhode 
2003, 7-11). In part, the large growth of these three industry sectors can be attributed to the creation of 
cooperatives, increased prevalence of mechanized farms, which includes irrigation, and use of paid labor. 
However, not all California farmers were eager to adopt new, innovative farming practices post-WWII or 
had the ability for capital-intensive farming that denotes conventional agricultural practices today.  
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 The California Center for Cooperative Development identified cooperatives as user-owned and –
controlled businesses intended to help farmers gain market power by providing marketing, supply or 
service benefits (California Center for Cooperative Development ND). Olmstead and Rhode (2003, 24) 
claim that the success and power of the California co-op model was not matched anywhere else in the 
country due to the state’s dominance in producing many specialty crops like almonds and grapes.  
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California Organic Agriculture 
 The story of California organic agriculture is just as remarkable and distinctive as the rest of 
California’s agricultural history. According to Guthman (2004, 14), California contained, “one of the 
most countercultural branches of the organic farming movement.” Organic farming emerged in both rural 
and urban epicenters predominantly situated in the central coast and central valley.
72
 Counter-culture in 
the late 1960s and 1970s deeply influenced cuisine served in San Francisco while Berkeley became 
notable because of Chez Panisse, a French-inspired restaurant opened in 1971 that serves fresh, local and 
sustainable ingredients (Belasco 2006; Chez Panisse 2012; Guthman 2003, 15). Two universities, the 
University California-Santa Cruz and the University of California-Davis, were also significant to the 
emergence of organic agriculture.  
 Officially established in 1980, the University of California-Davis Small Farm Center focuses on 
the small-scale farm operations including foci on specialty crops and rural cooperatives. The Center was 
the result of several years of amorphous existence and efforts to create a program on the campus that 
served small-scale rather than large, scale conventional farmers (Christensen et al. 1990).
73
 The “Tomato 
Harvester” lawsuit, filed by the California Agrarian Action Project
74
 and the California Rural Legal 
Assistance in Alameda County, spurred the creation of the Small Farm Center at the University of 
California-Davis campus (Martin and Olmstead 1985; Community Alliance with Family Farmers [CAFF] 
2013). Plaintiffs, 19 farm workers, claimed “publicly funded mechanization research
75
 displaced farm 
workers, eliminates small farmers, hurt consumers, impairs the quality of rural life, and impedes 
collective bargaining” (Martin and Olmstead 1985). While the “Tomato Harvester” lawsuit was 
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 Guthman (2003, 15) states that southern California experienced a health food movement several 
decades before the organic movement.  
73
 The Small Farm Program was created in 1976 and was the predecessor the Small Farm Center 
(Christensen, Giraud et.al 1990). In 2010, the Small Farm Center closed and became the Small Farm 
Program (UCSFP 2014). 
74
 The California Agrarian Action Project would eventually become the California Action Network in 
1985, and, in 1993, the California Action Network would unite with the California Association of Family 
Farmers to become the Community Alliance with Family Farmers (CAFF 2013). 
75
 According to Martin and Olmstead (1985), “Mechanization research is construed to include the 
development of machinery, crop varieties, chemical herbicides, growth regulators, and laborsaving 
methods of handling, transporting, and processing crops.” 
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eventually lost on appeal in the California Supreme Court in 1989, the Small Farm Center was a response 
and surviving legacy from legal action taken by stakeholders from the Central Coast. 
 Before the establishment of the Small Farm Center, Alan Chadwick was the founding leader of 
“the Garden,” an experimental agricultural endeavor, on the University of California-Santa Cruz campus 
in the late 1960s. The Garden was intended to give students a sense of place to, “to offset students’ 
feelings of displacement and disruption” (Center for Agroecology and Sustainable Food Systems 
[CASFS] 2010a). Not only was the Santa Cruz campus being physically redesigned, leaving little outdoor 
space for reflection, but students were also seeking refuge from political and cultural struggles of the 
1960s.
76
 Chadwick, a student of Rudolf Steiner,
77
 used a French-intensive, biodynamic style farming that 
would bridge the needs of the mind, body and spirit. Students and non-students alike were attracted to the 
Garden with many volunteers later operating their own farms. For example, Orin Martin, who would 
manage the Farm and Garden
78
 starting in the late 1960s, left behind his counter-culture activism 
activities, like protesting the Vietnam War, in the Northeast. He drove across country to Santa Cruz and 
eventually started volunteering at the Garden. As he recalls, 
I had some friends who were going to school at UC Santa Cruz. They said, ‘It’s really nice here. 
Why don’t you come out?’ This was in 1969. I got a VW bus and drove out here. And there were 
two people that were living in their house that worked at this place called ‘The Garden’ on 
campus, and they were never there, I mean, rarely there. They came in late and left before light. 
So after a while, I thought I would investigate where this garden place was. (Martin 2008, 6) 
 
The Farm and Garden at the University of California-Santa Cruz would eventually become the Center for 
Agroecology and Sustainable Food Systems [CASFS]. Many individuals that would play a key role in the 
development of California organic legislation and the development of the organic agriculture market, 
including Mark Scrowcroft and Mark Lipson, either attended or were a part of the network surrounding 
the Santa Cruz campus. 
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 Referenced political and cultural events include the Vietnam War and the perception of a culture only 
concerned with the artificial (CASFS 2010a).  
77
 Among his many accomplishments, Rudolf Steiner crafted the idea of biodynamic farming, which is 
part of Steiner’s Anthroposophy philosophy (Uhrmacher 1995). 
78
 The Farm is a separate operating entity from the Garden. The Farm Center was built under the premise 
of a class and founded in 1972 (Martin 2008, 17; CASFS 2010b). 
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 At about the same time the Farm was established in Santa Cruz, the California Certified Organic 
Farmers [CCOF], a farmer-led chapter-based certification organization, was organized and operating out 
of Barney Bricmont’s dining room (Brians and Brians 2007, 54; Bricmont 2007, 1; California Certified 
Organic Farmers [CCOF] 2013a). After efforts by the Rodale Institute, a rural Pennsylvania organic 
research group, failed to establish a certification program in California, Bricmont was one of six organic 
farmers from central California intent on creating a certification process for organic farms and products to 
define and protect the term organic from fraudulent use. For much of the 1970s and 1980s, CCOF was the 
only or at least the predominant certifier of organic operations in the state of California. In 1992, CCOF 
leading staff members, including Mark Scrowcorft and Mark Lipson, left CCOF to run the Organic 
Farming Research Foundation [OFRF]. OFRF was created by CCOF in 1990 as a way to provide funding 
for organic farming research. CCOF leaders did not feel that universities were doing enough to support 
organic farmers at the time and created OFRF as a vehicle to accept donations for research funding 
(Lipson 2007, 22-23).  
 During the lifetime of CCOF and OFRF organizations, certified organic farms and sales 
dramatically increased. After a watermelon scare in the summer of 1985,
79
 CCOF saw membership nearly 
double (Lipson 2007, 11; Scrowcroft 2007, 47). The demand for membership in CCOF would continue, 
even from those outside of the state and country, into the late 1980s and 1990s as more attention brought 
to the issue of organic food and agriculture through a number of focusing events and consumer curiosity 
and demand (Scrowcroft 2007, 37-40, 42; Lipson 2007, 19; Lipson 2013). The amount of media and 
consumer interest (framed as salience in our previous modeling), particularly in the late 1980s, 
contributed to demand to reform of California organic law as will be discussed below. Figures 6.6 and 6.7 
demonstrate the rapid increase in organic acreage and sales in California from 1992-2002 with most of the 
increase attributed to specialty crops such as fruits and vegetables.  In 2011, California had 2,530 certified 
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 In the summer of 1985, 2,000 people were sickened after eating California-grown watermelons illegally 
contaminated with Aldicarb, a pesticide used to kill pests on cotton, citrus, and potatoes among other food 
crops (Cone 2010). 
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Source: Klonsky 2003, 253 
Figure 6.6: 1992-2002 California Organic Acreage  
 
 
Source: Klonsky 2003, 254 
Figure 6.7: 1992-2002 California Organic Sales  
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A History of Organic Food and Agriculture Legislation in California 
 California passed a total of 18 legislative bills regarding organic food and agriculture regulation 
from 1979-2010. Table 6.2 outlines adopted legislative bills, year of passage, and bill sponsorship. Three 
legislative bills were the most significant to developing organic food and agriculture policy in the state 
because each provided a framework in which subsequent amendments were made (see Appendix K for 
legislation text). The Organic Foods Act of 1979 was the seminal piece of legislation while the California 
Organic Foods Act of 1990, and the California Organic Products Act of 2003 each represent a significant 
overhaul and reform of existing regulations. The other 13 bills representing either reauthorization, as in 
the case of AB 3422 in 1982, or were intended to refine and clarify aspects not addressed in the primary 
legislation.  
From 1979-1989, regulations were only developed within the Health & Safety Code. After 1990, 
organic food and agricultural regulations existed in both the Health & Safety Code and the Food & 
Agricultural Code spanning implementation responsibilities across two different state agencies. The 
California Department of Health Services [CDHS] is responsible for enforcement activities for the Health 
& Code. The California Department of Food and Agriculture [CDFA] is responsible for enforcement 
activities for the Food & Agricultural Code. While this study does not explicitly examine the 
development and internal policies of state administrative agencies, the role of CDHS and CDFA are 
significant to the development of legislation and overall California policy.   
 The history of organic food and agriculture legislation in California will be explored in three 
different eras. First, the passage of the Organic Foods Act of 1979 and reauthorization in 1982 will be 
explored. Then the events leading up to and the passage of the California Organic Foods Act of 1990 will 
be described. Amending legislation from 1991-1999 will also be covered, as well. Finally, the history will 






Table 6.2: California Organic Food and Agriculture Passed Legislation 
Year Bill Sponsored/Introduced* 
1979 AB 443 
Organic Foods Act of 1979 
Michael Gage [D] 
1982 AB 3422 Sam Farr [D] 
1982 SB 1273 Henry Mello [D] 
1990 AB 2012  
California Organic Foods Act of 1990 
Sam Farr [D] 
1991 AB 645 Sam Farr [D] 
1992 AB 3246 Sam Farr [D] 
1993 AB 1713 Sam Farr [D]; Rusty Areias [D] 
1994 AB 2518 Rusty Areais [D] 
1995 SB 688 Committee on Agriculture and Water Resources 
1996 AB 2340 Sal Cannella [D] 
1998 AB 2761 Committee on Agriculture 
1999 AB 1243 Committee on Agriculture 
2002 AB 2823  
California Organic Products Act of 2003 
Virginia Strom-Martin [D] 
2003 AB 776 Barbara S. Matthews [D] 
2005 SB 730 Jackie Speier [D] 
2009 AB 856 Anna Caballero [D] 
2010 AB 2612 Committee on Agriculture  
2010 AB 2686 Tom Berryhill [R] 
 
*Political Party – [D] =Democrat; [R]= Republican 
 
The Organic Foods Act of 1979 (AB 443) 
 The organic food and agriculture legislation passed in 1979 was not the first attempt in the 
California State Legislature to pass a law of that nature. In 1978, Assemblyman Vic Fazio, a Democratic 
representing constituents in the central California region, authored AB 2135, a bill that “proposed 
definitions and controls,” for the term organic in California agriculture (Legislative Counsel 1979). The 
bill was proposed at the recommendation of the Department of Consumer Affairs under the pressure of 
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Governor Jerry Brown, a Democrat. While the bill died after the third reading on the senate floor, 
Assemblyman Michael Gage, a Democratic representing Napa, Sonoma, and Vallejo, would sponsor AB 
443 in 1979, which was very similar to AB 2135. AB 443’s intent was to establish “standards within the 
Sherman Food, Drug and Cosmetic Law for food products being advertised or labeled as organic, 
organically grown or wild, natural grown, ecologically grown, or biologically grown” (Legislative 
Counsel 1979). Essentially, the bill was intended to provide a definition of organic to eliminate confusion 
and deceptive practices, or information asymmetry, in the market. There was little evidence to support 
political disagreement within the California State Legislature. Instead, most of the disagreement occurred 
between food and health industry groups.  
Summary of the Final Bill Version (AB 443)  
The final version of AB 443 altered the Health and Safety code to include sections 26469, 26569, 
and 26850 relating to organic food. Within these sections, key definitions are made, acceptable practices 
are identified, implementation funding determined, and a sunset clause established. Table 6.3 outlines key 
aspects of the bill. The bill offers precise guidelines for permissible use of terms and conditions of 
growth, production, and handling of organic food. However, certification of organic operations would 
remain voluntary. CCOF members wanted to keep certification as farmer-to-farmer certification as the 
method for validating organic claims and agreed to keep terms of agreement voluntary (Cantisano 2008, 
113). In addition to voluntary compliance, enforcement activities would not be mandatory for state 
agencies including CDHS. Citing the adoption of Proposition 13, it was expected that there would be cut-
backs in government funding (Fishman 1979c).
80
 Therefore, mandating state agencies to enforce the law 
without proper additional funding and resources was thought as inconceivable. 
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 On June 6, 2978, California voters passed Proposition 13. As part of the larger anti-tax movement in the 
country, Proposition 13 decrease property taxes to 1% and limited the growth of future assessments. It 
was believed, by some, that the passage of Proposition 13 would lead to cuts in government spending and 
increase unemployment rates (Glyn and Drenkard 2013).  
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Identifies the appropriate use of the terms organic, organically grown, naturally grown, 
wild, ecologically grown, and biologically grown. Limits use to “raw agricultural 
commodities or processed foods which have been produced without the use of 
synthetically compounded fertilizers, pesticides, or growth regulators for 12 months 
before seed was planted until the time of harvest, or harvested, stored, processed or 
packed” (Fishman 1979a).Processed foods can contain ascorbic acid, sodium ascorbate, 
calcium ascorbate, and citric acid.  Synthetically compounded means “products 
formulated by a process which chemically changes a material of substances” (e.g. 
splitting molecules) from a natural source except microbiological processes that only 
physically change the structure (Cal. Hlth & S. Code § 26569.11(a)(3)).  
Pesticide 
Residue 
The maximum level of acceptable pesticide residue for organically grown food is 10% of 
the level determined safe by the United States Food and Drug Administration (Cal. Hlth 
& S. Code § 26569.12).  
Meat, Fish, 
& Poultry 
Meat, fish, and poultry sold as organic can be treated with chemicals or drugs for disease. 
However, chemicals and drugs cannot be used within 90 days of slaughter, and 60% of 




Permissible materials in organic production include calcium oxide, sulfur, gypsum, light 
petroleum, and vegetable oils. Unacceptable materials include Bordeaux mix, aromatic 
petroleum solvents, diesel, petroleum fractions used as weed and carrot oils (Cal. Hlth & 
S. Code 26569.11(a)(3)). 
Record-
Keeping 
Growers, manufacturers, wholesalers, and retailers much keep accurate records for two 
years regarding source and details of food products labeled organic (Cal. Hlth & S. Code 
§26569.11, 26569.15(c-e)).  
Certification 
Labeling 
Food products that are certified organic and not simply labeled organic must list the 
person or organization that provided certification on the label (Cal. Hlth & S. Code 
§26569.15) 
Enforcement No funds are allotted for enforcement activities. No state agency is required to enforce 
the code (Cal. Hlth & S. Code §26850.5(c)). 
Sunset 
Clause 
Each section was set to expire, unless reauthorized, on January 31, 1983 (Cal. Hlth & S. 
Code §26469, 26569, 26850).  
 
 
 According to Bones (1992), Oregon not only provided the momentum for organic food and 
agriculture legislation in other states but also used Oregon’s 1973 administrative rules as a model.
81
 The 
California law differed from Oregon rules in record-keeping requirements, defining synthetic and labeling 
requirements. At the time, California’s rules were not only similar to Oregon’s rules but also Maine’s and 
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 Several requests were made to the Oregon State Archives division specializing in management of older 
Department of Agriculture administrative rules. Each request by phone and email went unanswered to this 
point.   
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a definition developed by the Federal Trade Commission in 1979 (USDA Study Team 1980, 6). Yet, 
California’s rules were considered to be a leading example to examine conflict surrounding the 
development of organic regulations. The link between Oregon and California was established through an 
organic network including CCOF, Oregon Tilth,
82
 and Friends of the Earth among other self-organized 
groups. These groups worked to build consensus and minimize opposition to legally defining and 
establishing organic rules.  
Support and Opposition 
AB 443 divided organic farmers and interested consumers into two camps. One camp feared the 
law as being too strict and disliked government intervention in this area. The other camp was fighting 
against fraud and watering-down of organic to where the market was losing relevance and stability 
(USDA Study Team 1980, 8). CCOF was in the latter camp and played an instrumental role in developing 
and advocating AB 443. Sy Weisman and Stuart Fishman,
83
 both with the North Coast chapter of CCOF 
and Gage’s constituents,
84
 initially expressed reservations about AB 2135 in its treatment and regulation 
of the term organic. The primary concern was“it would exclude virtually all of the growers using the 
term” at the time (CCOF 1988, 2).  
In rewriting AB 443, CCOF members worked extensively to create a California organic industry 
that could agree upon a definition of organic and how to appropriate regulate the market under attack. 
Fraud and loose application of the term organic on produce was a major concern. Working as focusing 
events, an article in New West magazine and a Los Angeles CBS news affiliate each exposed fraud in the 
organic market in 1979 (Fishman 1979a). Conventional growers could have an unfair market advantage 
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 Oregon Tilth is similar to CCOF. It is an organization that promotes organic agriculture as part of its 
broader mission to support sustainable and equitable agriculture. In addition, it also serves as an organic 
certifier.  Oregon Tilth can trace its roots to the early 1970s. As an outgrowth of Regional Tilth, Oregon 
Tilth is part of a broader network established in the Northwest. For more information about Oregon Tilth 
see http://tilth.org/ 
83
 Fishman was a produce buyer for Rainbow Groceries, a San Francisco co-op grocery store, and was 
reputable for scrutinizing organic operations. The term “Stu Fished” was a phrase coined to describe 
throughout scrutiny of an organic operation (Burroughs 2004).  
84
 Sy Weisman and Stuart’s Fishman’s North Coast chapter was the Farmers Organic Group of Sonoma 
Cunty, a marketing co-op (CCOF 1988). 
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by selling conventionally grown produce as organic and were damaging the organic market image. Many 
in the organic industry linked organic fraud with the diluting of the term natural. The term natural was 
perceived to have lost all meaning, and the effort was made to prevent the same diluting of the term 
organic through revising AB 443 (Fishman 1979a). AB 443 represented a method for identifying what 
farming operations were or were not organic. 
The distinction on who was organic and not organic was a process that took two years. CCOF 
started working on AB 443 in 1978 (CCOF 1988). Meetings were held with organic growers, processors, 
wholesalers, and retailers to develop a law that would codify the organic term. Support was drawn from a 
wide base including the California District Attorneys Association, Department of Consumer Affairs, 
California Health Officers Association, Sacramento Natural Foods Co-Op, and California Dietetic 
Association (Legislative Counsel 1979). From outside of California, CCOF worked closely with Friends 
of the Earth and Oregon Tilth (Fishman 1979a). The result ended in an 8-page bill detailing the terms and 
agreement of using the word organic. Yet the final bill version was a clear product of compromise and 
negotiation with opposing forces. Not even CCOF was completely satisfied with the passed version 
(CCOF 1988). 
 Opposition to the bill came from two primary sources
85
 outside of the organic industry network - 
Clinton Miller representing the National Health Federation and Dave Ajay from the National Nutritional 
Foods Association. Miller (1978), calling supporters of the bill “‘naïve’ but well meaning,” and Ajay had 
several key points of criticism (Lasher NDa). First, voiced opposition demonstrated a clear dislike for the 
organic definition included in the bill. Miller claimed the organic definition used in the bill was only one 
of many definitions used by organic producers. Moreover, the claim was made that the organic definition 
was arbitrarily different from the definition of natural (Fishman 1979b; Lasher NDa, NDb; Miller 1978). 
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 Assemblyman Gage’s office received opposition letters from others. One example is William Jarvis 
(1979), representing the National Council against Health Fraud, argued that the bill falls short for 
consumers and should not legitimize terms that would be misleading in the long run. Another example is 
the California Association of Tobacco and Candy Distributors raising concern about having to adjust 
marketing of wild cherry cough drops to comply with regulatory language regarding the term wild 
(Fishman and Fishman 1979). 
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Ajay contended that having multiple state definitions for organic would be problematic and suggested 
waiting for the Federal Trade Commission to develop regulations.  
A second concern was centered on quality differences between organic and conventional 
agriculture. Miller believed the bill should contain language to suggest organic and natural foods were 
superior in quality to conventionally grown foods. Quality refers to higher nutritional value as well as 
beneficial to health and the environment because of the quality of soil and absence of mechanized inputs 
(Fishman 1979b; Lasher NDa, NDb). Ajay elaborated on the quality point by arguing that the 12-month 
cessation period to transition from conventional to organic production was not enough to protect soil and 
product quality (Fishman 1979b). 
The third and final key criticism centers on the involvement of CDHS. Miller claimed that 
involving the CDHS would be bad for natural food stores, growers, and consumers. In a conversation 
with Ellen Powell, the Legislative Coordinator for the Department of Consumer Affairs, Miller indicated 
that the, “hostility ‘tween the heath food industry and the DoH goes back a long ways, and underlies 
A[jay] & M[iller]’s worry of the bill” (Lasher NDa). The perceived hostility was because CDFA 
implemented the Sherman Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act. Miller’s assumption was not clearly linked to 
Proposition 13 concerns or CDHS’ reservations about funding (California Department of Health Services 
[CDHS] 1979). 
In addition to Miller and Ajay’s voice opposition, some organic farmers also expressed concerns. 
Indeed, Bill Jessup, a citrus grower from Oasis, indicated reservations about the need for government 
intervention. In a letter written to Stuart Fishman, Jessup (ND) states, “I haven’t gotten a look yet at AB 
443. My first inclination is that it would be better to rely on private regulation than on the government.” 
Jessup sought a more stringent definition of organic and wanted to prevent having multiple definitions 
across the country. He felt that multiple definitions would cause confusion and could even be more 





Points of Compromise 
To address some of the voiced opposition, the compromises made in the bill included the sunset 
provision, removal of a definition for natural, technical exceptions to using the term wild, and the 
inclusion of language regarding no expectations of enforcement. The enforcement language [Cal. Hlth & 
S. Code §26850.5(c)], or rather language indicating no mandatory enforcement, was included to 
address concerns raised by CDHS regarding funding support. In an early bill analysis, CDHS indicated a 
neutral position (CDHS 1979). Funding was cited as a concern.  
 The removal and exceptions related to  term definitions for natural and wild were made in light of 
opposition. As described in Section 26469, the term wild can be “used to describe a flavor of a food or a 
plant variety.” This language was added after concerns related to naming of wild cherry cough drops 
raised by the California Association of Tobacco and Candy Distributors. There was no intent to change 
this long-time tradition (Fishman 1979c). The exclusion of the term natural from being regulation (see 
Cal. Hlth & S. Code §26469) is the result of a trade-off with agribusiness (Fishman 1979d). By not 
regulating natural-labeled foods, agribusiness agreed to leave the organic label alone. 
 Perhaps one of the bigger compromises involved the establishment of a sunset provision for 
January 31, 1983. Designers of the bill wanted to set up a regulatory board under the law that would add 
and modify permissible materials and practices (Fishman 1979d). It was understood the law would 
contain loopholes and would need to be addressed. However, the regulatory board was not approved. 
Therefore, the sunset provision was “unanimously and enthusiastically agreed upon” and included. It 
would allow concerned parties to create a more workable bill after discovering any loopholes or 
deficiencies of AB 443 (Fishman 1979c).  
1982 Reauthorization (AB 3422). 
AB 3422, introduced by Assemblyman Sam Farr, was the reauthorization and amending bill to 
the Organic Foods Act of 1979. AB 3422 was debated after the passage of SB 1273, an urgency measure 
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to create exceptions to the maximum allowable pesticide residue on organics.
86
 After the two year trial 
period for AB 443, several deficiencies and areas of improvement were identified. There was enough 
support for the continual existence of organic regulations despite continual in-fighting within in the 
organic community (Cantisano 1982). Some recommended improvements ranged from amending the list 
of permissible materials, requirement documentation for soil improvement, funding CDHS to improve 
enforcement, and giving distinctive definitions for ecologically or biologically grown (Castisano 1982). 
After a lengthy discussion for how to improve the existing law, AB 3422 eliminated all sunset provisions 
and new limitations to applying prohibited substances to raw agricultural commodities. Efforts to increase 
the “teeth” or enforcement of the bill were unfulfilled. The CDFA was hostile to the idea of getting 
involved with organic regulation, and the CDHS did not want to be responsible for enforcement without a 
funding source (CDHS 1982). 
The California Organic Foods Act of 1990 (AB 2012) 
 In March 1989, Sam Farr introduced AB 2012 or The California Organic Foods Act for the first 
time (Lipson 1990). The passage of the act involved two years of effort to craft a bill that would overhaul 
organic regulations. The 1980s marked a decade of both disappointment and joy in the organic 
community. Although the interest in organic products was increasing, weak enforcement of the 1979 law 
left to numerous scandals and need to create mandatory labeling standards. CCOF, the primary sponsor of 
the bill, aimed, “to increase the regulation of the labeling of organic foods and the inspection of foods 
grown under conditions considered as organic to meet the public’s expectation and prevent fraud” (Evans 
1989). 
The Call for Reform in California 
The movement for reform in California was spurred in the 1980s as attention to organic food and 
agriculture was increasing. A few high-profile cases of fraud in the market increased concern about the 
image and validity of the organically-labeled goods. Meanwhile, an increasing tide of concern over 
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 The medfly, or Mediterranean fruit fly, is an invasive species to North America that can cause extensive 
damage to a number of fruit crops. The exception was made due to the medfly infestation occurring in 
San Mateo, Alameda, and Santa Clara counties among other areas (Hagen, Allen, and Tassan 1981).  
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conventional agricultural practices led to increased consumer demand and curiosity. One of the biggest 
and most significant fraud scandals was the carrot caper scandal (Lipson 2007, 19; Scrowcroft 2007, 42; 
Epstein 2013). In 1988, photographic evidence surfaced incriminating Pacific Organics, a food 
distributor, of re-bagging conventionally grown Mexican carrots as organic (Scrowcroft 2007, 37-38; 
CCOF 2013a). The ‘organic’ carrots were then distributed to a number of grocery outlets and sold under 
false pretenses to organic consumers. CCOF and CDHS were investigating the odd occurrence of organic 
carrots being sold in Weed Patch, California, when the primary organic carrot grower was out of carrots. 
After the help from a Pacific Organics worker, evidence showed trucks from Mexico bringing 
conventionally grown carrot entering a warehouse and being re-bagged as organic carrots. According to 
Scrowcroft (2007, 38-39), CCOF went public with information in the San Jose Mercury News with the 
Associated Press picking up the news story short thereafter. Cases of fraud like the great carrot caper were 
not uncommon. However, the carrot caper incident was one of the more blatant cases leading to 
considerable concern in the organic community about protecting itself.  
 A second significant wave of concern emerged from public and environmental health issues 
regarding food contamination and questionable conventional agricultural practices. One focal point of 
attention came during the February 1989 broadcast on CBS’s 60 Minutes examining the dangers of Alar 
and other pesticides (Negin 1996; Scrowcroft 2007, 35).
87
 In response to the broadcast and the 
involvement of Meryl Streep,
88
 the public panicked and the number of organic farmers grew drastically 
(Negin 1996; Scrowcroft 2007, 35). Alar, also known as Daminozide, is a chemical sprayed on apples that 
enhances color and regulates growth. It is also a known carcinogen being banned in California under 
Proposition 65 on January 1, 1990 (Office of Environmental Health Hazard Assessment 2013). The focus 
on pesticides, not just Alar, at the time coincided with the passage of Proposition 65, an initiative for 
                                                          
87
 The broadcast was based on the Natural Resources Defense Council’s report “Intolerable Risk: 
Pesticides in Our Children’s Food” (Negin 1996).  
88
 Meryl Streep, an American actress, became outspoken against the use of pesticides in 1989. She went 
public on her views in numerous media outlets and even testified before Congress (Negin 1996). 
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labeling hazardous chemicals in the marketplace (Lipson 2013). Heightened concern about the dangers of 
conventional agriculture led to increased interest and demand of organic food and agriculture.
89
  
 Calls for reforming organic food laws in California came from the convergence of concerns over 
fraud and health concerns. As Bricmont (2007, 8-9) recalls about the need for reform, 
“Originally we went on our own code of ethics. But we had no way to control the industry. 
Anybody could just slap a label ‘organic,’ because organic meant nothing, there was no legal 
definition. At that point we were running across people who were just chemically growing, and 
labeling the food organic and selling it. We knew we had to clean up the industry. We knew what 
we were doing as a group. But then the outside world was not cooperating. So we decided we 
needed to draw a line in the sand that said: on this side of the line you’re organic, on the other 
side you’re not.” 
 
CCOF, who was truly the de facto enforcer of the 1979 law, led the effort for reform by hiring attorney 
Barry Epstein and working with Assemblyman Sam Farr to rewrite the law (Brians and Brians 2007, 51; 
Lipson 2013; Epstein 2013). Epstein was an environmental attorney in San Francisco that was introduced 
to the organic farming community during the 1988 medfly eradication.
90
 His expertise was sought for re-
writing the bill partially at the request of Farr. Farr was approach by what he describes as “hippie 
farmers” from his district seeking a legal course for enforcement (Farr 2007 12-13; Farr 2013). He 
worked to educate the farmers about the legislative process and how to go about writing and getting a bill 
passed. In addition to contacting key decision makers in the legislative process, part of that effort was to 
work with lawyers to write the bill in codified language (Farr 2013). Epstein worked closely with Mark 
Lipson and the CCOF grower committee to write the law starting 1989 (Lipson 2013). After two years of 
meetings
91
 and a number of revisions, the bill was reintroduced on March 9, 1990 after action during the 
previous legislative session failed.
92
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 Lipson (2007, 20) also noted the Chilean grape scare, where imported grapes were tainted with cyanide, 
in 1989 as a significant event.  
90
 Epstein represented a group of organic farmers in Northern California who were fighting against the 
mandatory medfly eradication spray program in 1988. Organic farmers would have taken them out of 
organic production (Epstein 2013). 
91
 Effort was made to create a conducive and welcoming environment for a wide variety of participants to 
the extent of Epstein requesting decorum at meetings (Epstein 1989a). Meeting participants include but 
are not limited to CCOF, CDFA, CDHS, California Department of Finance, California Cattlemen’s 
Association, California Grocers Association, Butte County Farm Bureau, Santa Cruz, County Farm 
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Summary of the Final Bill Version (AB 2012) 
The passed version of AB 2012 was approximately 13,500 words and was unusually detailed.  
The bill added Chapter 10 (Section 46000) and Section 14904 to the Food and Agricultural Code and 
altered the Health and Safety code by amending and moving regulatory code to Article 4.5 Section 
26569.20. Table 6.4 outlines major provisions of the bill. Adoption of the bill extended mandatory 
enforcement requirements for CDHS and CDFA. Fees would be collected from registration of persons 
engaged in the production or handling of organic goods and used for enforcement activities. While  
Table 6.4: Summary of AB 443 
Aspect Summary 
Enforcement The bill requires that the Director of CDHS and CDFA to enforce regulations 
regarding organic foods (Cal. Food & Ag. Code § 14904; Cal. Hlth & S. Code § 
26569.25). 
Registration & Fees All persons engaged in the production or handling of organic production and 
handling is required to register with the agricultural commissioner annually. For 
producers, registration fees are on a sliding scale based gross income (Cal. Food & 
Ag. Code § 46002; Cal. Hlth & S. Code § 26569.35). 
Application 
Limitations 
The bill identified the permissible time frames in which pesticides and other 
prohibited materials could be applied to crops, seeds, and growing mediums if 
identified and labeled as organic. A one-year transition period was established 
(Cal. Hlth & S. Code § 26569.22).  
Term Definitions The bill included precise definitions for such terms as applied, handled, processed, 
prohibited materials, sold as organic, and synthetically compounded (Cal. Hlth & 
S. Code § 26569.21-.22). 
Advisory Board The CDFA Director is responsible for the establishment of the Organic Food 
Advisory Board that will advise the Director and adopt regulations regarding 
permissible and prohibited materials. The board is a 13 member body representing 
producers, processors, retailers, consumers, scientists, and environmentalists (Cal. 
Food & Ag. Code §46003).  
Certification For products sold as certified organic, products must be certified by a registered 
organization that is a legally separate and independent organization than the entity 
being certified (Cal. Food & Ag. Code § 46009; Cal. Hlth & S. Code § 26569.30 & 
§265569.24). 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
Bureau, California Grain and Feed Association, California League of Food Processors, Western Growers 
Association, California Farm Bureau.  
92
 As Barry Epstein (2013) indicated as an appropriate footnote, California’s legislative session acts as a 
two-year legislative session. If bill are introduced in the first year of the two-year session window, such as 
the 1989-1990 session, the bill will continue on the books during the second year session. 
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application limits and some term definitions were provided, AB 2012 required the establishment of the 
Organic Food Advisory Board. The Board would be responsible for advising the CDFA Director and 
developing regulations regarding permissible and impermissible substances and practices. Prior to 
regulation adoption, the CDFA Director is responsible for publishing a list of materials, permissible and 
impermissible, based on materials published by CCOF, the Organic Food Production Association of 
North America, and Oregon and Washington Departments of Agriculture (Cal. Food & Ag. Code 
§46003.5).  
Certifying organic operations, a voluntary measure, would not be the responsibility of CDFA or 
CDHS. Instead, a third-party certification scheme was maintained from the 1979 bill. However, certifying 
agencies would be responsible for registering with the state and maintaining records. Furthermore, the 
certifying agency would need to be legally separate and independent from any entity it certified.  
Support, Opposition and Compromise  
The debate and compromise surrounding the two-year development of AB 2012 centered on three 
different groups of participants including elected officials, public organizations, and the agriculture 
industry including both conventional and organic agriculture. Conventional agricultural interests, 
including the California Farm Bureau and the Western Growers Association, were slow to recognize the 
significance of the bill, and, after their strategy of trying to kill the bill failed, tried to make the bill 
workable (Farr 2013; Epstein 2013). Three key points of debate and compromise center on the complexity 
of the bill including third-party certification, funding the implementation of the bill, and debates on 
technical aspects of regulation. 
Debate on Complexity & Third-Party Certification 
 One of the more notable aspects of the bill is its sheer length and complexity. At approximately 
13,500 words, the bill is comparatively longer to most legislation and remarkably more like 
administrative rules. As noted in a California Department of Finance 1990 bill review, AB 2012 is noted 
as establishing “a program that is complex, with program responsibilities spread between both State and 
local agencies including the [C]DFA, the [C]DHS, the CACs [county agricultural commissioners], and 
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local district attorneys.” The detailed complexity of the bill, however, was a calculated move by CCOF 
and its supporters. According to Barry Epstein (2013), the reason for the extensive detail was because of 
CCOF’s concern about the rule-making process with CDHS and, more specifically, CDFA. The 
perception was that CDFA was captured by conventional agricultural interest. Had the bill passed 
delegating authority to CDFA and CDHS, rules may have been developed that did represent the best 
interests of CCOF or the rest of the organic agriculture community.  
 The third-party certification scheme was one of the more hotly contested aspects of the complex 
bill. One reason the third-party certification scheme was include was related to politics. As Sam Farr 
pointed out (2007, 16-17; 2013), Republican Governor George Deukmejian posed as a challenge for 
passage.
93
 The third-party certification scheme worked only if it did not increase the cost or regulatory 
burden at a time of anti-regulation in the United. Yet, another challenge arose from state and local 
government entities wanting to retain regulatory power. CDFA, county agricultural commissioners 
[CACs], and CDHS all at one point during the process raised concern about the third-party scheme. From 
an agricultural standpoint, it was assumed that CACs could conduct independent certification (Kizer 
1989; Voss and Nutter 1989; Epstein 2013).
94
 Likewise, CDHS, who would support the bill in later 
versions, indicated that the AB 2012 “would place the DHS in direct competition with the private industry 
in the certification of organic food processors, handlers and producers” (CDHS 1989; Kizer 1989; Voss 
and Nutter 1989). However, both state agencies initially failed to recognize the importance of the farmer-
on-farmer certification process. 
 As a second and more well-established reason for the third-party certification was the demand 
from CCOF. CCOF growers truly believed in third-party certification but did not feel it should be 
mandated in the new law despite fraud. As Mark Lipson recalls (2007, 20), 
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 Another elected official that represented a challenge was Assemblyman Norman Waters, a Democrat 
and Chair of the Assembly Agriculture Committee. Waters was identified as, “an established, typical state 
politician, big friends with big ag,” and likely to create problems with reform particularly after organic 
growers expressed disgust with the 1988 mandatory spraying for medflies (Lipson 2007, 16). 
94
 Organizations such as the California Cattleman’s Association (1989) expressed the need to keep 
certification within CDFA or CDHS citing private certification as a barrier for entry into the market.  
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“The board of CCOF didn’t feel like it was right to impose a requirement for certification. They 
wanted that to be their additional level of value in the marketplace. But they said, ‘There needs to 
be some kind of legal baseline, so we’ll create this registration program where everybody has to 
basically declare that they’re following the law and make a legal affidavit that they’re following 
the standards in the law. But then, third-party certification will be over and above that.” 
 
AB 2012 wouldn’t diverge too much from the Organic Foods Act of 1979 except that enforcement and 
registration would be mandatory. Certification from a third-party entity would remain as method for label 
certification but with more clear indication for what constitutes as organic. The third-party certification 
scheme not only met the desires of CCOF, but also the cost-effectiveness requirements and infrastructure 
requirements set forth by Governor Deukmejian (Lipson 1990). 
Funding Implementation  
 Another significant barrier to the passage of AB 2012 was ensuring appropriate levels of funding 
for CDFA, CDHS, and CACs.
95
 On one side of the debate was a number of organizations against 
registration fees. For example, the California Grocers Association (1989) was against fees charged to 
retailers selling organic food. Yet, as stated previously, Governor Deukmejian posed a challenge for 
passage in part due to cost requirements of implementation (Farr 2013). The California Department of 
Finance, CACs, CDHS, and CDFA also indicated concerns, particularly early on in the process in 1989, 
about the cost of implementation and enforcement (CDHS 1989; California Department of Finance 1990; 
Lipson 1990). There was uncertainty regarding initial start-up cost and long-term viability of the program 
to sustain itself. If AB 2012 were to pass, it would have to contain funding to cover enforcing the bill.  
 Registration fees collected from organic producers and handlers were the primary vehicle to fund 
enforcement (Lipson 1990).
96
  However, additional compromises were made to ensure adequate funding 
levels. Specifically, writers of the bill “trimmed certain functions called for in the bill, phased in the start-
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 Associated with the revenue concern is concern about where collected fees would be deposited. Earlier 
versions of the bill directed collected fees to be deposited in the Food and Agriculture Fund and the 
Health Safety Fund, which did not exist. An adjustment was made for fees to be deposited into the 
California General Fund (California Department of Finance [CDF] 1990). 
96
 Collection of penalties and administrative charges were also additional sources of funding that would 
fund, but not significantly fund, the program.. Registration fees were expected to garner around $400,000 




up of some programs, and limited the scope of rule-making activity that is required” (Lipson 1990). For 
example, failure for a certifying organization to register would be a violation after December 31, 1991, 
allowing a one-year deferment of enforcement. While not all parties found the scenario ideal, the effort to 
“balance the equation” helped to overcome the financial problems associated with the passage.  
Technical Aspects of Regulation 
 Controversy also surrounded technical aspects of AB 2012, ranging from improper coding,
97
  
record keeping requirements, and decisions regarding organic practices. Revisions were made to protect 
the identity of registrants, requiring growing practices disclosure during registration, using the 1990 
CCOF Certification Handbook as a reference for prohibiting specific substances until 1992, and reducing 
the tolerance level from 10% to 5% for prohibited material contamination on organic products (Lipson 
1990). These technical adjustments were just some of the many compromises made. 
At the time technical aspects of AB 2012 were development, an effort was forged to standardize 
organic practices. The Western Alliance of Certification Organizations [WACO], including 
representatives from Oregon Tilth, Washington Tilth, and CCOF, was created and has been active since 
the late 1980s (Lipson 2007, 18; Lipson 2013). WACO’s purpose was to “harmonize” organic standards 
and practices on the west coast. In 1990, California was operating on a one-year transition period to 
organics while Oregon and Washington were operating on a three-year transition period (Scrowcroft 
2007, 40). The difference between transition periods caused Oregon to consider refusing California 
organic products. Such discrepancies led to a handshake agreement to iron-out differences. Over the 
course of several meetings, which also had participants from the Northeast Organic Farming Association 
chapters, an agreement was made to standardize regulations to improve interstate commerce and 
minimize competitive disadvantage (Epstein 1989b; Scrowcroft 2007, 40-41). While not all technical 
changes in AB 2012 synchronized with other states’ practices and standards, several legislative adoptions 
in the 1990s would work towards standardizing practices and norms. 
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 Improper coding was only a minor, but relatively significant, criticism by the CDHS during the 1990 
session debate (Griffin 1990). 
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Amending Adoptions of the 1990s 
A total of eight bills were passed from 1991-1999, amending provisions of the California Organic 
Foods Act of 1990. Table 6.5 provides a brief description of each bill’s intent. Of all the bills, the 1992 
AB 3246 was the only bill to be vetoed prior to passage. Republican Governor Pete Wilson cited 
inadequate funding for CDHS to implement the law (Legislative Counsel 1992). No other bill was found 
as vetoed during its course to passage. 
Three patterns emerge for amending legislation that occurred during the 1990s aside from 
implementation responsibility adjustments. First, five bills contain language that directly impact the scope 
and size of the Organic Food Advisory board. The 1991, 1992, 1993 and 1996 bills extended the deadline 
Table 6.5: Bills Amending the California Organic Foods Act of 1990 
Year Bill Summary of Intent Relating to Organic Provisions 
1991 AB 645 An urgency measure intended to continuously appropriate revenues, extend 
phasing deadlines for new regulations and revise established fee schedule for 
registration. 
1992 AB 3246 The bill would alter the complaint procedure, registration fees, and required 
adoption of prohibited substances be completed no later than July 1, 1994.  
1993 AB 1713 The bill amended a number of provisions including the following: add one 
additional member to the Organic Food Advisory Board; extend the date for 
listing prohibited substances to January 1, 1996; prohibit prescribe records 
from becoming public; ban co-mingling of organic and non-organic 
commodities; protect trade secrets, and limit the multi-ingredient labeling on 
certain organic products. 
1994 AB 2518 The bill amended a number of provisions including the following: allow for 
approval of certifiers based on national law; increase responsibilities of 
CACs; require all organic be certified; and corrected a technical glitch 
regarding application of pesticides in the 1990 bill. 
1995 SB 688 The bill clarifies deadlines and requirements for when prohibited materials 
can last be applied. These changes remain in effect until the implementation 
of federal organic certification. 
1996 AB 2340 The bill changed the deadline for when the prohibited substances list should 
be adopted. 
1998 AB 2761 The bill creates alternatives for the Organic Food Advisory Board. 
1999 AB 1243 The bill would further amend membership aspects of the Organic Food 
Advisory Board, make technical changes to approved ingredients for organic 




in which the board should adopt regulations regarding prohibited materials. The 1993 bill extended the 
final date to January 1, 1996. All of the amendments were intended to aid in the continual implementation 
of the California Organic Foods Act of 1990. However, the 1993 extension was explicitly noted in 
response to delayed federal efforts to the development of prohibited substance list at the federal level. As 
indicated during a hearing,  
“It is the intent of the Department of Food and Agriculture to adopt organic food regulations in a 
form and content similar to those adopted by the U.S.D.A. pursuant to the federal Organic Foods 
Production Act of 1990. Inasmuch as those regulations will not be prepared until 1994 or 1995, 
the extension of the time limit for the state’s adoption from 1994 to 1996 appears reasonable.” 
(Hite 1993) 
 
No further extension of the deadline was made after 1993, but the 1996 bill changed the deadline to a 
future date when the national standards are developed. 
 A second pattern within the 1990s amending legislation relating to the Organic Advisory Board 
was the adjustment of membership on the board. In 1993, the Board was expanded to 14 members with 
the addition of another producer representative. In 1998 and 1999, policy makers created and made 
technical adjustments for alternative board members. None of the adjustments received significant 
criticism.  
 A third trend of the 1990s amending legislation regards the moratorium periods of transitioning to 
organic. In the 1990 legislation, a 12-month period of transition was required where land may not have 
prohibited materials applied. The 1994 and 1995 bills clarified a glitch in the original bill and established 
organic transitionary periods based on initial registration dates. Table 6.6 identifies the transitionary 
period length based on registration date. Starting in 1996, the three-year transitionary period agreed upon 
by WACO was achieved in California. These changes received no significant opposition. 
The California Organic Products Act of 2003 (AB 2823) 
 The 2002 AB 2823, also known as the California Organic Products Act of 2003, was chaptered 
into law by the California Secretary of State on September 15, 2002. Introduced early during the 2002 
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legislative session by Assemblywoman Virginia Strom-Martin, a Democrat from Duncan Mills,
98
 AB 
2823 brought the state organic food program in compliance with the National Organic Program [NOP] 
effective in 2002. Starting in August 1999, meetings were held by the Organic Food Advisory Board with 
interested parties
99
 to collaborate on the re-writing of California’s organic law with the expectation of bill 
passage in 2002. 
100
 
Table 6.6: Organic Transitionary Periods Established After Passage of 1995 SB 688 
Registration Date No Prohibited Material Period 
Prior to January 1, 1995 Previous 12 Months 
During 1995 calendar year Previous 24 Months 
After January 1, 1996 Previous 36 Months 
 
Source: Legislative Counsel 1995 
 
Summary of the Final Bill Version (AB 2823) 
 The passed version of AB 2823 was as detailed and the California Organic Foods Act of 1990. 
The bill modified the Food and Agricultural Code and the Health and Safety Code regarding organic 
foods.
101
 Table 6.7 outlines major provisions of the bill. The bill maintained a mandatory third-party 
certification system and enforcement responsibilities by the CDFA, CDHS, and CACs. The Organic Food 
Advisory Board was replaced with the California Organic Products Committee. The Committee would be 
responsible for advising the California Secretary of Agriculture regarding his or her duties as assigned by 
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 Duncan Mills is a small community located approximately 75 miles northwest of San Francisco in 
Sonoma County. 
99
 Interested and supportive parties throughout the process included CCOF, the California Farm Bureau, 
the Environmental Health Network, the California Council for International Trade, Bayliss Ranch, 
Lundberg Farms, California Natural Products, Avalon Natural Products, Organic Ingredients Inc., Nub 
Circus, Alto Ingredients, Tikvah Company, and 26 individuals including consumers. California Grocers 
Association, Proctor & Gamble, and the Cosmetic Toiletries and Fragrance Association voiced 
opposition. 
100
 Eventually a COPA task force, let by Gay Timmons, developed in 2000 and comprised of 
approximately 65 companies and individuals to develop the proposed amendments (Timmons 2002a and 
2002b). 
101
 The Health and Safety Code organic regulations were moved to sections 110815-110959 as early as 
1999 (see California 1999 AB 2823).  
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AB 2823. Enforcement and certification responsibilities by all California entities, however, must be in 
compliance and meet the standards set forth by the NOP. 
 The California Organic Products Act of 2003 made substantial changes regarding fee structures 
and scope of materials and products covered by organic regulation. To offset increasing costs, a fee 
structured was created for CDHS, new fees were created for particular products and handlers, and CDFA 
fees were increased. The fee increases were at the request of the organic industry to cover certification 
costs (Strom-Martin 2002a). For the scope of coverage, alcohol, cosmetic products, dietary supplements, 
and pet food would be included as regulated items. Cosmetic products, as well as multi-ingredient 
products, would be subjected to additional fees. The inclusion of newer items beyond raw agricultural 
products or processed goods is reflective of the market that was expanding and diversifying.  




Requires the CDFA, CDHS, and CACs to enforce regulations (Cal. Food & Ag. Code 
§ 46000; Cal. Hlth & S. Code § 110812). Maintains the third-party certification system 
as also established by the NOP. 
Restructures 
Code 
Brings the Food and Agricultural Code and Health and Safety Code into compliance to 
the NOP. 
Advisory Board Establishes the California Organic Products Committee to advise the Agricultural 
Secretary. Comprised of 15 members and 15 alternatives representing producers, 
processors, wholesale distributor, consumer representatives, environmentalists, 
scientists, and retailers (Cal. Food & Ag. Code § 46003). 
Definitions & 
Coverage 
Maintains most definitions and includes new definitions for animal food and non-food 
plants, and USDA NOP (Cal. Food & Ag. Code § 46004.1; Cal. Hlth & S. Code §  
110815). The bill also extends coverage of organic items to include multi-ingredient 
items, cosmetics, alcohol, dietary supplements and pet food (Cal. Hlth & S. Code §  
110835). Cosmestic and multi-ingredient products must contain at least 70% 
organically produced ingredients (Cal. Hlth & S. Code § 110838-110839). 
Registration 
Requirements 
Maintains previous registration requirement and penalties (Cal. Food & Ag. Code § 
46013.1; Cal. Hlth & S. Code § 110875 and § 110915). 
Fees Amends CDFA fee structure to increase fees and fee caps and creates a fee schedule 
for CDHS. Also creates new fees for cosmetic products, multi-ingredient products, and  
for individuals that otherwise handle organic products not covered by CDHS scope 






Support, Opposition, and Compromise 
The controversy and debate surrounding AB 2823 departed from previous debates on organic 
regulations. Except for the 1992 AB 3246, partisanship did not clearly appear to affect the outcome of any 
organic bill. Even with the passage of the California Organic Foods Act of 1990, Republican Governor 
George Deukmejian challenges were not cited as a problem with most working on the bill. Partisanship, 
however, was clearly evident as Republicans clearly demonstrated reservations about the bill even in its 
final version. Table 6.8 demonstrates votes and party affiliation for votes in the Senate and Assembly 
Floors. A majority of Republicans were adamantly opposed to the passage of the bill but did not have a 
majority in either the Senate or Assembly to prevent passage. Opposition from the bill came from 
Republicans, the California Grocers Association, The Cosmetic Toiletry and Fragrance Association, and 
Proctor & Gamble. Three points of concern were raised by the opposition.  
First, Republicans suggests that a “bounty hunter” provision
102
 existed given that the CDFA 
would receive direct financial benefit from fees and penalties collected through enforcement activities by 
CACs (Assembly Republican Committee 2002; Rogers 2002). The rules establishing fees and penalties 
were law when AB 2832 went up for debate. However, as a second point of opposition, Republicans also 
referred to the fees and penalties as “draconian measures” (Rogers 2002).  The California Grocers 
Association was against the proposed fees for handling operations and retailers (Brown 2002b). In 
general, the new fee structure was widely supported by the organic industry (Strom-Martin 2002a). 
However, a compromise was made to strike the definition of retailer, which was argued as inconsistent 
with national law, and to create a $100 flat fee per store for retailers (Green 2002). 
A third and major dispute over AB 2823 was over new regulations regarding cosmetics. In an 
eleventh hour attempt to derail the bill,
103
 Proctor and Gamble along with the Cosmetic Toiletry and 
Fragrance Association objected to regulations covering organically-labeled cosmetics. It was believed by 
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 “Bounty hunter” provision was defined as “an awesome and powerful incentive to a government 
bureaucrat” (Rogers 2002).  
103
 Opposition to the bill’s regulation of cosmetics was not raised until August 2002, approximately two 
weeks before passage on the Senate and Assembly Floors. A formal letter of opposition was not received 
until August 26, 2002 (Strom-Martin 2002b). 
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the opposition that regulatory language covering organically labeled cosmetics were removed during June 
11
th
 amendments because cosmetics were not regulated by the NOP (Livingston 2002a and 2002b).
104
  
Table 6.8: Floor Votes on AB 2823 by Member and Party* 
Floor Vote/Date Ayes Nays 
Senate Floor/ 
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B. Campbell [R] 
J. Campbell [R] 
Cogdill [R] 
Cox [R] 












R. Pacheco [R] 





















*Political Party – [D] =Democrat; [R]= Republican 
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Yet language regarding organic cosmetics was reinserted with amendments on August 12
th
 and August 
20
th
 (Livingston 2002b). The NOP did allow for oversight of organically-labeled cosmetics requiring a 
minimum of 70% organic content to be labeled as such (Strom-Martin 2002b).
105
 Indeed, while certain 
aspects regulating cosmetics were removed with June 11
th
 amendments, regulatory language still existed 
that allowed for oversight of organically labeled cosmetics (AB 2823 Amended 6/11/2002). The August 
amendments reinserted the minimal standards requiring a minimum of 70% organic content in cosmetics 
before a company could label as organic. 
There was more support voiced for the bill’s inclusion of cosmetic regulations. Letters were 
received from the Environmental Health Network, Nub Circus, Organic Ingredients Inc, Alto Ingredients, 
Avalon Natural  Products, and several individuals in support of maintain regulations. In the personal 
letters, individuals expressed gratitude toward Strom-Martin for not succumbing the pressure from 
Proctor and Gamble and the Cosmetic Toiletries and Fragrance Association (Concerned Citizen 1 2002; 
Concerned Citizen 2 2002; Concerned Citizen 3 2002; Egide 2002; Peck 2002; Stern 2002; Wilkie 
2002).
106
 Amendments were not made to accommodate the eleventh hour opposition. Cosmetics were 
regulated under the California Organic Products Act of 2003.  
Amending Adoptions of the 2000s 
  Since the passage of the California Organic Products Act of 2003, organic regulations have been 
amended through five additional legislative bills. AB 1625 passed in the state legislature in 2012 but was 
vetoed by Democratic Governor Jerry Brown. The bill would have established a fund to help farmers 
transition from conventional to organic farming.  Of the five passed bills, amendments ranged from 
improving enforcement, clarifying expectations of handlers and producers, creating standards for organic 
fertilizer, and banning the labeling of seafood and aquaculture as organic. Table 6.9 provides a brief 
summary of each bill.  
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 For information about federal oversight of organic cosmetics see 
http://www.fda.gov/Cosmetics/ProductandIngredientSafety/ProductInformation/ucm203078.htm 
106
 One very personal letter indicated disgust with Clairol Herbal Essence Shampoo, which was labeled as 
“totally organic.” The product was reported to cause several skin and breathing conditions for that 
individual (Concerned Citizen 1 2002). 
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Table 6.9: Bills Amending the California Organic Products Act of 2003 
Year Bill Summary 
2003 AB 776 The bill clarifies confusion regarding the first-time registration fee of a 
minimum of $75 for the smallest producers. Scheduled fees are clarified in 
Section 46013.1 (Legislative Counsel 2003). It also provides more specific 
language regarding physical description of producer operations (Cal. Food & 
Ag. Code § 46013.1). 
2005 SB 730 The bill prohibits aquaculture products from being labeled, represented or sold 
as organic until formal standards are developed at the federal level (Cal. Hlth & 
S. Code § 110827) 
2009 AB 856 The bill establishes standards in conjunction with the California Organic 
Program, California Organic Foods Act of 1990, and California Organic 
Products Act of 2003 to clearly define organic input material as it relates to 
organic fertilizer (Legislative Counsel 2009; Cal. Food & Ag. Code § 14528). 
2010 AB 2612 The bill clarifies alternatives to the advisory board, adds a definition for an 
exempt handler, allows for the adoption of an online registration system, and 
make other technical changes (Legislative Counsel 2010a;   Cal. Hlth & S. 
Code § 110810;   Cal. Food & Ag. Code § 46004.1; 46013; 46014.1). 
2010 AB 2686 The bill increases the ability for CACs to enforce the law by allowing CACs to 
go to the District Attorney for criminal prosecution or have County Counsel file 
for an injunction (Legislative Counsel 2010b; Cal. Food & Ag. Code § 46017). 
 
 
Most of the amending adoptions were non-controversial. The 2002, 2009, and 2010 bills 
represent efforts to improve implementation and improve consumer confidence. For example, the 2009 
AB 856 bill creates specific language to identify organic fertilizers to clearly specific appropriate 
practices. The CDFA had been investigating the adulteration of organic fertilizer within the state and 
found non-organic fertilizer being sold to unknowing organic farmers (Legislative Counsel 2009). 
Likewise, the 2010 AB 2612 aimed to streamline the registration process, which would improve 
confidence in the market and law. 
The only amending adoption after 2002 that was controversial was 2005 SB 730, which regulated 
organic aquaculture. The introduction of SB 730 was “in response to concerns that have been raised by 
several consumers and environmental advocacy groups questioning the truthful and meaningful labeling 
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of organic seafood” (Office of Assemblywoman Jackie Speier 2005).
107
 A study conducted by the 
University of New York at Albany’s Institute for Health and the Environment raised concern after study 
results indicated high levels of contaminants including PCBs, dioxins and banned pesticides in farm 
raised fish.
108
 At the time, the NOP program did not have established standards for farm-raised or wild-
caught aquaculture, fish, or seafood products. In January 2005, the NOP began the formulation for two 
taskforces that would develop standards for wild-caught and farm-raised aquatic animals (AMS ND). 
While standards were being developed, NOP permitted seafood to be labeled with any non-USDA 
organic label claim (Office of Assemblywoman Jackie Speier 2005). This meant that seafood containing 
toxic contaminants and prohibited substances could be sold on the U.S. market as organic. Due to federal 
inaction, the bill was introduced under “the author’s hope that SB 730 will set a valuable precedent for the 
USDA to prohibit the use of the organic label on fish and seafood products until it establishes organic 
certification standards” (Office of Assemblywoman Jackie Speier 2005). 
 Opposition to the bill was primarily focused on the introduced version of the bill. As introduced 
on February 22, 2005, SB 730 prohibited all aquaculture products sold as organic from containing 
chemicals known to cause cancer or reproductive toxicity.
109
 The California Aquaculture Association, 
among other organizations, claimed the bill “set a precedent that is contrary to existing organic law” 
(Legislative Counsel 2005). Many Proposition 65 substances occur naturally in the environment and, 
according to the California Aquaculture Association, unfairly singles out aquaculture products compared 
to other organic products.   
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 The American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employee  California Public Interest 
Research Group, the Center for Food Safety, the Coastal Alliance for Aquaculture Reform, Consumers 
Union, the Organic Consumers Association, and other public citizens expressed support for the bill 
(Assembly Republican Committee 2005) 
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 To see the full study report go to http://www.albany.edu/ihe/salmonstudy/ 
109




The Senate passed an amended version on April 19, 2002 that would pass as the final version. 
However, there still remained opposition from a number of seafood companies
110
 and Republicans, who 
predominantly voted against the bill on the Senate and Assembly Floors.
111
  Republicans argued that the 
private industry and third-party certifiers are the best method for establishing appropriate standards 
(Assembly Republican Committee 2005).  In a letter to Republican Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger, 
Assembly Republican Leader Kevin McCarthy (2005) urged the governor to veto the bill on the grounds 
it, “is an overly-broad attempt to allegedly protect consumers from the dangers of farm-raised aquaculture 
that is labeled ‘organic’.” Governor Schwarzenegger did have a veto message included the CDFA 
enrolled bill report August 31, but SB 730 was eventually chaptered into law October 7, 2005. 
Explaining Adoption 
 The story of organic legislation adoption in California is a detailed saga starting in 1978 and 
spanning to the present day. Over the course of the past 36 years, a diverse set of factors influenced 
adoption. Early adoptions were influenced primarily by organic farmers via CCOF, a third-party 
certification organization. Adoptions of the 1990s were also driven by CCOF, but additional factors 
impacted adoption decisions such as partisan politics, federal adoption, regional pressures, increased 
salience, and a rapidly growing market. By the turn of the century, the role of CCOF appeared to diminish 
as a more diverse set of industry interests emerged. Partisan politics, federal implementation, salience, 
and market factors also continued to influence adoption behavior after the adoption of the California 
Organic Products Act of 2003.  
 The findings of this case confirm and elaborate upon the results of the statistical model. The 
initial adoption in California was motivated by a political culture that was progressive in nature and 
cognizant of policy being developed in other areas. Likewise, adoptions after 1982 were influenced by 
federal implementation, increasing salience, expansion of the market, and influences from other hubs of 
organic activity within the region and nation. As for comparisons within the Far West region models, 
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 Opposing seafood companies include 8
th
 Sea Organic Seafood Company, Emerald Organics LLC, and 
Horizon Organic Seafood Company Inc. (Assembly Republican Committee 2005). 
111
 See votes at http://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/billNavClient.xhtml 
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California confirms each statistically significant regional influence including regional pressures, federal 
implementation, and the role of fruit sales. To fully explore the contribution of each factor to adoption 
decisions, factors will be evaluated according to the policy diffusion model variables of internal 
conditions, external conditions, salience, policy type, and existing policy. The significant factors at time 
are often interdependent.  
Internal Conditions 
 In the case of California, several internal conditions appeared to have influenced adoption 
decisions the most. First and foremost, the role of third-party certification programs was highly 
instrumental in orchestrating the development and passage of policy. CCOF played a significant role in 
pushing for and writing the 1979, 1982, and 1990 organic bills. Policy was developed in California 
because organic farmers sought out government intervention to regulate the market. The design was also 
the result of preferences from organic farmers to maintain the farmer-on-farmer certification (Lipson 
2013; Cantisano 2008 114).  As Amigo Bob Cantisano recalls (2008, 114) the farmer-on-farmer 
inspection model was developed and worked well for CCOF and was then used as the model for the 
Organic Foods Act of 1979. The 1979 law was the first organic legislation adoption and established a 
precedent for a third-party-certification system within the state.  
The California Organic Foods Act of 1990 and the California Foods Act of 2003 would maintain 
and elaborate upon this preference. Under the 1990 bill, certification would not be mandated by all 
organically labeled products. However, the bill did provide some teeth for enforcement, a desire of CCOF 
and the organic community. Perhaps an oversight, the organic community left organic certification 
voluntary without the state actively having to enforce the 1979 law. As Amigo Bob Cantisano reflects 
(2008 114), “That was maybe our mistake at that time. We decided in ’79 that it would be voluntary to 
become organic. There was no state mandate. You didn’t have to go get registered. You didn’t have to go 
get certified.” The 1990 bill would require registration of producers to identify organic claims. By the 
time the 2003 bill passed, the role of CCOF appears to have diminished in strength as larger and more 
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diverse set of players begin to enter organic policy debates. However, the third-party certification scheme 
remained intact in California and was the model used at the federal level.  
 CCOF’s impact on policy development is undeniable. Two key reasons can explain the dominant 
role of the organization. First, CCOF was not only the only organic certifier in the state of California for 
the 1970s and much of the 1980s, but also acted as the de facto trade association (Epstein 2013).  CCOF 
worked laboriously in educating and advocating for organic agriculture for much of the 1970s and 1980s. 
In describing itself today, CCOF (2013b) identifies itself as a “full-service organic certification agency 
and trade association passionate about being the leading voice for organic, certifying, educating, 
advocating, and promoting organic.” The standards and models set forth by the organization have a 
profound impact on organic agriculture in the U.S. and abroad. 
 A second explanation for the dominant role of CCOF in developing standards relates to its 
capacity as the de facto trade association. In the 1980s, CCOF also served as the de facto enforcer of 
California’s organic law. In oral history interview, Grant Brians (2007, 51) stated, 
“CCOF really did do due diligence. And every single complaint that went into the CDFA 
[California Department of Food and Agriculture] during the 1980s, after the law was put into 
place, every single complaint that came from a certification organization or an industry course, 
came from CCOF, every single one. There were a number of blatant, blatant violators who were 
caught by people in the industry. They knew that CCOF was willing to follow up on it, even 
when CDFA wasn’t.”  
 
Brian was suggesting the CCOF ensured that fraudulent organic claims were investigated and enforced. 
The case of the carrot caper, where Scrowcroft contacted the San Jose Mercury, is evidence of CCOF 
intervening and demonstrating a clear lack of enforcement by state government. Such inaction of 
California government to prevent fraud would lead to the demands from CCOF for amending legislation 
in 1990. CCOF could not enforce the law alone. 
 A second internal characteristic to California that influenced adoption was the presence of an 
organic market and specialty crop production. While the influence of the organic market could not 
statistically be examined, qualitative evidence suggests an increasing interest in organic production over 
time. Scrowcroft and Lipson each indicated a sharp increase of interest in organic farming after the alar 
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scare, and the apple maggot eradication incident in 1988 demonstrates the importance of  fruit production 
in the state (Scrowcroft 2007, 47; Lipson 2007, 13; Lipson 2013).
112
 This increase in interest coincides 
with the explosive growth in production and sales in the 1990s (see Figure 6.4 and Figure 6.5). 
Comparatively, the growth of the organic market is similar to the emergence and growth of the specialty 
crop market starting at the end of the nineteenth century (See Figure 6.3).  The emergence and growth of 
each of these sectors are remarkable and created conditions, specifically a strong organic market anchored 
strongly in specialty crops, within the state that led to increased pressures to adopt regulation for the 
market.  
 Political conditions, a third set of internal characteristics, also played an important role in the 
adoption of organic legislation in California. The political culture of California is labeled as moralistic 
dominant culture with a strong individualistic strain according to Elazar (1994, 284), which is reflective 
of the 3.55 rating Sharkansky’s numeric scale of Elazar’s political culture (1969). This type of political 
culture may have been an undercurrent to the movement in the Central Coast and Central Valley that 
pushed for organic regulations. It could even be suggested the Santa Cruz, or more specifically the 
University of California-Santa Cruz, served as the epicenter for the movement. Assemblyman Sam Farr 
(2007, 18; 2013) even states the organic movement started in Santa Cruz, California. He describes Santa 
Cruz as a very progressive, forward-thinking community particularly after the establishment of the 
university (Farr 2013).
113
 While not representative of all California communities, the political attitude 
presented in Santa Cruz and even the Central Coast and Valley would create fertile grounds for a bill 
regulating the organic market. Specifically, the political culture could accept consumer protection laws 
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 The apple maggot fly is a native to the northeastern United States but did spread to the west coast of 
the U.S. in the late 1970s. Considered a pest, the apple maggot fly primarily infests apple crops but can 
also infests other fruit crops including cherries, plums, prunes, apricots, nectarines, peaches, blueberries, 
and pears. The infestation occurs when apple maggot fly eggs are deposited under the skin of the fruit and 
the larvae then begin to feed. The effects of infestation lead to significant crop damage. To control the 
apple maggot fly populations, insecticides such as phosalone have been used (Joos, Allen and Van 
Steenwyk  1984; University of California Agriculture and Natural Resources IPM 2009). 
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 Health concerns were particularly identified as a concern and emphasis in the Santa Cruz community 
as well (Farr 2013).  
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(e.g. labeling laws) while also seeking to protect the individualistic interests of organic farmers in the 
market.  
 A secondary political influence is the role of partisanship in state government. A majority of bills 
were sponsored by Democratic members, but this may have been the result of where their district was 
located (e.g. in the Central Coast or Central Valley). Partisanship appears to play a clear and evident role 
for only four adopted bills. For each bill, the influence of partisanship did appear to be over the issue of 
organic foods but rather focusing on the financial and regulatory-burden aspects of the law. Republican 
Governor Deukmejian created a tremendous amount of pressure for supporters of the California Organic 
Foods Act of 1990 (Farr 2007, 16; 2013). The 1990 law could not increase the size of government and 
needed to create its own revenue stream.  In part, Republican opposition to the 1990 bill may have been 
the result of a cavalier attitude towards the potential of the organic market. At the time, there was no 
indication for how important the bill would be and how quickly the organic market would grow (Farr 
2007, 16-17). 
The issue of financial sustainability of the program was the cause for the 1992 bill veto by 
Republican Governor Pete Wilson and contributed to part of the Republican opposition to the California 
Organic Products Act of 2003 (Legislative Counsel 1992). Although the organic program had existed in 
modern form since 1990, Republicans in the 2002 legislative session voiced opposition to the increases in 
fees and administrative power to collect fees and penalties. The 2005 bill departed from the financial 
partisan divide and instead was grounded in federalism and the appropriate role for government. 
Republican opposition clearly objected to the prohibition of organic seafood labeling and presented two 
different arguments for why the bill should not pass. The first argument was grounded in the idea that 
private organic certifiers are best equipped to make the judgment of what constitutes organic seafood. The 
second argument was grounded on the precedents and role of the NOP in developing standards.  It could 






 Horizontal and vertical diffusion dimensions also influenced adoption decisions and the design of 
the bills. Many of the bills had clear evidence of a mixture of both horizontal and vertical dimensions of 
influence. Some of the influences were based within an elaborate organic network in the West and 
Northeast. Other influences originated from state and federal legislation and rule-making. Disentangling 
the precise influence of each factor presents a challenge. As Lipson (2013) notes, “[It’s] hard to say what 
the specific influence back and forth might have been.” 
Horizontal Diffusion 
 Horizontal diffusion occurred both within the region and at a national-level. The regional 
diffusion patterns can be likened more to “cross pollination” rather than clear mimicking or learning in 
adoption decisions (Lipson 2013). The 1979 bill was based on administrative rules passed in Oregon in 
1973. During the adoption process of the California Foods Act of 1990, CCOF members worked in the 
regional organic organization WACO, including Washington and Oregon, standardized practices. 
Members from the Northeast Organic Farming Association chapters also attended those meetings. The 
three year organic transitionary period adopted in 1995 did adhere to the WACO agreement.  
 After 1990, adoption decisions were influenced less by regional activity and more by a national-
interaction and cross pollination of concerns and ideas. The inclusion of the Northeast Organic Farming 
Association marks how certain states, regions, or hubs of innovation may influence each other. As pointed 
out by several interview participants, the West, the Northeast, and upper-Midwest regions are really 
where organic policy is supported and was developed since the 1970s (Lipson 2013; Sustainable Food 
Advocate 2013). This national network was prominent in the 1990s but did not become overtly evident as 
an influence with other amending adoptions in California. 
Vertical Diffusion 
 The effects of vertical diffusion are consistent throughout California’s organic legislation history. 
The influence of federal activity on the state’s decisions began in 1979. The relationship between 
California adoption and federal activity is likened to a give-and-take scenario. On one hand, California 
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policymakers were respectful of federal supremacy in the policy area. On the other hand, California 
policymakers lacked faith in the passage of federal law and development of federal standards. Federal 
adoption did not appear to play as large of an influence when compared to implementation or even the 
Federal Trade Commission’s organic definition rule. 
 Approximately one-third of all California adoptions was in response to federal activity in some 
capacity. Policymakers in 1979 were aware of the Federal Trade Commission developing a definition of 
organic. Consideration was made as to how California law could potentially conflict with federal law. 
Adoptions from 1993 to 1996 included provisions that were in anticipation for when federal standards 
would be implemented. For example, the 1993 bill was the third amending adoption to have extended the 
deadline for developing a prohibited substance list in accordance with federal standards. After waiting 
two years for federal implementation, the 1993 bill extended the deadline to 1996. In turn, continual 
federal delays led to California adopting legislation to extend the prohibited substance list deadline to 
when federal rules are adopted. In 2002, California was finally able to adjust its law to comply with the 
NOP. Statutory language changes within the California Food and Agriculture and Health and Safety 
Codes reflect federal supremacy in developing standards. 
 Surprisingly, California was not influenced by the passage of the National Organic Foods Act in 
1990. The development and passage of California and federal law can best be described as operating on 
parallel tracks (Lipson 2007, 19; 2013). In other words, the development of California’s law was not 
influenced by federal legislation despite both efforts being in response to the same set of conditions. A 
probable cause for this state-federal relationship hinged on the probability of passage. As Lipson 
describes (2013), “They both were moving towards completion. There was no guarantee that either one of 
them would actually, ultimately come to be enacted. So both had to proceed as if the other wasn’t even 
happening. Or at least that was the case in California.” If anything, it was California that influenced 
federal movement on organic food and agriculture regulation. Lipson, “midwife for the California effort,” 
contacted the U.S. Senate Committee on Agriculture, Nutrition and Forestry in 1989 and spoke to 





 Merrigan, who would later work to develop NOP standards and service the USDA Deputy 
Secretary of Agriculture, then worked to push the issue onto the agenda by working with organic farmers, 
industry leaders, and environmental activists (Merrigan 2012). 
 In 2005 and 2009, California policymakers would take the lead on organic regulations. Delayed 
federal response to new issues emerging from an expanding and growing market led to California 
responding with its own policy. The 2009 bill came after a couple of years of investigating organic 
fertilizers and acceptable organic fertilizer practices. Two major cases of organic fertilizer fraud in 
California raised the alarm (AMS 2013b). The NOP did issue a final rule on organic fertilizers in 2009, 
but the rule would not go into effect until 2011 (NOP 2009). This is similar to the regulation of 
organically labeled aquaculture in 2005. California was quicker to address the problem of organically 
labeled aquaculture to protect consumer confidence. The NOP’s decision to permit aquaculture to be 
labeled as organic until rules were developed was questionable to many. Democratic lawmakers saw 
federal law as unacceptable and moved to prohibit the labeling of aquaculture in the state until the NOP 
developed standards. In sum, California influenced and moved forward federal organic policy as much as 
federal supremacy influenced California’s organic food and agriculture legislation development. 
Salience 
 The role of salience in the case of California is undeniable. A combination of focusing events and 
increasing coverage of organic food and agriculture fermented conditions ripe for the proposal and push 
for legislation. Within the organic community, attention to the watering-down of the term natural 
compelled action to develop rules to protect organic labeling from a similar fate in the late 1970s. The 
carrot caper incident and alar scare in the late 1980s were two significant focusing events which were just  
part of a larger rising tide of media attention towards organic fraud and alarm of conventional agricultural 
practices. Each event stimulated interest in promoting organic agriculture, preventing fraud in the market, 
and maintaining consumer confidence in labeling claims. In a Legislative Counsel digest for 1990 AB 
2012, several comments were made about the public and media attention focused on organic foods  
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 Kathleen Merrigan references initial contact with Lipson in 1988 (Merrigan 2012). 
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including the Alar scare, growth in organic production, and consumer preference for organic products. 
Similar references were made in 2005 and 2009 with organic seafood and organic fertilizers. The 2005 
SB 730 referred to NYU-Albany Institute for Health and the Environment study on contaminants in wild 
and farm-raised salmon (Office of Assemblywoman Jackie Speier 2005). Likewise, 2009 AB 856 was in 
response to high-profile cases of organic fertilizer fraud and a CDFA investigation into the issue (NOP 
2011). What can be inferred from each example is that salience matters particularly in conjunction with 
specific focusing events especially when accounting for a lagged response in earlier adoption cases. 
While focusing were not accounted for in the statistical model, it is clear that increasing attention to the 
issue and problems in the organic market led to adoption in at least four of the eighteen legislative 
adoption decisions. 
Policy Type & Existing Policy 
 Expectations for how policy type and existing policy were related to adoption decisions were not 
exactly as expected. Hypotheses developed regarding policy type and existing policy indicated more 
coercive regulatory adoption in the 1970s, co-regulatory adoption in the 1980s, and more innovative 
states to adopt amending legislation more often. The evidence in California can only clearly support one 
of the hypotheses. It is clear that the 1979 law did not result in a more coercive regulatory scheme as 
expected. The design was co-regulatory in nature, at the preference of CCOF, and did not have “teeth” for 
enforcement. However, the 1990 act did confirm the expectation of a co-regulatory scheme. The technical 
aspects of the bill were primarily developed in conjunction with CCOF and the organic community. In 
addition, the bill maintained the third-party certification scheme and mandated enforcement from CDFA 
and CDHS. The co-mingling of both public and private entities results in a co-regulatory policy 
development. The co-regulatory scheme was the result of industry preference, but the design also met the 
requirements and preferences from key Republican lawmakers at the time.  
 The influence of existing policy is more difficult to determine its relationship with adoption. 
Walker (1969) did indicate California as a state is that more likely to be innovative and set regional pace 
of adoption. Indeed, California was an early adopter in the region and did network with others in Oregon, 
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Washington, and the Northeast region. This can confirm both the regional pace-setting role and the 
significance of California on a national stage. Yet, this evidence alone does not clearly prove California 
adoptions make the state more innovative. New York had the earliest legislative adoption in 1976 but 
never adopted legislation again or developed administrative rules. Similarly, Oregon adopted 
administrative rules in 1973 but did not adopt organic legislation until 1989. Furthermore, Oregon only 
adopted amending legislation once in 2001 that terminated state organic statutes. If Oregon and New 
York indicative of leading innovative behavior, how should the evidence of California support the 
hypothesis on existing policy? Moreover, how should the results of California be compared to middle-of-
the pack adopters who also had a significant number of amending adoption such as Minnesota, Texas and 
Washington? 
 It is hard to determine whether the hypotheses should be confirmed or rejected. California has 
been identified as leading innovator in organic policy. The exceptionalism of the state extends beyond just 
organic policy. David Vogel (1997) even coins the term “California-Effect” to refer to the state’s 
significance in raising the bar for regulatory standards such as automobile emissions. In the context of 
amending adoption in organic policy, a number of the amending adoptions increased the regulatory 
standards for organic production. The 1990, 2005, and 2009 bills were efforts to increase the stringency 
of enforcement and acceptable practices. The other amending adoptions also demonstrated an effort to 
improve upon and address gaps in existing law. If California is a leader in this policy area, the number of 
amending adoptions signify that more innovative states are more likely to have a higher number of 
amending adoptions. However, to be cautious, the number of amending adoptions could also signify a 
more responsive state legislature or problems inherent in the original bill design. Accepting or rejecting 
the existing policy hypothesis is difficult based on a sample of one. 
Concluding California 
 The development of organic policy in California’s state legislature is remarkable. The complexity 
of how variables influenced adoption and each other leads to an intricate story and explanation for how 
organic policy developed in the state. The influence of CCOF, a third-party certifier, is one predominant 
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factor that explains adoption behavior. Issue salience, market growth and expansion, regional factors, 
federal activity or inactivity, and political considerations were also influential. The factor of time 
determines how each variable uniquely factors into adoption. The initial adoption, which made California 
an early-adopter, was spurred by CCOF and the political culture of the Central Coast and Central Valley. 
The 1990 reform adoptions was also influenced by CCOF, but the role of salience, regional influence, 
market growth, and partisan politics also influenced the development of the policy to where it was 
acceptable for passage. The 2002 reform adoption and subsequent amendments were influenced by 
federal activity, salience, partisan politics, and an expanding and growing market. The difference between 
initial and later amending adoptions is evident in how the issue of organic food and agriculture changed 











The history of organic legislation in Georgia is shorter and not as well documented in comparison 
to California. Georgia’s first organic food and agriculture bill was adopted in 2000, twenty-one years after 
California’s initial legislative adoption. Beyond the comparative differences, the case of Georgia is 
intended to shed some light on what conditions influence the late adopters and the adopters in the 
Southeast region. In a national picture, Georgia can be considered a lagging adopter. Thirty-one other 
states had existing state organic food and agriculture statutes prior to 2000.  Compared to other states in 
the Southeast region, Georgia’s initial adoption lagged behind Florida, Kentucky, and North Carolina. 
Mississippi, located within the Southeast region, adopted organic legislation for the first time in 2000 
with similar timing to Georgia. Since 2000, no other state in the Southeast has adopted organic 
legislation. 
The results of the Georgia case study confirm many of the statistical findings but also provides 
further depth for how certain variables interact and collectively contribute to adoption decisions. In 
particular, Georgia’s story confirms and sheds light on the results of the post-1990 and Southeast region 
models. Federal activity was clearly a motivating factor in the initial adoption in 2000 and the amending 
adoption in 2002. Internal conditions can be attributed to the rise of consumer and industry interest in 
organic products. The primary hubs for organic production and purchases are situated around the 
metropolitan hubs of Atlanta, Savannah, and Athens. Wealth and the political culture of these areas may 
explain how and why these hubs drive the demand for organic food and agricultural products in the state.  
This chapter is divided into four primary sections. First, a brief overview of Georgia is provided 
that provides a framework for understanding the conditions under which policy decisions are made. Both 
state economic conditions, such as major industries, and political factors, such as partisan control are 
considered. Second, the historical development of the Georgia agricultural industry is evaluated with an 
emphasis on the development of organic agriculture in the state. Next, an overview of Georgia’s three 
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legislative adoptions related to organic food is provided. Finally, the chapter finishes with an evaluation 
of significant factors of adoption in Georgia and concluding remarks. The results indicate that federal 
policy and consumer and producer demand, perhaps driven by economic and political factors, influenced 
Georgia’s initial adoption of legislation in 2000. Amending legislation, however, is influenced by federal 
implementation and broader financial considerations to maintain financial sustainability of the program. 
About Georgia 
 Georgia, also known as the peach state, is the 24
th
 largest state by land area in the U.S. with 
approximately 57,513 square miles (U.S. Census Bureau 2010b). Located in the Southeast, Georgia has 
100 miles of Atlantic coastline and shares borders with four other states including Florida, Alabama, 
Tennessee, and South Carolina. The capital of Georgia is Atlanta, located in Fulton County, which is 
situated in northwestern Georgia (see Figure 7.1 for a map of Georgia). According to the 2010 Census, 
the state’s population grew to 9.7 million with Fulton, Gwinnett, DeKalb, and Cobb counties
1
 having over 
a half million residents each. The Atlanta-metro area had the highest population concentration as well 
more individuals in the labor force than any other area in Georgia (U.S. Census Bureau 2010b).  
Key Industries 
 According to the Georgia Department of Economic Development (2013), the state has a pro-
business environment and supports a variety of industries. Manufacturing, entertainment, tourism, 
automotive, and agribusiness industries are identified as key contributors to Georgia economy.  Table 7.1 
provides an outline of employment figures and GDP by industry in Georgia for 2010. In 2010, the retail 
trade industry employed more residents than any other sector, but long-term employment projections 
predict growth in health care and professional business services (Georgia Department of Labor ND). 
However, despite high employment figures in retail, manufacturing and government industries have the 
highest level of economic productivity in the state. 
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Construction 149,340 15,102 Educational 
Services 
380,900 4,478 




Wholesale Trade 196,430 29,606 Health Care and 
Social Assistance 
419,770 26,891 
Retail Trade 433,470 25,062 Accommodation 




177,149 16,112 Government 305,630 58,488 
Information 
(Media) 
101,500 22,931 Note: Finance, Real Estate, Management 
categories were excluded from the listing due to 
missing information. 
 
Source: https://explorer.dol.state.ga.us/gsipub/index.asp?docid=386 and http://www.bea.gov/itable/ 
 
Political Environment 
 The pro-business environment in the state has political support from a largely Republican base. 
As part of the former Solid South,
2
 Georgia is largely identified as a Republican state, but hubs of 
democratic support do exist (Cook Political Report 2014; Lang and Pearson-Merkowitz 2013). 
Specifically, a cluster of Southwestern countries and the metropolitan areas surrounding Atlanta (Fulton 
county), Athens (Clarke county), Augusta (Richmond county), and Savannah (Chatham county) have 
consistently voted majority Democrat since the 2000 Presidential Election. Figure 7.2 provides a 
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 The “Solid South” refers to regional voting bloc behavior of states located in the Southeastern U.S. Prior 
to realignment in the 1960s, Southern states voted predominantly for Democrats even considering 
Republican and Populist movements in the region. In the mid-1960s, several Republican victories marked 
the end of the Democratic voting bloc behavior in the South (Tindall 1972). The cause for the “Solid 




comparison of Presidential election years voting patterns along a Republican-Democrat divide. Only 
minor shifts in partisanship voting occurred since 2000; however, 2004 voting results show fewer 
counties in Georgia voting majority Democrat than any other Presidential election year. Except for 
counties in the southwestern portion of the state, Democratic-voting areas have higher per capita income 
and higher population density (see Appendix L). 
 Compared to other states within the region, Georgia’s in-state political environment is on par with 
regional averages and norms (see Appendix M). Georgia’s political culture is identified as traditionalist 
with a moderately strong individualistic strain, which correlates to an 8.80 on Sharkansky’s political 
culture scale (Elazar 1994, 284; Sharkansky 1969). Regionally, the average political culture is 8.415 
indicating most states are predominantly traditionalist.
3
 This means that Georgia’s political culture is 
dominated by a hierarchal system that maintains strong social order and familial ties. Often, certain 
families have more political power. However, the strong individualistic strain indicates a cynical attitude 
towards government where the protection of individual rights will is sought.  Similarly, Georgia’s state 
legislature professionalism conforms to the regional ebb and flow over time. However, the actual state 
ranking, which was .135 in 2010, is low compared to other states including Florida and North Carolina. In 
general, Georgia’s state legislature is less professionalized than other states in the nation and within the 
region. Finally, state government control is also similar to other states within the region. Georgia has had 
Democratic, Republican, and split-control of state government from 1990-2010. Like Florida, Georgia 
state government transitioned from Democratic control to Republican control over time. In sum, the 
political conditions in Georgia are comparable to other states within the region but different from other 
regions in the U.S. Georgia is inherently more traditional, less professionalized, and leans towards 
Republican political candidates since 2005. 
A Brief Overview of Agricultural Production in Georgia 
 The history of agriculture Georgia is identified as complex and defined by a series of terms 
including “soil-abundance, fertility, misuse, abuse, and ultimately, conservation and regeneration” 
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 (University of Georgia Libraries ND). The state has a long history of agricultural production starting 
before European settlement by General James E. Ogelthorpe and the English colonists (Flatt 2013). Prior 
to European settlement, the Cherokee and Creek Indian tribes farmed corn, beans, melons, and fruits 
(University of Georgia Libraries ND). They also collected nuts from pecan, walnut, and hickory trees that 
grew wild. Early European settlers in the state, ranging from the English, Germans, Portuguese, and Scots 
cultivated a variety of vegetables and indigo in a 30-mile wide area near Savannah (Bonner 1964, 3; 
University of Georgia Libraries ND).
4
 Most of the early settlers lacked agricultural skills and the use of 
indentured servants was common practice until the introduction of slavery. Immigration of Africans was 




After the slavery ban repeal, a host of new crops would be grown as the new labor force became 
available. Cotton, along with tobacco and sugar cane, would be the most significant crops after the 
Revolutionary War (Bonner 1964, 49; University of Georgia Libraries ND). Mechanical, labor-saving 
machines only helped to spur the cotton industry’s growth (Bonner 1964, 96-105). However, the 
dependency on cotton as a staple crop would eventually lead to devastating financial and economic 
consequences. Farmers, particularly those in Georgia’s cotton belt, would particularly be affected.
6
 Poor 
agricultural practices, supported by political and social infrastructure, led to soil degradation starting in 
the mid-1800s. Clear cutting-forest for timber and lack of crop rotation led to top soil erosion and soil 
quality decline (Bonner 1964, 63; University of Georgia Libraries ND).
7
 Poor soil quality led to decline in 
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 Franciscan monks pre-date the arrival of the European settlers by approximately 160 years. The monks 
are responsible for the introduction of peaches in Georgia. Cherokee Indians would eventually cultivate 
the crop (Taylor 2013). 
5
 Despite a ban on immigration of Africans to the colony, free and enslaved Africans still immigrated to 
the colony. English settlers, in particular, claimed the climate of Georgia was inhospitable for the white 
settlers but not for Africans.  
6
 Bonner (1964, 46) describes the Cotton Belt as located “in the middle portion of Georgia with its 
counterpart in southwestern Georgia and in the lush valleys of the former Cherokee country.” This area of 
the state contained most of the agricultural productivity.  
7
 Georgia’s cotton belt had a counterpart in southwestern Georgia.  After exhaustion of lands in the cotton 
belt, farmers moved to the southwest corner (Bonner 1964, 46 and 61). 
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the quality of the crop and decreased crop yields. Combined with the overproduction of cotton nationally, 
Georgia’s cotton farmers faced declining prices for the cotton crops yielded under poor soil conditions.  
Several efforts over the years attempted to diversify Georgia’s crops and improve agricultural 




 centuries, but cotton remained king (Bonner 1964, 38; Flatt 2013). The 
final decline of cotton as a staple crop is attributed to the boll weevil and World War I (Flatt 2013).
8
 Low 
cotton prices post-World War I and the spread of the boll weevil into Georgia led to drastic decreases in 
production that would continue through the Great Depression. Diversification of Georgia’s agriculture 
would begin during World War II with the support of the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1933 and the 
Soil Conservation and Domestic Allotment Act of 1936 (University of Georgia Libraries ND). Both bills 
provided financial compensation for farmers to grow soil-conserving crops and to engage in practices that 
would rebuild soil quality.
9
 The Georgia State Legislature also provided help through the establishment of 
Soil Conservation Districts in 1937 (Brown 2002a, 79-82). District activities included draining swamps, 
managing forests, promoting soil conservation, and improving pastures. Civic organizations, the media, 
and churches helped to carry the message of conservation and soil stewardship. 
 Since the restoration of soil quality in Georgia, the agricultural portfolio of the state has become 
more diversified. Although cotton remains a top earning commodity in the state, peanuts, pecans, apples, 
peaches, blueberries, and soybeans are some of the most important commodity crops for the state as well 
(University of Georgia Cooperative Extension 2012). Georgia is the top producer nationally for peanuts, 
chickens, pecans and watermelons (Georgia Farm Bureau 2014). The agricultural industry, including 
forestry, employs one in six Georgia workers (Georgia Farm Bureau 2014) but contributes marginally to 
the states overall GDP. In a national context, Georgia ranks in the top 10 states for agricultural 
                                                          
8
 The boll weevil is a pest that infests cotton crops through the deposit of eggs in fruiting structures on the 
plant. Yield losses occur when the eggs hatch and the boll weevil larvae feed. The boll weevil played an 
integral part in the history of cotton production in Georgia and the South. In Georgia, boll weevil 
infestations led to significant yield losses in 1914. While insecticides would provide temporary relief 
from infestations, Georgia began to participate in a boll weevil eradication program in 1987. The program 
has led to increased yields and less use of pesticides (Roberts 2013). 
9
 It should be noted that soil-quality problems were not just a problem in Georgia or in the Southeast. 
Poor soil management practices were widespread in the 1930s (Brown 2002a, 63). 
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productivity and the top 20 for farm outputs in 2011(ERS 2013a, 2031b). Furthermore, the southwest 
portion of Georgia contains one of the more predominant areas for fruit and vegetable production in the 
country (National Agricultural Statistics Service [NASS] 2012a). 
 Agricultural regions in Georgia can be designated in several ways based on geographical features, 
elevation, and soil type. Figure 7.3 demonstrates one approach to mapping agricultural regions within the 
state. The map represents three main geographic regions and six soil provinces in the state used by crop 
and soil scientists at the University of Georgia (Hancock et al. 2011). The three main geographic regions 
represent climatic differences in the state such as higher elevations in the limestone valley and lower 
elevations in the coastal plain. The soil provinces represent differences in organic matter content, texture, 
and drainage. The Piedmont or Southern Piedmont region is where severe soil erosion occurred as a result 
of row cropping, including cotton and tobacco, in the 1800s and early 1900s. The Southern Coastal 
Plains, which includes the southwestern area comparable to the cotton belt, contains heavier and more 
fertile soils. Even accounting for the relatively diverse differences in regions and soil qualities, the 
number of farms is fairly balanced across the state but with a greater share of land in farms located in the 
southern portion of the state in the Southern Coastal Plain and Atlantic Coastal Flatland provinces (NASS 
2012b). 
Organic Agriculture in Georgia 
 The history of organic agriculture in Georgia is not well documented. There is no precise 
indication of when organic farming began in the state. Nevertheless, since 1997, the Georgia organic 
market has grown but remains ranked in the bottom ten states for the number of certified organic 
operations.
10
 According to the USDA Economic Research Service (2013c), Georgia had one certified 
grower and 572 acres of organic cropland in 1997 (see Figures 7.4 and 7.5). By 2011, the number of 
certified organic growers grew to 75 with a total of 5,483 acres of certified organic crop, pastures, and 
rangeland. While the number of certified organic acres has increased steadily over time, the peak number  
 
                                                          
10





Source: Hancock et al. 2011 
Figure 7.3: Agricultural Regions of Georgia 
 
Region 1 : Limestone Valley/Mountain  
      a) Limestone Valley 
      b) Blue Ridge 
Region 2 : Piedmont/ Southern Piedmont 
Region 3 : Coastal Plain 
      a) Sand Hills 
      b) Southern Coastal Plain 





Source: ERS 2013c 
*Data unavailable for 1998, 1999 and 2009. 
 




Source: ERS 2013c 
*Data unavailable for 1998, 1999 and 2009. 
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of certified growers occurred in 2007 when there were 121 certified growers representing 2,544 acres of 
organic cropland. No specific reason is identified for the decline in 2007, but the decline is consistent 
with the national trend that coincides with the Great Recession (Greene 2013).  
The distribution of certified organic operators is not even across the state. A majority of certified 
operations are located either in the northern Georgia, surrounding the greater Atlanta metro area, or the 
south central portion of the state near Savannah, where consumer interest has is identified as more intense 
(Georgia Department of Agriculture [GDA] Staff Member 2013; NASS 2013a). However, large scale 
organic operations, producing agronomic crops such as feed grains, peanuts and hay, are located in  
southern Georgia (Agriculture Specialist 1 2013).  An overwhelming majority of certified organic 
operations are crop growers and handlers. Out of the 166 certified operations, there are 83 certified 
operations as crop growers, 82 certified handling operations, and four are livestock. A few of the 
businesses are certified in two categories. Figure 7.6 demonstrates the distribution of certified operations 
in the state as of January 2013. 
Two organizations within the state, Georgia Organics and the Georgia Crop Improvement 
Association, are identified as significant to organic production in the state (Former GDA Staff Member 2 
2013; Agriculture Specialist 1 2013). Several interview participants deferred answering specific questions 
and recommended contacting individuals from each organization.
11
 However, limited information exists 
or provided detailing the role of Georgia Organic and the Georgia Crop Improvement Association in 
organic farming in the state. Neither organization was involved in promoting nor developing the initial 
organic food and agriculture bill adopted in the state in 2000, but both organizations are involved with the 
promotion of organic production since 2002. Emerging out of a 1970s growers’ association, Georgia 
Organics is a non-profit organization seeking to create sustainable local food systems in Georgia (Georgia 
Organics 2012). The organization plays a role in the state’s outreach as well as promotion of its organic 
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 Many former employees of both organizations have since retired. These participants were either limited 
in their participation or could not be located to confirm the details.  
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program and certification option after the official implementation of the NOP (Former GDA Staff 
Member 2 2013).  
Conversely, the Georgia Crop Improvement Association also helps with outreach and promotion 
of the state’s organic efforts albeit in a different manner. The association is a farmer organization created 
in 1946 (Georgia Crop Improvement Association Organic Certification Program 2013). Two bills, 1956 
HB 104 and 1997 SB 583, made the association the legal certifying agency in Georgia. The intent of the 
association is to promote more efficient agricultural production through the use of better quality seeds. 
Organic certification is one of several certification programs the association offers.
12
 Of the twelve 
 
 
• = Approximate location of certified organic operations 
Source: NOP 2013b 
Figure 7.6: Certified Organic Operations in Georgia 
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 The Georgia Crop Improvement Association also performs seed certification, quality assurance, food 




organic certifiers operating within the state, the Georgia Crop Improvement Association certifies nearly 
half of the certified operations in the state as of January 2013 (NOP 2013b). Other major certifiers in the 
state include CCOF, Clemson University Department of Plant Industry, Quality Assurance International, 
and Quality Certification Services. 
Georgia can be considered a late comer to expressing interest in organic food and agriculture 
compared to other states in the country. Several interview participants indicated that organic was a term 
that was not always salient in the state (Agriculture Specialist 1 2013; Former Organic Food Advocate 
2013). Evidence gathered in Georgia indicates that the support for organic products within the state has 
only come after a few decades of normalizing the term. Organic was not common term used in the South 
for much of the past four decades (Agriculture Specialist 1 2013; Former Organic Food Advocate 2013; 
GDA Staff Member 2013). From a consumer perspective, organic food has been met with skepticism and 
could even be referenced as a “California thing,” indicating organic as an outsider product that isn’t 
acceptable to the local culture (GDA Staff Member 2013). Indeed a consumer preference survey 
conducted in 1989, the same year of the carrot caper scandal in California, (see Chapter VI for more 
detail), demonstrates that 61% of the surveyed population expressed preference to buy organic (Misra, 
Huang, and Ott 1991).
13
 However, appearance of fresh produce was more important than being organic; 
over half of the respondents expressing organic preference would not buy “sensory defect” produce. 
Furthermore, most respondents did not provide a precise dollar amount for willingness to pay. The survey 
suggests that some Georgia consumers, namely older and wealthier white females, expressed a preference 
for organic products but may not be willing to pay or overlook cosmetic deficiencies of organic goods. 
This same preference may still exist today. When asked about the comparative perception of local versus 
organic food, a sustainable food advocate (2013) stated, “They are (more open to the idea of local 
compared to organic). That’s because there’s stigma attached to organic.” In essence, consumer 
preferences in Georgia, and even throughout the Southeast, are slow to buy into the organic market, but 
                                                          
13
 Survey respondents were 77% white with 10% being younger than 25 years of age. Approximately 35% 
of respondents had annual household incomes of $35,000, which is almost $19,000 more than the average 
per capita income in the state in 1989.  
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some hubs of organic activity do exist within the state. Atlanta, Savannah, and Athens, home to the 
University of Georgia, are where communities have been more likely to participate in the organic market 
(Agriculture Specialist 1 2013; Sustainable Food Advocate 2013).
14
 
 From a farming perspective, the increase in consumer demand nationally since the late 1990s 
mimics the increase of certified organic farms and operations in the state. Figure 7.7 demonstrates the 
growth in the U.S. market by annual consumer sales. While correlating annual state consumer sales is 
unavailable, the U.S. Ag Census tracked state level organic farm sales in 2002 and 2007. Reported annual 
sales for Georgia increased from $671,000 in 2002 to $2,042,000 in 2007 representing a 204% increase 
(NASS 2012a). The growth in consumer demand at the national level, based on data from the Organic 
Trade Association, is 136% growth from 2002 to 2007; whereas the U.S. Ag Census data on organic farm 
sales indicate a 335% increase in organic farm sales from 2002 to 2007. The growth in the Georgia 
organic market coincides with a larger national trend. However, as the national market grew, Georgia’s 
 
 
Source: Organic Trade Association 2011 
 
Figure 7.7: U.S. Annual Organic Sales 
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organic market nearly doubled during the same time period. Both trends demonstrate increasing interest 
in the organic market, but Georgia’s dramatic increase suggests a rapid interest.  
As the growth in the organic market occurred, so did the number of farms in Georgia (Figure 7.4). 
However, despite an increase in the market, support for organic farming within the state is not strong, and 
farmers may be less willing to engage in organic practices. The dominance of large agribusinesses 
extends to GDA and even the research and teaching objectives at the University of Georgia (Agriculture 
Specialist 2 2013; Former Organic Food Advocate 2013). Funding and support for agricultural research 
that is predominantly geared towards conventional practices may stifle interest in organic production.
15
 
Furthermore, farmers may hesitate to transition land out of production for three years to meet organic 
requirements, considered a niche market to some farmers (Former GDA Staff Member 1 2013; 
Agriculture Specialist 1 2013).  For organic farmers that already existed within the state, Georgia’s bill 
was an effort to protect the market and ensure consumer confidence in the organic label and the third-
party certification scheme.  
A History of Organic Food and Agriculture Legislation in Georgia 
Since 2000, Georgia has adopted four bills pertaining to organic food and agriculture. Only three 
of those bills substantively changed Georgia’s state statutes on organic food and agriculture.
16
 Initial 
legislation was adopted in 2000 (see Table 7.2). Substantive modifications to existing state organic food 
and agriculture statues occurred with the adoption of amending legislation in 2002 and 2010. Both 
amending adoptions resulted in minor changes to the structure of the statutes. To detail the development 
of Georgia organic legislation, this section will first cover the 2000 Organic Certification and Labeling 
Act. Next, the details of the amending legislation will are considered including related legislation and 
administrative rules after the 2010 amending adoption. 
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 The Georgia Department of Agriculture was led by Commissioner Tommy Irvin from 1969-2010 
(Jones 2010). Irvin was described as being “a big conventional chicken” suggesting he extended support 
for conventional agricultural preferences (Former Organic Food Advocate 2013). 
16
 In 2001, HB 107 made non-substantive stylistic changes to Code Section 2-21-3 by changing, “Upon 
July 1, 2000,” to “On or after July 1, 2000.”  
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Table 7.2: Georgia Organic Food & Agriculture Legislation 
Year Bill Sponsored/Introduced* 
2000 SB 477 
Organic Certification & Labeling Act 
Harold Ragan [D] & Michael Meyer von Bremen [D] 
2002 SB 361 Harold Ragan [D]  , Faye Smith [D], Donzella James 
[D], Seabaugh [R], and Peg Blitch [D] 
2010 HB 1055 Kevin Levitas [R], Tom Rice [R], Matt Ramsey [R], 
Jim Cole [R], and Richard Smith [R] 
 
*Political Party – [D] =Democrat; [R]= Republican 
 
2000 Organic Certification & Labeling Act (SB 477) 
 In February of 2000, SB 477 was introduced and read in Georgia’s State Senate for the first time 
(see Appendix N for text of Georgia Legislation). The bill, also known as the Georgia Organic 
Certification & Labeling Act, amended Title 2 of the Official Code of Georgia to include regulatory 
language for the identification and certification of organic food and agriculture inputs and outputs during 
the production, distribution, and processing stages. Table 7.4 summarizes major aspects of the bill. The 
final version of the bill designated the Georgia Department of Agriculture [GDA] as the enforcing agency 
and responsible for promulgating rules if necessary for implementation. Definitions, labeling 
requirements, and maximum levels of toxic material were established to provide clear guidelines. All 
certified entities must obtain certification from GDA or a GDA approved entity. Furthermore, all certified 
entities must maintain detailed records of their organic production and handling practices and processes. 
To implement the law, GDA was authorized to establish fees that would support the services provided 
through implementation. 
Harold Ragan and Michael Meyer von Bremen co-sponsored the bill. Both state senators were 
Democrats representing districts in the south-southwestern area of the state and members of the Senate 
Agriculture Committee. Senator Ragan, chairman of the Senate Agriculture Committee, was approached 
by staff members from the GDA about sponsoring the bill. The purpose of SB 477 derived from concerns 
among Georgia organic farmers and the GDA about establishing laws in the state to promote and protect 
185 
 
Table 7.3: Summary of SB 477/ OCGA § 2-21 
Aspect Summary 
Define Key Terms & 
Labeling Limitations 
Includes definitions for certification, feed, and organic among other referenced 




Limits organically labeled products to contain no more than 5% of substances 




Requires producers, brokers, distributors, and processors to keep detailed records 
of products labeled as organic (OCGA § 2-21-3). Subjects any product to 
inspection using state or federal regulatory requirements (OCGA § 2-21-4). 
Certification Requires certification for organically labeled goods including food, feed 
ingredient, article, commodity, or product (OCGA § 2-21-4). 
Rule Development 
& Enforcement 
The Georgia Department of Agriculture is responsible for enforcement of the bill 
and developing any reasonable standards as necessary. GDA establishes fees to be 
collected for implementation(OCGA § 2-21-6). Violation of the organic law will 
be guilty of a misdemeanor (OCGA § 2-21-8). 
 
organic products. As two former staff member stated, the GDA wanted to regulate the organic industry to 
make sure labeling was accurate and in accordance with federal requirements (Former GDA Staff 
Member 1 2013; Former GDA Staff Member 2 2013). No intention was made to go above and beyond the 
federal requirements (Agriculture Specialist 2 2013). The bill was a truth in labeling effort spurred by 
demand from the public and certain producers interested in pursuing organic certification. Concern was 
raised that third-party certifiers might not be conducting truly independent evaluations and audits. 
SB 477 was amended once during the 2000 legislative session to include explicit language 
regarding the regulatory nature of the bill and to remove language describing regulations of organic food 
and feed. As introduced, SB 477 created OCGA § 2-21-3 to include specific details of what constitutes 
organic food and feed. This language was removed in the final version of the bill. As one former organic 
advocate indicated (2013), the state was on the forefront of pushing for federal regulation of organic food 
and feed. However, organic food and feed was not included in the initial legislation. After amendments, 
SB 477 passed unanimously in both the Georgia House of Representative and Senate. No state legislator 





 Georgia modified its organic law twice since the initial adoption in 2000. Both bills included 
provisions that modified OCGA § 2-21-4. Adopted in 2002, SB 361 replaced the entire subsection of the 
state organic state statutes. Table 7.5 outlines the key amendment provision. SB 361 removed certification 
seal requirements for food and feed ingredients but maintained requirements for food and feed to comply 
with other organic regulations and certification requirements. The bill also added additional requirements 
for any individual involved in the production, processing, and distribution of handling of organic 
products. Each entity organic entity would be required to register annually with GDA starting in 2003. 
Fees collected from registration would go towards implementation of the law. SB 361 passed 
unanimously.  
HB 1055, adopted in 2010, would increase the minimum and maximum fee structure from 
$25.00/$500.00 to $75.00/$1000.00. The amendment was part of a larger bill focusing on a variety of 
amendments bundled as the “Georgia Taxpayer Relief Act of 2010” (Weber 2010). The amendment to the 
organic feed structure was added by the House Committee on Ways and Means. HB 1055 passed with 
some contention. However, the debate was not centered on raising organic registration fees but rather 
other aspects of the bill such as elimination of the retirement income tax and property tax. 
Table 7.4: Summary of SB 361/ Revision of OCGA § 2-21-4 
Aspect Summary 
Certification Seal Removes requirement for food and feed ingredients to bear the official seal of the 
certifying entity (OCGA § 2-21-4(d)). 
Registration Requires any individual producing, processing, distributing, or handling organic 
products to register with the GDA on or after January 1, 2003. Establishes annual 




  The story of organic food and agriculture legislative adoption in Georgia is a short and relatively 
uncomplicated story. Perhaps the most interesting fact to note is most individuals contacted for interviews 
did not know the state of Georgia enacted a law regulating organic food and agriculture (see Appendix G 
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for a list of where interview participants were recruited). Only four of the 34 recruited interview 
participants knew that Georgia adopted organic food and agriculture legislation. Of the four interview 
participants that did know of organic legislation, each was intimately involved in the adoption or 
implementation of the 2000 bill. However, even accounting the lack of awareness of the law, the case of 
Georgia is still able to contribute to the understanding of adoption decisions made by laggards in the 
diffusion process of organic legislation.  
The results from the quantitative models suggest that the post-1990 adoptions are influenced by 
federal implementation, per capita wealth, vegetable sales, and regional adoption percentages. Amending 
adoptions are also influenced by increasing vegetable sales. Furthermore, in the Southeast region, state 
legislative professionalism, political culture, agricultural productivity, and regional influences were 
significant to adoption decisions. Georgia conforms to most of the expectations of post-1990 adoption and 
the Southeast regional adoption models. All three legislative adoptions in Georgia were influenced by 
both internal and external conditions. The initial adoption in Georgia was influenced by federal activity, 
consumer demand in metropolitan hubs, and producer demand. Furthermore, some evidence also suggests 
regional influence through an organic industry network, political considerations, and wealth as significant 
variables for adoption. The effects of regionalism may also play a factor in why increased agricultural 
productivity is significant, as well. Soil degradation followed by attempts to rebuild soil quality in the 
twentieth century in the Southeast may have aided the increase agricultural productivity in the region. For 
Georgia, the soil rejuvenation helped to maintain the important of agriculture in the Georgia economy. 
For amending adoptions, federal implementation was the primary cause for the 2002 adoption, a 
finding consistent with post-1990 models for amending adoptions. The 2010 adoption was not clearly 
linked to any consideration except maintaining financial sustainability of the program, perhaps the result 
of post-Great Recession financial consequences and Republican-controlled state government. To fully 
detail the contribution of each variable significant to adoption, evaluation of significant factors are 
evaluated according to the diffusion model variables of internal conditions, external conditions, salience, 
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policy type, and existing policy. Significant variables are time dependent meaning that conditions 
affecting initial adoption in 2000 were not present in 2002 or 2010.  
Internal Conditions 
Both internal economic and political condition contributed to adoption decisions in Georgia. 
However, no internal variable identified and used in the statistical analysis has a clear and direct impact 
on amending adoptions. For the 2010 amending adoption, no clear indication was made for why fee 
structures were changed. While it could be the result of partisan politics, it would be overly presumptuous 
to assume that the partisan debate surrounding the taxpayer relief bill was centered on raising fees for 
organic growers and handlers. Yet the need for tax reform may signify larger systemic factors at play. The 
Great Recession is a factor that may have led the Republican-controlled state government to pass a bill to 
provide more financial sustainability within the state. While not measured in this analysis, the effect of 
overall state economic health may have contributed to adjustments to the organic registration fee 
structures to help minimize the cost of the state to implement organic food and agriculture policy. 
Comparatively, only the initial adoption in 2000 appears to have any clear indication for how the 
state’s internal conditions impacted adoption.  For the initial adoption of SB 477, indirect consumer and 
producer demand drove the desire for the GDA to seek regulations to ensure truth in labeling claims 
(Former GDA Staff Member 1 2013; Former GDA Staff Member 2 2013). While not explicitly 
referenced, consumer demand and production of organic food, particularly from metropolitan hubs. This 
finding confirms the expectation of Winders and Scott (2009, 80) that urban consumers have the ability to 
impact agricultural policy direction. It may be the increasing number of organic farms correlates with the 
increasing interest. Furthermore, farms that did transition into organic did so because the farm type and 
other relevant conditions (e.g. labor intensity level) may have led to an easier transition to organic 
farming practices. Nevertheless, as previously described, consumer interest and organic farming is 
primarily centered in and around metropolitan hubs including Atlanta, Athens, and Savannah.  
The hubs shed some light on additional conditions that likely led to adoption. In particular, wealth 
and political condition may have favorably led to adoption. Moreover, the role of the state’s local food 
189 
 
program, Georgia Grown, may have also created a gateway for perked consumer interest within key 
Georgia metropolitan areas. Wealth and political culture can be attributed to the push for consumer 
concern because the Atlanta, Athens, and Savannah areas are wealthier, with median household incomes 
ranging from $35,000 to over $75,000, and have political cultures that are more progressive compared to 
other parts of the state (U.S. Census Bureau 2013). On average, counties surrounding Atlanta, Athens, 
and Savannah have higher median household incomes, almost 1.5 to 2 time higher than rural areas, and 
have voted for Democratic in Presidential election years since 2000 (see Appendix L for wealth data). 
Higher incomes are not only correlated with higher education levels but also better health outcomes 
(National Center for Health Statistics 2012). Collectively, the factor of wealth in Georgia can explain the 
influence of consumer demands in metropolitan areas. Organic product consumers are usually wealthier, 
more educated, and concerned, in part, with health concerns. Therefore, organic consumer demand is 
situated in or near Atlanta, Savannah or Athens and consumer demand is primarily driven from these 
areas.  
The political activity of the Atlanta, Savannah, and Athens metropolitan areas can also help to 
explain why these regions are significant to the adoption of SB 477. As a whole, the state is identified as 
having a political culture that is predominantly traditionalist with a moderately strong individualistic 
strain, which correlates to an 8.80 numeric identification (Elazar 1994, 284; Sharkansky 1969). The state 
government has been controlled by both Democrats and Republicans, and in 2000 it was controlled by 
Democrats despite a majority of the state voting Republican in Presidential elections since 2000. 
Democratic voting patterns, however, are consistent in several metropolitan areas, which are also 
wealthier. The areas surrounding Atlanta, Savannah, and Athens have higher per capita incomes and are 
more likely to vote for Democrats, whose members in the Georgia state legislature sponsored the 2000 
and 2002 organic bills, than rural areas of the state (see Leip 2012). The combination of wealth and local 
political acceptance of innovative policies may contribute to a rise of interest in organic, but a third 
explanation still exist – the Georgia Grown program. 
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The Georgia Grown program is a marketing program operated by the GDA.  Its purpose is to 
promote locally grown, but more specifically, Georgia-grown products. Likewise, considerable efforts 
have been made to improve accessibility and to promote farmers markets in metropolitan areas such as 
Atlanta. Improving the quality and access to farmers markets may result in healthier food purchases but 
also promotes local farmers, which may also help to explain a correlation between adoption and an 
increase in agricultural productivity within the Southeast region and in the state. The emphasis with both 
programs is locally based food, an idea more popular in the Southeast (Former GDA Staff Member 1 
2013; Former Organic Food Advocate 2013; GDA Staff Member 2013; Sustainable Food Advocate 
2013). As several participants indicated, the connection between local and organic is crucial to sustainable 
agriculture, but the local component may also serve as a gateway for consumers to become interested in 
organic (Former Organic Food Advocate 2013; Sustainable Food Advocate 2013). Specifically, the local 
food movement in Georgia may contribute to consumers questioning how their food is made. This in turn 
may lead to consumers becoming more open and interested in the idea of organic food purchases. 
In sum, the adoption of SB 477 in Georgia is the result of both political and economic pressures within 
the state and the consideration of federal activity in the policy area. The political and economic pressures 
were only alluded to by key informants as consumer and organic farmers’ demands. However, upon 
further investigation, it could be derived that these hubs are supportive of organic production because 
each area possesses certain socio-economic and political factors that would lead to support of an organic 
market. As discussed in chapter I, organic consumers are wealthier, well-educated and Caucasian 
(Dettmann and Dimitri 2007).  
External Conditions 
A combination of both horizontal and vertical dimensions of diffusion also contributed to 
adoption decisions. The influence of the federal government on adoption decisions was confirmed as 
directly impacting adoption decisions in 2000 and 2002. Less clear is the effect of other state adoption 
decisions on Georgia lawmakers. There is evidence to suggest that regional pressures may have 
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contributed to the diffusion of organic legislation to Georgia. However, this evidence cannot definitely be 
confirmed. 
Horizontal Diffusion 
 Two states, North Carolina and Florida, are mentioned as influential to Georgia agricultural 
policy (Agricultural Specialist 2 2013). Specifically, Georgia, Florida, and North Carolina shared similar 
behavioral patterns in adopting certain agricultural practices (Agriculture Specialist 2 2013). Both states 
mirrored the movement in and out of cotton production, move into peanut production, and move into 
organic production compared to other Southeastern states. For organic agricultural production, the 
network within the Southeast may be similar, as well. While not clearly linked, two interview participants 
noted the significance of the Carolina Farm Stewardship Association (Agriculture Specialist 2 2013). 
Established in 1979, the Carolina Farm Stewardship Association is a non-profit group that focuses on 
education and advocacy of local, organic foods particularly in South Carolina and North Carolina 
(Carolina Farm Stewardship Association [CFSA] 2014). The association is the oldest sustainable 
agriculture organizations in the Southeast. The connection between organic legislation in Georgia to the 
Carolina Farm Stewardship Association was cited because of the potential cross-pollination of ideas 
between Georgia and North Carolina. The potential for cross-pollination of ideas is possible through 
connections in organic industry networks. Namely, the Carolina Farm Stewardship Association may have 
helped foster movement by Georgia organic farmers to push for regulation. Unfortunately, this connection 
could not be confirmed through interviews or through a comparison of adopted legislation, which varied 
drastically.  
Vertical Diffusion 
 Policy conditions at the federal level played a role in the initial adoption in 2000 (SB 477) and the 
amending adoption in 2002 (SB 361). For initial adoption, the effect of federal policy adoption and 
implementation were significant but not direct factors in adoption. Specifically, in 1999 and 2000, no 
federal adoption occurred or federal implementation began. The effects of the vertical pressures of 
diffusion may stem from other activities, such as proposed rule-making, but this analysis does not 
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specifically account for the factors statistically. Nonetheless, two former GDA staff members indicated 
Georgia lawmakers were aware of impending federal implementation of the law but wanted to prepare 
and ensure truth in labeling (Former GDA Staff Member 1 2013; Former GDA Staff Member 2 2013).  
SB 477 was intended to set-up a policy framework that would allow for the state to comply with federal 
supremacy but also ensure, should the NOP not publish a final rule that year, that Georgia had standards 
in place. By 2000, skepticism had developed in the organic community and for some state policymakers 
over the federal governments’ capability to actually implement a final rule. The delay of developing rules 
followed by the controversial 1997 proposed rule led to questions on if the federal organic program would 
ever be implemented. As one sustainable food advocate (2013) stated, “What you sort of saw in some of 
that state legislation stuff was a little bit of an effort to insure that if the federal program failed there was 
still a process at the state level.” For Georgia, perhaps similar to many other states adoption legislation 
from 1997-2002, was an attempt to provide state level oversight of the organic market. For the 2002 bill, 
SB 361, the effect of federal supremacy in the policy area is a more direct effect. Indeed, the 2002 bill 
was adopted in response to federal implementation of the NOP that year. The amendments brought the 
Georgia organic law in compliance with federal law by adjusting language to be consistent with federal 
standards (Former GDA Staff Member 2 2013). The 2010 bill did not have documented evidence to 
support any similar form of federal influence on the adoption decision.  
Salience, Policy Type, and Existing Policy 
Issue salience, policy typology, and existing policy appear to have little effect on adoption 
outcomes in Georgia. Salience may have contributed to increasing consumer interest, but participants 
cited other variables more likely to have perked consumer interest. In particular, the regional hubs of 
activity surrounding Atlanta, Savannah, and Athens are cited as the key drivers in the increasing 
consumer interest and demand for organic goods. These areas are characteristic (e.g. wealthier, more 
progressive) of what would more likely lead to the adoption of organic policy and the growth of the 
organic market. Increasing issue salience occurs within the time frame of initial adoption in 2000 and 
amending adoption in 2002, but it cannot clearly be linked to decision-making at the time. Instead, the 
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bills appear to be appeasement for and driven by a selective group within the state. Conventional farmers 
did not indicate any opposition to the bill and largely appear to be disinterested in the effort. 
As for policy typology and the effects of existing policy, discussions of how either influenced 
adoption decisions were nonexistent in the personal communications conducted in this analysis. The 
typology of the bill as a third-party system was not a significant debate. Similarly, compliance was 
mandatory, and the bill was not developed in collaboration with the organic industry. The amendments to 
the organic law maintained the original policy design but included registration requirements and fee 
structure to create financial sustainability of the program. The original bill had always included language 
referencing federal supremacy thereby eliminating any need to completely overhaul existing regulations. 
It could be argued that the design of the policy was not a contentious point with late state adopters such as 
Georgia. With establishment of the third-party certification system in California, a leader, and at the 
federal level, the design of the policy itself had already been determined and considered a successful 
model. Georgia’s initial adoption, therefore, resulted in a policy design that was already well-established 
by other states and the federal government. Any amending adoption after 2000 in Georgia would not 
result in major changes in policy type. The policy typology design was considered a national norm by the 
time Georgia adopted initial legislation. Additionally, the effect on existing policy would be, at a 
minimum, beyond allowing the statutory framework to make changes.  
Concluding Georgia 
 The development of organic policy in Georgia is a short but insightful story. As a late adopter, 
federal influence, through both previous adoption and implementation, was one external condition 
motivating adoptions in 2000 and 2002. Likewise, rising consumer and organic industry contributed to 
the decision for initial adoption in 2000. It could be interpreted that rising consumer interest in Atlanta, 
Savannah, and Athens explains how wealth, political culture, and partisan politics play a role in adoption 
decisions. Furthermore, the correlation between adoption and an increase in agricultural productivity may 
be the result of increased attention to promoting local food within the state. What is less clear is how the 
regionalism or even salience factor into Georgia’s adoption decision. Nationally, organic issue salience 
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was at an all time high in 2000, but no interview participant, including those associated with the 
development of the bill, suggested that increased media attention is what led to increased consumer 
interest. Similarly, a regional network was referenced by several individuals but no confirmation could be 
made if the Carolina Farm Stewards influenced Georgia organic farmers. 
 The case of Georgia can also shed some light on why states in the Southeast were slow to adopt 
organic policies compared to other regions. Skepticism over organics from both a consumer and producer 
perspective may have led to delayed adoptions by any Southeastern state until 1990. Furthermore, the 
case also demonstrates that discussions about policy typology may have been a moot point for late 
adopters as the co-regulatory scheme of third-party certification and registering with the state was already 
established by other states and at the federal level. As a late adopter, Georgia signifies that many of the 
variables that may have been significant to leading adopter or middle-of-the-pack adopters are not as 
influential in late adopting cases. Late adopters of organic legislation may be responding to gaps in 










 The primary research question of this dissertation is why do some states adopt organic food and 
agriculture legislation while others do not? By asking this question, the intent of this dissertation is to 
contribute to the theoretical development of the policy diffusion literature through an interesting 
application while also providing a foundation for improving our understanding of organic policy 
development in the United States. The findings of this study reveal that state adoption of organic food and 
agriculture legislation can be explained by a complex web of influential factors. Specifically, state 
adoption decisions are the result of external conditions, internal conditions, salience, policy typology, and 
existing policy; the results are consistent with expectations and conform to the expectations of the policy 
diffusion model developed in this study where: 
ADOPTi,t =  ƒ(INTERNALi,t , EXTERNALi,t, SALIENCEi,t, EXSPOLICYi,t , POLICYTYPEi,t) 
 
POLICYTYPE i,t =  ƒ(INTERNALi,t , EXTERNALi,t, SALIENCEi,t, EXSPOLICYi,t ,) 
 
EXSPOLICYi,t = ƒ(ADOPTi,t, POLICYTYPE i,t) 
Yet it is important to note that the timing of adoption (e.g. earlier versus later) and adoption type (e.g. 
initial versus amending adoptions) are influenced by different factors. Early initial adoptions are 
influenced by fewer variables compared to later initial adoptions. Likewise, earlier amending adoptions 
are influenced less by vertical pressures of diffusion, measured as federal adoption and federal 
implementation in this study, then amending adoptions after 1990. In essence, the research presented 
demonstrates that the adoption of a new and innovative policy is dependent on the conditions of a specific 
time and context. While this idea may not be new or radical, it does illuminate one potential explanation, 
the significance of time span, for why developing a robust policy diffusion model or list of consistent 
explanatory variables eludes public policy scholars. This analysis evaluated a 35-year time span and 
focused on a set of delineated time periods as designated by aspects of federalism. By not limiting the 
analysis to a larger time span or a narrower time period, there is a more robust identification of significant 
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variables over time but also for key periods of adoption where contagious policy adoption occurred while 
still accounting for federal supremacy in a given policy area. The policy diffusion model outlined above 
can examine both rapid and slower diffusion patterns and can account for vertical and horizontal 
dimensions of diffusion within one analysis. 
 In what will follow, this chapter summarizes and synthesizes the results of the quantitative and 
qualitative portions of the research including the variation over time and by adoption type. A discussion 
of lessons learned will follow with both theoretical and applied contributions derived from this research.  
Next, a discussion of future directions for research on policy diffusion and organic food and agriculture 
policy will follow. Finally, the chapter ends with a concluding statement indicating how this research 
improves our understanding of policy diffusion and organic food and agriculture policy. 
Explaining Policy Diffusion – Summary and Synthesis of Results 
 From 1976 to 2010, 38 states adopted organic food and agriculture legislation. As discussed in 
Chapter IV, the statistical results demonstrate a wide range of significant variables that influence adoption 
decisions including wealth, political culture, partisan control, vegetable sales, regional pressures (e.g. 
horizontal diffusion pressures), and national pressures (e.g. vertical diffusion pressures). Furthermore, 
several regions are also statistically significant indicators of diffusion and each demonstrated its own set 
of influential factors with each region. Comparatively, the cases of California and Georgia, Chapter VI 
and VII, support and build upon the findings from statistical models and provide much needed depth and 
meaning to what factors are suggested as statistically significant. The case studies, like the statistical 
models, provide undeniable evidence for how explanatory variables for state adoption decisions vary 
according to the time period (e.g. early versus late) and adoption type (e.g. initial or amending adoptions). 
To fully explore the collective findings, an overview of explanatory variables is presented according to 
the policy diffusion model variables. Table 8.1 provides a comparative summary table of results from the 




Table 8.1: Comparative Summary of Results 
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Internal Determinants of Diffusion (INTERNALi,t) 
 The internal determinants model variable is included in the policy diffusion model because of its 
ability to predict how conditions internal or inherent to the adopting entity may influence state adoption 
decisions. Several socio-economic and political indicators are used for the analysis of organic food and 
agriculture legislation. In total, twelve variables are identified as potential explanations for diffusion, and 
nine internal determinant hypotheses are tested. Four hypotheses can be accepted while two hypotheses 
cannot be rejected or accepted (see Table 3.4). Specifically, H4, H5, H6, and H9 can be accepted 
indicating that states that are wealthier, have moralistic cultures, have a Democratic controlled state 
government, and have the presence of third-party organic certifiers are more likely to adopt organic food 
and agriculture legislation. H1 and H8, on the other hand, only have evidence to partially support the 
predicted relationship. Only two of the four states listed in H1 were early adopters of legislation while the 
other two, Massachusetts and Michigan, never passed legislation. Yet, Michigan did adopt organic 
administrative rules in 1978. For H8, there is mixed evidence for fruit and vegetable sales as vegetable 
sales are significant in the larger, comprehensive models whereas fruit sales mattered only in the Far West 
region. All of these conditions and variables are explored further below. 
The Significance of State Level Wealth Over Time  
Per capita wealth was one consistent variable across time that explained diffusion of organic food 
and agriculture legislation both quantitatively and qualitatively. This suggests wealthier states are more 
likely to adopt innovative policies than less wealthy states. This finding is consistent with and supports 
the existing belief that wealthier states may have greater interest or ability to contemplate new policies 
(Bailey and Rom 2004; Berry and Berry 1990, 2007). The statistical results demonstrate a weak 
directional relationship beyond .00 or -.00, but it is the result of different measurement scales. Extending 
beyond the hundredths place value, the directional relationships range from -.0002822 to .0001684. This 
means that wealth matters, but there is limited indication for if wealth is a positive or negative factor in 
state adoption. There is no clear indication for why this occurs, but the case studies may shed some light 
on the effect of wealth on adoption of organic food and agriculture legislation. 
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In the case of California, the median household income for the state is $61,400 in 2012 with those 
counties, particularly counties around the metro areas of San Francisco and Los Angeles, having median 
household incomes over $55,000 (see Appendix I). Georgia, on the contrary, is comparatively much less 
wealthy on average throughout the state.  Certain counties, however, are comparable to California’s 
median household incomes. Larger metropolitan areas, such as Atlanta and Savannah, having median 
household incomes ranging from $42,000 to over $87,000 (see Appendix L).  
The case of California indicates that wealthier states, as a whole, may be more likely to adopt 
earlier. Other early state adopters, specifically New York and Connecticut, are also wealthier than most 
other parts of the country with respect to median household incomes (see Table 8.2). In 2012, New 
York’s median household income was $57,683 while Connecticut’s is $74,323. These figures are 
comparable to California’s wealth and have remained consistent in terms of growth and inflation for over 
two decades.
1718
 Likewise, Georgia’s median household income has followed a similar pattern but the 
average is lower. Instead, in the case of Georgia, several regional hubs of organic activity in wealthier 
areas of the state including Atlanta, Athens, and Savannah. The effect of wealth, in these metropolitan 
hubs, could operate in the same manner as general wealth in California or New York. Specifically, 
wealth, in the case of Georgia, could influence lawmakers in Atlanta, but it is probably indicative of the 
local lifestyle, a better education population, or even political preferences. Residents in these areas lean 
towards voting for Democrats and may be more inclined to purchase foods that are more expensive, but 
align with consumer concern commonly associated with organic such as health, the environment, or 
potentially supporting local food systems. What is happening in some Georgia cities may be identical to 
what is happening in California but on a smaller and more limited scale.  
Given the evidence, does policy diffusion hinge on the wealth of citizens in a state? Perhaps but it 
may be overly presumptuous to assume wealth is the primary predictor of adoption. Wealth could indicate  
                                                          
17
 For a comparative U.S. map by county or state see 
http://www.census.gov/censusexplorer/censusexplorer.html 
18
 The median household income in the United States was $51,017 in 2012, $49,276 in 2010, $41,990 in 
2000, and $29,943 in 1990 (US Census Bureau ND). 
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New York 1979 $16,647 $32,965 $43,393 $59,796 
California 1979 $18,243 $35,798 $47,493 $61,400 
Connecticut 1979 $20,077 $41,721 $53,935 $74,323 
Maine 1979 $13,816 $27,854 $37,240 $51,317 
  
Sources: http://www.census.gov/censusexplorer/censusexplorer.html and 
http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/income/data/historical/state/state1.html 
 
the ability to consider new ideas but it may also be a signifier of particular citizen lifestyle choices, such 
as an enhanced set of buying and eating choices, or regional pressures of diffusion. In essence, per capita 
income and wealth of citizens may be indicative of other variables that are important and correlated with 
wealth. Considering the significance of this variable over time for both initial and amending adoptions, 
other variables that relate to wealth should be considered and examined. 
The Significance of Third-Party Certification  
 In addition to wealth, there is persuasive evidence to suggest that state adoption decisions are 
influenced by third-party organic certifiers. California’s initial and several amending adoptions were 
pushed for by California Certified Organic Farmers [CCOF]. Indeed, CCOF wrote the Organic Foods Act 
of 1979 and the California Organic Foods Act of 1990; the former being the initial adoption of organic 
food and agriculture policy, and the latter representing a significant overhaul of the initial bill. For the 
1990 bill, CCOF even worked with other Far West regional certifiers through WACO and collaborated 
with NOFA to standardize organic practices across the country. In this particular case, the role and impact 
of third-party certifiers are direct and stems from within the state, as well as, being impacted by regional 
and cross-national interaction among organic third-party certifiers. Yet, this is not a story replicated in 
Georgia. The Georgia Crop Improvement Association, a state entity meant to conduct a number of 
certifications, did play a role in promoting organic agriculture and is one of a few primary certifiers in the 
state. However, there is not enough evidence to suggest that Georgia Crop Improvement Association or 
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any other third-party certifier operating within the state had any significant role in developing the initial 
legislation in 2000 or amending legislation in 2002 and 2010. Not even the influence of the Carolina 
Farm Stewards, an organization that once pursued becoming a certifier, could be confirm for a regional 
basis. 
 While perhaps not a direct cause-and-effect for both case studies, the presence of organic third-
party certifiers may demonstrate why certain and states and regions were likely to be leading adopters. 
Furthermore, the presence of organic certifiers may be representative of other factors and conditions that 
lead to adoption that are not accounted for directly in the data analysis. Specifically, annual organic 
production or sales figures were not available for all 35-years of this study. Specialty crop sales, included 
as vegetable and fruit sales, can help to assess potential organic production trends. Yet, even with these 
proxy measurements, there is no indication for how to measure the production or demand for organic 
versus conventional specialty crops. The presence of third-party certifiers within a state may indicate that 
more farmers are interested in organic production, and it is likely that consumer demand (and subsequent 
higher prices) may be driving that interest. Without hard data for all 35-years, there is no possible way to 
statistically test this assumption. However, the presence and analysis of third-party certifiers in the two 
cases suggests that there is some linkage between state adoption decisions and organic third-party 
certifiers. In California, the linkage and effect are more evident whereas, in Georgia, it is more indirect. 
Moreover, the presence of a nationally-renowned third part certifier, CCOF, and its network with regional 
and national certifiers may have directly attributed to early initial adoption in California and led to some 
of the more aggressive organic policy standards in the country.  
Other Internal Determinants   
 Several additional internal determinant variables are significant to state adoption decisions for 
organic food and agriculture legislation. Statistically, partisan control, political culture, vegetable sales, 
and state innovativeness as a characteristic are significant. Furthermore, narrowed time period models 
also found state legislature professionalism and agricultural productivity significant albeit in the opposite 
directional relationship from what was predicted. The case studies, particularly California, provided the 
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additional depth necessary to determine how and why these variables were important and of unexpected 
sign.  
Political Variables of Significance 
 Partisan control, which was only statistically significant for initial adoptions in the 
comprehensive model and all adoption in the 1990-2003 model, signifies that state adoptions of organic 
food and agriculture legislation is more likely to occur in years where state governments are controlled by 
Democrats. In California and Georgia (see Appendix J and M), initial adoptions are made in years where 
Democrats controlled state government. Furthermore, both states saw a majority of amending bills 
sponsored by Democrats even during split-controlled years. While these findings confirm other scholarly 
literature regarding Democrats and policy diffusion, the case studies do not demonstrate a strong causal 
link between political party and adoption. Indeed, sponsors of bills in California and Georgia may have 
been selected because of their roles served in the state legislatures. In California, sponsorship of bills in 
1979, 1982, and 1990 were clearly the result of constituents contacting their state assembly members for 
sponsorship. Both Assemblymen Michael Gage and Sam Farr were representing their constituents, 
predominantly members of CCOF, in the Central Valley of California when sponsoring bills. Other bills 
were sponsored by members on agriculture committees. Likewise, Harold Ragan’s sponsorship of the bill 
in Georgia was likely a function of his Chairmanship of the Senate Agriculture Committee that the 
Georgia Department of Agriculture approached about an organic law.  
 A second state political variable that demonstrated significance, and perhaps a more causal link, 
is political culture. According to the statistical results, state with moralistic-leaning political cultures, 
which demonstrate more trust in government and desire to promote policies for the public good, are found 
to be more likely to adopt organic food and agriculture legislation. This finding alone demonstrates why 
states like California were leading adopters while states like Georgia were laggard or even non-adopters. 
Yet the similarities between California and Georgia’s political culture demonstrate the significance of a 
strong individualistic strain as pertinent to adoption. California’s political culture is identified as 
moralistic with a strong individualistic strain whereas Georgia’s political culture is a traditionalist culture 
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with a strong individualistic strain. The individualistic strain in each state demonstrates government 
skepticism and an emphasis on individual rights. This suggests individualistic cultures may be less likely 
to seek government involvement for solving problems unless for the protection of individual rights. Given 
the nature of each political culture, the framing of organic legislation in each state may illuminate why 
moralistic states may be more likely to be leading adopters of innovative policies. States with political 
cultures interested in protecting the public good would be more likely to seek regulations that correct 
market asymmetries. However, the presence of an individualistic culture may explain the pattern of 
diffusion across states, but also the current policy typology design used by the National Organic Program. 
Specifically, the co-regulatory or third-party certification design is likely the result of skepticism in 
trusting government to solely develop rules and implement the policy.  
 California’s law was promoted by many organic farmers in the state for the purposes of 
preventing fraud in the marketplace but also to protect the market from being corrupted by conventional 
agriculture’s interpretation of the term. While organic farmers wanted a law that would protect 
themselves and consumers from fraudulent claims, they were also skeptical of government and the 
California Department of Food and Agriculture’s being beholden to conventional agricultural interests. 
For some organic farmers, the involvement of government would be considered heresy to their purpose 
and alternative production methods. However, CCOF organizers were comfortable with the idea of 
framing the policy as correcting an information asymmetry in the marketplace while relying on private 
third-party certification to ensure truth in labeling. The particular design of the 1979 and 1990 California 
bills demonstrate the desire to protect the public good and promote individual rights but a deep skepticism 
of involving state government. The policy typology design relied on government registration of organic 
growers, processors, and handlers but maintained a public-private form of implementation by relying on 
third-party certifiers. Furthermore, the sheer length of both the 1990 and 2003 California laws also 
demonstrate mistrust in the rule-making process and state policymakers for developing organic industry 
approved standards.  
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The presence of both a moralistic and individualistic political nature in California may help to 
determine why the state is a leading innovative adopter while also explaining the a co-regulatory style of 
policy for organic food and agriculture. The public and organic farmers would be protected by law while 
the co-regulatory style of policy implementation would prevent government from being overly persuaded 
by conventional agriculture interests. If California is considered a leader in organic policy and is a 
significant international actor in setting environmental and consumer protection standards, other 
moralistic and moralistic-leaning states would take cues from California. Likewise, California may seek 
to emulate or mimic the behavior of other moralistic states that have strong individualistic undertones 
such as New York, which was the first state to adopt. Under the presumption, individualistic dominant 
cultures would likely be middle-of-the-pack adopters with traditionalist dominant states predominantly 
being laggards. The function of individualistic strains in traditionalist states, particularly in the Southeast, 
may serve as a gateway to considering innovative policies that have are tested and successful in other 
states or motivated by skepticism in government capability. 
Indeed, Georgia’s traditionalist culture may have hindered the interest in organic food and 
agriculture policy until 2000 but the presence of the individualistic strain promoted policy that protect 
individuals. Skepticism in the federal government’s adoption and the desire from the Georgia Department 
of Agriculture to ensure truth in labeling claims may be representative of the individualistic undertones of 
the moralistic culture in the state. Specifically, mistrust in the federal government in 2000 stemmed not 
only from the USDA’s ability to develop final rules but from a broader debate of federalism and state 
versus federal policy domains. Under this assumption, states like Georgia would be skeptical of the 
federal government’s policy development but would like to maintain a hierarchy in their own territorial 
boundaries by protecting the interest of consumers and industry. Thus, this individualistic strain in 
Southeastern states may help to explain why the region was a late adopter and demonstrates slower 
regional interest in organic food and agriculture policy. Similarly, the Mid-Atlantic Region was also a 
region with delayed adoption with most states being individualist dominant with strong traditionalist ties. 
The higher percentage of state adopters in the Mid-Atlantic region, like the South, may be caused by the 
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presence of a traditionalist culture, which needs clear proof of a policy’s success or motivation to protect 
individual rights from unnecessary government intervention. 
However, despite the evidence supporting a political culture argument, there is on additional 
political factor, state legislature professionalism, which could explain state initial adoption decisions 
within the peak period of adoption from 1985-1990 as well as lend additional credence to the political 
culture argument. As demonstrated in Table 4.3, initial adoptions made from 1985 are influenced by 
moralistic-leaning cultures and less professionalized state legislatures among other patterns of regional 
and national-interaction pressures. As discussed previously, the directional relationship was not as 
predicted, but it could be the result of a larger political movement in the 1980s that sought deregulation 
and smaller government. While this analysis takes a leader-laggard approach for case study selections, 
this statistical finding does shed some light on middle-of-the-pack adopters and potentially indicates the 
effect of individualistic political cultures in helping the diffusion of organic food and agriculture 
legislation. There are two camps of non-adopters including traditionalist-leaning political cultures and 
states that adopted administrative rules but no legislation. Of the latter group, all administrative rule 
adopters were on par with states with similar moralistic and individualistic cultures. Therefore, only non-
adopting states have traditionalist-leaning cultures and all purely moralistic and individualistic adopted 
some form of organic food and agriculture law. For all initial state adoptions from 1985-1990 the rapid 
adoption rate, especially for 1989 and 1990, may be the result of the “perfect storm” of variables that led 
to the contagious diffusion of policy adoption. In term of state legislature professionalism, less 
professionalized state legislatures combined with a political culture skeptical of government during the 
1980s could have contributed to the rapid adoption of a co-regulatory policy typology, which would 
create less political backlash during the deregulatory and small government era.   
The Role of Fruit and Vegetable Sales – Economic Predictors 
 Statistically, the measures of fruit and vegetable sales, both specialty crops, were included as a 
proxy for assessing the presence and growth in organic food sales. As an economic indicator within the 
statistical results, states with increasing vegetable sales over time were more likely to adopt organic 
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legislation. Increasing fruit sales, on the contrary, were only statistically significant in the Far West 
region. There are several explanations for the patterns of significance. The two case states, California and 
Georgia, reported fruit and vegetable crops as significant to their overall agriculture industries. In 
addition, both states report the agriculture industry as a significant component to the states’ overall 
economy. Nonetheless, the significance of California’s agricultural productivity is bar none to other states 
and is even internationally ranked as a leading supplier for fruits, vegetables, and nuts. While Georgia’s 
agricultural productivity should not be considered insignificant, California’s fruit production likely 
provided considerable leverage to the significance of fruit sales in the Far West region.  
As for increasing vegetable sales, the distribution of the effect nationally may exist because of the 
ability to grow vegetables across more climatic zones. Moreover, fruit production is more often perennial, 
providing less dynamic changes over time, whereas vegetable production is not. While North Dakota or 
New Mexico may not generate as many fruit sales as California or Georgia, states like North Dakota and 
New Mexico can generate substantive vegetable sales given the nature of the climate and growing zone 
capabilities. Considering the national capacity for growing vegetables, it can be asserted that states with 
increasing vegetable sales most broadly signifies a greater concern for policies that would promote and 
protect this sector including organic food and agriculture policy. As will discussed below, the production 
patterns of fruit and vegetable sales, as well as farm type, by state may also shed some light on horizontal 
pressures for diffusion. 
State Innovativeness as a Characteristic 
 As a final consideration of internal determinants of policy diffusion, one hypothesis was included 
to assess the claim of innovativeness as a state characteristic. In the seminal Walker-Gray debate, Walker 
says (1969, 893), “States like New York, Massachusetts, California and Michigan should be seen as 
regional pace setters,” and even suggested that these states are inherently more innovative than others. 
Gray (1973a, 1973b) challenged this assumption claiming innovativeness as time and issue specific at 
best. The results from this analysis lend credibility to both claims. First, New York and California were 
early adopters of organic state legislation while Massachusetts adopted organic administrative rules in 
208 
 
1978. Moreover, New York and California were the first in their regions to adopt organic food and 
agriculture policy, and there is evidence to suggest that organic industry networks in the Northeast and 
Far West were interacting across the nation, a horizontal element of diffusion. If New York and California 
were regional trend setters and took cues for policy innovation from each other, then Walker’s argument 
for innovativeness as a state characteristic partially holds true.  
 The evidence that supports Gray’s claim is grounded in the delayed adoption by Michigan. 
Michigan was a late adopter. Lawmakers did not pass an initial organic bill until 2000 and only amended 
statutes once in 2006. As discussed earlier, the political culture differences between early and late 
adopters are significant. It may be possible that the issue of organic food and agriculture was not 
important or did not receive the attention from lawmakers either due to the political culture, for which 
Michigan is a more moralistic in nature, or other unidentified variables. Therefore, innovativeness may be 
time and issue specific at best in particular cases. 
External Determinants of Diffusion (EXTERNALi,t) 
 The external determinants model variable is included in the policy diffusion model to assess the 
dimensions of both horizontal and vertical dimensions of policy diffusion. For horizontal dimensions, 
which assess state-to-state influence, this analysis assesses both regional pressures and how national 
percentages of adoption and enacted statutes would impact adoption decisions. Three hypotheses, H10, 
H11 and H12, were tested to assess horizontal policy diffusion dimensions. For vertical dimensions, this 
analysis primarily sought to assess the impact of the federal government in altering state policy 
trajectories. Specifically, this analysis sought to determine how federal adoption of organic policy would 
impact state adoption decisions. Two hypotheses, H13 and H14, were tested to assess the vertical 
dimension of diffusion through both federal legislative adoption and official federal implementation.  
 The findings from the quantitative analysis confirm regional effects, assessed as both adoption 
percentage and enacted state statute percentage, on state adoption decisions. In essence, states are more 
likely to adopt organic food and agriculture legislation if other states in the region have adopted similar 
legislation or have enacted statutes in effect. What is less certain from the quantitative finding is the effect 
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of other horizontal patterns of diffusion such as isomorphism or national interaction. H12 predicted that 
states with similar economic and political conditions are more likely to adopt. For internal determinant 
conditions, wealthier, Democratically-control state governments, moralistic-leaning cultures, state 
legislature professionalism, increasing vegetable sales, and the presence of third-party certifiers in the 
state each influence adoption. Statistically, these effects do not demonstrate a clear diffusion pattern that 
can confirm a national-interaction or isomorphism approach to horizontal diffusion. However, evidence 
from the case studies, such as the presence of third-party certifiers, provide evidence for how states across 
the nation might interact through national organic industry networks or how diffusion may be based on 
the variations in fruit and vegetable production across states.  
 Case studies also shed some light on the uncertainties surrounding vertical influences since 
nothing quantitatively could be proven with absolute certainty. California confirms the belief that the 
correlation between state initial adoption and federal adoption in 1990 may be more coincidence that the 
actual cause and effect. Furthermore, evidence from both cases demonstrates cautionary frustration 
among states over delayed implementation at the federal level until 2002. As will discussed further below, 
there is strong evidentiary support to suggest that both horizontal and vertical dimensions of diffusion 
occurred throughout the development of organic food and agriculture policy in the U.S. 
The Horizontal Dimension of Diffusion 
 From the evidence presented in this analysis, states were highly influential on other states in the 
diffusion of organic innovation. States not only took cues from other states within their region, but there 
is also evidence to suggest how patterns of agricultural production and the effects of organic industry 
networks, via third-party certifiers, may have contributed to adoption decisions and policy development. 
The effects of regional pressure versus national pathways of influence shall be considered separately. 
Regional Pressures 
 The USDA’s Agricultural Marketing Service’s seven region designation was used to group states 
together for analysis. The seven-region designation accounts for climatic and agricultural productivity 
differences among states. Furthermore, the regional identification aids in assessing factors that influence 
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why the Southeast region has low certified organic production, one concern of the National Organic 
Program (McEvoy 2012). The results of this research suggest that regional effects matter. States can, and 
will, take cues from other states in their region regarding the adoption of new and innovative policies and 
programs. As Figure 8.1 demonstrates, certified organic production is primarily located outside of the 
Southeast. What is significant to note is that areas with adoptions prior to 1990 have some of the largest 
number of organic production acres. The Northeast and Far West regions have some of the earliest 
adoptions and some of the largest number of certified organic acres. Furthermore, middle-of-the-pack 
regions such as the Rocky Mountain and North Central regions also have early pace setters and more 
organic production acres than the Southeast. Given the spatial evidence, Walker’s (1969) original regional 
tree-based model may hold true. His model claimed there are regional pace setters, such as California and 
New York, that other states within the region will follow and emulate. 
 The Northeast region follows Walker’s predicted pattern with New York at the first legislative 
adopter with Connecticut and Maine following three years later. If including the dimension of organic 
administrative rules, Massachusetts could also be considered a follower of New York’s regional pace 
setting. The Far West region, to the contrary, does not necessarily follow Walker’s tree model. However, 
it is clear that regional effects matter. California was the first state to adopt organic legislation, but it was 
not the first state to adopt general regulations or guidelines regarding organic food labeling. Oregon 
initially adopted organic administrative rules in 1973. It is reported that California’s Organic Foods Act of 
1979 closely mirrored Oregon’s administrative rules. Nonetheless, it could be argued that California is a 
regional pacesetter for legislative adoption as not all state administrative agencies may have the same sort 
of broad delegation of authority to develop rules. Oregon lawmakers would eventually pass legislation in 
1989, but California had already begun to pioneer the policy area of organic food and agriculture with 
CCOF at the helms of California’s efforts. CCOF had consulted with other organic industry pioneers in 
the Far West region including Oregon Tilth, which also alludes to the significance of industry-networks 
within a regional construct. 
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 In the Southeast region, the secondary region of focus in the case studies, the regional effects are 
statistically significant for a higher percentage of enacted state statutes but not higher percentages of state 
adopters. This could be the result of delayed adoption within the region, but the Georgia case, 
unfortunately, cannot help further illuminate this finding and cannot lend support to Walker’s regional 
tree-model of diffusion. A few interview participants note how Georgia, North Carolina, and Florida are 
more innovative in nature and would be more likely to look at each other for agricultural production cues. 
Moreover, there was some limited information to suggest a similar organic industry network influence 
between North Carolina and Georgia. The Carolina Farm Stewardship Association was identified as 
having probable influence on organic food and agriculture policy in the Southeast region. While the 
association never achieved its goal of becoming a certifier, the Carolina Farm Stewardship Association is 
an active promoter of local and organic food in the Carolinas.  
 Another region that undermines Walker’s tree model is the Southwest region, composed of 
Arkansas, Louisiana, Oklahoma, and Texas. The three of the four states in the region adopted organic 
legislation in 1989. While the effects of regionalism could explain the adoption pattern, Walker’s tree 
model cannot. There is not a regional trend setter and the speed of adoption is an r-curve, indicating rapid 
and sudden adoption, rather than a gradual s-curve, which would be more of what Walker’s model would 
predict. Therefore, the regional effect in the Southwest region does lend further support to Boushey’s 
contagion model which suggests that regional effects may result in rapid and sudden adoption of 
innovation policies.  
 In sum, there is evidence to suggest regional effects do adoption decisions. Furthermore, from a 
regional-based approach, it can be argued that one potential cause for low levels of certified organic 
production in the Southeast has just as much to do with regional interest in organic policy as climatic 
conditions or investment by agribusiness in crop production. Figure 8.1 demonstrates that the regional is 
generally a laggard to comparison to other regions. This lack of early interest may indicate limited desire 





 As discussed in Chapter II, there are three additional approaches beyond regionalism for 
modeling policy diffusion along horizontal dimensions including national interaction, leader-laggard, and 
isomorphism. It was predicted that states would be more likely to adopt if states that had similar internal 
determinant conditions were also adopters of organic legislation. This prediction is more likely to address 
the isomorphism model, where states with similar characteristics mimic or emulate each other’s 
innovative policies. The statistical evidence could not, with accuracy, determine if an isomorphism model 
of diffusion was occurring in this particular policy domain. Not only do leading adopters share similar 
internal political conditions but states within each region also share similar characteristics. The case 
studies are able to help disentangle the horizontal dimension of diffusion as by pointing to a national-
interaction model of diffusion caused by the actions of the national network of organic industry specialists 
and certifiers seeking to promote organic policy. Yet, upon further observation with both the case studies 
and spatial maps of key internal characteristics, there is also support for an isomorphism effect that is 
grounded, at least in part, regionally.  
 In both the California and Georgia case studies, key interview participants indicated that organic 
activity is nationally situated around several hubs. Like the metropolitan hubs driving demand in Georgia, 
organic food production and demand also follows a spatial pattern across the U.S. akin to the organic 
production acreage presented in Figure 8.1. One sustainable food advocate (2013) describes organic 
regionalism as the following:  
“The centers of activity in my mind are California and then the Northwest, Oregon and 
Washington. Then you get over into Wisconsin. It’s pretty strong in the Midwest. And then New 
England has always been a leader. Then (it goes) down to the Southeast. And then the Deep 
South, you know Alabama and Mississippi, Arkansas, it’s barely existing.” 
 
Although this could be interpreted as regional-based diffusion, the discussion of different farm types and 
agricultural capabilities is also significant to determining low organic production efforts. As research on 
organic farming diffusion in Europe suggests farm type matters for diffusion of the practice.  
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 As previously discussed, the fruit and vegetable sales measures are used in this analysis as a 
proxy for assessing organic production and sales from 1976-2010. Assessing the sales of these two 
specialty crops spatially can shed additional light on how farm type contributes to regional peculiarities 
and an isomorphism form of diffusion. Figure 8.1 demonstrates the spatial distribution of organic farms in 
2007. Figure 8.2 and 8.3 spatially map orchard acres and vegetable acres harvested that same year. The 
distribution of organic farming is spread across the U.S. except for the Southeast. Yet the distribution of 
vegetable and fruit acreage is concentrated in a few key areas of the country where farm scale is relatively 
smaller. Namely, land in orchard acres is concentrated in the Far West, in California and Washington, and 
the Southeast, in Florida and southern Georgia. There are additional patches of orchard acres in Texas, 
Oklahoma, Michigan, and New York. It should be no surprise, given the land in orchards in California, 
that we found the regional significance of fruit sales in the Far West. The orchards located in the Central 
Valley of California are where most fruit production for the country occurs. Only Florida appears to have 
a comparable scale of fruit production. Comparably, vegetable acres harvested are more well-balanced 
nationally, which further contributes to our understanding of the significance of vegetable sales to the 
national models of state policy diffusion. Yet the mid-section of the country and most of the Southeast 
remains comparatively barren from vegetable production.  
 Given the evidence, the question is presented on why does this spatial conception of fruit and 
vegetable production matter to horizontal diffusion? In part, it helps to explain how isomorphism 
horizontal diffusion occurred. Given the differences in farm types and even scale of farming (e.g. large 
versus small), the diffusion of organic food and agricultural legislation may have occurred because of the 
concentration of fruit and vegetable production in certain states. Nationally, the ability of states like 
Oregon or Washington to have large-scale farming operations growing “low-risk” crops such as wheat 
and soybeans is not the same as states in the mid-section of the country. Likewise, the ability of states in 
the Southeast to have the same ability to crop the vast array and amount of specialty crops as California is 
simply unachievable.  Even Georgia has differences within the state with large scale farming occurring in 






Source: USDA National Agricultural Statistics Service 
 
Figure 8.1: Organic Production Acres, 2007 with State Initial Adoption Date 
1 Dot = 250 Acres 






Source: USDA National Agricultural Statistics Service 
 
Figure 8.2: Land in Orchard Acres, 2007 with State Initial Adoption Date 
1 Dot = 250 Acres 






Source: USDA National Agricultural Statistics Service 
 
Figure 8.3: Vegetable Acres Harvested for Sale, 2007 with State Initial Adoption Date
* = State Administrative Rules 
1 Dot = 250 Acres 
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capabilities nationally is even evident in the patterns of agricultural lobbying. Sam Farr (2013) was quick 
to indicate that the politics surrounding agriculture is not so much based on partisanship but by bias in the 
production by state. For example, “the corn lobby is not in California or Florida but the sugar cane lobby 
is certainly in Florida” (Farr 2013). This would suggest that agriculture is non-partisan but grounded in 
particular crops and goods.  
Combined with other internal determinant variables, such as political culture and wealth, fruit and 
vegetable production can collectively determine which states may take cues from each other. New York 
and California, leading adopters, do share a number of similarities such as political culture and wealth. In 
addition, both states produce both fruits and vegetables. If looking at other state adopters prior to 1990, 
the same is also true where these states share similar political and economic conditions including the 
production of fruits and vegetables. For example, Washington and Minnesota are also leading adopters 
that produce vegetables and fruit. Yet isomorphism is not the only additional horizontal model to be 
considered beyond regionalism. One additional factor that complicates the ability to identify one 
horizontal model of diffusion is the presence of organic industry networks. 
 Interview participants in both case studies indicated regional and even cross-national networks 
organic and sustainable food advocates operated within. In Georgia, the effect of the organic industry is 
limited within the region. The Carolina Farm Stewardship Association is reported to have influenced 
organic policy in the Southeast and may have been working with Georgia organic farmers. Therefore, at 
best, the industry network effects in Georgia are regional. California, on the other hand, has a network 
that transcends beyond just the Far West. The network is established not through state legislative contacts 
but by the national network of organic farmers. CCOF is the primary link for California to a national 
network. CCOF members are linked to Washington Tilth, Oregon Tilth, the Western Alliance of 
Certification Organizations [WACO], and the Northeast Organic Farming Association. The California 
Organic Foods Act of 1990 was partially influenced by this network as members from WACO, including 
Washington Tilth and Oregon Tilth, and the Northeast Organic Farming Association worked to create 
consensus for organic farming practices nationally. Yet, upon further investigation, each of these entities 
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indicates a longer history of engaging with each other. For example, Oregon Tilth’s impact is driven by 
its standing as an organic certifier but also the organization’s chapters located in Oregon, Washington, 
California, and Idaho. The location of chapters suggests a network that extends beyond the Far West to 
the Rocky Mountain region in Idaho. This sort of regionalism and trans-boundaries regionalism even 
extends to the Ellensburg (,Washington) Conference held in November of 1974. The conference was an 
alternative agriculture conference that attracted individuals from states such as California, Arizona, South 
Dakota, Ohio and North Carolina (Musick 2008). Collectively, the evidence from California, combined 
with a deeper understanding of the network established in the Pacific Northwest states, cannot only 
provide support for a national-interaction model based on organic network interactions but can also 
explain why regional patterns of adoptions occurred.  
Which Way for Horizontal Diffusion? 
 There is persuasive evidence to suggest that the policy diffusion of organic food and agriculture 
legislation is influenced by horizontal dimensions to diffusion. States do appear to influence each other’s 
adoption decisions. However, there is no one clear model that can explain the findings of this research.  
Regionalism, isomorphism, and a national-interaction model can each explain spatial adoption patterns. 
The uncertainty surrounding a precise horizontal model may be related to the internal conditions 
analyzed. Such similarity exists not only within the region but key leading innovators like California and 
New York. These regions are wealthier, Democratic-leaning, have moralistic-leaning cultures, have 
higher vegetable and fruit production and sales, and contain leading organizations in the national organic 
industry network. While there is no clear answer for which horizontal model explains adoption best, it is 
clear that horizontal effects on diffusion do matter. 
The Vertical Dimension of Diffusion 
 The vertical dimension of diffusion affected the 35 year analysis starting in 1990. The inclusion 
of federal adoption and federal implementation is to determine how state policy decisions are affected by 
federal policy intervention in the organic food and agriculture market. In this analysis, both federal 
adoption and federal implementation were significant quantitatively and qualitatively. For federal 
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adoption, the passage of the Organic Food Production Act of 1990 coincided with a record-breaking 
number of initial state adopters. The correlation between federal adoption and state adoption in 1990 may 
be the result of coincidence and surely demonstrates that states are not deterred from passing their own 
laws that year. California’s amending adoption in 1990 was said to be operating on a parallel track of 
development and passage than the federal law. Moreover, CCOF staff member Mark Lipson may have 
started the ball rolling for federal legislation, as well. From the perspective of California policymakers, 
there was no guarantee that the federal law was going to pass, and so California lawmakers worked as if 
nothing was being developed at the federal level. Other states may have also followed suit by passing 
their laws as if nothing was going to pass at the federal level. In turn, the statistical significance of federal 
adoption may be coincidence because federal adoption did not necessarily spur state adoption, but federal 
law was concurrently developed as more states were interested in developing their own policies, and there 
was a need to standardize practices across the country. 
 This research also considered how delayed implementation of federal law impacted state adoption 
decisions. There are far fewer initial state adoptions in the couple of years following the adoption of the 
Organic Food Production Act of 1990. States may have been waiting for the development of rules by 
1993. However, after the deadline came and passed with no rules being developed, state laws remained as 
the regulators of the market. The continual initial state adoption after 1993 signifies the degree of 
uncertainty regarding when and if federal implementation would occur. Georgia, as a lagging adopter, 
was inspired to adopt legislation partially over concerns about the federal law not being implemented. In 
California, numerous amending adoptions in 1990 also demonstrated a persistent concern for when and if 
federal law would be implemented. The time period between federal adoption and implementation clearly 
marks a period of uncertainty for states in making adoption decisions. 
 Once the National Organic Program final rule went into effect in 2002, many states amended but 
did not terminate state statutes, which is at odds with what was predicted. Yet the decline of enacted state 
statutes is minimal with most states maintaining organic food and agriculture statutes through 2010. There 
are several potential explanations for this phenomenon. First, for those states that terminated state 
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statutes, the cause may be related to a desire to eliminate potential duplication of efforts or a declining 
interest in maintaining the policy area. Second, it is likely that most amending adoptions simply alter the 
statutory language to account for federal supremacy. Both California and Georgia’s amending legislation 
in 2002 altered existing state statutory language to comply and account for federal law. For California, the 
need to continually amend legislation after 2002 is also the resulted in challenging federal law. In 
particular, California lawmakers took aim at the NOP for not sufficiently regulating organic aquaculture 
in 2005 or organic fertilizer content in 2009. Unlike the 1990 adoption, California law was not operating 
on a parallel track but was instead intentionally seeking to reshape acceptable practices and standards. 
California’s effect on federal law is just as significant as federal law’s effect on California. While the case 
of California may be the exception rather than the rule, the efforts of California lawmakers suggests 
dynamic and tense intergovernmental relations. Federal law may be the supreme law of the land, but 
states are willing to develop their own policies in light of gaps in federal policy. For California, the 
discrepancies in the federal law go beyond uncertainty of federal adoption or implementation and extends 
to challenging the permissible federal practices and standards. 
Issue Salience (SALIENCEi,t) 
 The issue salience measure is included in the policy diffusion model to assess the influence of 
attention to organic food and agriculture. For this analysis, issue salience is considered neither an internal 
nor external determinant condition. Instead, issue salience is considered its own entity as it difficult to 
determine how information may spread or be used especially since the emergence of the Information Age 
in the 1970s. One hypothesis, H15, predicted that, as issue salience increases so does the likelihood of 
state adoption. Quantitative and qualitative evidence supports this prediction. 
 While not as robust of a statistical explanation as wealth, organic food and agricultural policy 
diffusion is impacted by increasing issue salience over time. In examining the case studies, issue salience 
does not directly appear to be a significant contributor to Georgia’s organic policy development. 
Interview participants point to other factors that were more significant, such as federal policy, to 
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influencing the development of legislation. Yet issue salience may have contributed to the term organic 
becoming more familiar to Georgia consumers. 
California, on the contrary, appears to be influenced by issue salience and more specifically, 
individual focusing events, as well.  The passage of the Organic Foods Act of 1979 was in response to 
events surrounding the increasing use of the term natural and a series of stories about fraud in the organic 
market. While these stories were not in the national news, organic industry insiders were spurred to action 
by local reports about fraud and concerns about conventional agriculture co-opting the term natural. 
By 1990, organic food and agricultural issue salience dramatically increased. News coverage 
ranged from pointing out the dangers of conventional agriculture, where to buy organic produce, and 
stories of fraud. As identified by interview participants, the carrot caper scandal and the Alar scare are 
two stories that catalyzed the most definitive pressure on revising the law in California.  Market fraud was 
a continual concern, but the amount of attention given to the carrot caper scandal and the Alar scare truly 
elevated the issue salience of organic food and agriculture. The shock waves created by both incidences 
could have contributed to the development of organic policy by other states and the federal government. 
The patchwork of state regulations that emerged in the late 1980s, which the federal law in 1990 sought to 
eliminate, may have emerged in part due to the increased attention to fraud in the marketplace and general 
concerns over conventional agricultural practices.  
For the twenty years following the adoption of the Organic Foods Production Act of 1990, issue 
salience continued to increase until 2009, when the number of stories began to decline. Stories continued 
to address fraud in the marketplace, concerns about conventional agriculture, and the benefits of eating 
organic, but there were also a number of stories specifically addressing the development of federal 
organic policies, emerging new organic products (e.g. aquaculture and apparel), and how organic food 
compares to other sustainable food practices and labeling schemes such as local, natural, fair-trade, non-
GMO, and community-based agriculture. The decline of issue salience does not appear to have an adverse 
impact on initial state adoptions because the percentage of states at risk of adoption steadily declines after 
1990. Yet the decline in issue salience may raise others concerns such as the long-term viability of 
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organic food and agriculture policy at the state level. Issue salience alone may be the cause for states to 
lose interest in the policy domain, but it may be able to keep track of what issues are likely important for 
policymakers. 
Existing Policy (EXSPOLICYi,t) and Policy Type (POLICYTYPEi,t) 
 The final two policy diffusion model variables have a distinctive and comparatively unique 
purpose compared to internal determinants, external determinants, and issue salience. Two additional 
formulas are in the overall enhanced unified policy diffusion model to account for the endogeneity of 
each variable. In essence, adoption can depend on the design of the policy itself and whether or not policy 
has already been developed to resolve the issue. Policy type is grounded in the notion that “policy dictates 
politics” (Lowi 1972). As such, the policy type is affected by internal determinants, external determinants, 
and issue salience. Existing policy is a measurement intended to capture the risk and limitations of 
adoption decisions.  
Neither policy type nor existing policy is quantitatively examined, but the case studies do shed 
some light on how these variables influenced policy diffusion. In the case of organic food and agriculture 
legislature, the policy type is regulatory in nature but the design itself is co-regulatory, existing between 
more and less coercive regulatory design. The co-regulatory design was established early in California 
through the Organic Foods Act of 1979 as a result of both internal and external conditions. The legislation 
reportedly borrowed heavily from Oregon’s 1973 administrative rules and at the request of CCOF leaders, 
led to the voluntary nature of the bill resulted from political considerations and industry norms. In 
general, organic farmers were content with private certification but wanted government help in preventing 
fraud and misinformation (e.g. information asymmetry) in the organic market. The voluntary third-party 
regulatory system was the end result of wishing to maintain the private certification system and 
skepticism in government involvement. In the late 1970s, trust in government was low after a decade of 
scandals, waste, and economic decline. For organic farmers, the mistrust in elected officials and 
administrators, particularly in the CDFA, stemmed from perceived capture of policymakers by 
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conventional agriculture companies. Maintaining the integrity of the organic marketplace on the terms set 
forth by CCOF and other organic farmers was crucial to the design.  
 The 1990 amending California adoption reiterates many of the same previous design concerns. 
The sheer detail and length of the California Organic Foods Act of 1990 were the result of mistrust in the 
rule-making process. Conventional agriculture may have been slow to realize that the bill was being 
developed, but the rule-making process could have ended with organic standards not preferred by CCOF 
or the broader organic community. The continuance of the third-party certification policy type was at the 
hand of CCOF, who hired a lawyer to help write the bill. A key question to consider is what would 
organic food and agriculture legislation today if the third-party system was not advocated from the start? 
The precedence for less coercive, co-regulatory form of policy started with California.
19
 The option to 
move away from such a style may have never been considered a policy alternative for California or even 
the development of the federal law. Yet, if a more coercive form of regulatory policy were established in 
the 1970s, the option to move towards less-coercive may have been an option given the anti-government, 
deregulatory nature of politics in the 1980s and 1990s. Nonetheless, by Georgia’s initial adoption in 2000, 
the significance of organic food and agriculture policy design appears to be settled. There was not any 
major discussion about how to design organic regulations. The risk associated with adopting innovative 
policy may have been diminished enough for Georgia officials to pursue organic policy. Once the policy 
was established in 2000, only minor adjustments would need to be made. Georgia has not undergone 
major sweeping reforms like California. Considering the exceptionalism of California in this policy area, 
this should not be a surprising statement. 
What equals ADOPTi,t? 
 The policy diffusion of organic food and agriculture legislation is determined by a complex 
combination of factors. Internal determinants, external determinants, issue salience, policy type, and 
existing policy each contributes to our understanding for how innovative legislation spread from one state 
                                                          
19
 Since a copy of Oregon’s 1973 administrative rules has not been obtained, the default assumption is to 
consider California as a starting point. 
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to the next. Yet not all factors matter across time and for each type of adoption considered. The 
significance of using time constraints and adoption type designations are important to understanding 
policy diffusion. First, analyzing the difference between initial versus amending adoptions identifies how 
variables interact differently with each adoption type. In the case of organic food and agriculture 
legislation, initial adoptions are influenced by a much different set of conditions than amending 
adoptions. Furthermore, the effect of policy type and existing policy would have a different effect on risk 
perceptions and design designs of policy compared to amending adoptions. Second, by restricting time 
periods based key events, such as federal adoption and rapid periods of initial adoption, helps to 
understand time-bound significant factors and grasp what occurs during rapid periods of adoption. In this 
particular analysis, the factors which influenced pre-federal adoptions are fewer and only partially explain 
the rapid speed of adoption that occur between 1985-1990 when the majority of state adopted organic 
legislation for the first time. Furthermore, the effects of federal adoption and implementation are slightly 
different between 1990-2010 models and 1990-2004 models. By including time and adoption type 
considerations, it adds value to understand how factors are significant and contribute to comprehensive 
policy diffusion analysis by understanding different inherent risks in adoption types and consideration of 
slower, faster, and federally impacted time periods. 
 For organic food and agriculture legislation, the comprehensive findings, including both 
quantitative and qualitative assessments, for all adoptions indicate that states are motivated to adopt 
organic legislation under the following conditions: 
 Moralistic-leaning political cultures 
 Democrat controlled state government 
 Higher per capita wealth/median household income 
 Increasing or higher rates of vegetable sales 
 Presence of third-party certifiers 
 Increasing adoption and enacted state statutes within the region 
 Increasing adoption among states with similar economic and political conditions 
 Federal adoption and implementation 
 Policy typology and existing policy 




It should be noted that the existence of policy and policy type clearly influenced adoption in California 
particularly in 1979, 1982, and 1990 shedding some light on the significance of the Far West region. 
However, it may be difficult to generalize this finding to other states given the findings the Georgia case 
study as neither factor was cited as significant to adoption. Yet considering many other states and the 
federal government used a co-regulatory design, late state adopters may not have consciously consider 
policy typology design as a major concern. Moreover, the risk or perceived risk in adopting organic 
legislation may have drastically diminished by 2000 for most laggard adopters like Georgia. 
 As for initial adoptions over time, the set of conditions differ from earlier versus later adopters. 
Leading initial adopters are influenced by a more narrow set of conditions than middle-of-the-pack or 
lagging initial adopters. Leading adopters, such as California or New York, are influenced by issue 
salience, political culture, regional considerations, national adoption rates, third-party certifiers, and the 
policy type. The California case demonstrates the qualitative significance of third-party-certifiers and 
policy design for adoption decisions. In addition, issue salience is identified as being more of an in-state 
or regional condition. For middle-of-the-pack adopters, those adoptions from 1985-1990, adoptions are 
also influenced by issue salience, political culture, and regional considerations but are also influenced by 
a decline in state legislature professionalism. Assessing the influence of third-party certifiers or policy 
type is limited as no case study focused on a state that adopted during this time period. Lastly, lagging 
state adopters had a differing set of conditions that influenced initial adoption.  Similar to previous 
adopters, regional considerations and issue salience played role but federal adoption, federal 
implementation, and higher per capita wealth also mattered. From the Georgia case study, there is 
evidence to suggest the significance of the organic industry, but not a third-party certifier that was 
persuasive in the process. Also, there is little evidence to suggest that policy type was any significant 
debate, but there is some evidence to suggest that lawmakers already knew the policy design proposed 
would work for the state. This could mean that, by 2000, the third-party of co-regulatory approach 
pioneered by California and adopted by the federal government had established a norm and diminished 
the risk associated with developing the policy itself. Moreover, with diminished risk in adopting 
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innovative policy, the possibility therein lies more clear perception for how to implement the policy and 
make existing administrative structures work for the new policy. 
 Amending adoptions mimic a similar pattern to initial adoption overtime, but there is one key 
difference between the two.  Most amending adoptions occurred after the passage of the Organic Food 
Productions Act of 1990. This means that vertical pressures on diffusion were influencing or present as 
states were amending state statutes. For early amending adoptions, or those before 1990, are influenced 
by far fewer conditions than later amending adoption. From the statistical results, higher per capita wealth 
and decreasing agricultural GDP were more likely to lead to amendments of existing statutes. However, 
neither of these conditions appeared significant to California’s amending adoption in 1982. Instead, a 
sunset provision in the 1979 law led to a reauthorization of the bill. Wealth may have played a factor, but 
there was no discussion about declining agricultural economic activity. This latter factor may be more of 
a coincidence than powerful predictor or cause.  
 For amending adoptions after 1990, there is a wider range of significant factors including federal 
implementation, issue salience, vegetable sales, and the percentage of states, regionally and nationally, 
that had enacted state organic statues. Both case studies indicate adjustments to existing state statutes to 
accommodate for federal implementation in 2002. Furthermore, both states demonstrate consideration for 
how vegetable production is significant to the state economy. However, both cases also demonstrate how 
other economic and political factors may result in amending adoptions. In California, several amending 
adoptions pushed the boundaries for organic food and agriculture policy to clearly address organic 
cosmetics, aquaculture, and organic fertilizer inputs. In Georgia, bi-partisan politics resulted in the 
increase of registration fee in 2009. In sum, the cases point to a number of additional factors that promote 
modifications to existing policy. 
Lessons Learned – Contribution to the Literature 
 There are both theoretical and practical implications to be derived from the results of this 
research. The intent is to develop both a comprehensive overview of organic food and agriculture policy 
in U.S. states and to further scholarly understanding of how and why policy diffusion occurs.  
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Practical or Applied Contributions (Policy Implications) 
 From an applied standpoint, this study has provided clarity to our understanding of organic food 
and agriculture policy in two ways. First, this study details the historical development of organic food and 
agriculture legislation in U.S. No other previous study has identified the difference between state 
legislation and administrative rules. Furthermore, many other historical overviews and academic research 
missed key state adoptions such as New York. This historical background can serve as a basis for further 
constructing our understanding of the development and significance of organic food and agriculture 
policy in the U.S. In addition, without this historical background, solutions to addressing current 
challenges in the market and dilemmas facing the implementation of the National Organic program may 
not be addressing historical considerations.  
As a secondary contribution, the historical evidence does shed some light on why there is regional 
variation in certified organic production and why the organic market may be diminished as other food 
labeling schemes emerge. Specifically, the regional effects suggest the Southeast is laggard compared to 
other areas of the country.  The political and socio-economic conditions in the Southeast are not 
necessarily receptive to the passage of organic legislation or the promotion of the organic market. As a 
generally conservative area, organics were once and may still be perceived as a “California thing.” In 
addition, there may be stronghold of conventional agriculture research and development in the region, as 
well. Despite the hostile conditions to developing organic policy, the states in the Southeast may be more 
willing to pursue local food programs. In terms of issue salience, local food was one of several emerging 
food trends that increased in prominence as organic food salience peaked and began to decline. The 
Southeast may have been reluctant to pursue organic policy for a number of reasons but more open to 
accepting to the idea of local food promotion.  
Aside from the regional-bias of the Southeast, the emergence increasing attention to other food 
labeling schemes and programs may diminish the significance of organic foods in the market. 
Specifically, increasing attention on local foods, similar to that in the Southeast, and community-based 
agriculture appears to be swaying attention away from organics towards newer innovative ideas. Indeed, 
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policymakers in Kentucky replaced organic food statutes with a Kentucky Proud local food program. 
Many other states now have local food programs in place; some coinciding with or replacing organic food 
regulations, and several propositions have been made to address labeling of products that contain 
genetically modified organisms. While market sales for organic products still grows, there is the potential 
threat of infringement of other food labeling schemes luring customers away from organic goods.   
How then could organic remain relevant in the ever competitive food market?  In addition, is 
there any potential for the certified organic market to expand and become relevant in the Southeast? It is 
hard to say with precise certainty. If the evidence from Georgia holds true, local food programs could be a 
“gateway marketing label” for consumers in the Southeast to explore other alternative food production 
systems. Consumer exploration into where their food is sourced and how it’s grown may contribute to 
growing curiosity in organic, natural, fair trade, or non-GMO products. Yet criticism of the organic 
market goes beyond preconceived notions of it being a “California thing.” On a national scale, the 
standards and cost associated with becoming certified organic through the NOP may not be worth the 
investment for some growers and producers. There may be more value in seeking local, fair trade or non-
GMO certification to serve different consumer markets. While it is not the intentions of this analysis to 
diverge into the development of the organic prohibited substance list or other organic standards, there 
remains debate in the scientific community about the safe application of some non-synthetic materials on 
organic agriculture. Furthermore, there are significant debates concerning the true environmental 
sustainability of the organic food production system and if the current practices create a holistic approach 
to managing land and livestock. Therefore, if organic growers and producers seek to remain relevant, it 
may be wise to reassess the standards currently in place and to also consider dovetailing with other 
alternative food markets. Organic food sits at the nexus of both environmental and health concerns and, 
broadly speaking, existing policy may be stretching to serve both concerns simultaneously. The historical 
development of organic policy in the U.S. suggests that the design and standards were predominantly set 
by organic fruit and vegetable growers in the 1970s centered in the Far West and Northeast. Dissenting 
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opinions or opinions outside of these regions may have largely been ignored in the process thereby 
leading to current production patterns. 
Theoretical Contributions 
 In addition to the practical contribution, this research aimed to improve upon the policy diffusion 
literature in four ways. First, this research sought to incorporate how policy typology may shift overtime 
and how it could impact policy diffusion. Second, this analysis sought to account for how federal 
intervention in a policy may alter state policy adoption decisions and policy trajectories. Third, and 
perhaps most importantly, an enhanced unified model of diffusion was formulated and tested that 
incorporated the aforementioned improvements and elements of two unified policy diffusion models 
presented in the literature. Finally, this research used a mixed-methods approach to ensure that both 
breadth and depth were included in the assessment of diffusion. 
 So what are the lessons learned from this study?  How does this research improve our 
understanding of policy diffusion? The four improvements outlined above led to the development and 
testing of an enhanced policy diffusion model that can improve our understanding of policy diffusion in 
several ways. First, the enhanced unified model developed in this analysis can confirm previous findings 
while also incorporating additional variables from the public policy process literature. In particular, the 
results suggest model components of both Berry and Berry’s (2007) policy diffusion model and 
Boushey’s (2010) contagion policy diffusion model can be evaluated in the same analysis. In addition, the 
application of the enhanced unified model to explain organic food and agriculture legislation demonstrate 
the significance of certain factors. For example, the analysis confirms political culture, issue salience, and 
wealth are statistically significant predictors of policy. While wealth and issue salience have been 
relatively consistent predictors of diffusion, determining what political conditions matter most has been 
more difficult for scholars. Political culture has been used by some and appears to be relatively constant 
predictor including for organic food and agriculture legislation. The significance of political culture to 
diffusion may relate to its consistency overtime. In other words, while party politics and partisanships 
shifts overtime, political culture addresses the undertones and historical political attitude of each state.  
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 Aside from the confirmation of previous policy diffusion findings, the enhanced unified model 
also points to the significance of incorporating non-statistically measured variables, such as third-party 
certifiers, and endogenous variables including existing policy and policy type. As further discussed 
below, incorporating qualitative assessments of particular variables may lead to new discoveries for how 
policy diffusion occurs. For example, the presence of organic certifiers not only demonstrated the 
significance of these policy actors in promoting legislation but also how ideas spread regionally and 
across the nation. This was particularly evident with CCOF and its interaction with WACO and NOFA. 
Endogenous variables, specifically existing policy and policy type, also benefit from qualitative 
assessments and are a significant contribution to understanding policy diffusion. As demonstrated through 
the evidence, both policy type and existing policy, which taps into the step of implementation, is 
influenced by other independent variables while contributing to adoption decisions. The regulatory policy 
design must have been such that the perceived risk in adopting organic policy was not insurmountable. In 
addition, the establishment of policy did act as a restraint in modifying the third-party certification 
scheme and more than likely acted as a cue, once established, for adoption in other states by reducing the 
risk associated with adoption. 
 A second lesson to be derived is that the policy diffusion model developed can address both long- 
and short-term time frame of policy diffusion. A key point of Boushey’s (2010) contagion model is to 
address rapid and sudden adoptions. However, he may have been overlooking a key aspect of 
epidemiology by not allotting specific consideration for outliers over time. While there may be rapid and 
sudden change, there can also be a gradual accumulation of adoption frequencies prior and after an 
adoption outbreak with the outliers influenced by a similar yet different set of conditions. These outlying 
adopters may contribute to policy learning and evolution of policy over time. Likewise, the s-curve based 
analysis may fail to determine why there is a dramatic and rapid increase in adoption during a short-time 
period. This research assessed both long- and short-term timeframes for which policy diffusion can occur. 
In turn, the analysis can quantitatively and qualitatively determine what factors are robust explanations 
over time and what factors are time and adoption-type specific. The conditions that impacted initial state 
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adopters of the 1970s are not comprehensively the same as initial state adopters for the next 30 years. 
Similarly, amending adoptions are influenced by a comparable yet different set of factors than initial state 
adoptions.  
Only certain variables, including wealth, issue salience and regional effects, appear to be robust 
explanations over the 35-year analysis for each type of adoption analyzed. Other variables, such as 
political culture, partisan control, presence of third-party certifiers and vegetable sales, are time and 
adoption-type specific. For example, state legislature professionalism was the only statistically significant 
for adopters from 1985-1990 beyond other robust explanations. During this period of rapid adoption, 
particularly in 1989 and 1990, state legislature professionalism combined with the factors of wealth, issue 
salience, regional pressures, and political culture influenced first time state adopters. Similar scenarios 
exist for amending adoptions. In turn, the argument can clearly be made that the diffusion of policy 
innovations is reliant on both consistent predictor variables and time- and adoption-type specific 
conditions. This finding partially supports Gray’s claim that innovativeness is time and issue-specific at 
best. Timing of adoptions matter when considering the dynamic conditions that may influence state 
decision-making at any given moment. 
 A third lesson to be derived from this study is the significance of federalism and 
intergovernmental relations as it relates to diffusion patterns. The benefit of a longer-time frame of 
analysis goes beyond just the evaluation of rapid versus gradual rates of diffusion. A longer window of 
time allows for a complete picture for how federal adoption and implementation may alter state policy 
decisions. Moreover, the inclusion of both federal adoption and federal implementation also allows for a 
more comprehensive assessment for the state-federal interaction during policy diffusion. Had this study 
only focused on state legislative adoptions from 1985-1991, an incorrect assumption could be made about 
the effect of federal adoption on initial state adoptions of organic food and agriculture legislation. The 
perception would be that federal adoption in 1990 deterred first-time state adopters but spurred 
adjustments in a number of states the following year. This assumption would be incorrect.  
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Instead, this research demonstrates a complex, and, at time, tense federal-state interaction. 
Uncertainty over federal adoption and implementation spurred state policy action in the 1990s. In 1990, 
states may have been pursuing organic legislation as there was no guarantee law would pass at the federal 
level. Even after passage, the twelve year delay in federal implementation also created uncertainty and 
skepticism in the ability of rule development. The delayed establishment of the National Organic 
Standards Board until 1992 and the controversial 1997 proposed rules are two specific events that 
contributed to the overall skepticism and uncertainty. Perhaps this is why most states maintained their 
organic state statutes after implementation in 2002. The maintenance of state policy could be used to 
expand or improve upon policy standards set forth at the federal level. While California is a unique case, 
state lawmakers used state legislation in 2005 and 2010 to address perceived gaps in federal standards. In 
sum, policy diffusion studies that focus on U.S. states should consider the long-term dynamics of 
federalism as it relates to policy development by including both federal adoptions and implementation as 
significant vertical dimension factors. In essence, state-federal relationships have fluctuated overtime and 
it critical to assess how state respond and drive policy decisions at the federal level. 
As a fourth and final lesson, the policy diffusion model presented here demonstrates that adoption 
of innovative policies is inherently dependent on other endogenous policy conditions including the policy 
type and the previous establishment of policy. One critical shortcoming of previous models is to 
incorporate the perception of risk in adopting new policies and using the policy typologies identified by 
Lowi (1972) to determine how “policy dictates politics.” The pursuance of a new policy involves careful 
consideration for existing structure and capability to implement it and if the design of the policy is 
amenable to political conditions of a given state. Additionally, once a policy is passed there may only be 
incremental ability overtime to adjust the design of the policy to accommodate for learning. For example, 
the co-regulatory, third-party certifier policy design was implemented in California in 1979 with 
significant overhauls in 1990 and 2002. The co-regulatory design was the result of the political and 
economic conditions of the late 1970s. Yet, even as time passed, the only changes in design that occurred 
were mandating registration. Drastic departure to a more coercive, state-implemented approach was not 
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discussed as an option as the political conditions would not allow for such a design. Therefore, the model 
developed and tested in this dissertation can help to assess how learning occurs overtime but how 
innovative policies evolve by accounting for the interdependent relationship between policy adoption, 
existing policy, and policy typology.  
Missed Cues? Future Directions for Research 
 The results of this research point to additional directions for future policy diffusion research and 
the examination of organic food and agriculture policy in the U.S. Four areas for future research include 
the consideration of administrative rules, examination of other policy areas, the potential life cycle of 
innovative policies, and the role of the universities in promoting innovative ideas. Each new direction 
may increase the complexity of policy diffusion. However, each new direction may hold promising 
explanations for policy diffusion causes and patterns of adoption. 
The Role of Administrative Rules 
 This analysis looked at the diffusion of organic food and agriculture policy from the perspective 
of legislative adoptions. Administrative rules are considered another form of policymaking. While 
administrative rules and legislation may share some similarities, each has different processes, norms, and 
set of actors that may engage in policymaking. The significance of administrative rules arises as some 
states may delegate broad or specified policymaking power to administrative agencies. The history of 
organic food and agriculture legislation found that some states passed administrative rules prior to 
adopting legislation while other states passed administrative rules but no legislation.  
Four states, Massachusetts, Ohio, Rhode Island and Utah, are known to have organic food and 
agriculture administrative rules but have never passed organic legislation. Oregon and Texas are two 
states that are known to have state administrative agencies develop organic administrative rules prior to 
legislation. In Oregon, administrative rules were developed under a broad delegation of authority to 
regulate food labeling in 1973. Sixteen years later the Oregon state legislature would pass a bill that 
specified the delegation of organic rule-making power. In Texas, the response of the state legislature was 
quicker. In 1988, the Texas Department of Agriculture implemented its own organic certification 
234 
 
program. A year later, the state legislature responded by limiting the fees that could be collected for the 
program and designated how the monies could be used. In the case of Oregon and Texas, the response by 
state legislators appears as an oversight mechanism on administration.  
 Several questions arise regarding the effect on policy diffusion. First, what is the interaction 
between administrative rules and legislation in the policy diffusion process? Specifically, does the 
development of administrative rules increase or decrease the likelihood of legislative adoption? Second, 
what factor(s) can explain the differences among states regarding the development of administrative rules 
prior to legislation? While several states’ administrative agencies undertake organic rule-making under 
broad delegation of policymaking power, 36 states that adopted organic legislation do not. What makes 
Georgia and California different than Oregon or Massachusetts? Third, if administrative rules matter in 
the policy diffusion process, does the quality or detail of the rules matter? Most state organic legislation 
was not as detailed as California’s 1990 or 2002 bills. Most state bills delegated development of rules and 
standards to administrative agencies. Therefore, how does the quality and detail of the rules impact 
diffusion both within a state and among states? Finally, what is the effect of federal policy, including 
legislation and administrative rules, on state policymaking? Proposed Federal Trade Commission Rules in 
1979 were considered in the California debate. Do the NOP rules implemented in 2002 have a similar 
effect? All of these questions may improve our understanding of how states’ administrative rules 
contribution to the development of policy over time. 
Other Policy Areas 
 A notable exclusion from the policy diffusion model developed in this dissertation is the variable 
of other policies. The exclusion of analyzing other policies related to organic food and agriculture was an 
intentional methodological choice. Developing a comprehensive history of organic food and agriculture 
legislation in U.S. states is more important to construct prior to identifying similar issue areas. Identifying 
other similar issue areas to organic before this analysis may have been near impossible. Even Sam Farr 
suggested difficulty and awkwardness in defining organic. “Is this organic thing a health movement? Is it 
like vitamin supplements or something like that? Is it really agriculture in the traditional way? (Farr 
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2013)” Furthermore, the development of organic policy in California coincided with the passage of 
Proposition 65, a referendum measure that seeks to eliminate exposure to toxic and cancer-causing 
substances. Based on the evidence, organic food and agriculture sits at the nexus of health and 
environmental concerns broadly defined. Organic food and agriculture may be better for the environment 
while improving human health. It is both a food and agriculture topic that ties into food safety, chemical 
exposure, better land stewardship, and potentially better quality food. Reinserting the other policies 
variable into the policy diffusion model can help to determine how other issue areas may pre-empt 
discussions about organic food and agriculture. Other policy areas may provide an administrative 
framework and capability to implement a policy such as organic. Similarly, examining other issue areas 
may help to gauge government support for public health and environmental policies. It may be that states 
that already aggressively pursued both public health and environmental policies would be more likely to 
pursue organic food and agriculture policy, as well. 
Innovation and the University 
 The California and Georgia case studies shared one similarity that was not expected to be a factor 
in promoting or inhibiting organic food and agriculture production. Both cases cited the role of 
universities for influencing agricultural perspectives in the state. In California, the University of 
California-Santa Cruz played an instrumental role in supporting organic agriculture research and 
development. Today, the Center for Agroecology and Sustainable Food System at the University of 
California-Santa Cruz is a world renowned educational center focusing on sustainable agriculture. 
Conversely, the University of Georgia is cited as receiving more support from conventional agricultural 
interest than support organic research and development. Could it be that university-based research and 
development is key to fostering support for organic or sustainable food systems? If more money is 
prioritized for conventional agriculture research in state university systems, would adoption of organic 
food and agriculture legislation be less likely? Incorporating the role of university research may be a 




The Life Cycle of Innovative Policies 
 One discussion in the policy diffusion literature is determining where one innovative ends and 
another begins. If policies are being improved because states are learning, how can we tell when 
substantive modifications to an existing policy transforms into a newer innovative policy? In assessing 
the issue salience measure, it is observed that the decline of organic issue salience coincided with an 
increasing discussion of local and community-based agriculture. Fair trade and non-GMO foods were also 
present, but organic food is often criticized and compared in light to local and community-based 
agriculture. This phenomenon may not be anything more than explaining transitions in food fads, but 
there is a slow decline of enacted state organic food and agriculture statutes. This begs the question on if 
there is a life cycle of innovative policies? Are new ideas crafted and implemented only to be terminated 
once no longer relevant? Furthermore, can a new innovation in a similar issue area replace an older 
innovative policy? Kentucky is one state that replaced organic state statutory language with a local food 
program in 2010. If there is a life cycle of innovative policies, this could help to explain why certified 
organic is facing competition in the market. 
Concluding Remarks 
 This dissertation set out to answer the question of why do some states adopt food and agriculture 
legislation while others do not? The intention was to improve the policy diffusion literature while also 
providing the background necessary to resolve contemporary challenges facing implementation of organic 
policy and arising in the food market.  An enhanced unified policy diffusion model was developed and 
used to assess the diffusion of organic food and agriculture legislation in U.S. The results suggest the 
policy diffusion model tested provides a more comprehensive understanding of how diffusion occurs. 
Time of adoption and adoption type will dictate what variables matter most in state adoption decisions, 
but there are certain conditions that are consistently significant over time and regardless of adoption type. 
The strength of the findings not only results from the policy diffusion model design, but the methods 
utilized. The mixed-methods approach allowed for identifying variables that could not be statistically 
measured, but were crucial to understanding how and why organic food and agriculture legislation was 
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adopted by 38 states even as federal adoption and implementation of organic legislation occurred. There 
are a number of additional directions for future research that can only enhance our understanding of 
policy diffusion and the diffusion of organic food and agriculture policy. Policy diffusion is a complex 
phenomenon, and this dissertation marks only the first step towards answering larger questions about the 
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Appendix A – Adopting and Non-Adopting States 
 
State and Initial Amending Adoptions in Chronological Order 
State Region 
Date of Initial 
Adoption 
Date(s) of Amending Adoptions 
New York 7 – Northeast  1976  
California 1 – Far West 1979 1982, 1990, 1991, 1992, 1993, 1994, 1995, 1996, 
1997, 1998, 1999, 2002, 2003, 2005, 2009, 2010 
Connecticut 7 – Northeast  1979 1980, 1981, 1998, 2002 
Maine 7 – Northeast 1979 1985, 1989, 1991, 2003 
Minnesota 4 – North Central 1985 1988, 1990, 1996, 1997, 1999, 2003, 2005, 2009 






7 – Northeast  1985 1986, 1991, 2002, 2003 
Washington 1 – Far West 1985 1987, 1989, 1992, 1995, 1997, 2002, 2010 
Nebraska 4 – North Central 1986  
North Dakota 4 – North Central 1987 1991, 2003, 2009 
Iowa 4 – North Central 1988 1989 
South Dakota 4 – North Central 1988 2003 
Wisconsin 4 – North Central 1988  
Alaska 1 – Far West 1989 1998, 2003 
Colorado 2 – Rocky 
Mountain 
1989 
1993, 2002, 2005, 2009, 2010 
Louisiana 3 – Southwest  1989  
Oklahoma 3 – Southwest  1989 2000, 2003 
Oregon* 1 – Far West  1989 1991, 2001 
Texas* 3 – Southwest  1989 1991, 1993, 1995, 1997, 2001, 2003, 2007 
Florida 5 – Southeast 1990 1994, 1995, 2001 
Idaho 2 – Rocky 
Mountain 
1990 
1991, 1994, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2007 
Kentucky 5 – Southeast 1990 1994, 1996, 2000, 2002, 2008 





Date of Initial 
Adoption 
Date(s) of Amending Adoptions 
New Mexico 2 – Rocky 
Mountain 
1990 
1993, 2001, 2004 
Vermont 7 – Northeast  1990 2003 
Virginia 6 – Mid-Atlantic 1990 2001, 2003 
Arizona 2 – Rocky 
Mountain 
1992 1994, 1996, 1997, 2000, 2002 
Indiana 4 – North Central 1993 2006, 2008 
North Carolina 5 – Southeast 1993  
Pennsylvania 6 – Mid-Atlantic 1994 2010 
Nevada 1 – Far West 1997 2003 
Georgia 5 – Southeast  2000 2001, 2002, 2010 
Michigan 4 – North Central 2000 2006 
Mississippi 5 – Southeast 2000 2003, 2004 
Missouri 4 – North Central 2000 2002 
New Jersey 6 – Mid-Atlantic 2003  
Illinois 4 – North Central 2007  
Wyoming 2 – Rocky 
Mountain 
2009  





State Region State Region 
Alabama 5 – Southeast Ohio* 4 – North Central 
Arkansas 3 – Southwest Rhode Island* 7 – Northeast 
Delaware 6 – Mid-Atlantic South Carolina 5 – Southeast 
Hawaii 1 – Far West Tennessee 5 – Southeast 
Kansas 4 – North Central Utah* 2 – Rocky Mountain 
Massachusetts* 7 – Northeast West Virginia 6 – Mid-Atlantic 
*States known to have adopted administrative rules. 
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Appendix B – Correlations 
 
 
statenum year adopt iadopt aadopt fedadopt fedimpl salience logsali pcwealth logpcw stlegp~f sharkc~s 
statenum 1.00 
            year 0.00 1.00 
           adopt -0.08 0.11 1.00 
          iadopt 0.00 -0.03 0.49 1.00 
         aadopt -0.09 0.15 0.85 -0.04 1.00 
        fedadopt 0.00 0.36 0.12 0.03 0.11 1.00 
       fedimpl 0.00 0.76 0.05 -0.06 0.10 0.30 1.00 
      salience 0.00 0.84 0.04 -0.04 0.07 0.28 0.82 1.00 
     logsali 0.00 0.93 0.13 0.00 0.14 0.38 0.67 0.82 1.00 
    pcwealth -0.04 0.94 0.10 -0.03 0.13 0.34 0.75 0.83 0.87 1.00 
   logpcw -0.04 0.95 0.12 -0.02 0.15 0.36 0.66 0.75 0.89 0.96 1.00 
  stlegprof -0.15 -0.08 0.06 0.00 0.07 -0.04 -0.05 -0.06 -0.08 0.06 0.05 1.00 
 sharkculmeas -0.17 0.00 -0.09 -0.02 -0.08 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.10 -0.09 -0.15 1.00 
parcont -0.10 -0.24 -0.01 0.03 -0.02 -0.11 -0.13 -0.14 -0.22 -0.21 -0.25 0.08 0.32 
dividedgov -0.02 0.04 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.04 0.00 0.00 0.05 0.08 0.10 0.15 -0.16 
peraggdp 0.01 -0.02 -0.01 0.00 -0.01 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.01 0.00 0.01 -0.01 
logpagdp 0.15 0.16 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.08 0.09 0.13 0.17 0.01 0.05 -0.14 0.00 
fruper -0.12 0.03 0.11 -0.01 0.13 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.13 0.12 0.44 -0.10 
logfru -0.06 0.14 0.13 0.00 0.15 0.05 0.11 0.12 0.13 0.17 0.16 0.51 0.02 
vegper -0.18 0.19 0.08 -0.01 0.10 0.06 0.18 0.18 0.17 0.21 0.20 0.15 -0.10 
logveg -0.19 0.36 0.18 0.00 0.21 0.14 0.30 0.31 0.33 0.38 0.38 0.48 0.02 
natiadoptper 0.00 0.96 0.14 -0.01 0.17 0.42 0.61 0.73 0.95 0.88 0.92 -0.09 0.00 
regiadoptper 0.00 0.85 0.19 0.03 0.20 0.37 0.55 0.65 0.84 0.80 0.84 0.00 -0.19 
natexistper 0.00 0.92 0.15 -0.01 0.17 0.43 0.52 0.65 0.92 0.84 0.90 -0.09 0.00 
regexistper -0.01 0.79 0.20 0.04 0.21 0.37 0.45 0.56 0.79 0.72 0.79 -0.01 -0.19 
ar71 -0.10 0.00 0.10 0.01 0.11 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.07 0.08 0.23 -0.10 
ar72 -0.03 0.00 0.04 0.01 0.04 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.06 -0.05 -0.22 -0.22 
ar73 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.07 -0.06 -0.07 0.35 
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  statenum year adopt iadopt aadopt fedadopt fedimpl salience logsali pcwealth logpcw stlegp~f sharkc~s 
ar74 0.02 0.00 -0.03 0.01 -0.04 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.01 0.00 0.11 -0.31 
ar75 -0.11 0.00 -0.03 -0.01 -0.03 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.10 -0.10 -0.17 0.57 
ar76 0.16 0.00 -0.05 -0.01 -0.05 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.07 0.06 0.02 0.17 





  parcont divide~v peraggdp logpagdp fruper logfru vegper logveg natiad~r regiad~r natexi~r regexi~r ar71 
parcont 1.00 
            dividedgov -0.25 1.00 
           peraggdp -0.01 0.02 1.00 
          logpagdp -0.04 -0.01 -0.02 1.00 
         fruper 0.14 -0.05 0.02 -0.01 1.00 
        logfru 0.16 -0.04 0.01 0.04 0.62 1.00 
       vegper -0.09 -0.05 0.04 0.05 0.31 0.26 1.00 
      logveg 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.03 0.41 0.81 0.43 1.00 
     natiadoptper -0.25 0.06 -0.03 0.18 0.04 0.13 0.17 0.34 1.00 
    regiadoptper -0.26 0.07 -0.04 0.14 0.13 0.12 0.16 0.26 0.89 1.00 
   natexistper -0.25 0.07 -0.02 0.18 0.04 0.13 0.15 0.32 0.99 0.88 1.00 
  regexistper -0.28 0.07 -0.04 0.15 0.09 0.09 0.15 0.24 0.85 0.98 0.86 1.00 
 ar71 0.08 0.06 -0.01 0.01 0.48 0.11 0.13 0.13 0.00 0.13 0.00 0.12 1.00 
ar72 -0.19 0.02 -0.01 0.25 -0.16 -0.12 0.14 -0.05 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.04 -0.15 
ar73 0.15 -0.08 -0.01 -0.05 -0.16 0.00 -0.12 -0.01 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.05 -0.11 
ar74 -0.25 0.07 -0.01 -0.08 -0.25 -0.17 -0.18 -0.04 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.04 -0.20 
ar75 0.17 -0.12 -0.01 0.11 -0.02 0.09 -0.04 0.12 0.00 -0.22 0.00 -0.23 -0.17 
ar76 0.10 -0.05 0.06 -0.08 -0.02 0.07 0.03 0.00 0.00 -0.15 0.00 -0.17 -0.14 






  ar72 ar73 ar74 ar75 ar76 ar77 
ar72 1.00 
     ar73 -0.12 1.00 
    ar74 -0.22 -0.16 1.00 
   ar75 -0.18 -0.13 -0.24 1.00 
  ar76 -0.15 -0.11 -0.20 -0.17 1.00 




Appendix C – State Year Bivariate Logistic Regressions 
 
Number of obs = 1750 
    Number of groups =  50 
 
Wald chi2(1) = 23.14 
Log likelihood = -458.5405 
 
Prob > chi2 = 0 
adopt Coef. Std. Err.  z P>|z| [95% Conf. Interval] 
fedadopt 0.9249205 0.1922881 4.81 0 0.5480427 1.301798 
_cons -3.093189 0.2133095 -14.5 0 -3.511268 -2.67511 
/lnsig2u 0.1055821 0.34395     -0.5685474 0.7797117 
sigma_u 1.054209 0.1812976 
  
0.7525606 1.476768 
rho 0.2525109 0.0649203 
  
0.1468661 0.3986398 
       Number of obs = 1750 
    Number of groups =  50 
 
Wald chi2(1) = 4.87 
Log likelihood = -467.1589 
 
Prob > chi2 = 0.0273 
adopt Coef. Std. Err.  z P>|z| [95% Conf. Interval] 
fedimpl 0.4304861 0.1949821 2.21 0.027 0.0483281 0.8126441 
_cons -2.933781 0.20705 -14.17 0 -3.339591 -2.52797 
/lnsig2u  .0678707   .3455876      -.6094685    .7452099 
sigma_u 1.034518 0.1787582 
  
0.7373193 1.451511 
rho 0.2454595 0.064006 
  
0.1418126 0.3903985 
       Number of obs = 1750 
    Number of groups =  50 
 
Wald chi2(1) = 3.31 
Log likelihood = -467.9374 
 
Prob > chi2 = 0.0689 
adopt Coef. Std. Err.  z P>|z| [95% Conf. Interval] 
salience 0.0041719 0.0022937 1.82 0.069 -0.0003236 0.0086674 
_cons -2.948317 0.2135732 -13.8 0 -3.366913 -2.529721 
/lnsig2u 0.0647664 0.345734     -0.6128599 0.7423926 
sigma_u 1.032913 0.1785566 
  
0.7360701 1.449468 
rho 0.244885 0.0639319 
  
0.1414004 0.3897282 
       Number of obs = 1750 
    Number of groups =  50 
 
Wald chi2(1) = 26.19 
Log likelihood = -454.8506 
 
Prob > chi2 = 0 
adopt Coef. Std. Err.  z P>|z| [95% Conf. Interval] 
logsali 0.3458765 0.0675842 5.12 0 0.213414 0.4783391 
_cons -3.814476 0.2955155 -12.91 0 -4.393675 -3.235276 
/lnsig2u 0.1151116 0.3433188     -0.557781 0.7880042 
sigma_u 1.059244 0.1818293 
  
0.7566228 1.482904 
rho 0.2543138 0.0651064 
  
0.1482203 0.4006294 
       
267 
 
Number of obs = 1750 
    Number of groups =  50 
 
Wald chi2(1) = 14.48 
Log likelihood = -462.2154 
 
Prob > chi2 = 0.0001 
adopt Coef. Std. Err.  z P>|z| [95% Conf. Interval] 
pcwealth 0.000033 8.66E-06 3.81 0 0.000016 0.0000499 
_cons -3.575731 0.2922383 -12.24 0 -4.148507 -3.002954 
/lnsig2u 0.0589633 0.3471987     -0.6215336 0.7394602 
sigma_u 1.029921 0.1787935 
  
0.7328848 1.447344 
rho 0.2438135 0.0640125 
  
0.1403506 0.389031 
       Number of obs = 1750 
    Number of groups =  50 
 
Wald chi2(1) = 22.97 
Log likelihood = -456.7535 
 
Prob > chi2 = 0 
adopt Coef. Std. Err.  z P>|z| [95% Conf. Interval] 
logpcw 0.9462033 0.1974308 4.79 0 0.559246 1.333161 
_cons -12.23461 1.99727 -6.13 0 -16.14919 -8.320032 
/lnsig2u 0.0723516 0.3468786     -0.6075179 0.7522211 
sigma_u 1.036838 0.1798285 
  
0.7380388 1.456608 
rho 0.2462904 0.0643916 
  
0.1420502 0.3920683 
       Number of obs = 1750 
    Number of groups =  50 
 
Wald chi2(1) = 0.17 
Log likelihood = -469.4262 
 
Prob > chi2 = 0.6844 
adopt Coef. Std. Err.  z P>|z| [95% Conf. Interval] 
stlegprof 
-
0.5997559 1.475299 -0.41 0.684 -3.491289 2.291778 
_cons -2.696596 0.3318077 -8.13 0 -3.346927 -2.046265 
/lnsig2u 0.099468 0.3593431     -0.6048316 0.8037676 
sigma_u 1.050991 0.1888333 
  
0.7390307 1.494638 
rho 0.2513586 0.0676203 
  
0.1423779 0.4044205 
       Number of obs = 1750 
    Number of groups =  50 
 
Wald chi2(1) = 3.47 
Log likelihood = -467.7999 
 
Prob > chi2 = 0.0624 
adopt Coef. Std. Err.  z P>|z| [95% Conf. Interval] 
sharkcukmeas 
-
0.1275287 0.0684443 -1.86 0.062 -0.2616772 0.0066197 
_cons -2.160232 0.3764098 -5.74 0 -2.897981 -1.422482 
/lnsig2u -0.050082 0.3567296     -0.7492592 0.6490953 
sigma_u 0.9752699 0.1739538 
  
0.6875439 1.383405 
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Number of obs = 1750 
    Number of groups =  50 
 
Wald chi2(1) = 0.36 
Log likelihood = -464.2214 
 
Prob > chi2 = 0.5493 
adopt Coef. Std. Err.  z P>|z| [95% Conf. Interval] 
parcont 
-
0.0973004 0.1624868 -0.6 0.549 -0.4157686 0.2211679 
_cons -2.779756 0.1990584 -13.96 0 -3.169903 -2.389608 
/lnsig2u 0.0711031 0.3497518     -0.6143979 0.7566041 
sigma_u 1.036191 0.1812049 
  
0.7355043 1.459804 
rho 0.2460587 0.0648838 
  
0.1412138 0.3931135 
       Number of obs = 1750 
    Number of groups =  50 
 
Wald chi2(1) = 0.02 
Log likelihood = -464.3911 
 
Prob > chi2 = 0.8907 
adopt Coef. Std. Err.  z P>|z| [95% Conf. Interval] 
dividedgov 
-
0.0266393 0.1939305 -0.14 0.891 -0.4067361 0.3534574 
_cons -2.777749 0.2236378 0 -12.42 -3.216071 -2.339427 
/lnsig2u 0.0663339 0.3501132     -0.6198754 0.7525432 
sigma_u 1.033723 0.1809601 
  
0.7334927 1.456843 
rho 0.245175 0.0647934 
  
0.1405508 0.3921451 
       Number of obs = 1750 
    Number of groups =  50 
 
Wald chi2(1) = 3.13 
Log likelihood = -467.5982 
 
Prob > chi2 = 0.0768 
adopt Coef. Std. Err.  z P>|z| [95% Conf. Interval] 
peraggdp -11.27619 6.372249 -1.77 0.077 -23.76557 1.213186 
_cons -2.562974 0.2386438 -10.74 0 -3.030707 -2.095241 
/lnsig2u 0.1911753 0.3537356     -0.5021337 0.8844843 
sigma_u 1.100305 0.1946086 
  
0.7779704 1.556193 
rho 0.2690059 0.0695592 
  
0.1553842 0.4240027 
       Number of obs = 1750 
    Number of groups =  50 
 
Wald chi2(1) = 1.7 
Log likelihood = -468.7389 
 
Prob > chi2 = 0.1917 
adopt Coef. Std. Err.  z P>|z| [95% Conf. Interval] 
logperagdp 0.6693079 0.5126931 1.31 0.192 -0.335552 1.674168 
_cons -1.213483 1.229978 -0.99 0.324 -3.624195 1.197228 
/lnsig2u 0.0745353 0.3453381     -0.602315 0.7513855 
sigma_u 1.037971 0.1792254 
  
0.7399612 1.456 
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Number of obs = 1750 
    Number of groups =  50 
 
Wald chi2(1) = 4.05 
Log likelihood = -467.5789 
 
Prob > chi2 = 0.0441 
adopt Coef. Std. Err.  z P>|z| [95% Conf. Interval] 
fruper 3.800765 1.887854 2.01 0.044 0.1006397 7.50089 
_cons -2.969761 0.2138438 -13.89 0 -3.388887 -2.550635 
/lnsig2u 
-
0.0574726 0.3640078     -0.7709147 0.6559696 
sigma_u 0.9716727 0.1768482 
  
0.6801395 1.388168 
rho 0.2229911 0.0630702 
  
0.1232765 0.3693799 
       Number of obs = 1750 
    Number of groups =  50 
 
Wald chi2(1) = 9.52 
Log likelihood = -464.5142 
 
Prob > chi2 = 0.002 
adopt Coef. Std. Err.  z P>|z| [95% Conf. Interval] 
logfru 0.2036941 0.066003 3.09 0.002 0.0743306 0.3330576 
_cons -4.746962 0.6864519 -6.92 0 -6.092383 -3.401541 
/lnsig2u 
-
0.1181188 0.3831196     -0.8690194 0.6327818 
sigma_u 0.9426508 0.180574 
  
0.6475821 1.372167 
rho 0.2126599 0.0641479 
  
0.1130592 0.3639951 
       Number of obs = 1750 
    Number of groups =  50 
 
Wald chi2(1) = 0.55 
Log likelihood = -469.2540 
 
Prob > chi2 = 0.46 
adopt Coef. Std. Err.  z P>|z| [95% Conf. Interval] 
vegper 0.5219786 0.7065356 0.74 0.46 -0.8628057 1.906763 
_cons -2.825859 0.1952119 -14.48 0 -3.208467 -2.44325 
/lnsig2u 0.019445 0.3537618     -0.6739155 0.7128054 
sigma_u 1.00977 0.178609 
  
0.713939 1.428183 
rho 0.2366016 0.0638969 
  
0.1341489 0.3827146 
       Number of obs = 1750 
    Number of groups =  50 
 
Wald chi2(1) = 23.46 
Log likelihood = -458.0363 
 
Prob > chi2 = 0 
adopt Coef. Std. Err.  z P>|z| [95% Conf. Interval] 
logveg 0.321444 0.0663613 4.84 0 0.1913783 0.4515097 
_cons -6.1143 0.7360603 -8.31 0 -7.556951 -4.671648 
/lnsig2u -0.447899 0.4189018     -1.268932 0.3731332 
sigma_u 0.7993554 0.1674257 
  
0.5302186 1.205105 
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Number of obs = 1750 
    Number of groups =  50 
 
Wald chi2(1) = 32.18 
Log likelihood = -450.2776 
 
Prob > chi2 = 0 
adopt Coef. Std. Err.  z P>|z| [95% Conf. Interval] 
natiadoptper 2.287467 0.4032277 5.67 0 1.497155 3.077778 
_cons -3.981541 0.3065689 -12.99 0 -4.582405 -3.380677 
/lnsig2u 0.1308159 0.3424983     -0.5404684 0.8021001 
sigma_u 1.067594 0.1828246 
  
0.7632007 1.493392 
rho 0.2573034 0.0654509 
  
0.1504193 0.4040189 
       Number of obs = 1750 
    Number of groups =  50 
 
Wald chi2(1) = 48.6 
Log likelihood = -436.1279 
 
Prob > chi2 = 0 
adopt Coef. Std. Err.  z P>|z| [95% Conf. Interval] 
regiadoptper 3.018177 0.4329486 6.97 0 2.169613 3.866741 
_cons -4.437566 0.3354842 -13.23 0 -5.095103 -3.780029 
/lnsig2u 0.1048704 0.3481062     -0.5774053 0.787146 
sigma_u 1.053834 0.1834231 
  
0.749235 1.482268 
rho 0.2523766 0.0656816 
  
0.1457597 0.4004234 
       Number of obs = 1750 
    Number of groups =  50 
 
Wald chi2(1) = 35.9 
Log likelihood = -446.6899 
 
Prob > chi2 = 0 
adopt Coef. Std. Err.  z P>|z| [95% Conf. Interval] 
natexistper 2.790246 0.4656627 5.99 0 1.877564 3.702928 
_cons -4.171182 0.3251703 -12.83 0 -4.808504 -3.53386 
/lnsig2u 0.1426468 0.3418764     -0.5274187 0.8127123 
sigma_u 1.073928 0.1835754 
  
0.7681968 1.501337 
rho 0.2595708 0.0657065 
  
0.1520946 0.4065767 
       Number of obs = 1750 
    Number of groups =  50 
 
Wald chi2(1) = 53.58 
Log likelihood = -430.8658 
 
Prob > chi2 = 0 
adopt Coef. Std. Err.  z P>|z| [95% Conf. Interval] 
regexistper 3.4728 0.4744499 7.32 0 2.542895 4.402704 
_cons -4.612967 0.3514822 -13.12 0 -5.30186 -3.924075 
/lnsig2u 0.146065 0.346347     -0.5327627 0.8248927 
sigma_u 1.075765 0.1862941 
  
0.7661469 1.510508 
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Number of obs = 1750 
    Number of groups =  50 
 
Wald chi2(1) = 3.37 
Log likelihood = -467.8866 
 
Prob > chi2 = 0.0663 
adopt Coef. Std. Err.  z P>|z| [95% Conf. Interval] 
amsregion7 
-
0.1645645 0.0896011 -1.84 0.066 -0.3401794 0.0110504 
_cons -2.122815 0.39866 -5.32 0 -2.904175 -1.341456 
/lnsig2u -0.071929 0.3616713     -0.7807919 0.6369334 
sigma_u 0.9646744 0.1744475 
  
0.6767888 1.375018 
rho 0.2204963 0.0621632 
  
0.1222129 0.3649568 
      Number of obs = 1750 
    Number of groups =  50 
 
Wald chi2(1) = 2.72 
Log likelihood = -468.2191 
 
Prob > chi2 = 0.099 
adopt Coef. Std. Err.  z P>|z| [95% Conf. Interval] 
ar71 0.8267774 0.5012027 1.65 0.099 -0.1555619 1.809117 
_cons -2.894439 0.201992 -14.33 0 -3.290336 -2.498542 
/lnsig2u -0.053917 0.3598141     -0.7591399 0.6513053 
sigma_u 0.9734015 0.1751218 
  
0.6841556 1.384934 
rho 0.2236077 0.0624663 
  
0.1245547 0.3682941 
       Number of obs = 1750 
    Number of groups =  50 
 
Wald chi2(1) = 1.06 
Log likelihood = -468.9875 
 
Prob > chi2 = 0.3029 
adopt Coef. Std. Err.  z P>|z| [95% Conf. Interval] 
ar72 0.5075631 0.4926409 1.03 0.303 -0.4579954 1.473122 
_cons -2.877753 0.2097694 -13.72 0 -3.288893 -2.466613 
/lnsig2u 0.0275723 0.3472835     -0.6530908 0.7082354 
sigma_u 1.013882 0.1760522 
  
0.7214116 1.424923 
rho 0.2380727 0.0629952 
  
0.1365862 0.3816355 
       Number of obs = 1750 
    Number of groups =  50 
 
Wald chi2(1) = 0 
Log likelihood = -469.5114 
 
Prob > chi2 = 0.9798 
adopt Coef. Std. Err.  z P>|z| [95% Conf. Interval] 
ar73 0.0168466 0.6652637 0.03 0.98 -1.287046 1.320739 
_cons -2.807734 0.2025509 -13.86 0 -3.204727 -2.410742 
/lnsig2u 0.0581101 0.3460891     -0.620212 0.7364323 
sigma_u 1.029481 0.1781461 
  
0.7333692 1.445154 






      
272 
 
Number of obs = 1750 
    Number of groups =  50 
 
Wald chi2(1) = 0.53 
Log likelihood = -469.2477 
 
Prob > chi2 = 0.4663 
adopt Coef. Std. Err.  z P>|z| [95% Conf. Interval] 
ar74 -0.311129 0.427032 -0.73 0.466 -1.148095 0.5258395 
_cons -2.728855 0.2172015 -12.56 0 -3.154562 -2.303148 
/lnsig2u 0.0299443 0.3484735     -0.6530513 0.7129398 
sigma_u 1.015085 0.1768651 
  
0.7214259 1.428279 
rho 0.2385032 0.0632896 
  
0.1365908 0.3827463 
       Number of obs = 1750 
    Number of groups =  50 
 
Wald chi2(1) = 0.39 
Log likelihood = -469.3174 
 
Prob > chi2 = 0.5347 
adopt Coef. Std. Err.  z P>|z| [95% Conf. Interval] 
ar75 -0.313427 0.5047971 -0.62 0.535 -1.302811 0.6759569 
_cons -2.756652 0.2082859 -13.23 0 -3.164884 -2.348419 
/lnsig2u 0.0480833 0.3474697     -0.6329448 0.7291113 
sigma_u 1.024333 0.1779623 
  
0.7287151 1.439874 
rho 0.2418132 0.0637049 
  
0.1389795 0.386574 
       Number of obs = 1750 
    Number of groups =  50 
 
Wald chi2(1) = 1.06 
Log likelihood = -468.9749 
 
Prob > chi2 = 0.3026 
adopt Coef. Std. Err.  z P>|z| [95% Conf. Interval] 
ar76 -0.602041 0.5840105 -1.03 0.303 -1.746681 0.5425984 
_cons -2.732422 0.2019801 -13.53 0 -3.128296 -2.336549 
/lnsig2u 0.0156499 0.3503235     -0.6709715 0.7022713 
sigma_u 1.007856 0.1765378 
  
0.7149907 1.42068 
rho 0.2359168 0.0631493 
  
0.1344912 0.380229 
       Number of obs = 1750 
    Number of groups =  50 
 
Wald chi2(1) = 0.03 
Log likelihood = -469.4955 
 
Prob > chi2 = 0.8574 
adopt Coef. Std. Err.  z P>|z| [95% Conf. Interval] 
ar77 
-
0.0940062 0.5230884 -0.18 0.857 -1.119241 0.9312282 
_cons -2.793105 0.2084844 -13.4 0 -3.201727 -2.384484 
/lnsig2u 0.0568968 0.3463422     -0.6219214 0.735715 
sigma_u 1.028857 0.1781683 
  
0.7327427 1.444636 
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Number of obs = 1750 
    Number of groups =  50 
 
Wald chi2(1) = 1.65 
Log likelihood = -182.3387 
 
Prob > chi2 = 0.1992 
iadopt Coef. Std. Err.  z P>|z| [95% Conf. Interval] 
fedadopt 0.4542134 0.3537724 1.28 0.199 -0.2391677 1.147594 
_cons -3.930545 0.1980542 -19.85 0 -4.318724 -3.542366 
/lnsig2u -13.47885 26.17383     -64.77862 37.82091 
sigma_u 0.0011833 0.0154861 
  
8.58E-15 1.63E+08 
rho 4.26E-07 0.0000111 
  
2.24E-29 1 
      Number of obs = 1750 
    Number of groups =  50 
 
Wald chi2(1) = 5.5 
Log likelihood = -179.0635 
 
Prob > chi2 = 0.0191 
iadopt Coef. Std. Err.  z P>|z| [95% Conf. Interval] 
fedimpl -1.416458 0.6041618 -2.34 0.019 -2.600594 -0.232323 
_cons -3.587708 0.1713719 -20.94 0 -3.923591 -3.251826 
/lnsig2u -13.48032 26.17575     -64.78384 37.8232 
sigma_u 0.0011825 0.0154759 
  
8.56E-15 1.63E+08 
rho 4.25E-07 0.0000111 
  
2.23E-29 1 
       Number of obs = 1750 
    Number of groups =  50 
 
Wald chi2(1) = 2.47 
Log likelihood = -181.6216 
 
Prob > chi2 = 0.116 
iadopt Coef. Std. Err.  z P>|z| [95% Conf. Interval] 
salience -0.009279 0.0059029 -1.57 0.116 -0.0208485 0.0022904 
_cons -3.563336 0.2099775 -16.97 0 -3.974885 -3.151788 
/lnsig2u -13.47916 26.17422     -64.77969 37.82136 
sigma_u 0.0011831 0.0154839 
  
8.58E-15 1.63E+08 
rho 4.25E-07 0.0000111 
  
2.24E-29 1 
       Number of obs = 1750 
    Number of groups =  50 
 
Wald chi2(1) = 0.05 
Log likelihood = -183.0922 
 
Prob > chi2 = 0.8259 
iadopt Coef. Std. Err.  z P>|z| [95% Conf. Interval] 
logsali 
-
0.0234368 0.1065745 -0.22 0.826 -0.232319 0.1854455 
_cons -3.748318 0.3149486 -11.9 0 -4.365606 -3.13103 
/lnsig2u -13.47845 26.17319     -64.77697 37.82006 
sigma_u 0.0011836 0.0154888 
  
8.59E-15 1.63E+08 
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Number of obs = 1750 
    Number of groups =  50 
 
Wald chi2(1) = 2.26 
Log likelihood = -181.9223 
 
Prob > chi2 = 0.1324 
iadopt Coef. Std. Err.  z P>|z| [95% Conf. Interval] 
pcwealth -0.000025 0.0000166 -1.5 0.132 -0.0000575 7.56E-06 
_cons -3.293534 0.3609518 -9.12 0 -4.000987 -2.586082 
/lnsig2u -13.4719 26.17678     -64.77745 37.83365 
sigma_u 0.0011874 0.0155418 
  
8.59E-15 1.64E+08 
rho 4.29E-07 0.0000112 
  
2.24E-29 1 
       Number of obs = 1750 
    Number of groups =  50 
 
Wald chi2(1) = 0.74 
Log likelihood = -182.7500 
 
Prob > chi2 = 0.3892 
iadopt Coef. Std. Err.  z P>|z| [95% Conf. Interval] 
logpcw -0.257978 0.2995942 -0.86 0.389 -0.845172 0.3292156 
_cons -1.273286 2.937334 -0.43 0.665 -7.030355 4.483783 
/lnsig2u -13.47442 26.17448     -64.77545 37.82661 
sigma_u 0.0011859 0.0155208 
  
8.59E-15 1.64E+08 
rho 4.28E-07 0.0000112 
  
2.24E-29 1 
       Number of obs = 1750 
    Number of groups =  50 
 
Wald chi2(1) = 0 
Log likelihood = -183.1154 
 
Prob > chi2 = 0.9667 
iadopt Coef. Std. Err.  z P>|z| [95% Conf. Interval] 
stlegprof -0.056876 1.363605 -0.04 0.967 -2.729493 2.615741 
_cons -3.796837 0.3147093 -12.06 0 -4.413656 -3.180019 
/lnsig2u -13.47804 26.17304     -64.77626 37.82019 
sigma_u 0.0011838 0.0154919 
  
8.59E-15 1.63E+08 
rho 4.26E-07 0.0000111 
  
2.24E-29 1 
       Number of obs = 1750 
    Number of groups =  50 
 
Wald chi2(1) = 0.81 
Log likelihood = -182.7026 
 
Prob > chi2 = 0.3668 
iadopt Coef. Std. Err.  z P>|z| [95% Conf. Interval] 
sharkculmeas -0.058789 0.0651382 -0.9 0.367 -0.1864504 0.0688868 
_cons -3.521357 0.3471292 -10.14 0 -4.201717 -2.840996 
/lnsig2u -13.50629 26.17717     -64.8126 37.80002 
sigma_u 0.0011672 0.015277 
  
8.44E-15 1.61E+08 
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Number of obs = 1750 
    Number of groups =  50 
 
Wald chi2(1) = 1.23 
Log likelihood = -177.9118 
 
Prob > chi2 = 0.2666 
iadopt Coef. Std. Err.  z P>|z| [95% Conf. Interval] 
parcont 0.2893169 0.2604538 1.11 0.267 -0.2211632 0.799797 
_cons 3.875525 0.1803089 -21.49 0 -4.228924 -3.522126 
/lnsig2u -13.46406 26.44575     -65.29677 38.36866 
sigma_u 0.0011921 0.0157631 
  
6.62E-15 2.15E+08 
rho 4.32E-07 0.0000114 
  
1.33E-29 1 
       Number of obs = 1750 
    Number of groups =  50 
 
Wald chi2(1) = 0.06 
Log likelihood = -178.5085 
 
Prob > chi2 = 0.8045 
iadopt Coef. Std. Err.  z P>|z| [95% Conf. Interval] 
dividedgov 0.0830407 0.335483 0.25 0.805 -0.574494 0.7405753 
_cons -3.860953 0.2526449 -15.28 0 -4.356128 -3.365778 
/lnsig2u -13.4734 26.43925     -65.29337 38.34657 
sigma_u 0.0011866 0.0156858 
  
6.63E-15 2.12E+08 
rho 4.28E-07 0.0000113 
  
1.34E-29 1 
       Number of obs = 1750 
    Number of groups =  50 
 
Wald chi2(1) = 0.01 
Log likelihood = -183.0998 
 
Prob > chi2 = 0.9167 
iadopt Coef. Std. Err.  z P>|z| [95% Conf. Interval] 
peraggdp -0.044867 0.4291764 -0.1 0.917 -0.8860375 0.7963029 
_cons -3.806409 0.1644443 -23.15 0 -4.128713 -3.484104 
/lnsig2u -13.47811 26.17324     -64.77671 37.82049 
sigma_u 0.0011838 0.0154915 
  
8.59E-15 1.63E+08 
rho 4.26E-07 0.0000111 
  
2.24E-29 1 
       Number of obs = 1750 
    Number of groups =  50 
 
Wald chi2(1) = 0.19 
Log likelihood = -183.0269 
 
Prob > chi2 = 0.6588 
iadopt Coef. Std. Err.  z P>|z| [95% Conf. Interval] 
logpagdp 0.3515883 0.7962907 0.44 0.659 -1.209113 1.912289 
_cons -2.969286 1.901633 -1.56 0.118 -6.696419 0.757846 
/lnsig2u -13.47847 26.17391     -64.7784 37.82146 
sigma_u 0.0011836 0.0154891 
  
8.58E-15 1.63E+08 
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Number of obs = 1750 
    Number of groups =  50 
 
Wald chi2(1) = 0.28 
Log likelihood = -182.9641 
 
Prob > chi2 = 0.5951 
iadopt Coef. Std. Err.  z P>|z| [95% Conf. Interval] 
fruper -1.219508 2.294528 -0.53 0.595 -5.7167 3.277684 
_cons -3.756031 0.1873452 -20.05 0 -4.123221 -3.388841 
/lnsig2u -13.4841 26.1757     -64.78753 37.81933 
sigma_u 0.0011802 0.0154466 
  
8.54E-15 1.63E+08 
rho 4.23E-07 0.0000111 
  
2.22E-29 1 
       Number of obs = 1750 
    Number of groups =  50 
 
Wald chi2(1) = 0.01 
Log likelihood = -183.1122 
 
Prob > chi2 = 0.928 
iadopt Coef. Std. Err.  z P>|z| [95% Conf. Interval] 
fruit -0.005794 0.0641107 -0.09 0.928 -0.1314491 0.1198603 
_cons -3.75309 0.6288421 -5.97 0 -4.985598 -2.520582 
/lnsig2u -13.47831 26.17333     -64.7771 37.82047 
sigma_u 0.0011836 0.01549 
  
8.59E-15 1.63E+08 
rho 4.26E-07 0.0000111 
  
2.24E-29 1 
       Number of obs = 1750 
    Number of groups =  50 
 
Wald chi2(1) = 0.26 
Log likelihood = -182.9425 
 
Prob > chi2 = 0.6087 
iadopt Coef. Std. Err.  z P>|z| [95% Conf. Interval] 
vegper -1.326553 2.590992 -0.51 0.609 -6.404804 3.751699 
_cons -3.750215 0.1942987 -19.3 0 -4.131033 -3.369396 
/lnsig2u -13.47527 26.17633     -64.77994 37.8294 
sigma_u 0.0011854 0.0155153 
  
8.57E-15 1.64E+08 
rho 4.27E-07 0.0000112 
  
2.23E-29 1 
       Number of obs = 1750 
    Number of groups =  50 
 
Wald chi2(1) = 0.04 
Log likelihood = -183.0953 
 
Prob > chi2 = 0.8374 
iadopt Coef. Std. Err.  z P>|z| [95% Conf. Interval] 
logveg -0.016693 0.0813397 -0.21 0.837 -0.1761162 0.1427296 
_cons -3.636953 0.8471439 -4.29 0 -5.297324 -1.976581 
/lnsig2u -13.47559 26.17375     -64.7752 37.82402 
sigma_u 0.0011853 0.0155113 
  
8.59E-15 1.63E+08 







     
277 
 
Number of obs = 1750 
    Number of groups =  50 
 
Wald chi2(1) = 0.3 
Log likelihood = -182.9650 
 
Prob > chi2 = 0.5809 
iadopt Coef. Std. Err.  z P>|z| [95% Conf. Interval] 
natiadoptper -0.323799 0.5864398 -0.55 0.581 -1.4732 0.8256021 
_cons -3.668339 0.2956927 -12.41 0 -4.247886 -3.088791 
/lnsig2u -13.47851 26.1733     -64.77723 37.82021 
sigma_u 0.0011835 0.0154884 
  
8.59E-15 1.63E+08 
rho 4.26E-07 0.0000111 
  
2.24E-29 1 
       Number of obs = 1750 
    Number of groups =  50 
 
Wald chi2(1) = 1.52 
Log likelihood = -182.3193 
 
Prob > chi2 = 0.2171 
iadopt Coef. Std. Err.  z P>|z| [95% Conf. Interval] 
regiadoptper 0.6967748 0.5644787 1.23 0.217 -0.4095831 1.803133 
_cons -4.139063 0.3287125 -12.59 0 -4.783327 -3.494798 
/lnsig2u -13.48438 26.17466     -64.78578 37.81701 
sigma_u 0.0011801 0.0154438 
  
8.55E-15 1.63E+08 
rho 4.23E-07 0.0000111 
  
2.22E-29 1 
      Number of obs = 1750 
    Number of groups =  50 
 
Wald chi2(1) = 0.13 
Log likelihood = -183.0497 
 
Prob > chi2 = 0.7142 
iadopt Coef. Std. Err.  z P>|z| [95% Conf. Interval] 
natexistper -0.231426 0.6319583 -0.37 0.714 -1.470041 1.00719 
_cons -3.713093 0.3029213 -12.26 0 -4.306808 -3.119378 
/lnsig2u -13.47847 26.17323     -64.77706 37.82012 
sigma_u 0.0011836 0.0154887 
  
8.59E-15 1.63E+08 
rho 4.26E-07 0.0000111 
  
2.24E-29 1 
       Number of obs = 1750 
    Number of groups =  50 
 
Wald chi2(1) = 1.87 
Log likelihood = -182.1411 
 
Prob > chi2 = 0.172 
iadopt Coef. Std. Err.  z P>|z| [95% Conf. Interval] 
regexistper 0.8013685 0.5867505 1.37 0.172 -0.3486414 1.951378 
_cons -4.169347 0.3271055 -12.75 0 -4.810462 -3.528232 
/lnsig2u -13.48686 26.17487     -64.78866 37.81495 
sigma_u 0.0011786 0.0154248 
  
8.54E-15 1.63E+08 
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Number of obs = 1750 
    Number of groups =  50 
 
Wald chi2(1) = 0.25 
Log likelihood = -182.9912 
 
Prob > chi2 = 0.617 
iadopt Coef. Std. Err.  z P>|z| [95% Conf. Interval] 
amsregion7 -0.043098 0.0861763 -0.5 0.617 -0.2120007 0.1258041 
_cons -3.634571 0.3779265 -9.62 0 -4.375294 -2.893849 
/lnsig2u -13.48732 26.17442     -64.78823 37.8136 
sigma_u 0.0011783 0.015421 
  
8.54E-15 1.63E+08 
rho 4.22E-07 0.000011 
  
2.22E-29 1 
       Number of obs = 1750 
    Number of groups =  50 
 
Wald chi2(1) = 0.05 
Log likelihood = -183.0922 
 
Prob > chi2 = 0.8244 
iadopt Coef. Std. Err.  z P>|z| [95% Conf. Interval] 
ar71 0.1077518 0.4856996 0.22 0.824 -0.844202 1.059706 
_cons -3.821594 0.1759923 -21.71 0 -4.166532 -3.476655 
/lnsig2u -13.4802 26.17343     -64.77918 37.81877 
sigma_u 0.0011825 0.0154754 
  
8.58E-15 1.63E+08 
rho 4.25E-07 0.0000111 
  
2.24E-29 1 
       Number of obs = 1750 
    Number of groups =  50 
 
Wald chi2(1) = 0.1 
Log likelihood = -183.0663 
 
Prob > chi2 = 0.7482 
iadopt Coef. Std. Err.  z P>|z| [95% Conf. Interval] 
ar72 0.1445556 0.4503691 0.32 0.748 -0.7381517 1.027263 
_cons -3.829542 0.1787055 -21.43 0 -4.179798 -3.479285 
/lnsig2u -13.48214 26.17371     -64.78166 37.81738 
sigma_u 0.0011814 0.0154606 
  
8.57E-15 1.63E+08 
rho 4.24E-07 0.0000111 
  
2.23E-29 1 
       Number of obs = 1750 
    Number of groups =  50 
 
Wald chi2(1) = 0 
Log likelihood = -183.1160 
 
Prob > chi2 = 0.9807 
iadopt Coef. Std. Err.  z P>|z| [95% Conf. Interval] 
ar73 -0.014700 0.6082099 -0.02 0.981 -1.20677 1.177369 
_cons -3.806894 0.1709176 -22.27 0 -4.141887 -3.471902 
/lnsig2u -13.47846 26.17318     -64.77695 37.82003 
sigma_u 0.0011836 0.0154887 
  
8.59E-15 1.63E+08 
rho 4.26E-07 0.0000111 
  
2.24E-29 1 
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Number of obs =1750 
Number of groups =  50 
 
Wald chi2(1) = 0.11 
Log likelihood = -183.0603 
 
Prob > chi2 = 0.7357 
iadopt Coef. Std. Err.  z P>|z| [95% Conf. Interval] 
ar74 0.1258284 0.372767 0.34 0.736 -0.6047815 0.8564384 
_cons -3.839669 0.1910234 -20.1 0 -4.214068 -3.46527 
/lnsig2u -13.48251 26.17375     -64.78212 37.81711 
sigma_u 0.0011812 0.0154578 
  
8.57E-15 1.63E+08 
rho 4.24E-07 0.0000111 
  
2.23E-29 1 
       Number of obs = 1750 
    Number of groups =  50 
 
Wald chi2(1) = 0.23 
Log likelihood = -182.9935 
 
Prob > chi2 = 0.6299 
iadopt Coef. Std. Err.  z P>|z| [95% Conf. Interval] 
ar75 -0.233443 0.4844309 -0.48 0.63 -1.18291 0.716024 
_cons -3.774047 0.1760855 -21.43 0 -4.119168 -3.428926 
/lnsig2u -13.48653 26.17427     -64.78716 37.81411 
sigma_u 0.0011788 0.015427 
  
8.54E-15 1.63E+08 
rho .22E-07 0.0000111 
  
2.22E-29 1 
       Number of obs = 1750 
    Number of groups =  50 
 
Wald chi2(1) = 0.08 
Log likelihood = -183.0748 
 
Prob > chi2 = 0.7778 
iadopt Coef. Std. Err.  z P>|z| [95% Conf. Interval] 
ar76 -0.150674 0.5338365 -0.28 0.778 -1.196974 0.8956264 
_cons -3.791089 0.1734434 -21.86 0 -4.131031 -3.451146 
/lnsig2u -13.48123 26.17356     -64.78046 37.81801 
sigma_u 0.0011819 0.0154676 
  
8.57E-15 1.63E+08 
rho 4.25E-07 0.0000111 
  
2.23E-29 1 
       Number of obs = 1750 
    Number of groups =  50 
 
Wald chi2(1) = 0.02 
Log likelihood = -183.1046 
 
Prob > chi2 = 0.8799 
iadopt Coef. Std. Err.  z P>|z| [95% Conf. Interval] 
ar77 -0.073303 0.4849707 -0.15 0.88 -1.023828 0.877222 
_cons -3.798105 0.1760379 -21.58 0 -4.143133 -3.453077 
/lnsig2u -13.47924 26.17329     -64.77794 37.81945 
sigma_u 0.0011831 0.0154827 
  
8.58E-15 1.63E+08 
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Number of obs = 1750 
    Number of groups =  50 
 
Wald chi2(1) = 22.6 
Log likelihood = -354.1750 
 
Prob > chi2 = 0 
aadopt Coef. Std. Err.  z P>|z| [95% Conf. Interval] 
fedadopt 1.057854 0.2225205 4.75 0 0.6217221 1.493987 
_cons -3.796008 0.301757 -12.58 0 -4.387441 -3.204575 
/lnsig2u 0.6893989 0.3713677     -0.0384684 1.417266 
sigma_u 1.411566 0.262105 
  
0.9809496 2.031213 
rho 0.3772003 0.0872418 
  
0.2263012 0.5563641 
       Number of obs = 1750 
    Number of groups =  50 
 
Wald chi2(1) = 16.99 
Log likelihood = -356.7643 
 
Prob > chi2 = 0 
aadopt Coef. Std. Err.  z P>|z| [95% Conf. Interval] 
fedimpl 0.9051586 0.2196119 4.12 0 0.4747272 1.33559 
_cons -3.761008 0.3001878 -12.53 0 -4.349365 -3.172651 
/lnsig2u 0.6753858 0.3718342     -0.0533958 1.404168 
sigma_u 1.40171 0.2606019 
  
0.9736553 2.017953 
rho 0.3739141 0.0870473 
  
0.2236982 0.5531287 
       Number of obs = 1750 
    Number of groups =  50 
 
Wald chi2(1) = 9.65 
Log likelihood = -360.4583 
 
Prob > chi2 = 0.0019 
aadopt Coef. Std. Err.  z P>|z| [95% Conf. Interval] 
salience 0.0078462 0.0025263 3.11 0.002 0.0028947 0.0127977 
_cons -3.734815 0.3023881 -12.35 0 -4.327485 -3.142145 
/lnsig2u 0.6581272 0.3725285     -0.0720153 1.38827 
sigma_u 1.389666 0.2588452 
  
0.9646329 2.001976 
rho 0.3698826 0.086825 
  
0.2204815 0.5491959 
       Number of obs = 1750 
    Number of groups =  50 
 
Wald chi2(1) = 35.24 
Log likelihood = -343.2107 
 
Prob > chi2 = 0 
aadopt Coef. Std. Err.  z P>|z| [95% Conf. Interval] 
logsali 0.5199551 0.0875825 5.94 0 0.3482965 0.6916136 
_cons -5.053795 0.4234254 -11.94 0 -5.883694 -4.223897 
/lnsig2u 0.7306947 0.3693267     0.0068278 1.454562 
sigma_u 1.441014 0.2661025 
  
1.00342 2.069446 
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Number of obs = 1750 
    Number of groups =  50 
 
Wald chi2(1) = 28.43 
Log likelihood = -349.9025 
 
Prob > chi2 = 0 
aadopt Coef. Std. Err.  z P>|z| [95% Conf. Interval] 
pcwealth 0.000056 0.0000105 5.33 0.002 0.0000354 0.0000765 
_cons -4.825051 0.4075037 -11.84 0 -5.623744 -4.026359 
/lnsig2u 0.6843861 0.3728412     -0.0463691 1.415141 
sigma_u 1.408032 0.2624862 
  
0.9770821 2.029056 
rho 0.3760234 0.0874797 
  
0.2249209 0.5558396 
       Number of obs = 1750 
    Number of groups =  50 
 
Wald chi2(1) = 36.14 
Log likelihood = -342.4467 
 
Prob > chi2 = 0 
aadopt Coef. Std. Err.  z P>|z| [95% Conf. Interval] 
logpcw 1.579776 0.2627988 6.01 0 1.0647 2.094852 
_cons -19.30022 2.694658 -7.16 0 -24.58166 -14.01879 
/lnsig2u 0.7053592 0.3720605     -0.0238659 1.434584 
sigma_u 1.422875 0.2646978 
  
0.988138 2.048878 
rho 0.380957 0.0877426 
  
0.2288681 0.5606343 
       Number of obs = 1750 
    Number of groups =  50 
 
Wald chi2(1) = 0.4 
Log likelihood = -364.7099 
 
Prob > chi2 = 0.5267 
aadopt Coef. Std. Err.  z P>|z| [95% Conf. Interval] 
stlegprof -1.278151 2.018822 -0.63 0.527 -5.23497 2.678668 
_cons -3.21871 0.4439576 -7.25 0 -4.088851 -2.34857 
/lnsig2u 0.7054418 0.3884186     -0.0558446 1.466728 
sigma_u 1.422934 0.276347 
  
0.9724639 2.082073 
rho 0.3809765 0.0916021 
  
0.2232733 0.568536 
       Number of obs = 1750 
    Number of groups =  50 
 
Wald chi2(1) = 2.37 
Log likelihood = -363.7592 
 
Prob > chi2 = 0.1237 
aadopt Coef. Std. Err.  z P>|z| [95% Conf. Interval] 
sharkculmeas -0.139928 0.0909045 -1.54 0.124 -0.3180975 0.0382415 
_cons -2.722961 0.5088134 -5.35 0 -3.720217 -1.725705 
/lnsig2u 0.5378976 0.382599     -0.2119827 1.287778 
sigma_u 1.308588 0.2503323 
  
0.8994324 1.903871 
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Number of obs = 1750 
    Number of groups =  50 
 
Wald chi2(1) = 2.66 
Log likelihood = -362.5850 
 
Prob > chi2 = 0.1027 
aadopt Coef. Std. Err.  z P>|z| [95% Conf. Interval] 
parcont -0.311802 0.1910823 -1.63 0.103 -0.6863159 0.0627128 
_cons -3.369158 0.2774565 -12.14 0 -3.912963 -2.825353 
/lnsig2u 0.6265856 0.3734405     -0.1053443 1.358516 
sigma_u 1.367922 0.2554188 
  
0.948691 1.972413 
rho 0.3625619 0.0863061 
  
0.2148066 0.5418191 
       Number of obs = 1750 
    Number of groups =  50 
 
Wald chi2(1) = 0.07 
Log likelihood = -363.8869 
 
Prob > chi2 = 0.7891 
aadopt Coef. Std. Err.  z P>|z| [95% Conf. Interval] 
dividedgov -0.060092 0.2246703 -0.27 0.789 -0.5004378 0.3802534 
_cons -3.361928 0.2992193 -11.24 0 -3.948387 -2.775469 
/lnsig2u 0.5957575 0.3745155     -0.1382794 1.329795 
sigma_u 1.346998 0.2522359 
  
0.9331963 1.944291 
rho 0.3554678 0.0858054 
  
0.2093038 0.534681 
       Number of obs = 1750 
    Number of groups =  50 
 
Wald chi2(1) = 6.21 
Log likelihood = -360.7515 
 
Prob > chi2 = 0.0127 
aadopt Coef. Std. Err.  z P>|z| [95% Conf. Interval] 
peraggdp -24.1311 9.681538 -2.49 0.013 -43.10656 -5.155632 
_cons -2.995885 0.3384547 -8.85 0 -3.659243 -2.332526 
/lnsig2u 0.9093703 0.3861202     0.1525887 1.666152 
sigma_u 1.575677 0.3042004 
  
1.07928 2.300384 
rho 0.4300917 0.094643 
  
0.2614861 0.6166385 
       Number of obs = 1750 
    Number of groups =  50 
 
Wald chi2(1) = 1.5 
Log likelihood = -364.2449 
 
Prob > chi2 = 0.2206 
aadopt Coef. Std. Err.  z P>|z| [95% Conf. Interval] 
logpagdp 0.7460936 0.6090503 1.23 0.221 -0.447623 1.93981 
_cons -1.670364 1.463725 -1.14 0.254 -4.539213 1.198484 
/lnsig2u 0.6521727 0.3729547     -0.078805 1.38315 
sigma_u 1.385535 0.2583709 
  
0.9613637 1.996858 
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Number of obs = 1750 
    Number of groups =  50 
 
Wald chi2(1) = 6.12 
Log likelihood = -361.8426 
 
Prob > chi2 = 0.0134 
aadopt Coef. Std. Err.  z P>|z| [95% Conf. Interval] 
fruper 5.975273 2.41519 2.47 0.013 1.241587 10.70896 
_cons -3.713606 0.3121602 -11.9 0 -4.325428 -3.101783 
/lnsig2u 0.5380221 0.3932266     -0.2326879 1.308732 
sigma_u 1.30867 0.2573019 
  
0.890169 1.923923 
rho 0.3423531 0.088534 
  
0.1941079 0.5294371 
       Number of obs = 1750 
    Number of groups =  50 
 
Wald chi2(1) = 11.5 
Log likelihood = -357.3191 
 
Prob > chi2 = 0.0007 
aadopt Coef. Std. Err.  z P>|z| [95% Conf. Interval] 
logfru 0.3474379 0.1024629 3.39 0.001 0.1466143 0.5482615 
_cons -6.826894 1.117244 -6.11 0 -9.016651 -4.637137 
/lnsig2u 0.5743337 0.4355686     -0.2793651 1.428033 
sigma_u 1.332647 0.2902295 
  
0.8696342 2.042177 
rho 0.3505748 0.0991668 
  
0.1869103 0.5590198 
       Number of obs = 1750 
    Number of groups =  50 
 
Wald chi2(1) = 1 
Log likelihood = -364.4577 
 
Prob > chi2 = 0.3175 
aadopt Coef. Std. Err.  z P>|z| [95% Conf. Interval] 
vegper 0.7297826 0.7299991 1 0.317 -0.7009893 2.160555 
_cons -3.464918 0.2756334 -12.57 0 -4.005149 -2.924686 
/lnsig2u 0.5869385 0.3806194     -0.1590618 1.332939 
sigma_u 1.341072 0.255219 
  
0.9235495 1.94735 
rho 0.3534499 0.0869803 
  
0.2058852 0.5354632 
       Number of obs = 1750 
    Number of groups =  50 
 
Wald chi2(1) = 31.9 
Log likelihood = -347.2010 
 
Prob > chi2 = 0 
aadopt Coef. Std. Err.  z P>|z| [95% Conf. Interval] 
logveg 0.5020761 0.0888914 5.65 0 0.3278523 0.6763 
_cons -8.667975 1.0269 -8.44 0 -10.68066 -6.655288 
/lnsig2u 0.144226 0.4396147     -0.7174029 1.005855 
sigma_u 1.074777 0.2362438 
  
0.6985829 1.653555 
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Number of obs = 1750 
    Number of groups =  50 
 
Wald chi2(1) = 41.84 
Log likelihood = -333.6814 
 
Prob > chi2 = 0 
aadopt Coef. Std. Err.  z P>|z| [95% Conf. Interval] 
natiadoptper 3.847137 0.5947593 6.47 0 2.681431 5.012844 
_cons -5.585946 0.4788256 -11.67 0 -6.524426 -4.647465 
/lnsig2u 0.7653514 0.3676177     0.0448339 1.485869 
sigma_u 1.466202 0.269501 
  
1.02267 2.102095 
rho 0.3952023 0.0878671 
  
0.241218 0.573225 
       Number of obs = 1750 
    Number of groups =  50 
 
Wald chi2(1) = 46.04 
Log likelihood = -324.5340 
 
Prob > chi2 = 0 
aadopt Coef. Std. Err.  z P>|z| [95% Conf. Interval] 
regiadoptper 4.436003 0.6537809 6.79 0 3.154616 5.71739 
_cons -6.012935 0.5279908 -11.39 0 -7.047778 -4.978092 
/lnsig2u 0.7321701 0.3736295     -0.0001303 1.46447 
sigma_u 1.442078 0.2694014 
  
0.9999349 2.079724 
rho 0.3872996 0.0886618 
  
0.2330841 0.5679821 
       Number of obs = 1750 
    Number of groups =  50 
 
Wald chi2(1) = 41.29 
Log likelihood = -328.2550 
 
Prob > chi2 = 0 
aadopt Coef. Std. Err.  z P>|z| [95% Conf. Interval] 
natexistper 4.935822 0.7681463 6.43 0 3.430283 6.441361 
_cons -6.071637 0.5490274 -11.06 0 -7.147711 -4.995563 
/lnsig2u 0.7823064 0.3667152     0.0635578 1.501055 
sigma_u 1.478685 0.2711281 
  
1.032289 2.118117 
rho 0.399262 0.0879573 
  
0.2446616 0.5769359 
       Number of obs = 1750 
    Number of groups =  50 
 
Wald chi2(1) = 49.32 
Log likelihood = -317.5237 
 
Prob > chi2 = 0 
aadopt Coef. Std. Err.  z P>|z| [95% Conf. Interval] 
regexistper 5.329471 0.7588683 7.02 0 3.842117 6.816826 
_cons -6.456989 0.5873487 -10.99 0 -7.608171 -5.305807 
/lnsig2u 0.8308805 0.371001     0.1037318 1.558029 
sigma_u 1.515038 0.2810403 
  
1.053234 2.179324 
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Number of obs = 1750 
    Number of groups =  50 
 
Wald chi2(1) = 2.86 
Log likelihood = -363.5316 
 
Prob > chi2 = 0.0908 
aadopt Coef. Std. Err.  z P>|z| [95% Conf. Interval] 
amsregion7 -0.201694 0.1192593 -1.69 0.091 -0.4354378 0.03205 
_cons -2.599023 0.5322515 -4.88 0 -3.642217 -1.555829 
/lnsig2u 0.5162701 0.3866694     -0.2415879 1.274128 
sigma_u 1.294514 0.2502744 
  
0.8862165 1.890921 
rho 0.3374727 0.0864534 
  
0.1927195 0.5208081 
       Number of obs = 1750 
    Number of groups =  50 
 
Wald chi2(1) = 2.61 
Log likelihood = -363.6625 
 
Prob > chi2 = 0.1059 
aadopt Coef. Std. Err.  z P>|z| [95% Conf. Interval] 
ar71 1.071509 0.6626821 1.62 0.106 -0.2273246 2.370342 
_cons -3.556021 0.2906823 -12.23 0 -4.125748 -2.986295 
/lnsig2u 0.534677 0.384651     -0.219225 1.288579 
sigma_u 1.306483 0.2512699 
  
0.8961814 1.904633 
rho 0.3416004 0.0865117 
  
0.1962226 0.5244135 
       Number of obs = 1750 
    Number of groups =  50 
 
Wald chi2(1) = 1.09 
Log likelihood = -364.3874 
 
Prob > chi2 = 0.2971 
aadopt Coef. Std. Err.  z P>|z| [95% Conf. Interval] 
ar72 0.6784269 0.6507016 1.04 0.297 -0.5969249 1.953779 
_cons -3.536858 0.2982067 -11.86 0 -4.121333 -2.952384 
/lnsig2u 0.601515 0.3742936     -0.1320871 1.335117 
sigma_u 1.350882 0.2528132 
  
0.9360901 1.949472 
rho 0.356788 0.0858968 
  
0.2103305 0.536005 
       Number of obs = 1750 
    Number of groups =  50 
 
Wald chi2(1) = 0 
Log likelihood = -364.9245 
 
Prob > chi2 = 0.9965 
aadopt Coef. Std. Err.  z P>|z| [95% Conf. Interval] 
ar73 -0.003888 0.893488 0 0.997 -1.755093 1.747316 
_cons -3.4426 0.2871123 -11.99 0 -4.00533 -2.879871 
/lnsig2u 0.6360207 0.3734562     -0.09594 1.367981 
sigma_u 1.37439 0.2566373 
  
0.9531624 1.981771 
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Number of obs = 1750 
    Number of groups =  50 
 
Wald chi2(1) = 1.19 
Log likelihood = -364.3219 
 
Prob > chi2 = 0.2748 
aadopt Coef. Std. Err.  z P>|z| [95% Conf. Interval] 
ar74 -0.638319 0.5844698 -1.09 0.275 -1.783859 0.5072206 
_cons -3.28849 0.2975551 -11.05 0 -3.871688 -2.705293 
/lnsig2u 0.5930328 0.3751239     -0.1421966 1.328262 
sigma_u 1.345165 0.2523017 
  
0.9313703 1.942802 
rho 0.3548438 0.085877 
  
0.2086563 0.5342997 
       Number of obs = 1750 
    Number of groups =  50 
 
Wald chi2(1) = 0.14 
Log likelihood = -364.8532 
 
Prob > chi2 = 0.7065 
aadopt Coef. Std. Err.  z P>|z| [95% Conf. Interval] 
ar75 -0.251793 0.6686257 -0.38 0.706 -1.562276 1.058689 
_cons -3.401485 0.296161 -11.49 0 -3.98195 -2.82102 
/lnsig2u 0.6295927 0.3743823     -0.104183 1.363368 
sigma_u 1.36998 0.2564481 
  
0.949242 1.977205 
rho 0.3632572 0.0865951 
  
0.2150026 0.5430236 
       Number of obs = 1750 
    Number of groups =  50 
 
Wald chi2(1) = 0.97 
Log likelihood = -364.4324 
 
Prob > chi2 = 0.3253 
aadopt Coef. Std. Err.  z P>|z| [95% Conf. Interval] 
ar76 -0.778704 0.7916363 -0.98 0.325 -2.330283 0.7728744 
_cons -3.343862 0.2851113 -11.73 0 -3.90267 -2.785054 
/lnsig2u 0.5896054 0.3774782     -0.1502382 1.329449 
sigma_u 1.342861 0.2534504 
  
0.927633 1.943955 
rho 0.3540596 0.0863298 
  
0.2073316 0.534595 
       Number of obs = 1750 
    Number of groups =  50 
 
Wald chi2(1) = 0 
Log likelihood = -364.9224 
 
Prob > chi2 = 0.9486 
aadopt Coef. Std. Err.  z P>|z| [95% Conf. Interval] 
ar77 -0.044837 0.6950906 -0.06 0.949 -1.407189 1.317516 
_cons -3.436277 0.2958923 -11.61 0 -4.016215 -2.856338 
/lnsig2u 0.6352808 0.3734488     -0.0966654 1.367227 
sigma_u 1.373882 0.2565373 
  
0.9528167 1.981023 








Appendix D – Collapsed Data Correlation and Bivariate Regressions 
 
  totstadopt totiadopt totaadopt fedadopt fedimpl salience logsali 
totstadopt 1 
      totiadopt 0.4505 1 
     totaadopt 0.8452 -0.0963 1 
    fedadopt 0.4781 0.1291 0.4558 1 
   fedimpl 0.2153 -0.2535 0.3918 0.3025 1 
  salience 0.1772 -0.159 0.2927 0.2819 0.8244 1 




     
Number of obs = 35 
Source SS df MS 
 
F(  1,    33) = 9.78 
Model 84.65608 1 84.656085 
 
Prob > F = 0.0037 
Residual 285.6296 33 8.655443 
 
R-squared = 0.2286 
Total 370.2857 34 10.89076 
 
Adj R-squared = 0.2052 
     
Root MSE = 2.942 
       totstadopt Coef. Std. Err. t P>t      [95% Conf. Interval] 
fedadopt 3.703704 1.184273 3.13 0.004 1.294282 6.113125 
_cons 3.296296 0.566191 5.82 0 2.144373 4.44822 
 
            
       
     
Number of obs = 35 
Source SS df MS 
 
F(  1,    33) = 1.6 
Model 17.17033 1 17.17033 
 
Prob > F = 0.2141 
Residual 353.1154 33 10.70047   R-squared = 0.0464 
Total 370.2857 34 10.89076 
 
Adj R-squared = 0.0175 
     
Root MSE = 3.2712 
       totstadopt Coef. Std. Err. t P>t      [95% Conf. Interval] 
fedimpl 1.602564 1.265108 1.27 0.214 -0.9713165 4.176445 
_cons 3.730769 0.641527 5.82 0 2.425574 5.035965 
              
       
     
Number of obs = 35 
Source SS df MS 
 
F(  1,    33) = 1.07 
Model 11.62322 1 11.623216 
 
Prob > F = 0.3086 
Residual 358.6625 33 10.86856   R-squared = 0.0314 
Total 370.2857 34 10.89076 
 
Adj R-squared = 0.002 
     
Root MSE = 3.2968 
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       totstadopt Coef. Std. Err. t P>t      [95% Conf. Interval] 
salience 0.015811 0.015289 1.03 0.309 -0.0152948 0.046916 
_cons 3.646849 0.735242 4.96 0 2.150988 5.14271 
              
       
     
Number of obs = 35 
Source SS df MS 
 
F(  1,    33) = 11.54 
Model 95.93207 1 95.932072 
 
Prob > F = 0.0018 
Residual 274.3536 33 8.313747   R-squared = 0.2591 
Total 370.2857 34 10.89076 
 
Adj R-squared = 0.2366 
     
Root MSE = 2.8834 
       totstadopt Coef. Std. Err. t P>t      [95% Conf. Interval] 
logsali 1.081367 0.318339 3.4 0.002 0.4337016 1.729031 
_cons 1.357723 0.953822 1.42 0.164 -0.5828427 3.298289 
              
       
     
Number of obs = 35 
Source SS df MS 
 
F(  1,    33) = 0.56 
Model 1.779894 1 1.7798942 
 
Prob > F = 0.4597 
Residual 104.963 33 3.180696   R-squared = 0.0167 
Total 106.7429 34 3.139496 
 
Adj R-squared = -0.0131 
     
Root MSE = 1.7835 
       totiadopt Coef. Std. Err. t P>t      [95% Conf. Interval] 
fedadopt 0.537037 0.717907 0.75 0.46 -0.9235558 1.99763 
_cons 0.962963 0.343225 2.81 0.008 0.264666 1.66126 
              
       
     
Number of obs = 35 
Source SS df MS 
 
F(  1,    33) = 2.27 
Model 6.858242 1 6.8582418 
 
Prob > F = 0.1418 
Residual 99.88462 33 3.026807   R-squared = 0.0643 
Total 106.7429 34 3.139496 
 
Adj R-squared = 0.359 
     
Root MSE = 1.7398 
       totiadopt Coef. Std. Err. t P>t      [95% Conf. Interval] 
fedimpl -1.01282 0.67285 -1.51 0.142 -2.381745 0.356104 
_cons 1.346154 0.341197 3.95 0 0.6519826 2.040325 
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Number of obs = 35 
Source SS df MS 
 
F(  1,    33) = 0.86 
Model 2.69693 1 2.6969302 
 
Prob > F = 0.3617 
Residual 104.0459 33 3.152907   R-squared = 0.0253 
Total 106.7429 34 3.139496 
 
Adj R-squared = -0.0043 
     
Root MSE = 1.7756 
       totiadopt Coef. Std. Err. t P>t      [95% Conf. Interval] 
salience -0.00762 0.008235 -0.92 0.362 -0.0243696 0.009138 
_cons 1.324639 0.396004 3.35 0.002 0.5189619 2.130316 
              
       
     
Number of obs = 35 
Source SS df MS 
 
F(  1,    33) = 0.02 
Model 0.051392 1 0.0513917 
 
Prob > F = 0.9004 
Residual 106.6915 33 3.233075   R-squared = 0.0005 
Total 106.7429 34 3.139496 
 
Adj R-squared = -0.0298 
     
Root MSE = 1.7981 
       totiadopt Coef. Std. Err. t P>t      [95% Conf. Interval] 
logsali -0.02503 0.198518 -0.13 0.9 -0.4289156 0.378858 
_cons 1.150177 0.594808 1.93 0.062 -0.059969 2.360324 
              
       
     
Number of obs = 35 
Source SS df MS 
 
F(  1,    33) = 8.65 
Model 61.88571 1 61.885714 
 
Prob > F = 0.0059 
Residual 236 33 7.151515   R-squared = 0.2077 
Total 297.8857 34 8.761345 
 
Adj R-squared = 0.1837 
     
Root MSE = 2.6742 
       tataadopt Coef. Std. Err. t P>t      [95% Conf. Interval] 
fedadopt 3.166667 1.076481 2.94 0.006 0.9765506 5.356783 
_cons 2.333333 0.514656 4.53 0 1.286258 3.380409 
              
       
     
Number of obs = 35 
Source SS df MS 
 
F(  1,    33) = 5.99 
Model 45.73187 1 45.731868 
 
Prob > F = 0.0199 
Residual 252.1538 33 7.641026   R-squared = 0.1535 
Total 297.8857 34 8.761345 
 
Adj R-squared = 0.1279 
     
Root MSE = 2.7642 
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tataadopt Coef. Std. Err. t P>t      [95% Conf. Interval] 
fedimpl 2.615385 1.06906 2.45 0.02 0.4403665 4.790403 
_cons 2.384615 0.542112 4.4 0 1.28168 3.487551 
              
       
     
Number of obs = 35 
Source SS df MS 
 
F(  1,    33) = 3.09 
Model 25.51782 1 25.517824 
 
Prob > F = 0.088 
Residual 272.3679 33 8.253572   R-squared = 0.0857 
Total 370.2857 34 10.89076 
 
Adj R-squared = 0.058 
     
Root MSE = 2.8729 
       tataadopt Coef. Std. Err. t P>t      [95% Conf. Interval] 
salience 0.023427 0.013323 1.76 0.088 -0.0036797 0.050533 
_cons 2.32221 0.640716 3.62 0.001 1.018664 3.625756 
              
       
     
Number of obs = 35 
Source SS df MS 
 
F(  1,    33) = 16.78 
Model 100.4242 1 100.42423 
 
Prob > F = 0.0003 
Residual 197.4615 33 5.983681   R-squared = 0.3371 
Total 297.8857 34 8.761345 
 
Adj R-squared = 0.317 
     
Root MSE = 2.4462 
       tataadopt Coef. Std. Err. t P>t      [95% Conf. Interval] 
logsali 1.106395 0.270069 4.1 0 0.556935 1.655855 





























1979 Divided  .407 $9,819 $1,543 
1985 Divided 3.62 .623 $16,761 $1,932 




.526 $10,719 $8,937 
1985 Divided .611 $16,777 $11,235 
1990 Democrat .603 $21,380 $16,765 
 1979 Democrat  .200 $10,855 $231 
Connecticut 1985 Divided 3.0 .228 $18,635 $382 
 1990 Democrat  .211 $26198 $653 
 1979 Divided  .180 $7412 $264 
Maine 1985 Democrat 2.33 .152 $12,462 $593 
 1990 Divided  .127 $17,211 $508 
 1979 Divided  .211 $9,312 $2,907 
Minnesota 1985 Divided 1.0 .201 $15,023 $3,071 
 1990 Divided  .191 $19710 $3,628 
 1979 Democrat  .114 $8,192 $619 
Montana 1985 Divided 3.0 .111 $11,792 $334 
 1990 Divided  .095 $15,346 $842 
New 
Hampshire 
1979 Divided  .062 $8,686 $72 
1985 Republican 2.33 .045 $15,663 $110 
1990 Republican  .039 $20,236 $186 
 1979 Divided  .212 $9,847 $1,801 
Washington 1985 Divided 1.66 .227 $14,619 $2,293 
 1990 Divided  .217 $19,637 $3,544 
 1979   .216 $8,646 $2,142 
Nebraska 1985 Unicameral 3.66 .190 $13,756 $2,642 
 1990 
 
















 1979 Divided  .077 $8,290 $1,203 
North Dakota 1985 Divided 2.0 .075 $12,728 $1,244 
 1990 Divided  .068 $15,866 $1,221 
 1979 Republican  .266 $8,994 $3,995 
Iowa 1985 Divided 2.0 .231 $13,370 $3,831 
 1990 Divided  .201 $17,350 $4,266 
 1979 Republican  .104 $8,059 $1,289 
South Dakota 1985 Republican 3.0 .086 $11,898 $1,253 
 1990 Republican  .076 $16,075 $1,610 
 1979 Divided  .249 $9,197 $2,705 
Wisconsin 1985 Democrat 2.0 .267 $13,719 $2,793 
 1990 Divided  .346 $17,986 $3,211 
 1979 Divided  .320 $13,199 $204 
Alaska 1985 Divided 6.0 .312 $20,104 $501 
 1990 Divided  .279 $22,594 $516 
 1979 Divided  .284 $9.502 $919 
Colorado 1985 Divided 1.80 .298 $15,267 $1,300 
 1990 Divided  .249 $19,377 $1,858 
 1979 Democrat  .150 $7,744 $1,031 
Louisiana 1985 Democrat 8.0 .180 $12,024 $845 
 1990 Democrat  .169 $15,171 $992 
 1979 Democrat  .249 $8,395 $1,430 
Oklahoma 1985 Democrat 8.25 .250 $13,171 $1,204 
 1990 Divided  .225 $16,077 $1,630 
 1979 Divided  .223 $9,295 $1,045 
Oregon 1985 Divided 2.0 .190 $13,429 $1,348 

























 1979 Divided  .191 $8,832 $4,159 
Texas 1985 Democrat 7.11 .207 $14,110 $4,421 
 1990 Divided  .212 $17,260 $6,346 
 1979 Democrat  .224 $8,731 $3,006 
Florida 1985 Democrat 7.80 .251 $14,643 $4,201 
 1990 Divided  .253 $19,437 $5,378 
 1979 Divided  .179 $7,796 $791 
Idaho 1985 Divided 2.50 .133 $11,497 $1,092 
 1990 Divided  .119 $15,603 $1,692 
 1979 Democrat  .078 $7,603 $1,420 
Kentucky 1985 Democrat 7.40 .098 $11,503 $1,755 
 1990 Democrat  .095 $15,360 $1,970 
 1979 Democrat  .252 $9,971 $472 
Maryland 1985 Democrat 7.0 .211 $16,935 $836 
 1990 Democrat  .220 $22,681 $1,112 
 1979 Republican  .092 $7,545 $412 
New Mexico 1985 Divided 7.0 .097 $11,959 $467 
 1990 Divided  .096 $12,823 $716 
 1979 Republican  .130 $7,756 $188 
Vermont 1985 Divided 2.33 .143 $12,867 $230 
 1990 Divided  .134 $17,643 $280 
 1979 Divided  .164 $8,950 $697 
Virginia 1985 Democrat 7.86 .136 $15,284 $1,040 








Appendix F – Regional Univariate and Correlation Results 
 
 
REGION 1 – Far West 
 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
adopt 210 0.157143 0.364805 0 1 
fedadopt 210 0.228571 0.420916 0 1 
fedimpl 210 0.257143 0.438103 0 1 
salience 210 31.37143 36.53517 0 151 
logsali 210 2.575569 1.534658 0 5.01728 
pcwealth 210 23838.01 10199.42 6898 44816 
logpcw 210 9.975159 0.477041 8.838986 10.71032 
stlegprof 210 0.272676 0.147463 0.121 0.626 
sharkculmeas 210 4.41 2.305205 1.66 8.25 
parcont 210 0.295238 0.534437 -1 1 
dividedgov 210 0.633333 0.483046 0 1 
peraggdp 210 0.018482 0.009929 0.0018 0.0406 
logpagdp 210 -4.18974 0.712857 -6.319969 -3.20399 
fruper 210 0.150068 0.127576 0.0002364 0.3513 
logfru 210 10.28531 4.586064 1.252763 16.30243 
vegper 210 0.085302 0.078597 0.0042029 1 
logveg 210 10.9862 2.649775 5.905362 15.58373 
natiadoptper 210 0.443429 0.276526 0.02 0.76 
regiadoptper 210 0.552381 0.303545 0 0.833333 
natexistper 210 0.417714 0.25695 0.02 0.7 
regexistper 210 0.509524 0.270692 0 0.833333 
 
 
  adopt fedadopt fedimpl salience logsali pcwealth 
adopt 1 
     fedadopt 0.1077 1 
    fedimpl 0.0154 0.3025 1 
   salience 0.0121 0.2819 0.8244 1 
  logsali 0.1544 0.3821 0.6695 0.8198 1 
 pcwealth 0.1045 0.3529 0.7804 0.8663 0.9123 1 
logpcw 0.1372 0.3666 0.6757 0.7735 0.9066 0.9732 
stlegprof 0.3741 -0.0207 -0.0316 -0.0358 -0.0474 0.0321 
sharkculmeas -0.2156 0 0 0 0 0.0515 
parcont -0.0182 -0.0887 -0.1623 -0.16 -0.2172 -0.2407 
dividedgov 0.057 0.0612 0.0181 0.0492 0.1696 0.1524 
peraggdp 0.0797 -0.1855 -0.3763 -0.4059 -0.4376 -0.5462 
logpagdp 0.1042 -0.1721 -0.3914 -0.4086 -0.4152 -0.5028 
fruper 0.2671 0.0745 0.1089 0.1373 0.1872 0.1921 
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logfru 0.2784 0.048 0.0895 0.1032 0.1228 0.0793 
vegper 0.1885 0.0846 0.2162 0.2381 0.2952 0.3319 
logveg 0.3585 0.1121 0.2308 0.2432 0.2673 0.253 
natiadoptper 0.172 0.4175 0.6135 0.7298 0.9496 0.9191 
regiadoptper 0.2062 0.4301 0.5459 0.67 0.9309 0.8895 
natexistper 0.1927 0.4296 0.5204 0.6514 0.9223 0.8732 
regexistper 0.227 0.4007 0.3424 0.5289 0.8633 0.787 
 
  logpcw stlegp~f sharkc~s parcont divide~v peraggdp logpagdp 
logpcw 1 
      stlegprof 0.0335 1 
     sharkculmeas 0.07 -0.0144 1 
    parcont -0.2683 0.0477 0.0952 1 
   dividedgov 0.2107 0.0257 -0.1437 -0.7092 1 
  peraggdp -0.5552 0.0731 -0.596 0.1746 -0.1299 1 
 logpagdp -0.4956 0.2011 -0.4903 0.2269 -0.189 0.9273 1 
fruper 0.187 0.541 -0.0525 0.386 -0.2803 0.1761 0.2979 
logfru 0.056 0.4566 -0.4335 0.3428 -0.2329 0.4746 0.4919 
vegper 0.325 0.391 -0.0773 -0.0557 0.1075 -0.0651 -0.0186 
logveg 0.2241 0.5436 -0.5394 0.1803 -0.0734 0.3255 0.3044 
natiadoptper 0.9408 -0.0495 0 -0.2186 0.1821 -0.4625 -0.4297 
regiadoptper 0.9359 -0.043 0 -0.2334 0.2078 -0.4457 -0.4116 
natexistper 0.9151 -0.0495 0 -0.209 0.1921 -0.4442 -0.4061 
regexistper 0.8672 -0.0397 0 -0.218 0.2281 -0.3983 -0.356 
 
  fruper logfru vegper logveg natiad~r regiad~r natexi~r 
fruper 1 
      logfru 0.8607 1 
     vegper 0.2714 0.2294 1 
    logveg 0.7363 0.9259 0.33 1 
   natiadoptper 0.2022 0.1281 0.3184 0.2761 1 
  regiadoptper 0.2043 0.1268 0.3195 0.2692 0.9806 1 
 natexistper 0.2024 0.1249 0.3144 0.2644 0.9911 0.9806 1 














REGION 2 – Rocky Mountain 
 
Variable  Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
adopt 245 0.110204 0.313785 0 1 
fedadopt 245 0.228571 0.420772 0 1 
fedimpl 245 0.257143 0.437954 0 1 
salience 245 31.37143 36.52269 0 151 
logsali 244 2.586124 1.528345 0 5.01728 
pcwealth 245 20270.84 9874.536 5520 49104 
logpcw 245 9.790325 0.520109 8.616133 10.8017 
stlegprof 245 0.132057 0.071995 0.054 0.3 
sharkculmeas 245 3.708571 1.826252 1.8 7 
parcont 245 -0.15102 0.605346 -1 1 
dividedgov 245 0.57551 0.495277 0 1 
peraggdp 245 0.030322 0.023769 0.001 0.1065 
logpagdp 245 -3.78131 0.777256 -6.907755 -2.23961 
fruper 245 0.016627 0.021002 3.77E-06 0.092134 
logfru 245 8.825029 2.636977 0.6931472 11.84667 
vegper 245 0.08498 0.223531 0.0001089 1.591818 
logveg 245 10.05222 2.661801 4.189655 16.13538 
natiadoptper 245 0.443429 0.276432 0.02 0.76 
regiadoptper 245 0.453061 0.329085 0 0.857143 
natexistper 245 0.417714 0.256863 0.02 0.7 
regexistper 245 0.44898 0.333779 0 0.857143 
 
 
  adopt fedadopt fedimpl salience logsali pcwealth 
adopt 1 
     fedadopt 0.056 1 
    fedimpl 0.0606 0.3015 1 
   salience 0.0851 0.2806 0.8242 1 
  logsali 0.1971 0.3808 0.6699 0.8199 1 
 pcwealth 0.1693 0.3346 0.7813 0.8528 0.8762 1 
logpcw 0.1911 0.3612 0.6925 0.7808 0.9001 0.9653 
stlegprof 0.0988 -0.0681 -0.0453 -0.0802 -0.1595 -0.0587 
sharkculmeas 0.0216 0.0041 0.0044 0.0064 0.0126 -0.056 
parcont 0.0479 -0.1505 -0.0653 -0.0976 -0.2587 -0.2076 
dividedgov -0.0688 -0.1255 -0.2163 -0.2884 -0.3853 -0.2666 
peraggdp -0.0055 -0.1165 -0.2522 -0.2656 -0.2954 -0.3941 
logpagdp -0.0006 -0.1515 -0.3406 -0.3677 -0.3512 -0.4607 
fruper 0.1007 -0.0043 -0.0624 -0.0412 -0.0067 -0.1077 
logfru 0.1666 0.0494 0.1332 0.1392 0.1354 0.0446 
vegper 0.0935 0.0708 0.3344 0.3478 0.2765 0.2424 
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logveg 0.246 0.1581 0.3427 0.3535 0.3679 0.3443 
natiadoptper -0.1729 0.0453 0.1141 0.1212 0.1225 0.0543 
regiadoptper 0.2449 0.3724 0.5239 0.6687 0.9175 0.8201 
natexistper -0.171 0.0323 0.0916 0.0982 0.0974 0.0079 
regexistper 0.2402 0.3738 0.5238 0.6685 0.9142 0.8177 
 
  logpcw stlegp~f sharkc~s parcont divide~v peraggdp logpagdp 
logpcw 1 
      stlegprof -0.0765 1 
     sharkculmeas -0.0442 0.0084 1 
    parcont -0.2926 0.1767 0.4741 1 
   dividedgov -0.2873 0.2628 -0.0049 0.3033 1 
  peraggdp -0.4024 -0.085 -0.2265 0.0377 0.1924 1 
 logpagdp -0.4492 -0.1243 -0.1253 0.0864 0.2059 0.9102 1 
fruper -0.0715 0.3771 0.653 0.2573 -0.0684 -0.3072 -0.277 
logfru 0.059 0.5193 0.2005 0.1106 -0.1805 -0.076 -0.1698 
vegper 0.2434 0.1594 0.0379 -0.2113 -0.2085 0.0552 0.0602 
logveg 0.3458 0.5714 0.1504 -0.0224 -0.1952 -0.1628 -0.216 
natiadoptper 0.0588 -0.9243 0.0554 -0.1342 -0.2569 -0.1001 -0.0207 
regiadoptper 0.8839 -0.1869 0.0103 -0.3299 -0.4014 -0.2972 -0.3318 
natexistper 0.0154 -0.9178 0.0737 -0.1051 -0.2585 -0.052 0.036 
regexistper 0.8793 -0.1868 0.0101 -0.3255 -0.4027 -0.2925 -0.3282 
 
  fruper logfru vegper logveg natiad~r regiad~r natexi~r 
fruper 1 
      logfru 0.6114 1 
     vegper 0.1255 0.2605 1 
    logveg 0.47 0.8358 0.5496 1 
   natiadoptper -0.353 -0.5355 -0.1324 -0.5899 1 
  regiadoptper 0.0094 0.1208 0.2225 0.342 0.1125 1 
 natexistper -0.3349 -0.4669 -0.1131 -0.5515 0.9912 0.0881 1 
















REGION 3 – Southwest 
 
Variable  Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
adopt 140 0.085714 0.280947 0 1 
fedadopt 140 0.228571 0.42142 0 1 
fedimpl 140 0.257143 0.438628 0 1 
salience 140 31.37143 36.57895 0 151 
logsali 140 2.575569 1.536497 0 5.01728 
pcwealth 140 19375.41 9212.371 5157 39615 
logpcw 140 9.747244 0.520607 8.54811 10.58696 
stlegprof 140 0.170043 0.04588 0.104 0.25 
sharkculmeas 140 8.09 0.677368 7.11 9 
parcont 140 0.471429 0.605049 -1 1 
dividedgov 140 0.414286 0.494367 0 1 
peraggdp 140 0.023991 0.017749 0.0054 0.1036 
logpagdp 140 -3.9519 0.654187 -5.221356 -2.26722 
fruper 140 0.004132 0.002766 0.0014995 0.011198 
logfru 140 9.570138 1.228353 8.048469 12.46642 
vegper 140 0.009878 0.00857 0.0022359 0.028292 
logveg 140 10.27972 1.434034 8.301521 12.92446 
natiadoptper 140 0.443429 0.276857 0.02 0.76 
regiadoptper 140 0.471429 0.363691 0 0.75 
natexistper 140 0.417714 0.257258 0.02 0.7 
regexistper 140 0.471429 0.363691 0 0.75 
 
 
  adopt fedadopt fedimpl salience logsali pcwealth 
adopt 1 
     fedadopt 0.0764 1 
    fedimpl -0.005 0.3025 1 
   salience 0.0319 0.2819 0.8244 1 
  logsali 0.1696 0.3821 0.6695 0.8198 1 
 pcwealth 0.1174 0.3338 0.8021 0.8905 0.9021 1 
logpcw 0.1474 0.3579 0.6962 0.794 0.9079 0.9674 
stlegprof 0.2308 -0.0801 -0.1167 -0.1168 -0.156 -0.0324 
sharkculmeas -0.2816 0 0 0 0 -0.1338 
parcont -0.1548 -0.2281 -0.4058 -0.4094 -0.4241 -0.5433 
dividedgov 0.0533 0.1983 0.1024 0.135 0.2382 0.2676 
peraggdp -0.0368 -0.1637 -0.2662 -0.2906 -0.3201 -0.4215 
logpagdp -0.0931 -0.1741 -0.3402 -0.3734 -0.3787 -0.5125 
fruper 0.1663 0.056 0.3016 0.2569 0.1554 0.3374 
logfru 0.2629 0.1118 0.3354 0.3409 0.3109 0.4596 
vegper 0.1866 0.0659 0.1802 0.1448 0.1156 0.2514 
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logveg 0.2687 0.135 0.3106 0.3276 0.3384 0.4616 
natiadoptper 0.159 0.4175 0.6135 0.7298 0.9496 0.901 
regiadoptper 0.2354 0.4184 0.4523 0.6081 0.9052 0.7689 
natexistper 0.1819 0.4296 0.5204 0.6514 0.9223 0.8489 
regexistper 0.2354 0.4184 0.4523 0.6081 0.9052 0.7689 
 
  logpcw stlegp~f sharkc~s parcont divide~v peraggdp logpagdp 
logpcw 1 
      stlegprof -0.0219 1 
     sharkculmeas -0.1268 -0.674 1 
    parcont -0.5078 -0.1819 0.3623 1 
   dividedgov 0.3021 0.0427 -0.1066 -0.6576 1 
  peraggdp -0.4449 -0.4015 0.593 0.3161 -0.1747 1 
 logpagdp -0.5052 -0.3539 0.6633 0.4208 -0.1846 0.93 1 
fruper 0.2587 0.2899 -0.7844 -0.4838 0.0847 -0.3871 -0.5495 
logfru 0.4168 0.293 -0.7029 -0.5353 0.1563 -0.2618 -0.3628 
vegper 0.2352 0.2843 -0.7915 -0.3096 0.1452 -0.3978 -0.5042 
logveg 0.4515 0.2636 -0.7122 -0.467 0.1621 -0.3085 -0.3943 
natiadoptper 0.9401 -0.1658 0 -0.4194 0.2681 -0.3244 -0.3811 
regiadoptper 0.8281 -0.1587 0 -0.3307 0.2264 -0.2665 -0.3101 
natexistper 0.9104 -0.1647 0 -0.3988 0.2869 -0.3129 -0.362 
regexistper 0.8281 -0.1587 0 -0.3307 0.2264 -0.2665 -0.3101 
 
  fruper logfru vegper logveg natiad~r regiad~r natexi~r 
fruper 1 
      logfru 0.8723 1 
     vegper 0.9061 0.8211 1 
    logveg 0.8503 0.974 0.8814 1 
   natiadoptper 0.128 0.3027 0.1103 0.3395 1 
  regiadoptper 0.0664 0.2432 0.0702 0.2858 0.9484 1 
 natexistper 0.0922 0.2753 0.0939 0.3197 0.9911 0.962 1 
















REGION 4 – North Central 
 
Variable  Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
adopt 420 0.064286 0.245554 0 1 
fedadopt 420 0.228571 0.420413 0 1 
fedimpl 420 0.257143 0.43758 0 1 
salience 420 31.37143 36.49154 0 151 
logsali 420 2.575569 1.532825 0 5.01728 
pcwealth 420 21643.03 9984.855 5600 43502 
logpcw 420 9.861204 0.51468 8.630522 10.68056 
stlegprof 420 0.220119 0.126956 0.049 0.653 
sharkculmeas 420 3.599167 1.938622 1 7.66 
parcont 385 -0.14805 0.609305 -1 1 
dividedgov 385 0.61039 0.488297 0 1 
peraggdp 420 0.044181 0.043033 0.0038 0.41 
logpagdp 420 -3.55539 0.963823 -5.572754 -0.8916 
fruper 420 0.008337 0.018256 9.48E-06 0.084305 
logfru 420 8.586614 2.35344 2.890372 12.9962 
vegper 420 0.013818 0.017644 0.0001181 0.085491 
logveg 420 10.05453 1.928852 5.407172 13.13152 
natiadoptper 420 0.443429 0.276196 0.02 0.76 
regiadoptper 420 0.447619 0.313503 0 0.833333 
natexistper 420 0.417714 0.256644 0.02 0.7 
regexistper 420 0.440476 0.311904 0 0.833333 
 
 
  adopt fedadopt fedimpl salience logsali pcwealth 
adopt 1 
     fedadopt 0.1 1 
    fedimpl 0.1022 0.3025 1 
   salience 0.0972 0.2819 0.8244 1 
  logsali 0.1216 0.3821 0.6695 0.8198 1 
 pcwealth 0.1309 0.3553 0.781 0.8641 0.911 1 
logpcw 0.1358 0.371 0.678 0.7752 0.9117 0.9721 
stlegprof -0.0873 -0.0492 -0.081 -0.0828 -0.1029 -0.0583 
sharkculmeas -0.1147 0 0 0 0 -0.0203 
parcont 0.0485 -0.0912 -0.0229 -0.0179 -0.1197 -0.0707 
dividedgov 0.024 -0.0091 -0.0662 -0.0838 -0.0766 -0.0839 
peraggdp -0.0285 -0.0855 -0.1223 -0.1708 -0.2576 -0.3118 
logpagdp -0.0167 -0.1604 -0.1925 -0.2085 -0.3216 -0.3953 
fruper -0.0388 0.0037 -0.0094 -0.0112 -0.0042 -0.0026 
logfru -0.018 0.0576 0.1024 0.1062 0.1266 0.1881 
vegper 0.0273 0.1219 0.2019 0.1671 0.1893 0.2361 
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logveg 0.0838 0.1612 0.3408 0.3426 0.3564 0.4571 
natiadoptper 0.1175 0.4175 0.6135 0.7298 0.9496 0.9206 
regiadoptper 0.1524 0.3989 0.6377 0.7521 0.9426 0.9216 
natexistper 0.1163 0.4296 0.5204 0.6514 0.9223 0.8754 
regexistper 0.1511 0.3952 0.637 0.7459 0.9375 0.914 
 
  logpcw stlegp~f sharkc~s parcont divide~v peraggdp logpagdp 
logpcw 1 
      stlegprof -0.0405 1 
     sharkculmeas -0.0105 -0.0521 1 
    parcont -0.1059 0.2816 0.0233 1 
   dividedgov -0.0717 0.2534 -0.0461 0.3133 1 
  peraggdp -0.3492 -0.5062 -0.327 -0.2717 -0.1939 1 
 logpagdp -0.4259 -0.5949 -0.3865 -0.2086 -0.1701 0.8702 1 
fruper 0.0126 0.7793 -0.2541 0.0828 0.171 -0.3078 -0.4146 
logfru 0.2073 0.807 0.1274 0.3614 0.2623 -0.7624 -0.7904 
vegper 0.2337 0.7062 -0.2917 0.0539 0.1168 -0.4157 -0.5344 
logveg 0.4515 0.5979 -0.0124 0.2368 0.1384 -0.7206 -0.7491 
natiadoptper 0.9507 -0.108 0 -0.1495 -0.0723 -0.2775 -0.3614 
regiadoptper 0.9446 -0.1049 0 -0.1361 -0.067 -0.2798 -0.361 
natexistper 0.9259 -0.1059 0 -0.163 -0.0678 -0.2805 -0.3669 
regexistper 0.9381 -0.1051 0 -0.1378 -0.0657 -0.278 -0.3592 
 
  fruper logfru vegper logveg natiad~r regiad~r natexi~r 
fruper 1 
      logfru 0.6043 1 
     vegper 0.8312 0.6473 1 
    logveg 0.4394 0.8093 0.7162 1 
   natiadoptper -0.0017 0.1324 0.2004 0.3605 1 
  regiadoptper -0.0017 0.1327 0.2041 0.3632 0.9806 1 
 natexistper 0.0002 0.1284 0.1915 0.3397 0.9911 0.9673 1 
















REGION 5 – Southeast 
 
Variable  Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
adopt 280 0.064286 0.2457 0 1 
fedadopt 280 0.228571 0.420664 0 1 
fedimpl 280 0.257143 0.437841 0 1 
salience 280 31.37143 36.51333 0 151 
logsali 280 2.575569 1.53374 0 5.01728 
pcwealth 280 19404.02 9220.324 4746 39978 
logpcw 280 9.739899 0.54552 8.465057 10.59608 
stlegprof 280 0.150318 0.049855 0.067 0.281 
sharkculmeas 280 8.415 0.507068 7.4 9 
parcont 280 0.403571 0.654174 -1 1 
dividedgov 280 0.410714 0.492844 0 1 
peraggdp 280 0.020851 0.015805 0.0043 0.188 
logpagdp 280 -4.03716 0.556711 -5.44914 -1.67131 
fruper 280 0.042578 0.086407 0.0005747 0.311339 
logfru 280 10.08526 1.97315 7.36518 14.6657 
vegper 280 0.03969 0.053334 0.0018449 0.199974 
logveg 280 10.8704 1.550781 8.090555 14.2366 
natiadoptper 280 0.443357 0.276338 0.02 0.76 
regiadoptper 280 0.292857 0.265965 0 0.625 
natexistper 280 0.417643 0.256765 0.02 0.7 
regexistper 280 0.264286 0.233355 0 0.625 
 
 
  adopt fedadopt fedimpl salience logsali pcwealth 
adopt 1 
     fedadopt 0.1694 1 
    fedimpl 0.0457 0.3025 1 
   salience 0.074 0.2819 0.8244 1 
  logsali 0.1609 0.3821 0.6695 0.8198 1 
 pcwealth 0.1487 0.3545 0.7661 0.848 0.9121 1 
logpcw 0.1683 0.3685 0.6567 0.7557 0.9086 0.9699 
stlegprof -0.0289 -0.0744 -0.1005 -0.1529 -0.2198 -0.1152 
sharkculmeas -0.1487 0 0 0 0 -0.0605 
parcont -0.0059 -0.1671 -0.4887 -0.5304 -0.5446 -0.5883 
dividedgov 0.018 0.0988 0.1068 0.1672 0.2924 0.2212 
peraggdp -0.039 -0.2088 -0.19 -0.249 -0.3387 -0.3959 
logpagdp -0.0172 -0.2754 -0.4432 -0.4827 -0.5642 -0.6671 
fruper 0.0657 -0.0074 -0.0004 -0.0058 -0.0178 0.1069 
logfru 0.0796 0.0778 0.1637 0.1656 0.1762 0.3213 
vegper 0.1029 0.0572 0.1058 0.1111 0.1283 0.2689 
303 
 
logveg 0.0989 0.1616 0.3427 0.3638 0.3918 0.5571 
natiadoptper 0.2048 0.4176 0.6138 0.7299 0.9496 0.925 
regiadoptper 0.2182 0.4247 0.7361 0.7808 0.9009 0.9322 
natexistper 0.2183 0.4298 0.5206 0.6515 0.9224 0.8828 
regexistper 0.2496 0.4413 0.6304 0.6964 0.8784 0.8957 
 
  logpcw stlegp~f sharkc~s parcont divide~v peraggdp logpagdp 
logpcw 1 
      stlegprof -0.1377 1 
     sharkculmeas -0.0617 -0.0895 1 
    parcont -0.5498 -0.1049 -0.0016 1 
   dividedgov 0.2723 -0.0444 0.0749 -0.5048 1 
  peraggdp -0.4192 0.027 0.0117 0.3136 -0.1313 1 
 logpagdp -0.6582 0.0492 -0.063 0.4909 -0.1824 0.8404 1 
fruper 0.089 0.6671 -0.4108 -0.22 -0.1113 -0.0561 -0.0496 
logfru 0.3023 0.617 -0.1102 -0.3036 -0.0984 -0.1732 -0.2271 
vegper 0.2491 0.6417 -0.3214 -0.3202 -0.0892 -0.1619 -0.2261 
logveg 0.5348 0.5069 -0.0779 -0.3949 -0.0145 -0.3044 -0.4607 
natiadoptper 0.9496 -0.234 -0.0001 -0.5266 0.3093 -0.3698 -0.5926 
regiadoptper 0.8999 -0.2193 0 -0.5272 0.2412 -0.3316 -0.5831 
natexistper 0.9282 -0.2382 -0.0001 -0.4915 0.3209 -0.3779 -0.5809 
regexistper 0.8848 -0.2286 0 -0.4869 0.2527 -0.3434 -0.5773 
 
  fruper logfru vegper logveg natiad~r regiad~r natexi~r 
fruper 1 
      logfru 0.8238 1 
     vegper 0.9571 0.8806 1 
    logveg 0.7156 0.9128 0.8409 1 
   natiadoptper -0.021 0.1788 0.133 0.3994 1 
  regiadoptper -0.016 0.1853 0.1326 0.4065 0.9471 1 
 natexistper -0.0229 0.169 0.1285 0.3803 0.9911 0.9168 1 
















REGION 6 – Mid-Atlantic 
 
Variable  Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
adopt 210 0.047619 0.213468 0 1 
fedadopt 210 0.228571 0.420916 0 1 
fedimpl 210 0.257143 0.438103 0 1 
salience 210 31.37143 36.53517 0 151 
logsali 210 2.575569 1.534658 0 5.01728 
pcwealth 210 23826.97 11718.37 5468 52141 
logpcw 210 9.942011 0.548215 8.606668 10.86171 
stlegprof 210 0.2046 0.081179 0.116 0.502 
sharkculmeas 210 6.245 1.521672 4 7.86 
parcont 210 0.328571 0.642694 -1 1 
dividedgov 210 0.480952 0.500831 0 1 
peraggdp 210 0.293317 4.139868 0.0015 60 
logpagdp 210 -4.98511 0.859843 -6.50229 4.094345 
fruper 210 0.041818 0.045578 0.0020788 0.154025 
logfru 210 10.04363 1.297163 7.204893 12.03443 
vegper 210 0.058203 0.071429 0.003143 0.230744 
logveg 210 10.33108 1.439642 6.425679 12.15926 
natiadoptper 210 0.443429 0.276526 0.02 0.76 
regiadoptper 210 0.319048 0.277754 0 0.666667 
natexistper 210 0.417714 0.25695 0.02 0.7 
regexistper 210 0.280952 0.238855 0 0.666667 
 
 
  adopt fedadopt fedimpl salience logsali pcwealth 
adopt 1 
     fedadopt 0.1445 1 
    fedimpl 0.1242 0.3025 1 
   salience 0.0842 0.2819 0.8244 1 
  logsali 0.1422 0.3821 0.6695 0.8198 1 
 pcwealth 0.1623 0.3377 0.7482 0.826 0.8734 1 
logpcw 0.164 0.3591 0.6507 0.745 0.8841 0.9646 
stlegprof 0.0638 -0.0119 0.029 0.0401 0.0186 0.1136 
sharkculmeas 0.0249 0 0 0 0 -0.1158 
parcont 0.0249 -0.0667 0.0553 0.0131 -0.1217 -0.1712 
dividedgov -0.0362 0.0208 0.1097 0.0341 0.0384 0.0568 
peraggdp -0.0156 -0.0379 -0.0412 -0.0505 -0.0442 -0.0235 
logpagdp -0.0825 -0.2255 -0.4078 -0.4232 -0.4362 -0.5078 
fruper -0.0723 -0.0627 -0.0554 -0.0698 -0.1225 -0.0061 
logfru 0.0744 0.0263 0.109 0.1205 0.1052 0.1803 
vegper -0.0311 0.03 0.0274 0.0186 0.0347 0.2279 
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logveg 0.1226 0.1335 0.2747 0.292 0.3206 0.5512 
natiadoptper 0.1707 0.4175 0.6135 0.7298 0.9496 0.8809 
regiadoptper 0.1595 0.3964 0.6988 0.7809 0.9199 0.8798 
natexistper 0.1765 0.4296 0.5204 0.6514 0.9223 0.8374 
regexistper 0.1743 0.4528 0.5866 0.6717 0.8869 0.8289 
 
  logpcw stlegp~f sharkc~s parcont divide~v peraggdp logpagdp 
logpcw 1 
      stlegprof 0.1015 1 
     sharkculmeas -0.1049 -0.801 1 
    parcont -0.2087 -0.3328 0.344 1 
   dividedgov 0.0697 0.0314 -0.0098 -0.4933 1 
  peraggdp -0.0057 0.049 -0.1021 -0.0354 0.072 1 
 logpagdp -0.4481 0.002 0.1035 0.0249 0.1481 0.7328 1 
fruper -0.0755 0.1547 -0.5568 -0.0158 -0.1621 0.1246 -0.235 
logfru 0.1453 0.5632 -0.5886 -0.1961 -0.1229 0.0522 -0.1994 
vegper 0.2061 0.2202 -0.6195 -0.1575 -0.0256 0.1419 -0.2289 
logveg 0.5527 0.5235 -0.5228 -0.3458 0.1402 0.0575 -0.1627 
natiadoptper 0.9207 0.0099 0 -0.1797 0.0295 -0.0616 -0.4618 
regiadoptper 0.8762 0.0197 0 -0.1612 0.0267 -0.0802 -0.4927 
natexistper 0.8977 0.0043 0 -0.2058 0.0168 -0.0593 -0.4411 
regexistper 0.8505 0.0103 0 -0.2094 0.0116 -0.0821 -0.4844 
 
  fruper logfru vegper logveg natiad~r regiad~r natexi~r 
fruper 1 
      logfru 0.5195 1 
     vegper 0.7552 0.2626 1 
    logveg 0.0576 0.3567 0.5333 1 
   natiadoptper -0.1373 0.0996 0.0407 0.3282 1 
  regiadoptper -0.1248 0.1018 0.0397 0.3269 0.96 1 
 natexistper -0.142 0.0893 0.0419 0.314 0.9911 0.9328 1 
















REGION 7 – Northeast 
 
Variable  Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
adopt 245 0.073469 0.26144 0 1 
fedadopt 245 0.228571 0.420772 0 1 
fedimpl 245 0.257143 0.437954 0 1 
salience 245 31.37143 36.52269 0 151 
logsali 245 2.575569 1.534133 0 5.01728 
pcwealth 245 24824.07 12610.59 5698 56959 
logpcw 245 9.971222 0.574894 8.64787 10.95009 
stlegprof 245 0.225086 0.172894 0.027 0.659 
sharkculmeas 245 2.895714 0.54761 2.33 3.66 
parcont 245 0.183674 0.575222 -1 1 
dividedgov 245 0.636735 0.481925 0 1 
peraggdp 245 0.010803 0.013398 0.0013 0.155 
logpagdp 245 -4.96971 0.919459 -6.645391 -1.86433 
fruper 245 0.083032 0.071777 0.0195956 0.337495 
logfru 245 9.930303 1.452697 6.834109 12.94027 
vegper 245 0.061914 0.052323 0.0035006 0.293105 
logveg 245 9.588315 1.524259 6.731018 12.84103 
natiadoptper 245 0.446449 0.275828 0.02 0.76 
regiadoptper 245 0.602916 0.163113 0.1428571 0.714286 
natexistper 245 0.420245 0.255981 0.02 0.7 
regexistper 245 0.534694 0.178934 0.1428571 0.714286 
 
 
  adopt fedadopt fedimpl salience logsali pcwealth 
adopt 1 
     fedadopt 0.182 1 
    fedimpl 0.0133 0.3025 1 
   salience -0.0943 0.2819 0.8244 1 
  logsali -0.05 0.3821 0.6695 0.8198 1 
 pcwealth -0.0807 0.3367 0.7536 0.8338 0.8793 1 
logpcw -0.07 0.36 0.6506 0.7471 0.8901 0.9604 
stlegprof -0.1403 -0.0318 -0.0633 -0.0738 -0.0872 0.0515 
sharkculmeas -0.1587 0 0 0 0 0.1797 
parcont -0.0628 -0.0556 0.072 0.0947 -0.0544 -0.0211 
dividedgov -0.0801 0.1484 0.056 0.0589 0.2182 0.2075 
peraggdp 0.0238 -0.1372 -0.1249 -0.1815 -0.217 -0.3504 
logpagdp 0.0644 -0.2001 -0.3755 -0.399 -0.4258 -0.6434 
fruper -0.0919 -0.0015 -0.0146 0.0374 0.0692 0.0918 
logfru -0.05 0.0553 0.1608 0.1979 0.2038 0.2739 
vegper -0.0841 0.1898 0.4611 0.4499 0.4393 0.4106 
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logveg -0.0671 0.1629 0.3496 0.3782 0.4093 0.4872 
natiadoptper -0.0612 0.4145 0.6105 0.7278 0.949 0.8819 
regiadoptper -0.027 0.3724 0.4025 0.5302 0.805 0.7469 
natexistper -0.0603 0.4256 0.5149 0.6487 0.9217 0.8374 
regexistper 0.0579 0.3297 -0.1405 -0.0167 0.4264 0.3123 
 
  logpcw stlegp~f sharkc~s parcont divide~v peraggdp logpagdp 
logpcw 1 
      stlegprof 0.0531 1 
     sharkculmeas 0.1614 0.8664 1 
    parcont -0.0527 0.1928 0.2578 1 
   dividedgov 0.2089 0.1165 0.0789 -0.4236 1 
  peraggdp -0.3561 -0.2673 -0.4749 -0.0344 -0.0839 1 
 logpagdp -0.5974 -0.3529 -0.6267 -0.0221 -0.1483 0.7882 1 
fruper 0.1152 0.4062 0.4682 0.182 -0.1195 -0.1696 -0.2019 
logfru 0.2706 0.7335 0.5102 0.0467 0.1604 -0.1016 -0.2039 
vegper 0.4224 0.0953 0.1972 0.2488 -0.0885 -0.0671 -0.2476 
logveg 0.4944 0.6802 0.5562 0.1166 0.2013 -0.2466 -0.4147 
natiadoptper 0.9246 -0.0943 -0.0114 -0.1015 0.2767 -0.2188 -0.4243 
regiadoptper 0.8693 -0.0432 -0.0014 -0.1617 0.2504 -0.2014 -0.3357 
natexistper 0.9019 -0.0919 -0.0103 -0.1272 0.2971 -0.2221 -0.407 
regexistper 0.5211 -0.0023 0 -0.2413 0.2384 -0.1554 -0.1405 
 
  fruper logfru vegper logveg natiad~r regiad~r natexi~r 
fruper 1 
      logfru 0.5082 1 
     vegper 0.3463 0.3065 1 
    logveg 0.3076 0.8869 0.5439 1 
   natiadoptper 0.0629 0.1955 0.4275 0.4079 1 
  regiadoptper 0.1063 0.1931 0.3244 0.3501 0.8877 1 
 natexistper 0.0685 0.1849 0.3962 0.3891 0.9909 0.8986 1 











Appendix G - Participant Interview Recruitment Information 
 
California – Identified and Targeted Recruitment Organizations (Former and Current 
Employees/Staff/Members) 
 
 California State Assembly including appropriate committees 
 California Department of Food and Agriculture, California Organic Program 
 California Department of Public Health 
 California Organic Products Advisory Committee 
 California County Agricultural Commissioners 
 University of California, Santa Cruz  
 California Certified Organic Farmers including associates that helped write legislation 
 Oregon Tilth 
 Organic farms located in the Central Valley 
  
Georgia – Identified and Targeted Recruitment Organizations (Former and Current 
Employees/Staff/Members) 
 
 Georgia General Assembly including appropriate committees 
 Georgia Department of Agriculture 
 Georgia Organics 
 Clemson University 





Appendix H – Interview Question Guides 
 
Elected Officials 
1. What [was/is] your role in the [development/amending]organic adoption in [year]?  
a. Were you on relevant committee such as agriculture? 
2. Would you consider agriculture a partisan issue? 
a. Would you consider alternative agriculture, such as organic, a partisan issue? 
3. What factors contributed to the decision to pass [bill #]?  
a. Were there any objections to passing [bill #]? 
4. Were any other states considered exemplary models for your organic policy? 
5. Amending adoption question only – why did [state] decide to pass [bill #]?  
a. Was there a particular shortcoming of existing law? 
6. Do you believe the organic policy is likely to remain enacted? 
7. Do you believe the current organic policy is serving its need?  
a. Could it be improved? 
b. Are there any challenges in the organics market in [state]? 
8. Do you know of any other individual that may be willing to discuss their knowledge and 
participation of organic policy in [state]? 
 
Government Officials 
1. What [is/was] your role in the [development/amending]organic policy development? 
2. What factors contributed to the decision to pass [bill #]?  
a. Were there any objections to passing [bill #]? 
3. How would describe the implementation of current organic food and agricultural laws in [state]? 
4. Would you consider agriculture a partisan issue? 
a. Would you consider alternative agriculture, such as organic, a partisan issue? 
5. Were any other states considered exemplary models for your organic policy? 
6. Amending adoption question only – How has state congressional action affected the 
implementation and development of organic law? 
7. Do you believe the organic policy is likely to remain enacted in your state? 
8. Do you believe the current organic policy is serving its need?  
a. Could it be improved? 
b. Are there any challenges in the organics market in [state]? 
9. Do you know of any other individual that may be willing to discuss their knowledge and 
participation of organic policy in [state]? 
 
Interest Groups/Other Experts 
1. What [is/was] your role in the [development/amending] organic policy development? 
a. Did you participate in legislative development? 
b. Did you participate in rulemaking? 
2. Would you consider agriculture a partisan issue? 
a. Would you consider alternative agriculture, such as organic, a partisan issue? 
3. If legislative participation - What factors contributed to the decision to pass [bill #]?  
a. Were there any objections to passing [bill #]? 
b. What type of actors were influential 
4. Do you believe the organic policy is likely to remain enacted in your state? 
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5. Do you believe the current organic policy is serving its need?  
a. Could it be improved? 
b. Are there any challenges in the organics market in [state]? 
6. Do you know of any other individual that may be willing to discuss their knowledge and 









Per Capita Income by County (2010 U.S. Census) 
Less than $35,000 
$35,000 - $45,000 
$45,000 - $55,000 
$55,000 - $75,000 
Greater than 
$75,000 





Population Density by County (2010 U.S. Census) 





Greater than 2,000 
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Appendix J – Far West Regional State Political Conditions 
 














 PR GPC PR GPC PR GPC PR GPC PR GPC PR GPC 
1979 .320 S .526 D .246 D .130 S .233 S .212 S 
1980 .319 S .540 D .250 D .132 S .226 S .215 S 
1981 .317 S .554 D .255 D .135 S .219 S .217 R 
1982 .316 S .568 D .259 D .137 S .212 S .220 R 
1983 .315 S .583 S .263 D .139 D .204 S .222 S 
1984 .314 S .597 S .267 D .141 D .197 S .225 S 
1985 .312 S .611 S .272 D .144 S .190 S .227 D 
1986 .311 S .625 S .276 D .146 S .183 S .230 D 
1987 .303 S .620 S .274 D .148 S .180 D .227 D 
1988 .295 S .614 S .271 D .149 S .177 D .224 D 
1989 .287 S .609 S .269 D .151 S .174 D .220 S 
1990 .279 S .603 S .266 D .152 S .171 D .217 S 
1991 .272 S .598 S .264 D .154 S .168 S .214 S 
1992 .264 S .592 S .262 D .155 S .165 S .211 S 
1993 .256 S .587 S .259 D .157 S .162 S .208 D 
1994 .248 S .581 S .257 D .158 S .159 S .204 D 
1995 .240 S .575 S .254 D .160 S .156 S .201 S 
1996 .232 S .570 S .252 D .161 S .153 S .198 S 
1997 .231 S .578 S .248 D .158 S .154 S .198 S 
1998 .231 S .586 S .244 D .154 S .155 S .198 S 















 PR GPC PR GPC PR GPC PR GPC PR GPC PR GPC 
2000 .229 S .602 D .237 D .148 S .156 S .197 S 
2001 .228 S .610 D .233 D .145 S .157 S .197 S 
2002 .228 S .618 D .229 D .141 S .158 S .197 D 
2003 .227 R .626 D .225 S .138 S .159 S .197 S 
2004 .225 R .619 S .231 S .142 S .161 S .200 S 
2005 .224 R .611 S .237 S .145 S .163 S .202 D 
2006 .222 R .604 S .244 S .149 S .166 S .205 D 
2007 .220 R .596 S .250 S .152 S .168 D .207 D 
2008 .219 R .589 S .256 S .156 S .170 D .210 D 
2009 .217 S .581 S .262 S .159 S .172 D .212 D 
2010 .215 S .574 S .268 S .163 S .174 D .215 D 
PR (State Legislature Professionalism) 0 = least professionalized; 1 = most professionalized 




Appendix K – Text of Key California Legislation/ Chaptered Law 
 




 An act to add and repeal Sections 26469, 26569.11, 26569.12, 26569.13, 26569.15, 26569.16, 
26569.17, 268850.5, and 26850.5, and 26850.6 to the Health and Safety Code, relating to organic food. 
 
[Approved by Governor September 21, 1979 Filed with Secretary of State September 22, 1979] 
 
The people of the State of California do enact as follows: 
 
SECTION 1. The Legislature hereby finds and declares that an increasing number of marketed food 
products are advertised or labeled as being organic, organically grown, naturally grown, or wild and the 
frequently such food products command premium prices. 
The Legislature further finds and declares that in order to provide for the protection of the consumer and 
the farmer n this state, it is necessary that standards relating to the use of descriptive terms to fairly 
identify such food products be established. 
 In enacting the Organic Foods Act of 1979, the Legislature specifically makes no finding either 
that such food products are in any way superior to conventionally produced food products or that more 
conventionally produced food products lack safety, wholesomeness, or nutritional value. 
 
SEC. 2.. This act shall be known as the Organic Foods Act of 1979 
 
SEC. 3.. Section 26469 is added to the Health and Safety Code, to read: 
26469. It is unlawful to use the terms “organic,” “organically grown,” “wild,” “ecologically grown,” or 
“biologically grown,” when advertising or otherwise making representations with respect to a raw 
agricultural commodity, processed food product, or meat, poultry, fish, or milk, in violation of Section 
26569.11. 
 The prohibition of this section shall not apply to the term “wild” when such term is used to 
describe a flavor of a food or a plant variety. 
 The prohibition of this sections hall not apply to the term “natural.” 
 This section shall remain in effect only until January 31, 1983, and as of such date is repealed, 
unless a later enacted statute, which is chaptered before such date, deletes of extends such date. 
 
SEC. 4. Section 26569.11 is added to the Health and Safety Code, to read: 
26569.11. Except as otherwise provided in this division, the terms, “organic,” “organically grown,” 
“wild,” “ecologically grown,” or “biologically grown” shall be used after January 1, 1981, in the labeling 
or advertising of a food only for an of the following: 
 (a) Raw agricultural commodities without applied coloring or synthetically compounded 
materials in the unpeeled natural form, except rapid heating or chilling, an which meet the following 
requirements: 
 (1) Are produced, harvested, distributed, stored, processed, and packaged without application of 
synthetically compounded fertilizers, pesticides, or growth regulators. 
 (2) Additionally, in the case of perennial crops, no synthetically compounded fertilizers, 
pesticides, or growth regulators shall be applied to the field or area in which the commodity is grown for 
12 months prior to the appearance of flower buds and throughout the entire growing and harvest season of 
the particular commodity. 
 (3) Additionally, in the case of annual crops and two-year crops, no synthetically compounded 
fertilizers, pesticides, or growth regulators shall be applied to the field or area in which the commodity is 
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grown for 12 months prior to seed planting or transplanting and throughout the entire growing and harvest 
season for the particular commodity. 
 Only microorganisms, microbiological products, and materials consisting of, or derived or 
extracted solely from plant, animal, or mineral-bearing rock substances, may be applied in the production, 
storing , processing, harvesting, or packaging of raw agricultural commodities, other than seeds for 
planting, in order to meet the requirements of this subdivision. However, before harvest, the application 
of bordeaux mixes and trace elements, soluble kelp, lime, sulfur, gypsum, dormant oils, summer oils, fish 
emulsion, and soap are permitted, except that the application of aromatic petroleum solvents, diesel, and 
other petroleum fractions, used as weed or carrot oils, are prohibited. For purposes of this subdivision, 
“synthetically compounded” means those products formulated by a process which chemically changes a 
material or substance extracted from naturally occurring plant, animal or mineral sources, excepting 
microbiological processes. 
 (b) Processed foods manufactured only from raw agricultural commodities as described in 
subdivision (a). The use of ascorbic acid, sodium ascorbate, calcium ascorbate, and citric acid as an 
antioxidant or chelate is permitted in processed foods under this subdivision. 
 (c) Processed foods manufactured only from raw agricultural commodities as described in 
subdivision (a) and processed foods as described in subdivision (b). 
 (d) Meat, poultry, or fish produced without the use of any chemical or drug to simulate ro 
regulate growth or tenderness and without any drugs or antibiotics administered or introduced to such 
animal by injection of ingestion except for treatment of a specific disease or malady and in no event 
administered or introduced within 90 days of the slaughter of such animal; at least the final 60 percent of 
the sale weight of each animal, bird, or fish shall have been raised on feed without medication which 
complies with subdivision (a). 
 (e) Milk from animals, which are raised on feed without medication, which feed complies with 
the provisions of subdivision (a) or (b) and into which animal no drugs or antibiotics have been 
administered or introduced to such animal by injection or ingestion, except for treatment of a specific 
disease or malady and in no event administered or introduced within 30 days prior to the production of 
such milk. 
 (f) No product shall be labeled or advertised as a “wild” product unless such product is wholly 
derived from an undomesticated or uncultivated source and complies with the provisions of subdivision 
(s) 
 (g) No claim or implication shall be made in the advertising or promotion of a food product that 
the food product is organic, organically grown, naturally grown, wild, ecologically grown, or biologically 
grown, unless it conforms the requirements of this section 
 (h) This section shall not apply to the term “natural” when used in the labeling or advertising of a 
food. 
 This section shall not apply to the term “wild” when such term is used to describe a flavor or a 
food or a plant variety. 
 (i) This section shall remain in effect only until January 31, 1983, and as of such date is repealed, 
unless a later enacted statute, which is chaptered before such date, deletes or extends such date. 
 
SEC. 5  Section 26569.12 is added to the Health and Safety Code, to read 
26569.12 Except a otherwise provided in this division, no food product shall be labeled as “organic,” 
“organically grown,” “wild,” “ecologically grown,” or “biologically grown,” which has which has any 
pesticide residue in excess of 10 percent of the level regarded as safe by the federal Food and Drug 
Administration.  
 The prohibition of this section shall not apply to the term “wild” when such term is used to 
describe a flavor of a food or a plant variety 
 The prohibition of this section shall not apply to the term “natural”  
 This section shall remain in effect only until January 21, 1982, and as of such date is repealed, 
unless a later enacted statute, which is chaptered before such date, deleted or extends such date.  
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SEC. 6. Section 26569.13 is added to the Health and Safety Code, to read: 
26569.13(a) Except as otherwise provided in this division, the terms “organic,” “organically grown,” 
“wild,” “ecologically grown,” or “biologically grown” shall not be used for the advertising or labeling of 
a raw agricultural commodity, processed food product, or meat, poultry, fish, or milk, unless it complies 
with the provisions of Section 26569.11 and is prominently labeled as follows, or with substantially 
similar language: 
 (1) For raw agricultural food products 
      ORGANICALLY GROWN IN ACCORDANCE WITH SECTION 2659.11 OF THE  
     CALIFORNIA HELATH AND SAFETY CODE 
(2) For processed food products: 
    ORGANICALLY GROWN IN ACCORDANCE WITH SECTION 2659.11 OF THE  
     CALIFORNIA HELATH AND SAFETY CODE 
(3) For meat, poultry, fish, or milk: 
    ORGANICALLY GROWN IN ACCORDANCE WITH SECTION 2659.11 OF THE  
     CALIFORNIA HELATH AND SAFETY CODE 
(b) For unpackaged foods, the requirements of subdivision (a) relating to the labeling shall be 
deemed to have been met if such labeling appears prominently on or over the bin or container holding the 
food. 
The prohibition of this section shall not apply to the term “wild” when such term is used to 
describe a flavor of a food or a plant variety. 
 The prohibition of this section shall not apply to the term “natural.”  
 This section shall remain in effect only until January 21, 1982, and as of such date is repealed, 
unless a later enacted statute, which is chaptered before such date, deleted or extends such date.  
 
SEC. 7. Section 26569.15 is added to the Health and Safety Code, to read: 
26569.15  When a food product subject to the provisions of section 26569.11 is labeled as “certified,” the 
name of the person or organization which provides such certification shall be listed on the label. 
 This section shall remain in effect only until January 21, 1982, and as of such date is repealed, 
unless a later enacted statute, which is chaptered before such date, deleted or extends such date. 
 
SEC. 8. Section 26569.16 is added to the Health and Safety Code, to read: 
26569.16(a) All growers who sell farm products identified as “organic,” “organically grown,” “wild,” 
“ecologically grown,” or “biologically grown” shall keep accurate records of the location of the acreage 
used for growing such products and the additions, excluding water, made to the soil or applied to the 
plants or added to irrigation water. Such records shall be retained for two years after the crop is sold and 
delivered by the grower. 
(b) All persons who process of manufacture food products which are sold identified as “organic,” 
“organically grown,” “wild,” “ecologically grown,” or “biologically grown” shall keep accurate records 
as to the ingredients of the product and the names and addresses of persons from whom the ingredients 
were purchased. Such records shall be retained for two years after the food product is sold and delivered.  
  (c) All persons who sell such food products shall keep accurate records of the names and 
addresses of persons from whom such products were purchased. Such records shall be retained for two 
years after the food product is sold and delivered.  
 (d) Growers, manufacturers, and sellers of such products shall provide the department upon 
demand, with the relevant information from the records required pursuant to this section. 
 (e) The department shall collect information kept by a grower, manufacturer or seller pursuant to 
this section upon request of any person or entity. In providing such copies, the department may charge 
such requesting person of entity a fee for the cost of reproducing such information. 
(f) The provisions of this section shall not apply to the term “wild” when such term is used to 
describe a flavor of a food or a plant variety. 
 This section shall not apply to the term “natural” variety. 
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 This section shall remain in effect only until January 21, 1982, and as of such date is repealed, 
unless a later enacted statute, which is chaptered before such date, deleted or extends such date.  
 
SEC. 9. Section 26569.16 is added to the Health and Safety Code, to read: 
26569.17 The prohibitions or requirements contained in Sections 26569.11 to 26569.16, inclusive, shall 
not apply to persons engaged in business as wholesale or retail distributors of the commodities referred to 
in Sections 26569.11 to 26569.16, inclusive, except to the extent that such persons: 
 (1) Are engaged in the manufacturing, packaging, or labeling of such commodities, except that 
the prohibitions or requirements contained in Sections 26569.11 to 26569.16, inclusive, shall not apply to 
any such wholesale or retail distributor who in good faith makes the same representations on a package or 
label as have been made in writing or printed advertising or labeling by the manufacturer, distributor, or 
other person providing the product to such wholesale or retail distributor. 
 (2) Prescribe or specify by the specific means in violation of Sections 26569.11 to 26569.16, 
inclusive, the manner in which such commodities are manufactured packaged, or labeled. 
 (3) Have knowledge of the violation of any provisions of Sections 26569.11 to 26569.16, 
inclusive, by any specific batch of such commodities and continue to sell or distribute such specific batch 
of such commodity. 
This section shall remain in effect only until January 21, 1982, and as of such date is repealed, 
unless a later enacted statute, which is chaptered before such date, deleted or extends such date. 
SEC. 9.5. Section 26850.5 is added to the Health and Safety Code, to read: 
26850.5(a) Notwithstanding the provisions of Section 26850 or any other provision of law any person, 
organization, or public or private entity, may bring an action in superior court pursuant to this section and 
such court shall have jurisdiction upon hearing and for cause shown, to grant a temporary or permanent 
injunction restraining any person from violating any provision of Sections 26569.11 to 26569.16, 
inclusive. Any proceeding under the provisions of this section shall conform to the requirements of 
Chapter 3 (commencing with Section 525) of Title 7 of Part 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure, except  that 
such person, organization, or entity shall not be required to allege facts necessary to show, or tending to 
show, irreparable damage or loss, or to show, or tending to show, unique or special individual injury or 
damages. 
(b) In addition to the injunctive relief provided in subdivision (a), the court may award to such 
person, organization, or entity reasonable attorney’s fees as determined by the court. 
(c) The provisions of this section shall not be construed to limit or alter the power of the 
department and its authorized agents to bring an action to enforce the provisions of this chapter pursuant 
to Section 26850 or any other provision of law.  
This section shall remain in effect only until January 21, 1982, and as of such date is repealed, 
unless a later enacted statute, which is chaptered before such date, deleted or extends such date. 
 
SEC. 10. Section 26850.6 is added to the Health and Safety Code, to read: 
26850.6. Notwithstanding any provision of this division, including, but not limited to, Sections 26200, 
26202, 26205, 26206, 26207, 26208, 26210, 2630, 26232, 26409, 26433, 26434, 26436, 26438, 26559, 
26561, 26564, 26569,9, 26581, 26582, and 25590, and Article 2 (commencing with Section 26811), 
Article 3 (commencing with Section 26830), or Article 4 (commencing with Section 26850 of Chapter 8, 
or any other provision of law, no state agency shall have any affirmative obligation to adopt regulations or 
other to enforce the provisions of the Organic Foods Act of 1979, including but not limited to, the 
prevision of Section 2656911. 
This section shall remain in effect only until January 21, 1982, and as of such date is repealed, 
unless a later enacted statute, which is chaptered before such date, deleted or extends such date. 
SEC. 11. Notwithstanding Section 2231 or 2234 f the Revenue and Taxation Code, no appropriation is 
made by this act pursuant to these sections because this act creates a new crime or infraction, eliminates a 
crime or infraction, or changes the penalty for a crime or infraction. It is recognized however, that a local 
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agency or school district may pursue any remedies to obtain reimbursement available to it under Chapter 
3 (commencing with Section 2201 of Part 4 of Division 1 of that code. 
 
 




AN ACT to add Section 14904 to, and to add Chapter 10 (commencing with Section 46000) to 
Division 17 of, the Food and Agricultural Code, and to amend Section 26850.5 of, to add Article 4.5 
(commencing with Section 26569.20) to Chapter 5 of Division 21 of, and to repeal Sections 26469, 
26569.11, 26569.12, 26569.13, 26569.15, 26569.16, and 26569.17 of, the Health and Safety Code, 
relating to food. 
 
[Approved by Governor September 22, 1990.] 
[Filed with Secretary of State September 25, 1990.] 
 
LEGISLATIVE COUNSEL'S DIGEST 
 
AB 2012, Farr. Organic foods. 
 
(1) Under the Sherman Food, Drug and Cosmetic Law, standards are set forth defining the terms 
“organic,” “organically grown,” “naturally grown,” “wild,” “ecologically grown,” and “biologically 
grown” for purposes of their use in labeling or advertising of food. 
Existing law makes it unlawful, and subject to specified criminal penalties, to use these terms in a 
manner other than as those terms are defined, in the advertising or otherwise making other representation 
with respect to a raw agricultural commodity, processed food product, or meat, poultry, fish, or milk. 
The bill would make legislative findings and declarations concerning the need for clarification 
and enforcement of standards relating to the producing, processing, handling, and labeling of food sold as 
organic and the need to establish an Organic Food Advisory Board. 
The bill would repeal existing provisions relating to the sale of organic food. 
The bill would enact the California Organic Foods Act of 1990 in the Sherman Food, Drug and 
Cosmetic Law. 
The bill would specify that no food may be sold as organic unless it meets specified requirements, 
and would impose certain labeling requirements. 
This bill would require certification organizations which certify organic food to meet certain 
requirements as a condition of registration. The bill would require, on or after January 1, 1992, a 
certification organization which certifies processed food sold as organic, except for processed meat, fowl, 
or dairy products, to have registered with the State Director of Health Services and to annually renew the 
registration, as prescribed. 
The bill would require, on or after July 31, 1991, the State Director of Health Services, upon 
request of a sufficient number of persons to fund the program's cost, to establish and maintain a 
certification program for processors of food sold as organic, as prescribed, and also would require the 
director to establish and collect a fee to cover all of the costs of the State Department of Health Services 
of administering the program. 
The bill would require a registered certification organization to follow specified procedures as a 
requirement of providing certification. 
The bill would require, on or after January 1, 1992, every person engaged in this state in the 
processing or handling of processed food sold as organic, including the handling or processing of fish or 
seafood sold as organic, except for processors and handlers of processed meat, fowl, or dairy products, to 
have registered with the State Director of Health Services and to annually renew the registration, as 
320 
 
prescribed. It would require that a registration form be accompanied by payment of a nonrefundable 
registration fee, established by the State Director of Health Services. It would require the director to 
establish a fee schedule for handlers and processors. It would require that the fees not exceed the cost of 
the department to regulate and enforce the provisions in the bill. 
The bill would specify that certain acts are unlawful. 
The bill would authorize the director, in lieu of prosecution, to assess a civil penalty against any 
person who violates specified provisions or regulations adopted pursuant to those provisions, as 
prescribed. 
The bill would require that any fees and civil penalties collected by the State Director of Health 
Services pursuant to the act to be deposited in the General Fund and, upon appropriation by the 
Legislature, to be expended to fulfill the responsibilities of the director as specified in this bill. The bill 
would require the State Director of Health Services to enforce the California Organic Food Act of 1990 as 
applicable to processors and handlers of processed food sold as organic, only to the extent funds are 
available. 
 The bill would require the director, in cooperation with the Director of Food and Agriculture, to 
prepare a report to the Legislature, on or before January 1, 1994, describing certain enforcement 
activities, and containing recommendations regarding the need for, and means of, improved enforcement. 
The bill would provide for a complaint process to be established by the director to the extent funds are 
available. 
 
(2) The bill would require the Director of Food and Agriculture and county agricultural commissioners 
under the supervision and direction of the director to enforce the provisions of the California Organic 
Foods Act of 1990 applicable to producers of food sold as organic, handlers of raw agricultural 
commodities and eggs sold as organic, handlers and processors of meat, fowl, and dairy products sold as 
organic, and retailers of food sold as organic. The bill would require, on or after March 1, 1991, every 
person engaged in the production or handling of raw agricultural commodities or eggs sold as organic, 
except retailers of food sold as organic, or engaged in the production, handling, or processing of meat, 
fowl, and dairy products sold as organic to have registered with county agricultural commissioners and to 
annually renew the registration, as prescribed, and would require certain information on the registration 
form to be submitted under penalty of perjury, thereby imposing a state-mandated local program by 
creating a new crime. 
The bill would require the registration form of producers to be accompanied by payment of a 
nonrefundable registration fee, as specified, and would require the director to establish a fee schedule for 
handlers and processors to cover certain costs. It would require that the fees not exceed the cost of the 
department to regulate and enforce the provisions in the bill. It would require the registration form to 
include a public information sheet, as specified, which would be required to be made available for 
inspection and copying by the department and each county agricultural commissioner, as specified. 
The bill would require the director to establish the Organic Food Advisory Board, as specified, to 
advise the director. The bill would provide for a complaint process, spot inspections, and civil penalties 
for the enforcement of the program. The bill would impose a state-mandated local program by imposing 
specified duties on county agricultural commissioners. 
The bill would require, on or after January 1, 1992, a certification organization which certifies 
raw agricultural commodities, eggs, meat, fowl, or dairy products sold as organic to have registered with 
the Director of Food and Agriculture and to annually renew the registration, as prescribed, and would 
require the director to establish and collect an annual registration fee, as prescribed, of not more than 
$2,000 per organization. It would require that the fees not exceed the cost of the department to regulate 
and enforce the provisions of the bill. This bill would permit a county agricultural commissioner that 
conducts a prescribed certification program to establish a fee schedule for program participants, as 
specified. 
This bill would require that any fees and civil penalties collected by the Director of Food and 
Agriculture be deposited in the Department of Food and Agriculture Fund and, upon appropriation by the 
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Legislature, to be expended to fulfill the responsibilities of the director, as prescribed by the bill. Any fees 
and penalties collected by a county agricultural commissioner would be required to be expended to fulfill 
the responsibilities of the county agricultural commissioner, as prescribed by the bill. 
The bill would require the Director of Food and Agriculture, in consultation with the county 
agricultural commissioners and in cooperation with the State Director of Health Services, to prepare a 
report to the Legislature regarding the enforcement of the act. 
Since a violation of the provisions of the Sherman Food, Drug and Cosmetic Law is a 
misdemeanor, the bill would create new crimes, thus imposing additional duties upon local law 
enforcement agencies, and thereby imposing a state-mandated local program. 
The California Constitution requires the state to reimburse local agencies and school districts for 
certain costs mandated by the state. Statutory provisions establish procedures for making that 
reimbursement, including the creation of a State Mandates Claims Fund to pay the costs of mandates 
which do not exceed $1,000,000 statewide and other procedures for claims whose statewide costs exceed 
$1,000,000. 
This bill would provide that for certain costs no reimbursement is required by this act for 
specified reasons. 
However, the bill would provide that, if the Commission on State Mandates determines that this 
bill contains other costs mandated by the state, reimbursement for those costs shall be made pursuant to 
those statutory procedures and, if the statewide cost does not exceed $1,000,000, shall be payable from 
the State Mandates Claims Fund. 
 
The people of the State of California do enact as follows: 
 
SECTION 1. The Legislature hereby finds and declares all of the following: 
(a) An increasing amount of food sold in California is advertised, labeled or otherwise represented using 
descriptive terms such as “organic,” “organically grown,” “naturally grown,” “ecologically grown,” or 
“biologically grown,” or variations of those terms. This food often commands premium prices throughout 
the distribution chain. 
(b) In order to provide for the protection of the consumer, other buyers of organic food throughout the 
distribution chain, and the producers of organic food within this state, it is necessary that standards 
relating to the producing, processing, handling, and labeling of food sold as organic be clarified, and that 
these standards be strictly enforced. 
(c) Clarification and strict enforcement of standards related to food sold as organic will foster confidence 
in the integrity of this food, protect consumers, promote use of sustainable agricultural techniques, and 
facilitate the development of both in-state and out-of-state markets for California food that has been 
organically produced and certified. 
(d) Establishment of an Organic Food Advisory Board is necessary for the efficient development and 
management of an organic foods industry in the state, and essential to carrying out the purposes of this 
act. 
 
CA FOOD & AG § 14904 
SEC. 2. Section 14904 is added to the Food and Agricultural Code, to read: 
14904. The director shall adopt and enforce regulations for the manufacture, distribution, and labeling of 
feed used in connection with the production of food sold as organic pursuant to Article 4.5 (commencing 
with Section 26569.20) of Chapter 5 of Division 21 of the Health and Safety Code which shall be 
consistent with the requirements of that article. 
 
CA FOOD & AG Prec. § 46000 
SEC. 2.5. Chapter 10 (commencing with Section 46000) is added to Division 17 of the Food and 
Agricultural Code, to read: 
CHAPTER 10. ORGANIC FOODS 
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CA FOOD & AG § 46000 
46000. (a) The director and county agricultural commissioners under the supervision and direction of the 
director shall enforce the provisions of Article 4.5 (commencing with Section 26569.20) of Chapter 5 of 
Division 21 of the Health and Safety Code applicable to producers of food sold as organic, handlers of 
raw agricultural commodities sold as organic, and eggs sold as organic, handlers and processors of meat, 
fowl, and dairy products sold as organic, and retailers of food sold as organic. 
(b) The director and county agricultural commissioners under the supervision and direction of the director 
shall also enforce the provisions of Article 4.5 (commencing with Section 26569.20) of Chapter 5 of 
Division 21 of the Health and Safety Code applicable to certification organizations which certify food 
sold as organic under the enforcement jurisdiction of the director pursuant to subdivision (a). 
(c) The director may adopt any regulations as are reasonably necessary to implement his or her 
enforcement responsibilities as specified in Article 4.5 (commencing with Section 26569.20) of Chapter 5 
of Division 21 of the Health and Safety Code and in this chapter. 
 
CA FOOD & AG § 46002 
46002. (a) On or after March 1, 1991, every person engaged in this state in the production or handling of 
raw agricultural commodities or eggs sold as organic, or in the production, handling, or processing of 
meat, fowl, and dairy products sold as organic, excluding retailers of food sold as organic, shall have 
registered with the agricultural commissioner in the county of principal operation prior to the first sale of 
the food, and shall thereafter annually renew the registration unless no longer engaged in the activities 
requiring the registration. Each registrant shall provide a complete copy of its registration to the 
agricultural commissioner in any county in which the registrant operates. 
(b) Registration pursuant to this section shall be on a form provided by the department and shall be valid 
for a period of one calendar year from the date of validation by the department or county agricultural 
commissioner of the completed registration form. The director shall make forms available for this purpose 
on January 1, 1991. 
(c) The information provided on the registration form shall include all of the following: 
(1) The nature of the registrant's business, including the specific commodities produced, handled, or 
processed which are sold as organic. 
(2) For producers, a map showing the precise location and dimensions of the facility or farm where the 
commodities are produced. The map shall also describe the boundaries of the production area and all 
adjacent land uses, shall assign field numbers to distinct fields or management units, and shall describe 
the size of each field or management unit. 
(3) Sufficient information, under penalty of perjury, to enable the director or county agricultural 
commissioner to verify the amount of the registration fee to be paid in accordance with subdivision (e). 
(4) The names of all certification organizations or governmental entities, if any, providing certification 
pursuant to Sections 26569.30 to 26569.34, inclusive, of the Health and Safety Code. 
(5) In the case of producers, for each field or management unit, a list of all substances applied to the 
crop, soil, growing medium, growing area, irrigation or postharvest wash or rinse water, or seed, 
including the source of the substance, the brand name, if any, the rate of application, and the total 
amount applied in each calendar year, for at least the applicable time periods specified in subdivision (a) 
of Section 26569.22 of the Health and Safety Code. 
(d) The registration form shall include a separate “public information sheet” which shall include: 
(1) The name and address of the registrant. 
(2) The nature of the registrant's business, including the specific commodities produced, handled, or 
processed which are sold as organic. 
(3) The names of all certification organizations or governmental entities providing certification pursuant 
to Sections 26569.30 to 26569.34, inclusive, of the Health and Safety Code. 
(e) A registration form shall be accompanied by payment of a nonrefundable registration fee as follows: 
(1) For producers, a fee based on gross sales by the registrant of food sold as organic in the calendar year 
which precedes the date of registration, or if no sales were made in the preceding year, then based on the 
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expected sales during the 12 calendar months following the date of registration, according to the 
following schedule: 
 
Gross Sales Registration Fee 
$ 0 – 10,000 $ 25 
$ 10,001 – 25,000 $ 75 
$ 25,001 – 50,000 $ 100 
$ 50,001 – 100,000 $ 175 
$ 100,001 – 250,000 $ 300 
$ 250,001 – 500,000 $ 450 
$ 500,001 – 1,000,000 $ 750 
$ 1,000,001 – 2,500,000 $1,000 
$ 2,500,001 – 5,000,000 $1,500 
$ 5,000,001 and above $2,000 
 
Gross Sales Registration Fee 
$ 0 – 10,000 $ 25 
$ 10,001 – 25,000 $ 75 
$ 25,001 – 50,000 $ 100 
$ 50,001 – 100,000 $ 175 
$ 100,001 – 250,000 $ 300 
$ 250,001 – 500,000 $ 450 
$ 500,001 – 1,000,000 $ 750 
$ 1,000,001 – 2,500,000 $1,000 
$ 2,500,001 – 5,000,000 $1,500 
$ 5,000,001 and above $2,000 
(2) For handlers and processors subject to the enforcement jurisdiction of the director pursuant to 
Section 46000, the director shall establish a fee schedule to cover the reasonable, additional costs of 
administration and enforcement pursuant to this chapter in conjunction with other enforcement 
responsibilities of the director and the county agricultural commissioners funded from other sources. The 
fee for registration of handlers and processors subject to the enforcement jurisdiction of the director shall 
not exceed two thousand dollars ($2,000). 
The director shall publish annually a list of the fee schedule for each registration governed by this 
chapter. The setting of fees pursuant to this subdivision shall not be subject to the requirements of 
Chapter 3.5 (commencing with Section 11340) of Part 1 of Division 3 of Title 2 of the Government Code. 
(f) To the extent feasible, the director shall coordinate the registration and fee collection procedures of 
this section with similar licensing or registration procedures applicable to registrants. 
(g) The director or county agricultural commissioner shall reject a registration submission which is 
incomplete or not in compliance with this chapter and with Article 4.5 (commencing with Section 
26569.20) of Chapter 5 of Division 21 of the Health and Safety Code. 
(h) A registrant shall immediately notify the director of any change in the information reported on the 
registration form and shall pay any additional fee owed if that change results in a higher fee owed than 
that previously paid. 
(i) At the request of any person, the “public information sheet” described in subdivision (d) for any 
registrant shall be made available for inspection and copying at the main office of the department and 
each county agricultural commissioner. Copies of the “public information sheet” shall also be made 
available by mail, upon written request. The director or commissioner may charge a reasonable fee for the 
cost of reproducing a “public information sheet.” Except as described in this subdivision, a registration 
form shall be exempt from Chapter 3.5 (commencing with Section 6250) of Division 7 of Title 1 of the 
Government Code. 
(j) The requirements of this section shall not apply to retailers of food sold as organic. 
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CA FOOD & AG § 46003 
46003. (a) The director shall establish an advisory board, which shall be known as the Organic Food 
Advisory Board, for the purpose of advising the director in his or her responsibilities under this chapter 
and Article 4.5 (commencing with Section 26569.20) of Chapter 5 of Division 21 of the Health and 
Safety Code. 
(b) The advisory board shall be comprised of 13 members. Six members shall be producers, at least one of 
whom shall be a producer of meat, fowl, fish, dairy products, or eggs. One member shall be a processor, 
one member shall be a handler or a retailer, two members shall be consumer representatives, one member 
shall be an environmental representative, and two members shall be technical representatives with 
scientific credentials related to agricultural chemicals, toxicology, or food science. Except for the 
consumer, environmental, and technical representatives, the members of the advisory board shall have 
derived a substantial portion of their business income, wages, or salary from the production, handling, 
processing, or retailing of food sold as organic for at least three years preceding their appointment to the 
advisory board. The consumer and environmental representatives shall not have a financial interest in the 
organic food industry and shall be representatives of recognized nonprofit organizations whose principal 
purpose is the protection of consumer health or protection of the environment. The technical 
representatives shall not have a financial interest in the organic food industry. 
(c) The State Director of Health Services, or his or her representative, and a county agricultural 
commissioner shall be appointed as ex officio members of the advisory board. 
 
CA FOOD & AG § 46003.5 
46003.5. On or before January 1, 1993, the director, in consultation with the Organic Food Advisory 
Board, shall adopt regulations listing specific substances which are in compliance or not in compliance 
with the definition of “prohibited materials,” as defined in subdivision (p) of Section 26569.21 of the 
Health and Safety Code, for use in the production and handling of organic foods. 
These regulations should conform to any federal law or regulation governing materials allowed or 
disallowed for use on food sold as organic to the greatest extent possible. 
Prior to the adoption of these regulations, the director shall, by March 31, 1991, issue administratively a 
preliminary, non exhaustive list of materials which are in compliance or not in compliance with 
subdivision (p) of Section 26569.21 of the Health and Safety Code based on the listings of permitted 
materials published by California Certified Organic Farmers, the Organic Foods Production Association 
of North America, and the Departments of Agriculture of the States of Oregon and Washington. 
 
CA FOOD & AG § 46004 
46004. (a) Any person may file a complaint with the director concerning suspected noncompliance with 
Article 4.5 (commencing with Section 26569.20) of Chapter 5 of Division 21 of the Health and Safety 
Code, by a person under the enforcement jurisdiction of the director as provided in Section 46000. 
(b) The director shall establish procedures for handling complaints, including provision of a written 
complaint form, and procedures for commencing an investigation within three working days after 
receiving a complaint regarding fresh food, and within seven working days for other food, and completing 
an investigation and reporting findings and enforcement action taken, if any, to the complainant within 60 
days thereafter. 
(c) The director may establish minimum information requirements to determine the verifiability of a 
complaint, and may provide for rejection of a complaint which does not meet the requirements. The 
director shall provide written notice of the reasons for rejection to the person filing the complaint. 
 
CA FOOD & AG § 46005 
46005. The director and the county agricultural commissioners may conduct a program of spot 
inspections of persons required to register pursuant to Section 46002 to verify continuing compliance 
with this chapter and Article 4.5 (commencing with Section 26569.20) of Chapter 5 of Division 21 of the 
Health and Safety Code, according to uniform procedures established by the director. 
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CA FOOD & AG § 46006 
46006. At the request of a county agricultural commissioner, the district attorney for that county may 
bring an action to enforce this chapter or Article 4.5 (commencing with Section 26569.20) of Chapter 5 of 
Division 21 of the Health and Safety Code, within the enforcement jurisdiction of that commissioner. 
 
CA FOOD & AG § 46007 
46007. (a) In lieu of prosecution, the director or a county agricultural commissioner may levy a civil 
penalty against any person under the enforcement jurisdiction of the director as provided in Section 46000 
who violates Article 4.5 (commencing with Section 26569.20) of Chapter 5 of Division 21 of the Health 
and Safety Code, or any regulation adopted pursuant thereto or pursuant to this chapter, in an amount not 
more than five thousand dollars ($5,000) for each violation. The amount of the penalty assessed for each 
violation shall be based upon the nature of the violation, the seriousness of the effect of the violation upon 
effectuation of the purposes and provisions of this chapter and Article 4.5 (commencing with Section 
26569.20) of Chapter 5 of Division 21 of the Health and Safety Code, and the impact of the penalty on the 
violator, including the deterrent effect on future violations. 
(b) Notwithstanding the penalties prescribed in subdivision (a), if the director or county agricultural 
commissioner finds that a violation was not intentional, the director or county agricultural commissioner 
may levy a civil penalty of not more than two thousand five hundred dollars ($2,500) for each violation. 
(c) For a first offense, in lieu of a civil penalty as prescribed in subdivision (a) or (b), the director or 
county agricultural commissioner may issue a notice of violation if he or she finds that the violation is 
minor. 
(d) A person against whom a civil penalty is levied shall be afforded an opportunity for a hearing before 
the director or county agricultural commissioner, upon request made within 30 days after the issuance of 
the notice of penalty. At the hearing, the person shall be given the right to review the director's or 
commissioner's evidence of the violation and the right to present evidence on his or her own behalf. If no 
hearing is requested, the civil penalty shall constitute a final and nonreviewable order. 
(e) If a hearing is held, review of the decision of the director or commissioner may be sought by any 
person pursuant to Section 1094.5 of the Code of Civil Procedure within 30 days of the date of the final 
order of the director or commissioner. 
(f) A civil penalty levied by the director pursuant to this section may be recovered in a civil action 
brought in the name of the state. A civil penalty levied by a county agricultural commissioner pursuant to 
this section may be recovered in a civil action brought in the name of the county. 
(g) The director shall maintain in a central location, and make publicly available for inspection and 
copying upon request, a list of all civil penalties levied by the director and by each county agricultural 
commissioner within the past five years, including the amount of each penalty, the person against whom 
the penalty was levied, and the nature of the violation. Copies of this list shall also be available by mail, 
upon written request and payment of a reasonable fee, as set by the director. 
 
CA FOOD & AG § 46008 
46008. On or before January 1, 1994, the director, in consultation with the county agricultural 
commissioners and in cooperation with the State Director of Health Services, shall prepare a report to the 
Legislature describing enforcement activities under this chapter and Article 4.5 (commencing with 
Section 26569.20) of Chapter 5 of Division 21 of the Health and Safety Code, and containing 
recommendations regarding the need for, and means of, improved enforcement of that article and this 
chapter. The report shall include an analysis of the adequacy of fees collected pursuant to this chapter. 
 
CA FOOD & AG § 46009 
46009. (a) On or after January 1, 1992, a certification organization which certifies raw agricultural 
commodities, eggs, meat, fowl, or dairy products sold as organic shall have registered with the director 
and shall thereafter annually renew the registration unless no longer engaged in the activities requiring the 
registration. Registration shall be on a form provided by the director, shall include the filing of a 
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certification plan as specified in Section 26569.33 of the Health and Safety Code, and payment of the fee 
specified in subdivision (b). The registration form shall contain the names of all persons involved in 
making certification decisions or setting certification standards for the certification organization. The 
director shall reject a registration submission that is incomplete or not in compliance with this chapter and 
with Article 4.5 (commencing with Section 26569.20) of Chapter 5 of Division 21 of the Health and 
Safety Code. The director shall make forms available for this purpose on or before July 31, 1991. 
(b) The director shall supervise all certification organizations registered with the department, 
shall establish a complaint procedure concerning noncompliance with this chapter or Article 4.5 
(commencing with Section 26569.20) of Chapter 5 of Division 21 of the Health and Safety Code by 
certification organizations registered with the department, and shall establish and collect an annual 
registration fee based on the acreage, unit of weight or measurement, number of head, gross sales, or 
other measure of the amount of food certified by the organization, to cover the costs of the supervision. 
The registration fee may not exceed two thousand dollars ($2,000) per organization. Supervision shall 
include a written evaluation of the organization's certification plan at least biannually, which shall be 
made available for public inspection. The director shall have the authority to audit the organization's 
certification procedures and records at any time, but any records of the certification organization not 
otherwise required to be disclosed shall be kept confidential by the director. 
(c) On or after July 31, 1991, the director and the county agricultural commissioners under the 
supervision of the director shall, if requested, establish a voluntary certification program for producers of 
organic food and processors of organic meat, fowl, and dairy products under the enforcement jurisdiction 
of the director. This program shall meet all of the requirements of Sections 26569.31 to 26569.34, 
inclusive, of the Health and Safety Code. The director shall establish a fee schedule, which may include a 
late payment penalty, for participants in this program which covers all of the department's reasonable 
costs of the program. A county agricultural commissioner that conducts a voluntary certification program 
pursuant to this section shall establish a fee schedule for participants in this program which covers all of 
the agricultural commissioner's reasonable costs of the program. The director may not expend funds 
obtained from registration fees collected under this chapter for the purposes of adopting or administering 
this program. 
(d) This chapter shall apply to all food sold as organic within the state, wherever produced, handled, or 
processed, and to all food produced, handled, or processed in the state, wherever sold as organic, except 
that in lieu of certification under this chapter, the director may recognize a certification program operating 
outside of the state which certifies raw agricultural commodities, eggs, meat, fowl, or dairy products if the 
director determines that such program meets minimum standards substantially similar to those contained 
in subdivision (c) of Section 26569.30, and Sections 26569.32 to 26569.34, inclusive, of the Health and 
Safety Code. 
 
CA FOOD & AG § 46010 
46010. This chapter shall be interpreted in conjunction with Article 4.5 (commencing with Section 
26569.20) of Chapter 5 of Division 21 of the Health and Safety Code. 
 
CA FOOD & AG § 46010.5 
46010.5. No fee established and collected pursuant to this chapter shall exceed the department's costs or 
the county agricultural commissioner's costs, as the case may be, of regulating and enforcing the 
provisions of this chapter related to the function for which the fee is established. 
 
CA FOOD & AG § 46011 
46011. Any fees and penalties collected by the director pursuant to this chapter shall be deposited in the 
Department of Food and Agriculture Fund and, upon appropriation by the Legislature, shall be expended 
to fulfill the responsibilities of the director as specified in this chapter. Any fees and penalties collected by 
a county agricultural commissioner pursuant to subdivision (c) of Section 46009 shall be expended to 
fulfill the responsibilities of the county agricultural commissioner, as specified in this chapter. 
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CA HLTH & S § 26469 Repealed 
SEC. 3. Section 26469 of the Health and Safety Code is repealed. 
 
CA HLTH & S § 26569.11 Repealed 
SEC. 4. Section 26569.11 of the Health and Safety Code is repealed. 
 
CA HLTH & S § 26569.12 Repealed 
SEC. 5. Section 26569.12 of the Health and Safety Code is repealed. 
 
CA HLTH & S § 26569.13 Repealed 
SEC. 6. Section 26569.13 of the Health and Safety Code is repealed. 
 
CA HLTH & S § 26569.15 Repealed 
SEC. 7. Section 26569.15 of the Health and Safety Code is repealed. 
 
CA HLTH & S § 26569.16 Repealed 
SEC. 8. Section 26569.16 of the Health and Safety Code is repealed. 
 
CA HLTH & S § 26569.17 Repealed 
SEC. 9. Section 26569.17 of the Health and Safety Code is repealed. 
 
CA HLTH & S Prec. § 26569.20 
SEC. 10. Article 4.5 (commencing with Section 26569.20) is added to Chapter 5 of Division 21 of the 
Health and Safety Code, to read: 
Article 4.5. The California Organic Foods Act of 1990 
 
CA HLTH & S § 26569.20 
26569.20. This article shall be known, and may be cited as, the California Organic Foods Act of 1990. 
 
CA HLTH & S § 26569.21 
26569.21. The following words and phrases, when used in this article, shall have the following 
meanings: 
(a) “Administered” means ingested, injected, or otherwise topically or internally introduced to livestock, 
fowl, or fish. 
(b) “Applied” means introduced, incorporated within, added to, or placed upon any seed, crop, plant, 
livestock, fowl, fish, soil, or growing medium, and shall also mean used in, on, or around any facility or 
area in which food is kept. 
(c) “Area” means the physical space surrounding food where there is more than a negligible chance of a 
prohibited material being absorbed by, incorporated into, or adhered to the food, soil or growing medium. 
The area may differ significantly depending on the circumstances. Except in the case of the production of 
food, area shall not include any physical space surrounding food if an intervening event, such as the use 
of a cleaning method for processing equipment, or the passage of time, has made the chance of a 
prohibited material being absorbed by, incorporated into, or adhered to the food, negligible. 
(d) “Botanicals” means substances derived solely from plants or plant parts. 
(e) “Endemic disease” means a disease in animal or fish which is either universal or common to a species 
within the geographic region. 
(f) “Enforcement authority” means the governmental unit with primary enforcement jurisdiction, as 
provided in Section 26569.44. 
(g) “Field” means a contiguous area of land for agricultural production which is managed with a 
consistent set of production methods. 
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(h) “Feed” means any substance used or intended for consumption by livestock, fowl, or fish to provide 
nourishment, including range and pasturage vegetation. 
(i) “Growing medium” means a substance that provides nutrients for plants or fungi but which is separate 
from the land surface of the world. 
(j) “Handled” means shipped, packed, repacked, sold for resale, warehoused, wholesaled, imported into 
the state, or stored by other than a grower, producer, processor, or retailer of that food. 
(k) “Management unit” means the physical facilities and equipment associated with crop production 
which is not confined to a field, such as animal production, greenhouse production, or seed sprouting. 
Management units shall be described by the location and function of the physical facilities and equipment, 
and other aspects as determined by the enforcement authority. In the case of animal production, the 
management units shall also be described by the quantity and source of each group of animals that is 
managed together as a unit. 
(l) “Processed” means cooking, baking, heating, drying, mixing, grinding, crushing, pressing, churning, 
separating, extracting juices or other materials, peeling, fermenting, eviscerating, preserving, dehydrating, 
freezing, or manufacturing which materially alters the flavor, keeping quality, or any other property, or 
the making of any substantial change of form. “Processed” does not include refrigeration at temperatures 
which are above the freezing point nor any other treatment which merely retards or accelerates the natural 
processes of ripening or decomposition. 
(m) “Produced” means grown, raised, harvested, handled, or stored under the control of the grower or 
producer. 
(n) “Producer,” “handler,” and “processor” means any person who has, respectively, produced, handled, 
or processed any food. 
(o) “Production,” “handling,” and “processing” means the process by which any food is, respectively, 
produced, handled, and processed. 
(p) “Prohibited materials” means any of the following: 
(1) When used in connection with the production, handling, or processing of meat, fowl, or fish: 
(A) Any drug, medication, hormone or growth regulator, whether or not synthetic, or any other synthetic 
substance, including, but not limited to, any substance administered to stimulate or regulate growth or 
tenderness, and any subtherapeutic dose of antibiotic. The use of a drug or medication for medical 
treatment of a specific and manifest malady diagnosed and prescribed by a licensed veterinarian, or under 
the general supervision of a licensed veterinarian, shall be permitted, but not within 90 days prior to 
slaughter or twice the withdrawal time specified by the federal Food and Drug Administration, whichever 
is longer. In addition, vaccines may be administered for prevention of an endemic disease or as required 
by law. Vitamin and mineral supplements also may be administered. 
(B) Any feed administered to livestock, fowl, or fish that does not comply with the requirements of 
regulations adopted pursuant to Section 14904 of the Food and Agricultural Code. 
(C) Any artificial rumen stimulants, such as plastic pellets. 
(D) Any manure intentionally fed or refed. 
(E) Any synthetically compounded substance applied postslaughter to the meat, fowl, or fish itself, or to 
its packaging, including preservatives. 
(F) Any substance applied to any area where livestock, fowl, or fish or meat, fowl, or fish products are 
handled or kept at any time that does not consist entirely of microorganisms, microbiological products, or 
substances consisting of, or derived or extracted solely from, plant, animal, or mineral-bearing rock 
substances. Prohibited materials shall not include the application of botanicals, lime-sulfur, gypsum, 
soaps, and detergents. Prohibited materials shall include the application of petroleum solvents, diesel, and 
other petroleum fractions. 
(2) When used in connection with the production, distribution, or processing of dairy products or eggs: 
(A) Any drug, medication, hormone, or growth regulator, whether or not synthetic, and any other 
synthetic substance, including, but not limited to, any substance administered to stimulate or regulate 
growth, milk or egg production, and any subtherapeutic dose of antibiotic. The use of a drug or 
medication for medical treatment of a specific and manifest malady diagnosed and prescribed by a 
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licensed veterinarian, or under the general supervision of a licensed veterinarian, shall be permitted, but 
not less than 30 days prior to taking of the milk or laying of eggs, or twice the withdrawal time specified 
by the federal Food and Drug Administration, whichever is longer. In addition, vaccines may be 
administered for prevention of an endemic disease or as required by law. Vitamin and mineral 
supplements may also be administered. 
(B) Any feed administered to livestock within one year of the taking of the milk, or to fowl within six 
months of the laying of eggs, that does not comply with the requirements of regulations adopted pursuant 
to Section 14904 of the Food and Agricultural Code. 
(C) Any artificial rumen stimulants, such as plastic pellets. 
(D) Any manure intentionally fed or refed. 
(E) Any substance applied to any area where livestock, fowl, or fish, or meat, dairy, fowl, or fish products 
are handled or kept at any time that does not consist entirely of microorganisms, microbiological 
products, or substances consisting of, or derived or extracted solely from, plant, animal, or mineral-
bearing rock substances. Prohibited materials shall not include the application of botanicals, lime-sulfur, 
gypsum, soaps, and detergents. Prohibited materials shall include the application of petroleum solvents, 
diesel, and other petroleum fractions. 
(3) When used in connection with the production, handling, or processing of raw agricultural 
commodities and any other food not specified in paragraphs (1) and (2), any synthetically compounded 
fertilizer, pesticide, growth regulator, or any other substance that does not consist entirely of 
microorganisms, microbiological products, or substances consisting of, or derived or extracted solely 
from plant, animal, or mineral-bearing rock substances. Before harvest, prohibited materials shall not 
include the application of bordeaux mixes and trace elements for known deficiencies as determined by 
plant or animal tissue or by soil testing, soluble aquatic plant products, botanicals, lime-sulphur, gypsum, 
dormant oils, summer oils, fish emulsion, soaps, detergents, and nonionic surfactants except for 
petroleum solvents, diesel, and other petroleum fractions, used as weed or carrot oils. Prohibited materials 
shall not include the application of soaps and detergents. 
(4) Water, including substances dissolved in water, shall not be a prohibited material, even if it contains 
incidental contamination from a prohibited material, if the prohibited material was not added by, or under 
the direction or control of, the producer, handler, processor or retailer. 
(q) “Retailer” means a person engaged in the sale to consumers of food sold as organic and not engaged 
in the production, handling or processing of food sold as organic. 
(r) “Sold as organic” means any use of the terms “organic,” “organically grown,” “naturally grown,” 
“ecologically grown,” or “biologically grown,” or grammatical variations of those terms, whether orally 
or in writing, in connection with any food grown, handled, processed, sold, or offered for sale in this state, 
including, but not limited to, any use of these terms in labeling or advertising of any food and any 
ingredient in a multi-ingredient food, except as provided in Section 26569.36. 
(s) “Substance” includes all components of a substance, including active and inert ingredients. 
(t) “Synthetically compounded” means formulated or manufactured by a process which chemically 
changes a substance extracted from naturally occurring plant, animal, or mineral sources, excepting 
microbiological processes. 
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26569.22. Except as otherwise provided in this article, no food shall be sold as organic unless it consists 
entirely of any of the following: 
(a) Raw agricultural commodities which meet the following requirements: 
(1) The commodity has been produced and handled without any prohibited material or color additive 
having been applied, and without irradiation. 
(2) In the case of any raw agricultural commodity produced from seed, the seed has not been treated with 
any prohibited material. If untreated seed is not available, seed treated with a fungicide may be used for 
food germinated prior to January 1, 1994, except for seed used for sprouts, as described in paragraph (6). 
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(3) Prior to January 1, 1995, in the case of perennial crops, no prohibited material shall have been applied 
to the crop, field, management unit, or area in which the commodity is grown for 12 months prior to the 
appearance of flower buds. During the 1995 calendar year, in the case of perennial crops, no prohibited 
material shall have been applied to the crop, field, management unit, or area in which the commodity is 
grown for 24 months prior to harvest. Commencing January 1, 1996, in the case of perennial crops, no 
prohibited material shall have been applied to the crop, field, management unit, or area in which the 
commodity is grown for 36 months prior to harvest. 
(4) Prior to January 1, 1995, in the case of annual or two-year crops, no prohibited material shall have 
been applied to the field, management unit, or area in which the commodity is grown for 12 months prior 
to seed planting or transplanting. During the 1995 calendar year, in the case of annual or two-year crops, 
no prohibited material shall have been applied to the crop, field, management unit, or area in which the 
commodity is grown for 24 months prior to harvest. Commencing January 1, 1996, in the case of annual 
or two-year crops, no prohibited material shall have been applied to the crop, field, management unit, or 
area in which the commodity is grown for 36 months prior to harvest. 
(5) In the case of any raw agricultural commodity that is grown in any growing medium, such as fungi 
grown in compost or transplants grown in potting mix: 
(A) The growing medium must have been manufactured or produced: 
(i) Without any prohibited material having been included in the medium. 
(ii) Without any prohibited material having been applied to the area in which the medium is manufactured 
or produced for 12 months prior to seeding or inoculation of the medium. 
(iii) Using methods that will minimize the migration or accumulation of any pesticide chemical residue in 
food grown in the medium. 
(B) No prohibited material shall have been applied to the area in which the commodity is grown for 12 
months prior to seeding or inoculation. 
(6) In the case of any raw agricultural commodity that is grown directly from seed without soil or any 
growing medium, such as sprouts, no prohibited material shall have been applied to the seed, and no 
prohibited material shall have been applied to the area in which the commodity is grown for 12 months 
prior to germination of the seed. After January 1, 1992, the seed shall have been produced, handled, and 
processed in accordance with this article. 
(b) Processed food manufactured only from raw agricultural commodities as described in subdivision (a). 
(c) Processed food manufactured only from a combination of raw agricultural commodities as described 
in subdivision (a) and processed food as described in subdivision (b). 
(d) Meat, fowl, fish, dairy products, or eggs which are produced, distributed, and processed without any 
prohibited material having been applied or administered. 
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26569.23. (a) No food which contains any prohibited material residue as a result of spray drift or any 
other contamination beyond the control of the producer, handler, processor, or retailer, may be sold as 
organic unless the amount of residue does not exceed 10 percent of the federal Environmental Protection 
Agency tolerance level or, where there is no tolerance level, does not exceed the federal Food and Drug 
Administration action level. 
(b) After January 1, 1992, no food which contains any prohibited material residue as a result of spray drift 
or any other contamination beyond the control of the producer, handler, processor, or retailer, may be sold 
as organic unless the amount of prohibited material residue does not exceed 5 percent of the federal 
Environmental Protection Agency tolerance level or, where there is not a tolerance level, the federal Food 
and Drug Administration action level. 
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26569.24. (a) No food grown, handled, processed, sold, advertised, represented, or offered for sale in this 
state, shall be sold as organic unless it also is prominently labeled, invoiced, and represented as follows, 
or with substantially similar language: 
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(1) For raw agricultural commodities: 
ORGANICALLY GROWN IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE CALIFORNIA ORGANIC 
FOODS ACT OF 1990. 
(2) For processed food: 
ORGANICALLY GROWN AND PROCESSED IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE 
CALIFORNIA ORGANIC FOODS ACT OF 1990. 
(3) For unprocessed meat, fowl, fish, dairy products, or eggs: 
ORGANICALLY PRODUCED IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE CALIFORNIA ORGANIC 
FOODS ACT OF 1990. 
(b) For unpackaged food sold as organic to consumers, physical attachment to the food of the applicable 
language set forth in subdivision (a) shall not be required if the language appears prominently on or near 
the bin or container holding the food. 
(c) For food certified by a registered certification organization in accordance with Sections 26569.30 to 
26569.34, inclusive, or Section 46009 of the Food and Agricultural Code, the term “CERTIFIED” may be 
used in labeling food sold as organic by the producer and by any handler if the name of the registered 
certification organization precedes or follows that term in the same size type, and if subdivisions (a) and 
(b) have been met. 
(d) When unprocessed food that has been certified by two or more registered certification organizations, 
is commingled by a handler or retailer, but is not processed, the food shall thereafter be labeled as set 
forth in paragraph (1) or (3) of subdivision (a), and subdivisions (b) and (c), with the name of each 
certification organization that has certified any of the food. 
(e) Except as provided in subdivision (f), when less than all of the ingredients in a multi-ingredient food 
are produced, handled, and, if applicable, processed in accordance with Section 26569.22, the food shall 
not be sold as organic. However, those ingredients produced, handled, and processed in accordance with 
Section 26569.22 may be described using the terms contained in subdivision (r) of Section 26569.21 on 
the principal display panel of the food if the terms are clearly used only to modify those ingredients and 
only if 100 percent of those ingredients are produced in accordance with Section 26569.22. The use of the 
terms shall be limited to no greater than three-quarters of the type size of the statement of identity. 
Additionally or alternatively, those ingredients produced, handled, and processed in accordance 
with Section 26569.22 may be described using the terms contained in subdivision (r) of Section 26569.21 
on the ingredient list on the packaging, if all other provisions of this article are met. 
(f) No food may be advertised or labeled as “organic when available” or similar terminology which leaves 
in doubt whether the food is being sold as organic. 
(g) The provisions of this article relating to the labeling of meat and meat products and poultry and 
poultry products shall not be interpreted to authorize any labeling of those products, which is subject to 
the jurisdiction of federal labeling laws, in a manner inconsistent with those federal labeling laws. 
(h) Notwithstanding subdivision (a), until January 1, 1992, any person may utilize existing supplies of 
labels that conform to the requirements of former Section 26569.13. 
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26569.25. The director may adopt regulations listing specific substances which are in compliance or not 
in compliance with subdivision (p) of Section 26569.21 for use in the processing of foods under the 
enforcement jurisdiction of the department. 
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26569.28. (a) All persons who produce raw agricultural commodities that are sold as organic shall keep 
accurate and specific records of the following: 
(1) For each field or management unit, all substances applied to the crop, soil, growing medium, growing 
area, irrigation or postharvest wash or rinse water, or seed, including all substances applied during the 
time periods specified in paragraphs (3) to (6), inclusive, of subdivision (a) of Section 26569.22, the 
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quantity of each substance applied, and the date of each application. All substances shall be identified by 
brand name, if any, and by source. 
(2) The quantity harvested from each field or management unit, the size of the field or management unit, 
the field number, and the date of harvest. 
(3) The name and, if applicable, the registration numbers issued pursuant to Section 26569.35 or Section 
46002 of the Food and Agricultural Code of all handlers, processors, or retailers to whom the food is sold 
or otherwise transferred, the quantity of food sold or otherwise transferred, and the date of the transaction. 
(b) All persons who produce meat, fowl, fish, dairy products, or eggs sold as organic shall keep accurate 
and specific records of the following: 
(1) Unless the livestock, fowl, or fish was raised or hatched by the producer, the name and address and, if 
applicable, the registration numbers issued pursuant to Section 26569.35 or Section 46002 of the Food 
and Agricultural Code of all suppliers of livestock, fowl, or fish and the date of the transaction. 
(2) The name and address and, if applicable, the registration numbers issued pursuant to Section 26569.35 
or Section 46002 of the Food and Agricultural Code of all suppliers of feed, the quantity of feed 
purchased, and the date of the transaction. 
(3) All substances administered and fed to the animal, including all feed, medication and drugs, and all 
substances applied in any area in which the animal, milk or eggs are kept, including the quantity 
administered or applied, and the date of each application. All substances shall be identified by brand 
name, if any, and by source. 
(4) The name and address and, if applicable, the registration numbers issued pursuant to Section 26569.35 
or Section 46002 of the Food and Agricultural Code of all handlers, processors, or retailers to whom the 
food is sold or otherwise transferred, the quantity of food sold or otherwise transferred, and the date of the 
transaction. 
(c) All persons who handle food sold as organic shall keep accurate and specific records of the following: 
(1) The name and address and, if applicable, the registration numbers issued pursuant to Section 26569.35 
or Section 46002 of the Food and Agricultural Code of all suppliers of the food, the quantity of food 
purchased or otherwise transferred, and the date of the transaction. 
(2) Invoices for each shipment from the supplier that state that the food may be sold as organic. 
(3) If the food is labeled or represented to be certified, invoices from the supplier or separate written 
documentation from a certification organization which states that the food is certified under this article. 
(4) All pesticide chemicals applied to the food while in the control of the handler, including the quantity 
applied, and the date of each application. All pesticide chemicals shall be identified by brand name, if 
any, and by source. 
(5) All substances routinely applied in or around any area or container in which the food is kept. All 
substances shall be identified by brand name, if any, and by source. This record may be provided in the 
form of a single list of substances used. 
(6) The name and address and, if applicable, the registration numbers issued pursuant to Section 26569.35 
or Section 46002 of the Food and Agricultural Code of all persons to whom the food is sold or otherwise 
transferred, the quantity of food sold or otherwise transferred, and the date of the transaction. 
(d) All persons who process food sold as organic shall keep accurate and specific records of the 
following: 
(1) The name and address and, if applicable, the registration numbers issued pursuant to Section 26569.35 
or Section 46002 of the Food and Agricultural Code of all suppliers of the food, the quantity of food 
purchased or otherwise transferred, and the date of the transaction. 
(2) Invoices for each shipment from the supplier that state that the food may be sold as organic. 
(3) If the food is labeled or represented to be certified, invoices from the supplier or separate written 
documentation from a certification organization which states that the food is certified under this article. 
(4) All substances applied to the food or used in its processing, all substances applied to the food while in 
the control of the processor, and all substances applied in or around any area or container in which the 
food is kept, including the quantity of substances applied and the date of each application. All substances 
shall be identified by brand name, if any, and by source. 
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(5) The name and address and, if applicable, the registration numbers issued pursuant to Section 26569.35 
or Section 46002 of the Food and Agricultural Code of all handlers, processors, or retailers to whom the 
food is sold or otherwise transferred, the quantity of food sold or otherwise transferred, and the date of the 
transaction. 
(e) All persons who sell, at retail, food sold as organic shall keep accurate and specific records of the 
following: 
(1) The name and address and, if applicable, the registration numbers issued pursuant to Section 26569.35 
or Section 46002 of the Food and Agricultural Code of all suppliers of the food, the quantity of food 
purchased or otherwise transferred, and the date of the transaction. 
(2) Invoices for each shipment from the supplier that state that the food may be sold as organic. 
(3) If the food is labeled or represented to be certified, invoices from the supplier or separate written 
documentation from a certification organization which states that the food is certified under this article. 
(4) All pesticide chemicals applied to the food while in the control of retailer, including the quantity 
applied, and the date of each application. All pesticide chemicals shall be identified by brand name, if 
any, and by source. 
(5) All substances routinely applied in or around any area or container in which the food is kept. All 
substances shall be identified by brand name, if any, and by source. This record may be provided in the 
form of a single list of substances used. One list may be kept at the retailer's headquarters office if all 
individual stores operated by that retailer utilize only the substances on the list. 
Paragraphs (1) and (2) shall not apply to a person who both produces and sells, at retail, the same 
food. The records required to be kept pursuant to paragraphs (1) to (4), inclusive, of this subdivision may 
be kept at the retailer's warehouse or headquarters office. 
(f) All records required to be kept under this section shall be maintained by producers, handlers, and 
processors for no less than two years from the date on which the food is sold and shall be maintained by 
retailers for no less than one year from the date on which the food is received by the retailer. These 
records shall be made available for inspection at any time by the director or the Director of Food and 
Agriculture and by each certification organization that certifies the food, if any, for purposes of carrying 
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26569.29. (a) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, any producer, handler, processor, or retailer 
of food sold as organic shall immediately make available for inspection by, and shall upon request, within 
72 hours of the request, provide a copy to, the director or the Director of Food and Agriculture of any 
record required to be kept under this section for purposes of carrying out this article and Chapter 10 
(commencing with Section 46000) of Division 17 of the Food and Agricultural Code. 
(b) Upon written request of any person, the director and the Director of Food and Agriculture shall obtain 
and provide to the requesting party within 10 working days of the request a copy of the following records 
required to be kept under this section which pertain to a specific product sold or offered for sale, except 
that financial information about an operation or transaction, information regarding the quantity of a 
substance administered or applied, the date of each administration or application, and any other 
information on that record which is not required to be disclosed under this subdivision shall be removed 
before disclosure: 
(1) Records of a producer, as described in paragraph (1) of subdivision (a) and in paragraph (3) of 
subdivision (b) of Section 26569.28. 
(2) Records of a handler, as described in paragraphs (4) and (5) of subdivision (c) of Section 26569.28, 
records of previous handlers, if any, and producers as described in paragraph (1) of subdivision (a) of, 
paragraph (3) of subdivision (b) of, and paragraphs (4) and (5) of subdivision (c) of, Section 26569.28, 




(3) Records of a processor, as described in paragraph (4) of subdivision (d) of Section 26569.28, records 
of previous processors and handlers, if any, and producers as described in paragraph (1) of subdivision (a) 
of, paragraph (3) of subdivision (b) of, paragraphs (4) and (5) of subdivision (c) of, and paragraph (4) of 
subdivision (d) of, Section 26569.28, without identifying the previous processors, handlers, or producers, 
and, if applicable, records obtained as required in subdivision (d). 
(4) Records of a retailer, as described in paragraphs (4) and (5) of subdivision (e) of Section 26569.28, 
records of previous processors and handlers, if any, and producers as described in paragraph (1) of 
subdivision (a) of, paragraph (3) of subdivision (b) of, paragraphs (4) and (5) of subdivision (c), and 
paragraph (4) of subdivision (d) of, Section 26569.28, without identifying the previous processors, 
handlers, or producers, and, if applicable, records obtained as required in subdivision (d). 
(c) The director or the Director of Food and Agriculture may charge the person requesting records a 
reasonable fee for the cost of reproducing the records requested and may require specific information on 
the date and location of sale or offer for sale and details concerning the identity of the product. 
(d) Any person who first imports into this state, for resale, food sold as organic shall obtain and provide to 
the enforcement authority, upon request, the records required to be kept under subdivisions (a) and (b) of 
Section 26569.28 and, if applicable, subdivisions (c) and (d). 
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26569.30. (a) On or after January 1, 1992, the term “certified” and variations of that term may be used in 
connection with food sold as organic only in accordance with this section, subdivisions (c) and (d) of 
Section 26569.24, Sections 26569.31 to 26569.34, inclusive, and Section 46009 of the Food and 
Agricultural Code. 
(b) Food sold as organic may be certified only by a certification organization registered pursuant to 
subdivisions (c) and (d), by the director pursuant to subdivision (f), or by a county agricultural 
commissioner pursuant to Section 46009 of the Food and Agricultural Code. 
(c) In order to be registered, a certification organization shall meet all of the following minimum 
qualifications: 
(1) Be the certification organization for at least 10 legally separate and distinct, financially unrelated, and 
independently controlled persons involved in the production or processing of food sold as organic. 
(2) Be a legally separate and distinct entity from any person whose food is certified by the organization. A 
certification organization shall be considered legally separate and distinct notwithstanding the fact that 
persons or representatives of persons whose food is certified serve as directors, officers, or in other 
capacities for the certification organization, so long as those persons or representatives of those persons 
do not exercise decisionmaking authority over certification of that particular food. 
(3) Have no financial interest in the sale of the food, except that fees charged by the certification 
organization to cover the reasonable costs of operating the certification organization do not constitute a 
financial interest for purposes of this section. 
(d) On or after January 1, 1991, a certification organization which certifies processed food sold as 
organic, except for processed meat, fowl, or dairy products, shall have registered with the director and 
shall thereafter annually renew the registration unless no longer engaged in the activities requiring the 
registration. Registration shall be on a form provided by the director, shall include the filing of a 
certification plan as specified in Section 26569.33 and payment of the fee specified in subdivision (f). The 
director shall make forms available for this purpose on or before July 31, 1991. The registration form 
shall include the names of all persons involved in making certification decisions or setting certification 
standards for the certification organization. The director shall reject a registration submission that is 
incomplete or not in compliance with this article. 
(e) On or after July 31, 1991, the director may, upon the request of a sufficient number of persons to fund 
the program's cost, establish and maintain a certification program for processors of food sold as organic 
and shall establish and collect a fee from all processors of food certified under that program to cover all of 
the department's costs of administering the program. The certification program shall be subject to all 
335 
 
provisions regarding certification organizations contained in this article, except that the requirements of 
subdivisions (c) and (d) shall not apply. 
(f) The director shall supervise all certification organizations registered with the department, shall 
establish a complaint procedure concerning noncompliance with this article by certification organizations 
registered with the department, and shall establish and collect an annual registration fee based on the unit 
of weight or measure, gross sales or other measure of the amount of food certified by the organization, to 
cover the costs of the supervision. The registration fee established by the department shall not exceed two 
thousand dollars ($2,000) per organization. Supervision shall include a written evaluation of the 
organization's certification plan at least biannually. The written evaluation shall be made available for 
public inspection. 
(g) The director shall have the authority to audit the organization's certification procedures and records at 
any time. Records of certification organizations not otherwise required to be disclosed shall be kept 
confidential by the director. 
 
CA HLTH & S § 26569.31 
26569.31. Prior to an initial certification, a registered certification organization shall conduct at least two 
initial physical inspections of the premises at which the food to be certified is produced or processed. 
These inspections shall include the recordkeeping system necessary for compliance with Section 
26569.28 and the area or facility at which the food is produced or processed. 
For raw agricultural commodities, at least one initial inspection shall include fertility analysis of 
the soil or growing medium. Sampling for this analysis shall be no less frequent than one sample per 40 
acres or per management unit, whichever is less, except that only one sample shall be required for 
contiguous parcels managed solely for range or pasturage, and except that, for field crops, sampling shall 
be no less frequent than one sample per 160 acres or per management unit, whichever is less. 
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26569.32. (a) A registered certification organization shall no less often than, at the end of each calendar 
quarter, prepare a list by name of all persons whose production or processing of food is certified or 
pending certification by the certification organization. This list shall be filed with the department or the 
Department of Food and Agriculture, as applicable, by the certification organization and made publicly 
available within 30 days after the end of each quarter. 
(b) A registered certification organization shall, at least annually, physically inspect the premises at which 
the food to be certified is produced and processed. The inspection shall include an examination of 
recordkeeping and, for raw agricultural commodities, fertility analysis as required under Section 
26569.31. 
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26569.33. A registered certification organization shall adopt and adhere to a certification plan filed 
annually and made publicly available. Except in the case of a certification program established pursuant 
to subdivision (e) of Section 26569.30, a certification plan shall be filed as part of the registration 
required pursuant to subdivision (d) of Section 26569.30. A certification plan shall at minimum include a 
detailed description of all of the following elements of the certification organization's program: 
(a) Minimum information required from producers or processors regarding growing or processing 
practices and methods for verifying that information. 
(b) Qualifications of and training requirements for all inspectors. 
(c) Procedures for inspection, including frequency and items covered. 
(d) Procedures for soil and tissue sampling and analysis. 
(e) Criteria for certification. 
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26569.34. (a) Only food that has been produced, handled, and processed in accordance with this article 
may be certified by a registered certification organization. No food may be certified unless compliance 
with this article has been verified by the registered certification organization, in the case of producers, for 
at least one year, and in the case of processors, for at least six months. 
(b) Processed or multi-ingredient food sold as organic may only by certified if all the ingredients are 
certified. 
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26569.35. (a) On or after January 1, 1992, every person engaged in this state in the processing or 
handling of processed food sold as organic, including the handling or processing of fish or seafood sold as 
organic, except for processors and handlers of processed meat, fowl, or dairy products, shall have 
registered with the director, prior to the first sale of such food, and shall thereafter annually renew the 
registration unless no longer so engaged. 
(b) Registration shall be on a form provided by the director and shall be valid for a period of one calendar 
year from the date of validation of the completed registration form. The director shall make forms 
available for this purpose on or before October 1, 1991. The information provided on the registration form 
shall include all of the following: 
(1) The nature of the registrant's business, including the specific commodities handled or processed which 
are sold as organic. 
(2) Sufficient information, under penalty of perjury, to enable the director to verify the amount of the 
registration fee to be paid in accordance with subdivision (c). 
(3) The names of all certification organizations and governmental entities, if any, providing certification 
pursuant to this article. 
(c) A registration form shall be accompanied by payment of a nonrefundable registration fee. For handlers 
and processors subject to the enforcement jurisdiction of the director, the director shall establish a fee 
schedule to cover the additional cost of enforcing and administering this article in conjunction with other 
enforcement responsibilities funded from other sources. The registration fee shall not exceed two 
thousand dollars ($2,000). The director shall publish annually a list of the fee schedule for each 
registration governed by this article. The setting of fees pursuant to this article shall not be subject to the 
requirements of Chapter 3.5 (commencing with Section 11340) of Part 1 of Division 3 of Title 2 of the 
Government Code. 
(d) To the extent feasible, the director shall coordinate the registration and fee collection procedures of 
this section with similar licensing or registration procedures applicable to registrants. 
(e) The director shall reject a registration submission which is incomplete or not in compliance with this 
article. 
(f) A registrant shall immediately notify the director of any change in the information reported on the 
registration form and shall pay any additional assessment owed if that change results in a higher 
assessment owed than that previously paid. 
(g) Registration forms shall be made available to the public for inspection and copying at the main office 
of the department. Copies of registration forms shall also be made available by mail, upon written request 
and payment of a reasonable fee, as determined by the director. All financial information of the registrant 
shall be deleted prior to public inspection and copying. 
(h) The requirements of this section shall not apply to retailers of food sold as organic. 
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26569.36. This article shall apply to all food sold as organic within the state, wherever produced, 
handled, or processed, and to all food produced, handled, or processed in the state, wherever sold as 
organic; except that in lieu of certification under this article, the director may recognize a certification 
program operating outside the state which certifies processed food sold as organic, except for processed 
meat, fowl, or dairy products, as functionally equivalent to a certification organization registered under 
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Section 26569.30, so long as that program meets minimum standards substantially similar to those 
contained in subdivision (c) of Section 26569.30 and Section 26569.31 and subdivision (b) of Section 
26569.32. 
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26569.37. This article shall not apply to the term “natural” when used in the labeling or advertising of a 
food. 
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26569.38. (a) It is unlawful for any person to sell, offer for sale, advertise, or label any food in violation 
of this article. 
(b) Notwithstanding subdivision (a), a person engaged in business as a distributor or retailer of food who 
in good faith sells, offers for sale, labels, or advertises any food in reliance on the representations of a 
producer, processor, or other distributor that the food may be sold as organic, shall not be found to violate 
this article unless the distributor either: (1) knew or should have known that the food could not be sold as 
organic; (2) was engaged in producing or processing the food; or (3) prescribed or specified the manner in 
which the food was produced or processed. 
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26569.39. (a) It is unlawful for any person to certify food in violation of this article. 
(b) It is unlawful for any person to certify food as organic unless duly registered as a certification 
organization pursuant to Section 26569.30. 
(c) It is unlawful for any person to willfully make a false statement or representation, or knowingly fail to 
disclose a fact required to be disclosed, in registration for a certification organization pursuant to Section 
26569.30. 
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26569.40. (a) It is unlawful for any person to produce, handle, or process food sold as organic unless 
duly registered pursuant to Section 26569.34. 
(b) It is unlawful for any person to willfully make a false statement or representation, or knowingly fail to 
disclose a fact required to be disclosed, in registration pursuant to Section 26569.35. 
 
CA HLTH & S § 26569.41 
26569.41. It is unlawful for any person to forge, falsify, fail to retain, fail to obtain, or fail to disclose 
records pursuant to Sections 26569.28 and 26569.29. 
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26569.42. It is unlawful for any person to advertise, label, or otherwise represent that any fertilizer or 
pesticide chemical may be used in connection with the production, processing, or distribution of food sold 
as organic if that fertilizer or pesticide chemical contains a prohibited material. 
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26569.43. (a) In lieu of prosecution, the director may levy a civil penalty against any person who 
violates this article or any regulation adopted pursuant to this article in an amount not more than five 
thousand dollars ($5,000) for each violation. The amount of the penalty assessed for each violation shall 
be based upon the nature of the violation, the seriousness of the effect of the violation upon effectuation 
of the purposes and provisions of this article, and the impact of the penalty on the violator, including the 
deterrent effect on future violations. 
(b) Notwithstanding the penalties prescribed in subdivision (a), if the director finds that a violation was 
not intentional, the director may levy a civil penalty of not more than two thousand five hundred dollars 
($2,500) for each violation. 
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(c) For a first offense, in lieu of a civil penalty as prescribed in subdivisions (a) and (b), the director may 
issue a notice of violation, if he or she finds that the violation is minor. 
(d) A person against whom a civil penalty is levied shall be afforded an opportunity for a hearing before 
the director, upon request made within 30 days after the date of issuance of the notice of penalty. At the 
hearing, the person shall be given the right to review the director's evidence of the violation and the right 
to present evidence on his or her own behalf. If no hearing is requested, the civil penalty shall constitute a 
final and nonreviewable order. 
(e) If a hearing is held, review of the decision of the director may be sought by any person within 30 days 
of the date of the final order of the director pursuant to Section 1094.5 of the Code of Civil Procedure. 
(f) A civil penalty levied by the director pursuant to this section may be recovered in a civil action 
brought in the name of the state. 
 
CA HLTH & S § 26569.435 
26569.435. No fee established and collected pursuant to this article shall exceed the department's costs of 
regulating and enforcing the provisions of this article related to the function for which the fee is 
established. 
 
CA HLTH & S § 26569.44 
26569.44. Any fees and civil penalties collected pursuant to this article shall be deposited in the General 
Fund and, upon appropriation by the Legislature, shall be expended to fulfill the responsibilities of the 
director as specified in this article. 
 
CA HLTH & S § 26569.45 
26569.45. The director shall, to the extent funds are available, enforce the provisions of this article 
applicable to all processors and handlers of processed food sold as organic, including handlers and 
processors of fish and seafood sold as organic, except for processors and handlers of processed meat, 
fowl, and dairy products. 
 
CA HLTH & S § 26569.46 
26569.46. (a) The director shall maintain in a central location, and make publicly available for inspection 
and copying, upon request, a list of all penalties levied within the past five years, including the amount of 
each penalty, the party against whom the penalty was levied, and the nature of the violation. The list also 
shall be available by mail, upon written request and payment of a reasonable fee, as determined by the 
director. 
(b) On or before January 1, 1994, the director, in cooperation with the Director of Food and Agriculture, 
shall prepare a report to the Legislature describing enforcement activities under this article and Chapter 
10 (commencing with Section 46000) of Division 17 of the Food and Agricultural Code and containing 
recommendations regarding the need for, and means of, improved enforcement of this article and Chapter 
10 (commencing with Section 46000) of Division 17 of the Food and Agricultural Code. 
 
CA HLTH & S § 26569.47 
26569.47. (a) Any person may file a complaint with the director concerning suspected noncompliance 
with this article by a person over whom the director has responsibility as provided in this article. 
(b) The director shall, to the extent funds are available, establish a procedure for handling complaints, 
including, provision of a written complaint form, and procedures for commencing an investigation within 
three working days of receiving a written complaint regarding fresh food, and within seven working days 
for other food, and completing an investigation and reporting findings and enforcement action taken, if 
any, to the complainant within 90 days thereafter. 
(c) The director may establish minimum information requirements to determine the verifiability of a 
complaint and may provide for rejection of a complaint which does not meet the requirements. The 
director shall provide written notice of the reasons for rejection to the person filing the complaint. 
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(d) The responsibilities of the director under this section shall be carried out to the extent funds are 
available. 
 
CA HLTH & S § 26569.48 
26569.48. This article shall apply notwithstanding any other provision of law that is inconsistent with 
this article. Nothing in this article is intended to repeal any other provision of law not inconsistent with 
this article. 
 
CA HLTH & S § 26569.49 
26569.49. The director may adopt any regulations as are reasonably necessary to assist in the 
implementation of, or to make more specific, the provisions of, this article. 
 
CA HLTH & S § 26569.50 
26569.50. Any reference in law to former Section 26569.11, whether existing or hereinafter enacted, 
shall be interpreted to refer to this article and Chapter 10 (commencing with Section 46000) of Division 
17 of the Food and Agricultural Code as the successor section. 
 
CA HLTH & S § 26850.5 
SEC. 11. Section 26850.5 of the Health and Safety Code is amended to read: 
26850.5. (a) Notwithstanding the provisions of Section 26850 or any other provision of law, any person  
may bring an action in superior court pursuant to this section and the court shall have jurisdiction upon 
hearing and for cause shown, to grant a temporary or permanent injunction restraining any person from 
violating any provision of Article 4.5 (commencing with Section 26569.20 of Chapter 5. Any proceeding 
under the provisions of this section shall conform to the requirements of Chapter 3 (commencing with 
Section 525) of Title 7 of Part 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure, except that the person shall not be 
required to allege facts necessary to show, or tending to show, lack of adequate remedy at law, or to 
show, or tending to show, irreparable damage or loss, or to show, or tending to show, unique or special 
individual injury or damages. 
(b) In addition to the injunctive relief provided in subdivision (a), the court may award to such person, 
organization, or entity reasonable attorney's fees as determined by the court. 
(c) The provisions of this section shall not be construed to limit or alter the powers of the department and 
its authorized agents to bring an action to enforce the provisions of this chapter pursuant to Section 26850 
or any other provision of law. 
 
SEC. 12. If any provision of this act or the application thereof to any person or circumstances is held 
invalid, that invalidity shall not affect other provisions or applications of the act which can be given effect 
without the invalid provision or application, and to this end the provisions of this act are severable. 
 
SEC. 13. No reimbursement is required by this act pursuant to Section 6 of Article XIII B of the 
California Constitution for those costs which may be incurred by a local agency or school district because 
this act creates a new crime or infraction, changes the definition of a crime or infraction, changes the 
penalty for a crime or infraction, or eliminates a crime or infraction. 
No reimbursement is required by this act pursuant to Section 6 of Article XIII B of the California 
Constitution because the local agency or school district has the authority to levy service charges, fees, or 
assessments sufficient to pay for certain aspects of the program or level of service mandated by this act. 
However, notwithstanding Section 17610 of the Government Code, if the Commission on State 
Mandates determines that this act contains other costs mandated by the state, reimbursement to local 
agencies and school districts for those costs shall be made pursuant to Part 7 (commencing with Section 
17500) of Division 4 of Title 2 of the Government Code. If the statewide cost of the claim for 
reimbursement does not exceed one million dollars ($1,000,000), reimbursement shall be made from the 
State Mandates Claims Fund. Notwithstanding Section 17580 of the Government Code, unless otherwise 
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specified in this act, the provisions of this act shall become operative on the same date that the act takes 
effect pursuant to the California Constitution. 
 
 
2002 AB 2823 (Chapter 533) 
 
CHAPTER   786 
FILED WITH SECRETARY OF STATE SEPTEMBER 26, 1994 
APPROVED BY GOVERNOR SEPTEMBER 24, 1994 
 
   An act to amend Section 46009 of the Food and Agricultural Code, and to amend Sections 26569.22, 
26569.29, and 26569.30 of, and to amend, repeal, and add Section 27831 of, the Health and Safety Code, 
relating to food. 
 
LEGISLATIVE COUNSEL'S DIGEST 
 
 AB 2518, Areias.  Organic foods:  farmers' markets. 
 (1) Existing law requires any nongovernmental certification organization that certifies certain products as 
organic to register with the Secretary of Food and Agriculture. 
    This bill would provide that in lieu of complying with these registration requirements, the 
Secretary of Food and Agriculture may approve certification organizations that are accredited under the 
federal organic foods law.  
 (2) Existing law requires, under certain circumstances, the secretary and county agricultural 
commissioners to establish a voluntary certification program for producers of organic food 
products. 
    This bill would require this program to meet all of the requirements of the federal certification 
program, including federal accreditation.  This bill would thus increase the duties of county agricultural 
commissioners by requiring that the certification program meet federal requirements, thereby 
imposing a state-mandated local program. 
 (3) Existing law, the Sherman Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Law, prohibits application of prohibited 
materials on any raw agricultural commodity that is grown directly from seed without 
soil or any growing medium. 
     This bill would, instead, prohibit the application to any raw agricultural commodity that is 
grown directly from seed and harvested within 18 days of germination. 
 (4) Existing law requires the State Director of Health Services and the Secretary of Food and Agriculture 
to obtain and provide to a requesting party a copy of specified records that are prepared by producers, 
handlers, processors, or retailers of food sold as organic that pertain to a specific product and 
identify the substances applied, administered, or added to the product.  It provides that this information is 
not to be considered a trade secret. 
 Existing law authorizes the director or secretary to charge a reasonable fee to reimburse himself 
or herself or the source of the records for the cost of reproducing the records requested. 
 
    Existing law provides that the above provisions become inoperative on January 1, 1995. 
 This bill would delete the provision making the foregoing provision inoperative on January 1, 
1995. 
     The bill would authorize a person required to provide these records to petition the State 
Director of Health Services or the Secretary of Food and Agriculture to deny the request for the records 
on the ground that the request is frivolous or harassing, and would authorize the secretary or director to 
waive this information production requirement for the specific request for information that was the 
subject of the petition.  
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 (5) Existing law authorizes use of the term "certified" and variations of the term in connection with food 
sold as organic only in accordance with certain laws. 
    This bill would, instead, require that all organic products be certified by a registered certifying 
organization and would permit the sale of food as organic only in accordance with certain laws. 
 (6) Existing law authorizes the director to establish and maintain a certification program for processors of 
food sold as organic, subject to certain requirements.  Existing law authorizes the director to establish and 
collect a fee to cover the costs of administering the program. 
    This bill would require that the program meet all of the requirements for federal certification 
programs, including federal accreditation. 
 (7) Existing law, the California Uniform Retail Food Facilities Law regulates sanitary standards in retail 
food establishments, including certified farmers' markets and vehicles selling food, as defined.  Existing  
law prohibits food preparation at certified farmers' markets.  Existing law imposes primary responsibility 
for the enforcement of this law on local health agencies, and provides that the willful violation of any 
of its provisions is a misdemeanor. 
    This bill would provide an exception to this prohibition for food samples if certain sanitary 
conditions are met, including the use of potable water for hand washing and sanitizing and the disposal of 
utensil and hand washing water in a manner approved by the local law enforcement agency.  This bill 
would authorize vendors selling food adjacent to and under the jurisdiction and management of a certified 
farmers' market to store, display, and sell food from a table or display fixture apart from the vehicle in a 
manner approved by the local enforcement agency. It would provide for the repeal of these provisions on 
January 1, 1997. 
    To the extent that this bill would increase the duties of local public health agencies by requiring 
the approval of the local enforcement agency, this bill would impose a state-mandated local program.  By 
imposing new requirements on certified farmers' markets, this bill would expand the definition of a crime, 
thereby imposing a state-mandated local program. 
 (8) The California Constitution requires the state to reimburse local agencies and school districts for 
certain costs mandated by the state.Statutory provisions establish procedures for making that 
reimbursement, including the creation of a State Mandates Claims Fund to pay the costs of mandates 
which do not exceed $1,000,000 statewide and other procedures for claims whose statewide costs exceed 
$1,000,000.  
    This bill would provide that for certain costs no reimbursement is required by this act for 
specified reasons. 
   However, the bill would provide that, if the Commission on State Mandates determines that this bill 
contains costs mandated by the state, reimbursement for those costs shall be made pursuant to those 
statutory procedures and, if the statewide cost does not exceed $1,000,000, shall be made from the State 
Mandates Claims Fund. 
 
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA DO ENACT AS FOLLOWS: 
 
SECTION 1. Section 46009 of the Food and Agricultural Code is amended to read:  
  46009.(a) Effective January 1, 1993, a nongovernmental certification organization that certifies raw 
agricultural commodities, eggs, meat, fowl, or dairy products sold as organic shall register with the 
secretary and shall thereafter annually renew the registration, unless the organization is no longer 
engaged in the activities requiring the registration. Registration shall be on a form provided by the 
secretary, shall include the filing of a certification plan as specified in Section 26569.33 of the Health and 
Safety Code, and payment of the fee specified in subdivision (b).  The registration form shall contain the 
names of all persons involved in making certification decisions or setting certification standards for 
the certification organization.  The secretary shall reject a registration submission that is incomplete or not 
in compliance with this chapter and Article 4.5 (commencing with Section 26569.20) of Chapter 5 of 




    In lieu of registration pursuant to this subdivision, the secretary may approve a certification 
organization that is accredited under the federal organic foods law. 
 (b) Each nongovernmental certification organization shall pay an annual registration fee of five hundred 
dollars ($500) to the secretary.  Any registration submitted by a certification organization, registered with 
the department, shall be made available to the public for inspection and copying.  The secretary may audit 
the organization's certification procedures and records at any time, but any records of the certification 
organization not otherwise required to be disclosed shall be kept confidential by the secretary. 
 (c) The secretary and the county agricultural commissioners under the supervision of the secretary shall, 
if requested by a ufficient number of persons to cover the costs of the program in a county as determined 
by the secretary, establish a voluntary certification program for producers of organic food and processors 
of organic meat, fowl, and dairy products under the enforcement jurisdiction of the secretary.  This 
program shall meet all of the requirements of Sections 26569.31 to 26569.34, inclusive, of the Health and 
Safety Code.  In addition, this program shall meet all of the requirements of the federal certification 
program, including federal accreditation. 
   The secretary shall establish a fee schedule for participants in this program that covers all of the 
department's reasonable costs of the program.  A county agricultural commissioner that conducts a 
voluntary certification program pursuant to this section shall establish a fee schedule for participants in 
this program which covers all of the agricultural commissioner's reasonable costs of the program.  The 
secretary may not expend funds obtained from registration fees collected under this chapter for the 
purposes of adopting or administering this program. 
    The certification fee authorized by this subdivision is due and payable on or before the 10th day 
of the month following the month in which the decision to grant the certification is issued.  Any person 
who does not pay the amount that is due within the required period shall pay the enforcement authority 
providing the certificate a penalty of 10 percent of the total amount determined to be due, plus interest at 
the rate of 11/2 percent interest per month on the unpaid balance. 
 (d) This chapter applies to all food sold as organic within the state, wherever produced, handled, or 
processed, and to all food produced, handled, or processed in the state, wherever sold as organic, except 
that in lieu of registration under this chapter, the secretary may recognize a certification organization 
operating outside of the state that certifies raw agricultural commodities, eggs, meat, fowl, or dairy 
products if the secretary determines that the organization meets minimum standards substantially similar 
to those contained in subdivision (c) of Section 26569.30, and Sections 26569.32 to 26569.34, inclusive, 
of the Health and Safety Code.  The secretary shall establish, administratively, a procedure for 




SEC. 2. Section 26569.22 of the Health and Safety Code is amended to read: 
   26569.22.  Except as otherwise provided in this article, no food shall be sold as organic unless it 
consists entirely of any of the following: 
 (a) Raw agricultural commodities that meet the following requirements: 
 (1) The commodity has been produced and handled without any prohibited material or color additive 
having been applied, and without irradiation. 
 (2) In the case of any raw agricultural commodity produced from seed, the seed has not been treated with 
any prohibited material.  If untreated seed is not available, seed treated with a fungicide may be used, 
except for seed used for sprouts, as described in paragraph (6). 
 (3) Prior to January 1, 1995, in the case of perennial crops, no prohibited material shall have been applied 
to the crop, field, management unit, or area where the commodity is grown for 12 months prior to the 
appearance of flower buds.  During the 1995 calendar year, in the case of perennial crops, no prohibited 
material shall have been applied to the crop, field, management unit, or area where the commodity is 
grown for 24 months prior to harvest.  Commencing January 1, 1996, in the case of perennial crops, no 
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prohibited material shall have been applied to the crop, field, management unit, or area where the 
commodity is grown for 36 months prior to harvest. 
 (4) Prior to January 1, 1995, in the case of annual or two-year crops, no prohibited material shall have 
been applied to the field, management unit, or area where the commodity is grown for 12 months prior to 
seed planting or transplanting. During the 1995 calendar year, in the case of annual or two-year crops, no 
prohibited material shall have been applied to the crop, field, management unit, or area where the 
commodity is grown for 24 months prior to harvest.  Commencing January 1, 1996, in the case of annual 
or two-year crops, no prohibited material shall have been applied to the crop, field, management unit, or 
area where the commodity is grown for 36 months prior to harvest. 
 (5) In the case of any raw agricultural commodity that is grown in any growing medium, such as fungi 
grown in compost or transplants grown in potting mix: 
 (A) The growing medium must have been manufactured or produced: 
 (i) Without any prohibited material having been included in the medium. 
 (ii) Without any prohibited material having been applied to the area where the medium is manufactured 
or produced during seeding or inoculation of the medium. 
 (iii) Using methods that will minimize the migration or accumulation of any pesticide chemical residue in 
food grown in the medium. 
 (B) No prohibited material shall have been applied to the area where the commodity is grown during 
seeding or inoculation. 
   If a prohibited material is applied in the area prior to seeding or inoculation, a residue test shall 
be performed on the commodity grown from that seeding or inoculation. 
 (6) In the case of any raw agricultural commodity that is grown directly from seed and harvested within 
18 days of germination, including, by way of example, sprouts, no prohibited material shall have been 
applied to the seed, and no prohibited material shall have been applied to the area where the commodity is 
grown after introduction of the seed.  After January 1, 1992, the seed shall have been produced, handled, 
and processed in accordance with this article. 
 (b) Processed food manufactured only from raw agricultural commodities as described in subdivision (a), 
except as follows: 
 (1) Water, air, and salt may be added to the processed food. 
 (2) Ingredients other than raw agricultural commodities as described in subdivision (a) may be added to 
the processed food if these ingredients are included in the national list adopted by the United States 
Secretary of Agriculture pursuant to Section 6517 of the federal Organic Foods Production Act (7 U.S.C. 
Sec. 6501 et seq.) and do not represent more than 5 percent of the weight of the total finished product, 
excluding salt and water. 
 (c) Processed food manufactured only from a combination of raw agricultural commodities as described 
in subdivision (a) and processed food as described in subdivision (b). 
 (d) Meat, fowl, fish, dairy products, or eggs that are produced, distributed, and processed without any 
prohibited material having been applied or administered. 
 SEC. 3. Section 26569.29 of the Health and Safety Code is amended to read: 
   26569.29.(a) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, any producer, handler, processor, or retailer 
of food sold as organic shall immediately make available for inspection by, and shall upon request, within 
72 hours of the request, provide a copy to, the director, the Attorney General, any prosecuting attorney, 
any governmental agency responsible for enforcing laws related to the production or handling of food old 
as organic, or the Secretary of Food and Agriculture of any record required to be kept under this section 
for purposes of carrying out this article and Chapter 10 (commencing with Section 46000) of Division 17 
of the Food and Agricultural Code.  Records acquired pursuant to this subdivision shall not be public 
records as that term is defined in Section 6252 of the Government Code and shall not be subject to 
Chapter 3.5 (commencing with Section 6250) of Division 7 of Title 1 of the Government Code. 
 (b) Upon written request of any person that establishes cause for the request, the director and the 
Secretary of Food and Agriculture shall obtain and provide to the requesting party within 10 working 
days of the request a copy of any of the following records required to be kept under this article that 
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pertain to a specific product sold or offered for sale, and that identify substances applied, administered, or 
added to that product, except that financial information about an operation or transaction, information 
regarding the quantity of a substance administered or applied, the date of each administration or 
application, information regarding the identity of suppliers or customers, and the quantity or price of 
supplies purchased or products sold shall be removed before disclosure and shall not be released to any 
person other than persons and agencies authorized to acquire records under subdivision (a): 
 (1) Records of a producer, as described in paragraph (1) of subdivision (a) and in paragraph (3) of 
subdivision (b) of Section 26569.28. 
 (2) Records of a handler, as described in paragraphs (4) and (5) of subdivision (c) of Section 26569.28, 
records of previous handlers, if any, and producers as described in paragraph (1) of subdivision (a) of, 
paragraph (3) of subdivision (b) of, and paragraphs (4) and (5) of subdivision (c) of, Section 26569.28, 
without identifying the previous handlers or producers, and, if applicable, records obtained as required in 
subdivision (d). 
 (3) Records of a processor, as described in paragraph (4) of subdivision (d) of Section 26569.28, except 
for processing aids that are not residual in the product and spices and seasonings exempt from labeling 
requirements in Parts 145 and 146 of Title 21 of the Code of Federal Regulation, records of previous 
processors and handlers, if any, and producers as described in paragraph (1) of subdivision (a) of, 
paragraph (3) of subdivision (b) of, paragraphs (4) and (5) of subdivision (c) of, and paragraph (4) of 
subdivision (d) of, Section 26569.28, without identifying the previous processors, handlers, or producers, 
and, if applicable, records obtained as required in subdivision (d). 
 (4) Records of a retailer, as described in paragraphs (4) and (5) of subdivision (e) of Section 26569.28, 
records of previous processors and handlers, if any, and producers as described in paragraph (1) of 
subdivision (a) of, paragraph (3) of subdivision (b) of, paragraphs (4) and (5) of subdivision (c), and 
paragraph (4) of subdivision (d) of, Section 26569.28, without identifying the previous processors, 
handlers, or producers, and, if applicable, records obtained as required in subdivision (d). 
    This subdivision shall be the exclusive means of public access to records required to be kept 
by producers, processors, handlers, and retailers under this article. 
    A person required to provide records pursuant to a request under this subdivision, may 
petition the director or the Secretary of Food and Agriculture to deny the request based on a finding that 
the request is of a frivolous or harassing nature. 
   The secretary or director may, upon the issuance of such a finding, waive the information 
production requirements of this subdivision for the specific request for information that was the subject of 
the petition. 
 (c) Information specified in subdivision (b) that is required to be released upon request shall not be 
considered a "trade secret" under Section 26235, Section 1060 of the Evidence Code, or the Uniform 
Trade Secrets Act (Title 5 (commencing with Section 3426) of Part 1 of Division 4 of the Civil Code). 
 (d) The director or the Secretary of Food and Agriculture may charge the person requesting records a 
reasonable fee to reimburse him or her self or the source of the records for the cost of reproducing the 
records requested. 
 (e) Any person who first imports into this state, for resale, food sold as organic shall obtain and provide 
to the enforcement authority, upon request, proof that the products being sold have been certified by an 
accredited certifying organization or have otherwise been produced in compliance with this article. 
 (f) The director shall not be required to obtain records not in his or her possession in response to a 
subpoena.  Prior to releasing records required to be kept pursuant to this chapter in response to a 
subpoena, the director shall delete any information regarding the identity of suppliers or customers and 
the quantity or price of supplies purchased or products sold. 
 
SEC. 4. Section 26569.30 of the Health and Safety Code is amended to read: 
 26569.30.(a) Commencing January 1, 1996, all organic products shall be certified by a registered 
certifying organization, and food shall be sold as organic only in accordance with this section, 
subdivisions (c) and (d) of Section 26569.24, Sections 26569.31 to 26569.34, inclusive, and Section 
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46009 of the Food and Agricultural Code.  The Secretary of Food and Agriculture, director, and the 
county agricultural commissioners shall carry out this subdivision to the extent that adequate funds are 
made available for that purpose. 
 (b) Food sold as organic may be certified only by a certification organization registered pursuant to 
subdivisions (c) and (d), by the director pursuant to subdivision (f), by a certification organization 
registered pursuant to Section 46009 of the Food and Agricultural Code, or by the Secretary of Food 
and Agriculture or a county agricultural commissioner pursuant to Section 46009 of the Food and 
Agricultural Code or a federally accredited certification organization. 
 (c) In order to be registered, a certification organization shall meet all of the following minimum 
qualifications: 
 (1) Be the certification organization for at least five legally separate and distinct, financially unrelated, 
and independently controlled persons involved in the production or processing of food sold as organic. 
 (2) Be a legally separate and distinct entity from any person whose food is certified by the organization.  
A certification organization shall be considered legally separate and distinct notwithstanding the fact that 
persons or representatives of persons whose food is certified serve as directors, officers, or in other 
capacities for the certification organization, so long as those persons or representatives of those persons 
do not exercise decisionmaking authority over certification of that particular food. 
 (3) Have no financial interest in the sale of the food, except that fees charged by the certification 
organization to cover the reasonable costs of operating the certification organization do not constitute a 
financial interest for purposes of this section. 
 (d) Effective January 1, 1992, a certification organization which certifies processed food sold as organic, 
except for processed meat, fowl, or dairy products, shall register with the director and shall thereafter 
annually renew the registration unless no longer engaged in the activities requiring the registration.  
Registration shall be on a form provided by the director, shall include the filing of a certification plan as 
specified in Section 26569.33 and payment of the fee specified in subdivision (f).  The director shall make 
forms available for this purpose on or before December 1, 1993.  The registration 
form shall include a written statement affirming compliance with all requirements for certification 
organizations specified in Section 26569.30 to 26569.34, inclusive, and confirmation that each component 
of the organization's certification plan has been filed as specified in Section 26569.33.  The director shall 
reject a registration submission that is incomplete or not in compliance with this article. 
 (e) Commencing July 31, 1991, the director may, upon the request of a sufficient number of persons to 
fund the program's cost, establish and maintain a certification program for processors of food sold as 
organic and shall establish and collect a fee from all processors of food certified under that program to 
cover all of the department's costs of administering the program.  The certification program shall be 
subject to all provisions regarding certification organizations contained in this article, except that the 
requirements of subdivisions (c) and (d) shall not apply, and the program shall meet all of the 
requirements for federal certification programs, including federal accreditation. 
 (f) The registration fee shall be five hundred dollars ($500), unless the certification organization is also 
registered as a certifier of producers by the Secretary of Food and Agriculture under Section 46009 of the 
Food and Agricultural Code, in which case the registration fee shall be one hundred dollars ($100). 
 (g) The director may audit the organization's certification procedures and records at any time.  Records of 
certification organizations not otherwise required to be released upon request or made publicly available 
shall not be released by the director except to other employees of the department, the Department of Food 
and Agriculture, a county agricultural commissioner, the Attorney General, any prosecuting attorney, or 
any government agency responsible for enforcing laws related to the activities of the person subject to this 
division. 
 
SEC. 5. Section 27831 of the Health and Safety Code is amended to read: 
   27831.  Certified farmers' markets shall meet the provisions of Article 6 (commencing with Section 
27590) and, in addition, shall meet all of the following requirements: 
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 (a) All food shall be stored at least 15 centimeters (6 inches) off the floor or ground or under any other 
conditions which are approved. 
 (b) Food preparation is prohibited at certified farmers' markets with the exception of the food samples.  
Distribution of food samples is allowed provided that the following sanitary conditions exist: 
 (1) Samples shall be kept in approved, clean, covered containers. 
 (2) All food samples shall be distributed by the producer in a sanitary manner. 
 (3) Clean, disposable plastic gloves shall be used when cutting food samples. 
 (4) Food intended for sampling shall be washed, or cleaned in another manner, of any soil or other 
material by potable water in order that it is wholesome and safe for consumption. 
 (5) Potable water shall be available for hand washing and sanitizing as approved by the local 
enforcement agency. 
 (6) Potentially hazardous food samples shall be maintained at or below 45 degrees fahrenheit.  All other 
food samples shall be disposed of within two hours after cutting. 
 (7) Utensil and hand washing water shall be disposed of in a facility connected to the public sewer 
system or in a manner approved by the local enforcement agency. 
 (8) Utensils and cutting surfaces shall be smooth, nonabsorbent, and easily cleaned or disposed of as 
approved by the local environmental health agency. 
 (c) Approved toilet and hand washing facilities shall be available within 60 meters (200 feet) of the 
premises of the certified farmers' market or as approved by the enforcement officer. 
 (d) No live animals, birds, or fowl shall be kept or allowed within 6 meters (20 feet) of any area where 
food is stored or held for sale.  This subdivision does not apply to guide dogs, signal dogs, or service dogs 
when used in the manner specified in Section 54.1 of the Civil Code. 
 (e) All garbage and rubbish shall be stored, and disposed of, in a manner approved by the enforcement 
officer. 
 (f) Notwithstanding Article 11 (commencing with Section 27670), vendors selling food adjacent to and 
under the jurisdiction and management of a certified farmers' market may store, display, and sell from a 
table or display fixture apart from the vehicle, in a manner approved by the local enforcement agency. 
 (g) This section shall be repealed on January 1, 1997. 
 
SEC. 6. Section 27831 is added to the Health and Safety Code, to read: 
   27831.  Certified farmers' markets shall meet the provisions of Article 6 (commencing with Section 
27590) and, in addition, shall meet all of the following requirements: 
 (a) All food shall be stored at least 15 centimeters (6 inches) off the floor or ground or under any other 
conditions which are approved. 
 (b) Food preparation is prohibited. 
 (c) Approved toilet and hand washing facilities shall be available within 60 meters (200 feet) of the 
premises of the certified farmers' market or as approved by the enforcement officer. 
 (d) No live animals, birds, or fowl shall be kept or allowed within 6 meters (20 feet) of any area where 
food is stored or held for sale.  This subdivision does not apply to guide dogs, signal dogs, or service dogs 
when used in the manner specified in Section 54.1 of the Civil Code. 
 (e) All garbage and rubbish shall be stored, and disposed of, in a manner approved by the enforcement 
officer. 
 (f) This section shall become operative on January 1, 1997. 
 
SEC. 7. No reimbursement is required by this act pursuant to Section 6 of Article XIIIB of the California 
Constitution for those costs which may be incurred by a local agency or school district because this act 
creates a new crime or infraction, changes the definition of a crime or infraction, changes the 
penalty for a crime or infraction, or eliminates a crime or infraction. 
    Moreover, for certain costs, no reimbursement is required by this act from the State Mandates 
Claims Fund because the local agency or school district has the authority to levy service charges, fees, or 
assessments sufficient to pay for the program or level of service mandated by this act. 
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    However, notwithstanding Section 17610 of the Government Code, if the Commission on State 
Mandates determines that this act contains other costs mandated by the state, reimbursement to local 
agencies and school districts for those costs shall be made pursuant to Part 7 (commencing with Section 
17500) of Division 4 of Title 2 of the Government Code. If the statewide cost of the claim for 
reimbursement does not exceed one million dollars ($1,000,000), reimbursement shall be made from the 
State Mandates Claims Fund.  Notwithstanding Section 17580 of the Government Code, unless otherwise 
specified in this act, the provisions of this act shall become operative on the same date that the act takes 






Appendix L – Maps of Georgia Wealth and Population Density 
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Appendix M – Southeast Regional State Political Conditions 
 

















 PR GPC PR GPC PR GPC PR GPC PR GPC PR GPC PR GPC PR GPC 
1990 .122 S .253 S .123 D .095 D .147 D .181 S .181 S .128 D 
1991 .113 S .252 D .120 D .094 D .144 D .176 S .174 S .126 D 
1992 .103 S .251 D .117 D .093 D .140 S .171 S .166 S .124 D 
1993 .094 S .251 S .115 D .091 D .137 S .165 D .158 S .122 D 
1994 .085 S .250 S .112 D .090 D .134 S .160 D .150 S .121 D 
1995 .076 S .250 S .110 D .088 D .130 S .154 S .143 S .119 S 
1996 .067 S .249 S .107 D .087 D .127 S .149 S .135 S .117 S 
1997 .076 S .245 S .108 D .096 D .124 S .156 S .133 S .117 S 
1998 .085 S .242 S .110 D .104 D .121 S .163 S .132 S .117 S 
1999 .094 D .238 R .111 D .113 D .118 S .170 S .130 S .117 S 
2000 .104 D .234 R .112 D .122 S .116 D .177 D .129 S .116 S 
2001 .113 D .230 R .113 D .131 S .113 D .184 D .127 S .116 S 
2002 .122 D .227 R .115 D .139 S .110 D .191 D .126 S .116 S 
2003 .131 S .223 R .116 S .148 S .107 D .198 S .124 R .116 D 
2004 .122 S .221 R .116 S .146 S .108 S .195 S .130 R .116 D 
2005 .113 S .217 R .116 R .144 S .110 S .192 D .136 R .117 S 
2006 .105 S .213 R .116 R .143 S .111 S .189 D .143 R .117 S 
























 PR GPC PR GPC PR GPC PR GPC PR GPC PR GPC PR GPC PR GPC 
2008 .087 S .206 R .116 R .139 S .114 S .183 D .155 R .118 S 
2009 .078 S .210 R .116 R .137 S .115 S .180 D .161 R .118 S 
2010 .069 S .208 R .116 R .135 S .116 S .177 D .167 R .118 S 
PR (State Legislature Professionalism) 0 = least professionalized; 1 = most professionalized 












Appendix N - Text of Georgia Legislation 
 
2000 SB 477   
 
First Reader Summary 
A bill to be entitled an Act to amend Title 2 of the Official Code of Georgia Annotated, relating to 
agriculture, so as to provide for the certification and labeling of organic food and feed; to provide a short 
title; to provide definitions; to provide for what constitutes organic food or feed; to provide for items 
which may be used in the production, preservation, and processing of plants and animals intended to meet 
the standard of identity for organic food or feed; to provide for regulation of identification, advertisement, 
promotion, labeling, and packaging of organic food and feed; to provide for regulation and standards for 
production, distribution, and processing practices; to repeal conflicting laws; and for other purposes. 
 
By: Senators Ragan of the 11th and Meyer von Bremen of the 12th  
  
A BILL TO BE ENTITLED AN ACT  
  
To amend Title 2 of the Official Code of Georgia Annotated, relating to agriculture, so as to provide for  
certification and labeling of organic food and feed; to provide a short title; to provide definitions; to 
provide for regulation of identification, advertisement, promotion, labeling, and packaging of organic 
food and feed; to provide for regulation and standards for production, distribution, and processing 
practices; to prohibit the use of the words  "certified organic by" in the advertising, promotion, packaging, 
or labeling of food or feed ingredients, articles, commodities, or products except under certain conditions; 
to prohibit certain substitutions and commingling; to provide for labeling of organic food or feed  
ingredients, articles, commodities, and products; to provide for inspections and analyses; to provide for 
fees; to provide for rules and regulations; to provide for practices and procedures; to provide for appeals; 
to provide for penalties; to repeal conflicting laws; and for other purposes.  
  
  BE IT ENACTED BY THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF GEORGIA:  
  
SECTION 1.  
Title 2 of the Official Code of Georgia Annotated, relating to agriculture, is amended by adding at the end 
thereof a new Chapter 21 to read as follows:  
2-21-1. 
This chapter shall be known and may be cited as the 'Georgia Organic Certification and Labeling Act.'  
2-21-2. 
As used in this chapter, the term:  
 (1) 'Certification' means the verification of authentic organic practices in the production or processing of    
organic food or feed and is an annual process by which  the producer or processor of fresh, wholesale, or 
retail organic food or feed receives written certification from the department or a department approved 
certifying entity that, through the on-site inspection of the production, storage, processing, transportation,   
distribution, and required audit trail practices used by an organic producer or processor, consumers are 
assured that organic food or feed is produced and processed in compliance with Code Section 2-21-3.  For 
purposes of complying with Code Section 2-21-3, certification does not require membership in nor imply 
a contractual agreement to produce or process organic food or feed for a certifying organic organization, 
business, firm, or individual. However, certification or the use of organic labeling shall require the 
maintenance of records and documentation verifying full compliance with the organic standards.  All 
records shall be made available to the department or an approved certifying entity upon request.  
 (2) 'Certifying entity' means any organization, business, firm, or individual that:  
  
(A) Has standards for certification of organic food or feed production or processing which meet or exceed  
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standards set by the department and which are approved in writing by the Commissioner or his or her 
designee; and  
 (B) Meets such education, experience, financial, and ethical standards as are set by rules promulgated by  
the Commissioner and meets the requirements of Chapter 5 of this title.  
 (3) 'Commissioner' means the Commissioner of Agriculture of this state.  
 (4) 'Department' means the Georgia Department of Agriculture.  
 (5) 'Feed' means any article or substance normally intended to be consumed by animals for physical  
subsistence and health.  
(6) 'Food' means any article or substance normally  intended to be consumed by humans for physical  
subsistence and health.  
 (7) 'Organic' means an agriculture management system that enhances biodiversity, biological cycles, and 
soil biological activity to produce agricultural commodities and foster human and environmental health.  
 (a) Upon testing, any agricultural ingredient, article, commodity, or product which is identified, labeled,  
advertised, packaged, or promoted as organic shall contain no more than 5 percent of a level established 
as toxic by the United States Food and Drug Administration, the United States Environmental Protection 
Agency, the Environmental Protection Division of the Department of Natural Resources, or the United 
States Department of Agriculture.  
 (b) Producers, brokers, distributors, and processors of an organic food or feed product which is identified,  
advertised, promoted, labeled, or packaged as organic shall keep accurate records of all purchasing, 
shipping, and storage practices which transpired while any organic commodity or product was in the 
possession of a producer, broker, distributor, or processor. Accurate records shall include the location at 
which such organic commodity or product originated.  
 (c) Upon the effective date of this chapter, any qualifying organic production, distribution, or processing  
practices shall be deemed eligible for certification upon approval by the department. The department shall 
review any organic production, distribution, or processing practice which began prior to the effective date 
of this chapter and may approve certification if such practice meets the requirements as set forth in this 
chapter and the standards adopted by the department.  
2-21-3. 
 (a) No person may use the words 'certified organic by' in the identification, advertising, promotion, 
packaging, or labeling of a food or feed ingredient, article, commodity, or product unless that ingredient, 
article, commodity, or product complies with the requirements of Code Section 2-21-3 and unless the 
producer, distributor, or processor has a certification in good standing from the department.  
 (b) No person who produces, processes, distributes, or transports an advertised, promoted, identified, 
tagged, stamped, packaged, or labeled organic food or feed ingredient, article, commodity, or product 
may substitute or commingle any ingredient, article, commodity, or product which does not comply with 
Code Section 2-21-3.  
  (c) Any fresh, wholesale or retail organic food or feed ingredient, article, commodity, or product shall be  
tagged, stamped, labeled, crated, bagged, packaged, or be in any other standardized form which complies 
with state and federal regulations pertaining to inspection, identity, contents, weight, measure, and grade 
and must bear the official seal of the certifying entity which provides certification of the organic 
production, distribution, or processing practices for such organic food or feed ingredient, article, 
commodity, or product.   
 (d) Any food or feed ingredient, article, commodity, or product labeled as organic must be certified by 
the department or a department approved certifying entity as meeting the requirements of this chapter 
prior to being sold in the State of Georgia after July 1, 2000.  
 (a) The department or a department approved certifying entity may inspect at any reasonable time any 
area where food or feed identified, labeled, advertised, packaged, or promoted as organic food or feed is 
produced, processed, stored, distributed, transported, or sold.   
 (b) The department or a department approved certifying entity may require a laboratory analysis for the 




(a) The Commissioner shall promulgate rules and regulations fixing and establishing reasonable 
definitions and standards for organic food and feed commodities or products being produced or sold 
within the State of Georgia.  
 (b) The Commissioner may adopt, by reference, pursuant to Chapter 13 of Title 50, known as the  
'Georgia   Administrative Procedure Act,' regulations for production, handling, and marketing of 
organically produced agricultural products as set forth by the United States Department of Agriculture.  
 (c) The Commissioner is authorized by rule or regulation to adopt fees which may be charged, collected, 
and retained by certifying entities as compensation for the services of such certifying entities under the 
provisions of this chapter.  
(d) The Commissioner is authorized to adopt reasonable rules and regulations necessary to carry out this 
chapter, to provide for the approval of certifying entities, and to provide for the certification of organic 
food and feed. Any person, producer, broker, distributor, or processor of an organic food or feed product 
which is adversely affected by any action of an approved certifying entity shall have the right to appeal to 
the Commissioner.  Such appeal and any further proceedings shall be subject to Chapter 13 of Title 50, 
known as the 'Georgia Administrative Procedure Act.' Any person who violates any provision of this 
chapter shall be guilty of a misdemeanor."   
SECTION 2.  
 All laws and parts of laws in conflict with this Act are repealed.  
  
 
2002 SB 361 
 
By: Senators Ragan of the 11th, Smith of the 25th, James of the 35th, Seabaugh of the 28th 




To amend Chapter 21 of Title 2 of the Official Code of Georgia Annotated, known as the "Georgia 
Organic Certification and Labeling Act," so as to provide that no person who produces, processes, 
distributes, or handles an advertised, promoted, identified, tagged, stamped, packaged, or labeled organic 
food or feed ingredient, article, commodity, or product may substitute or commingle any ingredient, 
article, commodity, or product which does not comply with Code Section 2-21-3; to repeal the 
requirement that certain organic food or feed ingredients bear the official seal of the certifying entity; to 
require the registration of persons who produce, process, distribute, or handle in this state any food or 
feed ingredient, article, commodity, or product labeled as organic; to provide for exceptions; to require 
the registration of any organization, business, firm, or individual acting as a certifying entity in this state; 
to provide for terms and conditions of registration; to provide for fees; to provide for classifications; to 
provide for practices and procedures; to repeal conflicting laws; and for other purposes. 
 
BE IT ENACTED BY THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF GEORGIA: 
SECTION 1. 
Chapter 21 of Title 2 of the Official Code of Georgia Annotated, known as the "Georgia Organic 
Certification and Labeling Act," is amended by striking Code Section 2-21-4, relating to packaging and 
labeling, and inserting in its place the following:  
2-21-4. 
(a) No person may use the words 'certified organic by' in the identification, advertising, promotion, 
packaging, or labeling of a food or feed ingredient, article, commodity, or product unless that ingredient, 
article, commodity, or product complies with the requirements of Code Section 2-21-3 and unless the 
producer, distributor, or processor has a certification in good standing from the department.  
(b) No person who produces, processes, distributes, or handles an advertised, promoted, identified, 
tagged, stamped, packaged, or labeled organic food or feed ingredient, article, commodity, or product 
355 
 
may substitute or commingle any ingredient, article, commodity, or product which does not comply with 
Code Section 2-21-3. 
(c) Any fresh, wholesale or retail organic food or feed ingredient, article, commodity, or product shall be 
tagged, stamped, labeled, crated, bagged, packaged, or be in any other standardized form which complies 
with state and federal regulations pertaining to inspection, identity, contents, weight, measure, and grade. 
(d) Any food or feed ingredient, article, commodity, or product labeled as organic must be certified by the 
department or a department approved certifying entity as meeting the requirements of this chapter prior to 
being sold in the State of Georgia after July 1, 2000.  
(e) On and after January 1, 2003, no person shall produce, process, distribute, or handle in this state any 
advertised, promoted, identified, tagged, stamped, packaged, or labeled organic food or feed ingredient, 
article, commodity, or product unless such person has first registered with the department; provided, 
however, that retail food sales establishments licensed under Article 2 of this chapter that do not process 
or repackage certified organic commodities shall be exempt from registration provisions set forth in this 
chapter. On and after January 1, 2003, no organization, business, firm, or individual shall act as a 
certifying entity in this state unless such organization, business, firm, or individual has first registered 
with the department. The Commissioner shall establish by regulation registration standards for producers, 
processors, distributors, handlers, and certifying entities not inconsistent with this chapter. Registration 
shall be made upon forms prescribed and furnished by the department. Registrations shall expire on the 
last day of December of the year for which they are issued. The Commissioner shall establish by rule a 
registration fee for certifying entities in an amount of not less than $25.00 nor more than $500.00 per 
annum and may establish classes of certifying entities with different registration fees for each class." 
SECTION 2. 
All laws and parts of laws in conflict with this Act are repealed. 
 
 
2010 HB 1055 (Section 1-14) 
 
AN ACT To amend provisions of the Official Code of Georgia Annotated relating to fees; to change the 
amount of the fees; to provide for new fees; to provide for promulgation of rules and regulations 
regarding fees; to change fees and certain other provisions regarding special license plates; to provide for 
the retention of certain fees by state agencies or other entities; to change fees and certain other provisions 
regarding bona fide coin operated amusement machines; to correct cross-references in the Official Code 
of Georgia Annotated; to amend Chapter 8 of Title 31 of the Official Code of Georgia Annotated, relating 
to the care and protection of indigent and elderly patients, so as to provide for a payment to be imposed 
on hospitals to be used to obtain federal financial participation for medical assistance payments under 
Medicaid; to provide for a short title; to provide for definitions; to establish a segregated account within 
the Indigent Care Trust Fund for the deposit of provider payments; to provide for a method for calculating 
and collecting the provider payment; to authorize the Department of Community Health to inspect 
hospital records for purposes of auditing provider payments; to provide for penalties for failure to pay a 
provider payment; to authorize the Department of Community Health to withhold Medicaid payments 
equal to amounts owed as a provider payment and penalty; to provide for the collection of payments by 
civil action and tax liens; to provide for the appropriation of funds in the segregated account for medical 
assistance payments; to provide for application of the “Georgia Medical Assistance Act of 1977”; to 
provide for automatic repeal of such amendments to said Chapter 8; to amend Title 48 of the Official 
Code of Georgia Annotated, relating to revenue and taxation, so as to revise and change certain provisions 
regarding the manner and time of making the state ad valorem tax levy and gradually eliminate such levy 
over a period of time; to provide for applicability; to provide that such provisions shall not abate or affect 
prosecutions, punishments, penalties, administrative proceedings or remedies, or civil actions related to 
certain violations; to provide for a complete exclusion of certain retirement income from Georgia taxable 
net income over a period of time; to provide for related matters; to provide for effective dates; to repeal 
conflicting laws; and for other purposes. 
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BE IT ENACTED BY THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF GEORGIA: 
--- 
SECTION 1–14. 
Said title is further amended by revising subsection (e) of Code Section 2–21–4, relating to registration of 
organic products, as follows: 
“(e) On and after January 1, 2003, no person shall produce, process, distribute, or handle in this state any 
advertised, promoted, identified, tagged, stamped, packaged, or labeled organic food or feed ingredient, 
article, commodity, or product unless such person has first registered with the department; provided, 
however, that retail food sales establishments licensed under Article 2 of this chapter that do not process 
or repackage certified organic commodities shall be exempt from registration provisions set forth in this 
chapter. On and after January 1, 2003, no organization, business, firm, or individual shall act as a 
certifying entity in this state unless such organization, business, firm, or individual has first registered 
with the department. The Commissioner shall establish by regulation registration standards for producers, 
processors, distributors, handlers, and certifying entities not inconsistent with this chapter. Registration 
shall be made upon forms prescribed and furnished by the department. Registrations shall expire on the 
last day of December of the year for which they are issued. The Commissioner shall establish by rule a 
registration fee for certifying entities in an amount of not less than $25.00 $75.00 nor more than $500.00 
$1,000.00 per annum and may establish classes of certifying entities with different registration fees for 
each class. Any fees collected pursuant to this Code section shall be retained pursuant to the provisions of 




LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS 
 
 
[AMS] Agricultural Marketing Service 
[CASFS] Center for Agroecology and Sustainable Food Systems  
[CDFA] California Department of Food and Agriculture  
[CDHS] California Department of Health Service 
[CCOF] California Certified Organic Farmers  
[ERS] Economic Research Service 
[EHA] Event History Analysis 
[FAO] U.N. Food and Agriculture Organization 
[GDA] Georgia Department of Agriculture 
[IFOAM] International Federation of Organic Agriculture Movements 
[NOFPA] National Organic Food Production Act 
[NOP] National Organic Program 
[NOSB] National Organic Standards Board 
[OTA] Organic Trade Association 
[USDA] United States Department of Agriculture 
[WACO] Western Alliance of Certification Organizations 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
